PECO Energy Co. v. Washington, A. ( 2016 )


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  • J-S49044-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    PECO ENERGY COMPANY,                           IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    ANN R. WASHINGTON,
    Appellant                    No. 66 EDA 2016
    Appeal from the Order November 30, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Civil Division at No(s): No 04046 03 Term, 2014
    BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                       FILED JUNE 27, 2016
    Appellant Ann R. Washington appeals from the order of the Court of
    Common Pleas of Philadelphia County granting Appellee PECO Energy
    Company’s motion for summary judgment.        For the foregoing reasons, we
    affirm.
    In March 2014, PECO Energy filed a complaint in replevin and for
    breach of contract as well as a motion for writ of seizure against
    Washington, seeking judgment for possession of its utility meter numbered
    014851400 as well as damages in the amount of $9,633.38 for unpaid utility
    service to Appellant’s property at 3762 North 18th Street in Philadelphia.
    After the trial court granted PECO Energy’s Motion for Writ of Seizure on May
    7, 2014, PECO Energy took possession of the meter.
    On October 2, 2014, Washington filed an answer to the complaint.
    After an arbitration hearing at which Washington was represented by
    *Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S49044-16
    counsel, the arbitration panel awarded PECO Energy its requested damages
    and possession of the meter.     Washington appealed from the arbitration
    award.
    On May 19, 2015, PECO filed a bond as well as a Praecipe for Issuance
    of a Writ of Seizure for the meter. On June 8, 2015, Washington responded
    with an Emergency Petition to Stay Execution, which the trial court
    subsequently dismissed. Washington sought reconsideration of this decision,
    which was also denied.
    In discovery, PECO Energy sent Washington a Request for Admissions
    and Corresponding Interrogatories.    Washington never responded to this
    request even after PECO Energy informed her that her response was past
    due and that a failure to respond would deem its Request for Admissions
    admitted pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 4014. On October 26, 2015, PECO Energy
    filed a motion for summary judgment.       Washington did not contest or
    respond to the motion.      On December 2, 2015, the trial court granted
    summary judgment in favor of PECO Energy. This timely appeal followed.
    Washington raises one issue for our review on appeal:
    Did the Court below clearly abuse its discretion an [sic] commit
    an error of law in granting PECO’s Motion for Summary
    Judgment and ruling there were no genuine issues of material
    fact?
    Washington’s Brief, at 4.
    When reviewing the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment,
    we employ the following standard:
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    J-S49044-16
    A reviewing court may disturb the order of the trial court only
    where it is established that the court committed an error of law
    or abused its discretion. As with all questions of law, our review
    is plenary.
    In evaluating the trial court's decision to enter summary
    judgment, we focus on the legal standard articulated in the
    summary judgment rule. Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2. The rule states that
    where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
    party is entitled to relief as a matter of law, summary judgment
    may be entered. Where the non-moving party bears the burden
    of proof on an issue, he may not merely rely on his pleadings or
    answers in order to survive summary judgment. Failure of a
    non[-]moving party to adduce sufficient evidence on an issue
    essential to his case and on which it bears the burden of proof
    establishes the entitlement of the moving party to judgment as a
    matter of law. Lastly, we will view the record in the light most
    favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the
    existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved
    against the moving party.
    Thompson v. Ginkel, 
    95 A.3d 900
    , 904 (Pa.Super. 2014), reargument
    denied (Aug. 18, 2014), appeal denied, 
    108 A.3d 36
     (Pa. 2015).
    Before we reach the merits of Washington’s appeal, we must
    determine whether she has properly preserved her claim for our review. As
    noted above, Washington asserts the trial court erred in granting summary
    judgment as she alleges there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the
    amount of unpaid utilities she owed PECO.
    However, Washington admits she failed to respond to PECO’s Request
    for Admissions and PECO’s Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial court
    was justified in entering summary judgment against Washington based on
    her inaction in both instances.   With respect to a Request for Admissions,
    Rule 4014(b) provides that “[t]he matter is admitted unless, within thirty
    -3-
    J-S49044-16
    days after service of the request, or within such shorter or longer time as
    the court may allow, the party to whom the request is directed serves upon
    the party requesting the admission an answer verified by the party or an
    objection, signed by the party or by the party's attorney.”         Pa.R.C.P.
    4014(b). See also Richard T. Byrnes Co. v. Buss Automation, Inc., 
    609 A.2d 1360
    , 1367 (Pa.Super. 1992) (“the failure to respond to a request for
    admissions deems the facts contained within the request admitted by the
    party from whom the admission was sought”). While Washington claims the
    amount of unpaid utilities was an issue of material fact, her failure to
    respond to PECO Energy’s request for admission that she owed PECO Energy
    the sum of $12,108.95 as of March 24, 2015 was deemed an admission of
    that fact.1
    In addition, the trial court was also justified in entering summary
    judgment against Washington by her failure to respond to PECO Energy’s
    motion for summary judgment. Our rules of civil procedure provide that the
    “adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the
    pleadings but must file a response within thirty days after service of the
    motion.”      Pa.R.C.P. 1035.3(a).      Moreover, “[s]ummary judgment may be
    entered against a party who does not respond.” Pa.R.C.P. 1035.3(d).
    ____________________________________________
    1
    Washington did not seek to have this admission withdrawn or amended.
    See Pa.R.C.P. 4014(d) (“Any matter admitted under this rule is conclusively
    established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of
    the admission”).
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    J-S49044-16
    As a litigant who chooses to proceed pro se is not absolved from
    complying with procedural rules, we conclude that the trial court did not err
    in granting PECO Energy’s uncontested motion for summary judgment.
    Hoover v. Davila, 
    862 A.2d 591
    , 595 (Pa.Super. 2004).
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 6/27/2016
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 66 EDA 2016

Filed Date: 6/27/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/27/2016