Com. v. Phillips, T. , 2016 Pa. Super. 103 ( 2016 )


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  • J. S22027/16
    
    2016 PA Super 103
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :          PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                     :
    :
    TABU NAZSHON PHILLIPS,                     :
    :
    Appellant         :     No. 802 MDA 2015
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 31, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
    Criminal Division No(s): CP-22-CR-0001621-2012
    BEFORE: MUNDY, J., DUBOW, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
    OPINION BY DUBOW, J.:                                      FILED MAY 19, 2016
    Appellant, Tabu Phillips, appeals from the Judgment of Sentence
    entered in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas on March 31, 2015.
    Following a trial, the jury convicted Appellant of one count of Persons Not to
    Possess Firearm and one count of Possessing an Instrument of Crime –
    Unlawful Body Armor.1 We hold that: (i) the trial court was not required to
    advise Appellant of the applicable sentencing guidelines prior to finding that
    Appellant knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to counsel;
    (ii) having already obtained a valid waiver of counsel, the trial court was not
    required to perform a new waiver-of-counsel colloquy absent a substantial
    change in circumstances; (iii) Appellant waived his claim that certain out-of-
    *
    Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1
    18 Pa.C.S. §6105 and 18 Pa.C.S. §907(c) respectively.
    J.S22027/16
    court statements were inadmissible proof of prior acts under Pa.R.E. 404(b)
    when he failed to preserve this claim in the trial court and in his Rule
    1925(b) Statement; and (iv) Appellant waived his claim that these out-of-
    court statements were irrelevant by failing to develop this claim in the
    argument section of his Appellate Brief.        Accordingly, we affirm the
    Judgment of Sentence.
    Factual and Procedural History
    This is Appellant’s second conviction and appeal to this Court for the
    same underlying offense.    This Court previously vacated Appellant’s initial
    convictions and remanded for a new trial after concluding that the trial court
    had failed to elicit a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of counsel
    from Appellant before permitting him to proceed pro se in his first trial. See
    Commonwealth v. Phillips, 
    93 A.3d 847
    , 855 (Pa. Super. 2014). At his
    re-trial, Appellant again elected to represent himself pro se. That jury also
    convicted Appellant. The facts and procedural history are as follows.
    On December 22, 2011, officers of the Harrisburg City Police
    Department responded to a 911 call from a female screaming for help and
    stating that someone was trying to kill her. 
    Id. at 849
    . Officers responded
    to a boarding house and followed the sounds of a screaming female to the
    second floor, where they encountered Appellant breathing rapidly as he
    walked out of a bedroom. 
    Id.
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    In the bedroom that Appellant had just vacated, officers found Jasmine
    Matthews (“Matthews”), who was “crying, breathing very hard, and had
    blood coming from her nose and mouth.”          
    Id.
       The visibly distraught
    Matthews told officers that Appellant had repeatedly struck her with his fists
    and with a gun. N.T. Suppression, 11/13/14, at 20-21. Matthews showed
    officers the gun Appellant used to strike her, a .32 caliber Colt gray top
    action revolver located under the foot of the bed. Phillips, supra at 849.
    Officers discovered Appellant had a warrant out for his arrest, and took
    him into custody. Id. While searching Appellant incident to arrest, officers
    discovered Appellant was wearing a Kevlar vest with ammunition for a .32
    caliber firearm in the pocket. Id. Appellant was charged with one count of
    Persons Not to Possess Firearm, one count of Possessing an Instrument of
    Crime – Unlawful Body Armor, and one count of Simple Assault.
    As noted above, Appellant represented himself pro se in his first trial.
    After a jury convicted him of the two possession charges and acquitted him
    of the simple assault, Appellant appealed to this Court alleging, inter alia,
    that his waiver of counsel had not been knowing, voluntary and intelligent.
    This Court agreed, finding none of the waiver-of-counsel colloquies given by
    the trial court satisfied the minimum requirements under Pa.R.Crim.P. 121.
    Id. at 852-55. We remanded for a new trial on the possession charges only.
    On October 7, 2014, Appellant filed two motions pro se: (1) a Motion
    to Proceed Pro Se citing a disagreement in trial strategy between Appellant
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    and his appointed counsel; and (2) a Motion to Suppress challenging the
    officer’s warrantless entry into the boarding house and the subsequent
    seizure of the firearm discovered therein.
    On November 13, 2014 the Honorable Scott Arthur Evans held a
    hearing on both Motions.     At the commencement of the hearing, the trial
    court presided over a waiver-of-counsel hearing of Appellant on the record
    before granting Appellant’s Motion to Proceed Pro Se and appointing standby
    counsel. N.T. Suppression, 11/13/14, at 3-12. The parties then proceeded
    with testimony on the Motion to Suppress, which Judge Evans denied at the
    close of the hearing.
    A two-day jury trial began on March 11, 2015. Prior to jury selection,
    Appellant presented the trial court with a Motion in Limine challenging the
    admissibility of (1) Appellant’s prior criminal record, (2) a recording of a
    prison phone conversation, and (3) the content of the 911 call from
    Matthews. Appellant challenged the 911 call, in which Matthews states “He
    is trying to kill me,” as irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial given the absence
    of assault charges against Appellant on remand.
    The trial court denied Appellant’s Motion in Limine, and then conducted
    a second waiver-of-counsel hearing of Appellant on the record before
    proceeding with jury selection and trial.
    The jury convicted Appellant of both possession charges. Judge Evans
    subsequently sentenced Appellant to five to ten years of incarceration for
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    Persons Not to Possess Firearms, and a consecutive one to four years
    sentence for Unlawful Body Armor. Appellant filed a pro se post-sentence
    motion on April 8, 2015. The next day, counsel entered an appearance on
    behalf of Appellant and filed an amended post-sentence motion. The court
    denied the Motion on April 13, 2015.      Appellant timely appealed.      Both
    Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    Issues Raised on Appeal
    Appellant raised the following alleged errors in his counseled Rule
    1925(b) Statement:
    1. [The trial court] erred by failing to conduct a complete and
    thorough, on-the-record colloquy of Appellant before allowing
    him to proceed to his suppression hearing and trial pro se in
    violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. Rule 121, resulting in an unknowing,
    involuntary, and unintelligent waiver of his right to counsel
    under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States
    Constitution and Articles I and V, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania
    Constitution.
    2. [The trial court] erred in admitting evidence of the 911 call
    where such was irrelevant to the underlying charges, and where
    any probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair
    prejudice, confusing the issues, and misleading the jury.
    3. [The trial court] erred in admitting the victim's statement to
    police where the statement constituted inadmissible hearsay not
    subject to any exception.
    4. [The trial court] erred in denying Appellant's Post-Sentence
    Motion where his sentence is excessive and unreasonable and
    constitutes too severe a punishment in light of the gravity of the
    offense, Appellant's rehabilitative needs, and what is needed to
    protect the public.
    Appellant’s Statement of Errors Complained of Upon Appeal Pursuant to
    PA.R.A.P. 1925(b).
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    Appellant’s Statement of Questions Presented in his counseled Brief to
    this Court raises two issues on appeal:
    a. Did not the lower court fail to insure that [Appellant’s] waiver
    of his right to counsel was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent
    when it failed to conduct a waiver-of-counsel colloquy at a
    critical stage of the proceedings and when the two colloquies
    that it did conduct were insufficient under the standards of
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 121(A)(2)?
    b. Did the trial court err in denying [Appellant’s] Motion In
    Limine to exclude as irrelevant certain out-of-court declarations
    of the alleged victim of the simple assault when the defendant
    had been acquitted of the simple assault at the first jury trial and
    when it was unnecessary for the Commonwealth at the second
    trial to introduce a detailed account of the alleged assault?
    Appellant’s Brief at 5 (capitalization omitted).
    Waiver of Counsel Claims
    Although stated as a single question in his brief to this Court,
    Appellant’s waiver-of-counsel claim consists of two distinct arguments. First,
    Appellant avers that the trial court was required to advise him of the
    applicable sentencing guidelines prior to finding Appellant’s waiver of counsel
    was knowing, voluntary and intelligent.      Second, Appellant avers that the
    trial court was required to conduct a new waiver-of-counsel colloquy prior to
    hearing Appellant’s Motion in Limine.
    The right to counsel and the corresponding right to self-representation
    are deeply entrenched in both state and federal law. As our Supreme Court
    has made clear:
    [i]t is . . . firmly established that an accused has a constitutional
    right to counsel during trial. While an accused may waive his
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    constitutional right, such a waiver must be the free and
    unconstrained choice of its maker, and also must be made
    knowingly and intelligently. To be a knowing and intelligent
    waiver defendant must be aware of both the right and of the
    risks of forfeiting that right.
    Commonwealth v. Tyler, 
    360 A.2d 617
    , 620 (Pa. 1976) (citations and
    quotations omitted).     Deprivation of the right to counsel, or the right to
    waive counsel, can never be harmless.        Commonwealth v. Payson, 
    723 A.2d 695
    , 699–700 (Pa. Super. 1999). Moreover,
    the presumption must always be against the waiver of a
    constitutional right. Nor can waiver be presumed where the
    record is silent. The record must show, or there must be an
    allegation and evidence which shows, that an accused was
    offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the
    offer. Anything less is not waiver.
    Commonwealth v. Monica, 
    597 A.2d 600
    , 603 (Pa. 1991).
    Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 121 outlines additional
    requirements for a valid waiver-of-counsel colloquy. It states, in pertinent
    part:
    Rule 121. Waiver of Counsel
    (A) Generally.
    (1) The defendant may waive the right to be represented by
    counsel.
    (2) To ensure that the defendant's waiver of the right to counsel
    is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, the judge or issuing
    authority, at a minimum, shall elicit the following information
    from the defendant:
    (a) that the defendant understands that he ... has
    the right to be represented by counsel, and the right
    to have free counsel appointed if the defendant is
    indigent;
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    (b) that the defendant understands the nature of the
    charges against the defendant and the elements of
    each of those charges;
    (c) that the defendant is aware of the permissible
    range of sentences and/or fines for the offenses
    charged;
    (d) that the defendant understands that if he ...
    waives the right to counsel, the defendant will still be
    bound by all the normal rules of procedure and that
    counsel would be familiar with these rules;
    (e) that the defendant understands that there are
    possible defenses to these charges that counsel
    might be aware of, and if these defenses are not
    raised at trial, they may be lost permanently; and
    (f) that the defendant understands that, in addition
    to defenses, the defendant has many rights that, if
    not timely asserted, may be lost permanently; and
    that if errors occur and are not timely objected to, or
    otherwise timely raised by the defendant, these
    errors may be lost permanently.
    ***
    (C) Proceedings Before a Judge. When the defendant seeks
    to waive the right to counsel after the preliminary hearing, the
    judge shall ascertain from the defendant, on the record, whether
    this is a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of counsel.
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 121(A)(1)-(2)(a)-(f), (C) (emphasis in original).        Finally, “a
    waiver colloquy must, of course, always contain a clear demonstration of the
    defendant's ability to understand the questions posed to him during the
    colloquy.” Commonwealth v. McDonough, 
    812 A.2d 504
    , 507 n. 1 (Pa.
    2002).
    With these requirements in mind, we now turn to Appellant’s waiver of
    counsel claims.
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    Adequacy of the November Waiver-of-Counsel Colloquy
    During the November 13, 2014 waiver-of-counsel colloquy, Appellant
    answered        questions   about   his   age,   educational   background,   and
    comprehension skills.       N.T. Suppression, 11/13/14, at 4.     The trial court
    confirmed that Appellant understood that he had a right to counsel, including
    the right to be appointed counsel free of charge in the event he could not
    afford an attorney. 
    Id.
     The trial court confirmed that Appellant understood
    the nature of the charges against him, going over both of the charges then
    pending as well as the elements of each offense.               Id. at 4-5, 9-11.
    Appellant acknowledged that he understood the maximum possible penalty
    for each of the offenses charged.            Id. at 5.    Appellant indicated he
    understood he would be held to the same procedural and evidentiary rules
    as an attorney, and that an attorney would “be more familiar” with those
    rules.    Id.    In addition, Appellant acknowledged he might have “possible
    defenses that an attorney may be aware of that if not raised at trial [could
    be lost] permanently.”       Id. at 6.    Finally, Appellant stated he understood
    that he had many rights that he would have to assert in a timely manner or
    avoid losing permanently, including the right to appeal errors at trial. Id.
    In spite of this extensive inquiry, Appellant now argues that the
    waiver-of-counsel colloquies conducted in the trial court did not comply with
    the minimum standards set forth in Pa.R.Crim.P. 121(A)(2) and that
    therefore Appellant’s waiver of counsel was not knowing, voluntary and
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    intelligent.    In    particular,   the    Appellant    argues     that   Pa.R.Crim.P.
    121(A)(2)(c), which requires the trial court to advise potential pro se
    defendants of the “permissible range of sentences,” also required the trial
    court to advise Appellant of the sentencing guidelines applicable to his case.
    Addressing Appellant’s claim requires us to interpret the meaning of
    Rule 121. The interpretation of procedural rules is a question of law, so our
    standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.
    Commonwealth v. Dowling, 
    959 A.2d 910
    , 913 (Pa. 2008).
    The rules for interpreting a Rule of Criminal Procedure in this Court are
    well established:
    When we interpret our Rules of Criminal Procedure, we employ
    the same principles employed in the interpretation of statutes.
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 101(C); Commonwealth v. Cooper, 
    611 Pa. 437
    ,
    
    27 A.3d 994
    , 1003 (2011). The object of interpretation of the
    criminal rules “is to ascertain and effectuate the intention” of our
    Supreme Court, as the rule-issuing body. “Every [rule] shall be
    construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.” 1
    Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). “When the words of a [rule] are clear and
    free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded
    under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b).
    Commonwealth v. Noel, 
    53 A.3d 848
    , 855 (Pa. Super. 2012).
    As the language of Pa.R.Crim.P. 121 is “clear and free from all
    ambiguity,     we    need   not   delve    further   into   the   applicable   rules   of
    construction.” 
    Id. at 855-56
    .
    Rule 121, by its plain language, requires the trial court to determine
    “that the defendant is aware of the permissible range of sentences and/or
    fines for the offenses charged[.]”           Pa.R.Crim.P. 121(A)(2)(c) (emphasis
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    added). The plain language of Rule 121 does not mention that the trial court
    must advise the defendant of the applicable sentencing guidelines.         Our
    Supreme Court is aware of the existence of sentencing guidelines, and if it
    wished to include the sentencing guidelines in the requirements under Rule
    121, it was free to do so. The Supreme Court did not.
    We, thus, conclude that under the plain language of Rule 121, the trial
    court was not required to advise Appellant of the applicable sentencing
    guidelines prior to finding that Appellant had knowingly, voluntarily and
    intelligently waived his right to counsel. Therefore, Appellant is not entitled
    to relief on this claim.
    Duration of a Valid Waiver of Counsel
    Appellant next argues that the Motion in Limine was a “critical stage,”
    and therefore the lower court erred in hearing Appellant’s Motion without
    first conducting a waiver-of-counsel colloquy.    Even assuming, arguendo,
    that the Motion in Limine was a “critical stage,” we have already held,
    supra, that the trial court previously elicited a knowing, intelligent and
    voluntary waiver of counsel from Appellant at the November 13, 2014
    hearing on the Motion to Suppress.       Accordingly, the relevant inquiry is
    whether, and under what circumstances, the trial court has a duty to repeat
    the waiver-of-counsel colloquy.
    After a thorough review of the case law in this Commonwealth, we
    conclude this is a case of first impression.        Although our Opinion in
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    Commonwealth v. Baker, 
    464 A.2d 496
     (Pa. Super. 1983), refers in dicta
    to the need for a thorough waiver-of-counsel colloquy “at every critical stage
    of a criminal proceeding,” this Court in Baker expressly declined to decide
    the question of whether a waiver-of-counsel colloquy must be repeated at
    every critical stage of the prosecution.2 Baker, 464 A.2d at 500. Although
    the appellant in Baker raised the issue of whether the trial court was
    required to re-colloquy the appellant prior to sentencing, this Court found
    the initial waiver colloquy constitutionally inadequate, and granted relief
    without addressing the issue of re-colloquy.
    Although our research yielded no controlling case law in Pennsylvania
    on the issue of the need to repeat the colloquy, our survey of our sister
    states and federal circuit courts shows that every jurisdiction but one has
    held that a valid waiver of counsel is presumed to remain effective
    throughout any subsequent trial proceedings absent either a revocation by
    the defendant or a substantial change in circumstances.3
    2
    Moreover, none of the cases relied upon by this Court in Phillips, 
    supra
     or
    Baker holds that a waiver-of-counsel colloquy must be repeated at every
    critical stage of the prosecution. Instead, they highlight the fact that the
    question of waiver may arise for the first time at various stages, and that
    when it arises, if ever, the court must conduct a thorough waiver-of-counsel
    colloquy. See Phillips, 
    93 A.3d at 854
    ; Baker, 464 A.2d at 499.
    3
    Importantly, the only jurisdiction to address the issue and hold otherwise
    did so on the basis of a state statute that explicitly requires re-colloquy at
    each subsequent stage, and not on constitutional right-to-counsel grounds.
    See Meuhleman v. State, 
    3 So.3d 1149
    , 1156 (Fla. 2009) (relying on Fla.
    R.Crim. P. 3.111(d)(5) (2003)).
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    This “ongoing waiver” rule was first adopted by the Eighth Circuit in
    Davis v. United States, 
    226 F.2d 834
    , 840 (8th Cir. 1955) (finding the trial
    judge was “entirely justified in taking [the appellant’s] prior refusal of
    counsel as ‘definite’” and still valid at a later proceeding, and reasoning that,
    absent some change in circumstance, it would be “mere ceremony” and
    “neither good law nor good sense” to require the trial court to re-colloquy a
    defendant at each subsequent proceeding).         Since Davis, every federal
    Circuit Court that has considered the issue has adopted some version of the
    ongoing waiver rule announced in Davis.         See, e.g., United States v.
    Unger, 
    915 F.2d 759
    , 762 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that, in the absence of
    intervening events, a defendant's earlier waiver was still in force at the
    sentencing hearing); United States v. McBride, 
    362 F.3d 360
    , 367 (6th
    Cir. 2004) (adopting “the rule set forth above by our sister circuits that a
    defendant's waiver of counsel at trial carries over to subsequent proceedings
    absent a substantial change in circumstances”); United States v. Fazzini,
    
    871 F.2d 635
    , 643 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that “[o]nce the defendant has
    knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel, only a substantial
    change in circumstances will require the district court to inquire whether the
    defendant wishes to revoke his earlier waiver.”); Panagos v. United
    States, 
    324 F.2d 764
    , 765 (10th Cir. 1963) (denying motion to vacate
    sentence where the record contained “no facts or circumstances which would
    prevent the initial waiver of the right to counsel, knowingly and intelligently
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    made, from extending to and being fully effective at the time of
    sentencing”).
    The Ninth Circuit has pointed out that certain acts by the defendant
    may trigger the need for a re-colloquy. In Arnold v. United States, 
    414 F.2d 1056
    , (9th Cir. 1968), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that,
    although the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies at each critical stage
    of the prosecution, “it does not follow that once the assistance of counsel in
    court has been competently waived, a new waiver must be obtained at every
    subsequent court appearance by the defendant.”       Id. at 1059. The Court
    then considered whether the defendant may have triggered the need for a
    re-colloquy by expressly requesting the appointment of counsel or indicating
    in the initial waiver that he wanted to limit that waiver to a particular stage
    of the proceedings.    Id.   The Ninth Circuit found the defendant had not
    triggered the need for a new colloquy, and therefore his valid waiver of
    counsel prior to pleading guilty remained valid at sentencing and at re-
    sentencing some six months later. Id. at 1057.
    Similar to the Federal Courts, nearly every state Supreme Court to
    consider the issue has adopted the ongoing waiver rule. See, e.g., State v.
    Mathis, 
    159 N.W.2d 729
    , 732 (Wis. 1968) (holding that a valid waiver
    “continues through the proceedings until, by some act of the defendant, it is
    withdrawn or the presumption of continuance interrupted”); State v. Harig,
    
    218 N.W.2d 884
    , 890-91 (Neb. 1974), reaffirmed, State v. Tiff, 260 N.W.2d
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    296, 303 (Neb. 1977) (adopting the reasoning of the Circuit Courts in Davis
    and Panagos, 
    supra);
     State v. Steed, 
    506 P.2d 1031
    , 1033 (Ariz. 1977)
    (holding that “[a] defendant's election, once properly made, continues
    throughout the trial and sentencing”); State v. Carpenter, 
    390 So.2d 1296
    ,
    1299 (La. 1980) (adopting the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Arnold,
    supra); People v. Baker, 
    440 N.E.2d 856
    , 860-61 (Ill. 1982) (“In the
    absence of some circumstances indicating that the waiver is limited, or other
    facts which would give the trial court reason to conduct a further inquiry, we
    hold . . . that a competent waiver of counsel at arraignment by a defendant
    who is advised that he has a constitutional right to counsel at all stages of
    the proceedings is operative at the time of sentencing.”); Lay v. State, 
    179 P.3d 615
    , 620 (Okla. 2008) (finding defendant in a capital murder trial
    properly waived his right to counsel during the guilt phase, and that this
    waiver remained valid throughout the trial and sentencing phases),
    abrogated on other grounds by Harmon v. State, 
    248 P.3d 918
     (Okla.
    2011).
    Consistent with the weight of authority, we now hold that once a
    defendant has made a competent waiver of counsel, that waiver remains in
    effect through all subsequent proceedings in that case absent a substantial
    change in circumstances.
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    Having adopted this rule, we now consider whether some substantial
    change is present here.4     There is nothing in the record to suggest any
    change in circumstances beyond the passage of a few months’ time.
    Moreover, there is no evidence that suggests Appellant intended to limit his
    waiver of counsel to the suppression hearing, or that Appellant requested
    the re-appointment of counsel. Absent any of these triggers, the trial court
    was not required to colloquy Appellant again prior to hearing Appellant’s
    Motion in Limine on March 11, 2015. Therefore, Appellant is not entitled to
    relief on this claim.
    Admissibility of Out-of-Court Statements Claims
    Appellant    next   challenges    the     admission   of   two   out-of-court
    statements made by Matthews to 911 and to the responding police officers.
    Appellant’s challenge to the admission of the statements includes two
    distinct parts.5 First, Appellant argues that the out-of-court statements were
    inadmissible evidence of prior bad acts. Second, Appellant argues the out-
    of-court statements were irrelevant. We address and deny each argument
    in turn.
    The out-of-court statements at issue were those of Matthews, who was
    allegedly beaten by Appellant with the gun and who initially summoned
    4
    We expressly decline to define all the facts under which we would find a
    substantial change in circumstances.
    5
    Appellant’s Brief expressly abandons any hearsay objection raised at trial
    or in his Rule 1925(b) Statement. See Appellant’s Brief at 30.
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    police to the scene. She did not testify at trial. Instead, the Commonwealth
    brought in two different out-of-court statements made by Matthews through
    other witnesses.
    First, the Commonwealth played a 911 call in which Matthews asked
    for help and told the dispatcher “he is trying to kill me.” N.T. Trial, 3/12/15,
    at 52-53.     Appellant objected to the introduction of this evidence as
    irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial in the pre-trial Motion in Limine discussed
    above.
    Second, one of the Commonwealth’s witnesses testified to statements
    Matthews made to the responding officers. N.T. Trial, 3/12/15, at 69-71. In
    her statements on scene, Matthews told officers that Appellant had struck
    her about her face and abdomen with his fists and with a gun. 
    Id.
     When
    asked about the gun, Matthews directed officers to the firearm recovered
    from under the bed.     
    Id.
       Appellant made two hearsay objections to this
    testimony, which the trial court overruled on the grounds that the
    statements were admissible excited utterances. 
    Id.
    In the argument portion of Appellant’s Brief to this Court, he avers
    that the 911 call and statements made at the scene of Appellant’s arrest
    were inadmissible evidence of prior bad acts under Pa.R.E. 404(b). We find
    Appellant waived this argument as to both statements.
    Our Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure and our case law set
    forth the well-established requirements for preserving a claim for appellate
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    review.    “Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be
    raised for the first time on appeal.”     Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).    This requirement
    bars an appellant from raising “a new and different theory of relief” for the
    first time on appeal. Commonwealth v. York, 
    465 A.2d 1028
    , 1032 (Pa.
    Super. 1983).
    Similarly, our Supreme Court has made it clear that “[a]ny issues not
    raised    in   a   [Rule]   1925(b)   statement   will   be   deemed   waived.”
    Commonwealth v. Castillo, 
    888 A.2d 775
    , 780 (Pa. 2005) (citation and
    quotation omitted).         See also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not
    included in the Statement . . . are waived.”). Moreover, the issues raised
    must be identified with sufficient particularity; a Rule 1925(b) statement
    “which is too vague to allow the court to identify the issues raised on appeal
    is the functional equivalent of no [Rule 1925(b)] Statement at all.”
    Lineberger v. Wyeth, 
    894 A.2d 141
    , 148 (Pa. Super. 2006).
    In the instant case, Appellant’s arguments to the trial court were
    limited to objections on the basis of relevance and hearsay.        At no point
    before, during, or after trial did Appellant object on the ground that the
    evidence was inadmissible as prior bad acts. Nor did Appellant raise this bad
    acts argument in his Rule 1925(b) Statement, which again was limited to
    alleging error on the grounds the testimony was irrelevant and/or hearsay.
    Because Appellant is improperly attempting to raise a new theory of relief for
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    the first time on appeal, we conclude Appellant waived this prior acts claim.
    See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); York, supra.
    Appellant’s Statement of Questions Involved also avers that the out-
    of-court statements were not relevant on remand given that the initial jury
    acquitted Appellant of Simple Assault. The argument section of Appellant’s
    counseled Brief to this Court, however, lacks any discussion of this relevance
    claim.   Instead, the argument section of Appellant’s Brief sets forth, in
    substance, only a prior bad acts argument.     Accordingly, Appellant waived
    this relevance claim.
    This Court will address only those issues properly presented and
    developed in an appellant’s brief as required by our Rules of Appellate
    Procedure, Pa.R.A.P. 2101-2119. “Appellate arguments which fail to adhere
    to these rules may be considered waived, and arguments which are not
    appropriately developed are waived.” Coulter, supra at 1088 (citation and
    quotation omitted). Thus, issues raised in a Brief’s Statement of Questions
    Involved but not developed in the Brief’s argument section will be deemed
    waived. Harkins v. Calumet Realty Co., 
    614 A.2d 699
    , 703 (Pa. Super.
    1992).
    Appellant’s Brief does not refer to Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 401,
    defining the test for whether evidence is relevant, or to Rule 402, which
    governs the admissibility of relevant evidence generally. Nor does Appellant
    cite to any cases which interpret or apply our relevance standards outside of
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    those cases that consider whether evidence of prior bad acts may be
    excluded as unfairly prejudicial.
    In fact, Appellant expressly concedes that the out-of-court statements
    had at least “minimal relevance,” but argues that the evidence should have
    been excluded as improper evidence of a prior bad act under Rule 404(b).
    Appellant’s Brief at 32. As discussed supra, Appellant failed to preserve any
    prior bad acts claim.     He cannot now resurrect that claim on appeal by
    calling it something else.   Nor can he preserve a relevance argument in a
    brief that only discusses the evidence’s admissibility as a prior bad act. See
    Harkings, 
    614 A.2d at 703
    .          Therefore, we find Appellant waived this
    relevance claim.
    Conclusion
    Having found Appellant waived two of his claims and is not entitled to
    relief on the merits of his remaining claims, we affirm the trial court’s
    Judgment of Sentence.
    Judgment of Sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 5/19/2016
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