Com. v. Caro, J. ( 2016 )


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  • J-S47041-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                           IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    JOHN CARO
    Appellant                         No. 80 MDA 2016
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 16, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-35-CR-0000682-2014
    BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., LAZARUS, J., and JENKINS, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                                  FILED AUGUST 09, 2016
    John Caro appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered in the
    Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, after he pled guilty to
    attempted criminal homicide.1            Caro’s counsel also seeks to withdraw
    pursuant to the dictates of Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    (1967),
    Commonwealth           v.    Santiago,         
    978 A.2d 349
      (Pa.   2009),   and
    Commonwealth v. McClendon, 
    434 A.2d 1185
    (Pa. 1981). Upon review,
    we grant counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm Caro’s judgment of
    sentence.
    On December 31, 2006, Caro pulled his vehicle next to the victim’s
    vehicle while driving on Route 81 and shot the victim in the head. Based
    ____________________________________________
    1
    18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a); 18 Pa.C.S. § 2501.
    J-S47041-16
    upon these actions, Caro was initially charged with attempted criminal
    homicide and related crimes including aggravated assault,2 recklessly
    endangering another person (REAP),3 and carrying a firearm without a
    license.4     Caro fled to Colombia after the above incident and was not
    apprehended until 2014.         In exchange for Caro’s guilty plea to attempted
    homicide on December 10, 2014, Caro’s remaining charges were nolle
    prossed.
    Caro was sentenced on March 16, 2015, to a term of 13 to 30 years’
    incarceration. On September 24, 2015, Caro filed a pro se petition pursuant
    to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA),5 seeking reinstatement of his direct
    appeal rights nunc pro tunc. Caro’s PCRA petition was granted on December
    8, 2015, and he was appointed counsel, who filed a nunc pro tunc notice of
    appeal of the judgment of sentence on January 7, 2016.         On January 26,
    2016, Caro filed a timely court-ordered concise statement of errors
    complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).         On appeal Caro
    asserts that his sentence is excessive.
    ____________________________________________
    2
    18 Pa.C.S. § 2702.
    3
    18 Pa.C.S. § 2705.
    4
    18 Pa.C.S. 6106.
    5
    42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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    Counsel has filed a petition to withdraw pursuant to Anders,
    McClendon, and Santiago.       “When faced with a purported Anders brief,
    this Court may not review the merits of the underlying issues without first
    passing on the request to withdraw.” Commonwealth v. Rojas, 
    847 A.2d 638
    , 639 (Pa. Super. 2005). Based upon Anders and McClendon, counsel
    seeking to withdraw must:      1) petition the court for leave to withdraw,
    certifying that after a thorough review of the record, counsel has concluded
    the issues to be raised are wholly frivolous; 2) file a brief referring to
    anything in the record that might arguably support an appeal; and 3) furnish
    a copy of the brief to the appellant and advise him of his right to obtain new
    counsel or file a pro se brief raising any additional points that the appellant
    deems worthy of review.     Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 
    783 A.2d 784
    ,
    786 (Pa. Super. 2001). Additionally, in Santiago, our Supreme Court held
    that counsel must state the reasons for concluding the client’s appeal is
    frivolous. 
    Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361
    .
    Instantly, counsel’s petition to withdraw states that he has examined
    the record and has concluded that the appeal is wholly frivolous. Counsel
    has also filed a brief in which he repeats the assertion that there are no non-
    frivolous issues to be raised and provides his reasoning for concluding the
    appeal is frivolous. Counsel has notified Caro of the request to withdraw and
    has provided him with a copy of the brief and a letter explaining his right to
    proceed pro se or with privately retained counsel regarding any other issues
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    J-S47041-16
    he believes might have merit.             Accordingly, we find that counsel has
    substantially complied with the procedural requirements for withdrawal.
    Once counsel has satisfied the above requirements, this Court
    conducts its own review of the proceedings and renders an independent
    judgment    as   to   whether       the   appeal   is,   in   fact,    wholly   frivolous.
    Commonwealth v. Wright, 
    846 A.2d 730
    , 736 (Pa. Super. 2004).
    Caro’s sole contention is that his sentence is excessive, which presents
    a challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentencing. An appellant is not
    entitled to review of the discretionary aspects of sentencing unless he or she
    satisfies a four-part test:
    (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
    Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
    preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify
    sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief
    has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a
    substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not
    appropriate under the Sentencing Code.
    Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 
    117 A.3d 763
    , 768 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en
    banc) (quoting Commonwealth v. Allen, 
    24 A.3d 1058
    , 1064 (Pa. Super.
    2011)).
    Here, Caro filed a timely nunc pro tunc notice of appeal after his direct
    appeal rights were reinstated and had preserved this issue in a motion for
    reconsideration of sentence after sentencing.                 Caro’s brief includes a
    separate   statement    of    the    reasons    relied   upon     in    challenging   the
    discretionary aspects of his sentence pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). Thus,
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    we turn to whether Caro presents a substantial question that his sentence is
    not appropriate under the Sentencing Code.
    Caro’s claim is limited to the argument that the sentence he received
    is excessive. This assertion neither indicates how the sentence specifically
    violates the sentencing scheme in the Sentencing Code nor how it is contrary
    to a fundamental norm of the sentencing process. See Caldwell, supra at
    768; see also Commonwealth v. Fisher, 
    47 A.3d 155
    , 159 (Pa. Super.
    2012) (“[A] bald assertion that a sentence is excessive does not by itself
    raise a substantial question justifying this Court’s review of the merits of the
    underlying claim.”). Thus, Caro fails to raise a substantial question.6
    Based upon the foregoing and our independent review of the record,
    we find Caro’s appeal to be meritless. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of
    sentence and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.
    ____________________________________________
    6
    Had Caro raised a substantial question, he nevertheless would not be
    entitled to relief because the sentence imposed is in the standard range of
    the sentencing guidelines and the court reviewed a pre-sentence
    investigation (PSI) report. “[W]here a sentence is within the standard range
    of the guidelines, Pennsylvania law views the sentence as appropriate under
    the Sentencing Code.” Commonwealth v. Moury, 
    992 A.2d 162
    , 171 (Pa.
    Super. 2010) (citing Commonwealth v. Cruz-Centeno, 
    668 A.2d 536
    (Pa.
    Super. 1995) (combination of PSI and standard range sentence, without
    more, not excessive or unreasonable)).
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    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/9/2016
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