Bremmer, L. v. Samsel, B. ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
LISA T. BREMMER, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
BRIAN K. SAMSEL,
Appellant No. 1512 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Dated August 5, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Columbia County
Civil Division at No(s): 20-CV-1849-DV
BEFORE: SHOGAN, OTT, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JULY 14, 2016
Appellant, Brian K. Samsel (“Husband”), appeals from the order of
August 5, 2015, entered in favor of Appellee, Lisa T. Bremmer (“Wife”) in
this equitable distribution matter. We affirm.
We summarize the procedural history of this case as follows. The
parties were married on May 4, 1985, and ultimately separated on July 18,
2010. The parties have no children. A bifurcated decree in divorce was
entered on July 30, 2014. A special master’s hearing was held on
September 4, 2014, and at the time of the hearing both parties were fifty-
two years old. Both parties made post-hearing submissions to the master.
On February 19, 2015, the master submitted his report to the trial court.
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Husband filed exceptions to the master’s report on March 11, 2015. The
trial court held a hearing on Husband’s exceptions on August 5, 2015. In an
order dated August 5, 2015, and entered on August 6, 2015, the trial court
denied Husband’s exceptions. Husband then filed this timely appeal. Both
Husband and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Husband presents the following issues for our review:
1. DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT AN ERROR IN DETERMINING
THAT [HUSBAND’S] INCOME WAS $62,400.00?
2. DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT AN ERROR OF LAW AND
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DETERMINING THAT SOLELY DUE TO
THE DISPARATE INCOME OF THE PARTIES THAT [WIFE] SHOULD
RECEIVE ALIMONY?
3. DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT AN ERROR OF LAW IN
DETERMINING THAT [HUSBAND] SHOULD MAKE A
CONTRIBUTION TOWARD [WIFE’S] ATTORNEY’S FEES IN THE
AMOUNT OF $6,000.00?
4. DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT AN ERROR OF FACT IN
DETERMINING THE VALUE OF THE 1993 HARLEY DAVIDSON FAT
BOY AT $22,000.00 WHICH WAS SUBSEQUENTLY GIVEN TO THE
APPELLANT DURING EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION?
Husband’s Brief at 4.
In the context of an equitable distribution of marital property, a trial
court has the authority to divide the award as the equities presented in the
particular case may require. Mercatell v. Mercatell, 854 A.2d 609, 611
(Pa. Super. 2004).
Our standard for reviewing awards of equitable
distribution is well settled. The trial court has broad
discretion in fashioning such awards, and we will overturn
an award only for an abuse of that discretion. To assess
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whether the trial court abused its discretion, we must
determine whether the trial court misapplied the law or
failed to follow proper legal procedure. Further, we
measure the circumstances of the case against the
objective of effectuating economic justice between the
parties and achieving a just determination of their
property rights.
Hayward v. Hayward, 868 A.2d 554, 557-558 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations
omitted).
Prior to discussing the substantive issues raised by Husband, we first
consider Wife’s contention that this appeal should be dismissed because of
Husband’s failure to comply with provisions of the Pennsylvania Rules of
Appellate Procedure relating to the filing of appellate briefs. Wife’s Brief at
12. We have reviewed the record before us and agree that Husband has
failed to fully comply with the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.
We note appellate briefs must materially conform to the briefing
requirements set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Pa.R.A.P. Chapter 21. Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2101, when a party’s brief fails
to conform to the Rules of Appellate Procedure and the defects are
substantial, an appellate court may, in its discretion, quash or dismiss the
appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 2101.
Rule 2111 provides specific guidelines regarding the content of an
appellant’s brief. See Pa.R.A.P. 2111 (setting forth general contents of
appellant’s brief). For example, Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(11) and Pa.R.A.P.
2111(d) set forth the requirement that the appellant include in his brief filed
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with the Superior Court a copy of the statement of errors complained of on
appeal, that was filed with the lower court pursuant to Rule 1925(b). In
addition, Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(10) and Pa.R.A.P. 2111(b) specify that the
appellant include in his brief filed with the Superior Court a copy of any
opinions delivered by any court below relating to the determination under
review.
Further, Pa.R.A.P. 2119 addresses the argument section of appellate
briefs and provides, in part, as follows:
(a) General rule. The argument shall be divided into as
many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall
have . . . such discussion and citation of authorities as are
deemed pertinent.
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (emphases added). “The Rules of Appellate Procedure
state unequivocally that each question an appellant raises is to be supported
by discussion and analysis of pertinent authority.” Estate of Haiko v.
McGinley, 799 A.2d 155, 161 (Pa. Super. 2002). “Appellate arguments
which fail to adhere to these rules may be considered waived, and
arguments which are not appropriately developed are waived. Arguments
not appropriately developed include those where the party has failed to cite
any authority in support of a contention.” Lackner v. Glosser, 892 A.2d
21, 29-30 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted). This Court will not act as
counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant. Irwin
Union National Bank and Trust Company v. Famous and Famous and
ATL Ventures, 4 A.3d 1099, 1103 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citing
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Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766 (Pa. Super. 2007)). See also
Schenk v. Schenk, 880 A.2d 633, 639 (Pa. Super. 2005) (reiterating that
“It is not the duty of the Superior Court to scour the record and act as
appellant’s counsel.”).
We observe that Husband’s counseled brief fails to conform with
multiple rules of appellate procedure pertaining to the construction of
appellate briefs. In particular, Husband’s brief does not contain a copy of
the statement of errors complained of on appeal filed with the trial court
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Further, Husband’s brief does not contain a
copy of the opinion filed by the trial court pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
We decline to dismiss this appeal due to these defects in Husband’s brief.
However, more importantly, the argument section of Husband’s brief
fails to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). We are constrained to observe that
the additional defects in Appellant’s brief are not minor. Although Husband
lists a total of four issues in his statement of the questions presented, the
argument portion of Husband’s brief is not divided into as many parts as
there are questions to be argued because the argument portion is not
divided into any distinctive segments. Husband’s Brief at 8-13. Even
more disconcerting is the fact that the argument portion of Husband’s brief
does not contain any meaningful discussion of relevant legal authority. Id.
Rather, the argument section of Husband’s brief consists of general
statements regarding how he sees the facts of this case and lacks any
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significant legal discussion or analysis. This lack of analysis hinders
meaningful appellate review. Accordingly, because Husband’s arguments on
his issues fail to set forth any meaningful discussion of relevant legal
authority, we conclude that his issues are waived for appellate review.
Lackner, 892 A.2d at 29-30.
Order affirmed.
Judge Ott joins this Memorandum.
Judge Strassburger files a Concurring Memorandum.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/14/2016
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