Heddleston, M. v. Obstetrical and Gynecological ( 2016 )

J-A07033-16
MARIA HEDDLESTON AND BRIAN IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
HEDDLESTON, HER HUSBAND PENNSYLVANIA
Appellants
v.
OBSTETRICAL AND GYNECOLOGICAL
ASSOCIATES OF PITTSBURGH INC.
D/B/A/ OB/GYN ASSOCIATES OF
PITTSBURGH, RENATA D. HOCA, M.D.
PEDIATRIC ALLIANCE, P.C. D/B/A THE
BREASTFEEDING CENTER OF
PITTSBURGH, NANCY BRENT, M.D.,
MAGEE-WOMEN'S HOSPITAL-UPMC AND
UPMC
Appellees No. 443 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment Entered March 2, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Civil Division at No(s): GD12-10765
MARIA HEDDLESTON AND BRIAN IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
HEDDLESTON, HER HUSBAND OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellees
v.
OBSTETRICAL AND GYNECOLOGICAL
ASSOCIATES OF PITTSBURGH INC.
D/B/A/ OB/GYN ASSOCIATES OF
PITTSBURGH, RENATA D. HOCA, M.D.
PEDIATRIC ALLIANCE, P.C. D/B/A THE
BREASTFEEDING CENTER OF
PITTSBURGH, NANCY BRENT, M.D.,
MAGEE-WOMEN'S HOSPITAL-UPMC AND
UPMC
APPEAL OF: PEDIATRIC ALLIANCE, P.C.
J-A07033-16
D/B/A THE BREASTFEEDING
CENTER OF PITTSBURGH AND NANCY
BRENT, M.D. No. 471 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment Entered March 2, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Civil Division at No(s): GD12-10765
_____________________________________________________________
MARIA HEDDLESTON AND BRIAN IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
HEDDLESTON, HER HUSBAND OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellees
v.
OBSTETRICAL AND GYNECOLOGICAL
ASSOCIATES OF PITTSBURGH INC.
D/B/A/ OB/GYN ASSOCIATES OF
PITTSBURGH, RENATA D. HOCA, M.D.
PEDIATRIC ALLIANCE, P.C. D/B/A THE
BREASTFEEDING CENTER OF
PITTSBURGH, NANCY BRENT, M.D.,
MAGEE-WOMEN'S HOSPITAL-UPMC AND
UPMC
APPEAL OF: OBSTETRICAL AND
GYNECOLOGICAL ASSOCIATES OF
PITTSBURGH INC. D/B/A OB/GYN
ASSOCIATES OF PITTSBURGH,
RENATA D. HOCA, M.D., MAGEE
WOMEN'S HOSPITAL-UPMC AND UPMC
No. 490 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment Entered March 2, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Civil Division at No(s): GD12-10765
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J-A07033-16
BEFORE: BOWES, J., MUNDY, J., and JENKINS, J.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.:
FILED JULY 22, 2016
In my view, neither of the reasons given by the majority for granting
Appellants a new trial warrants relief. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from
the majority’s analysis of these issues and its decision to grant a new trial to
Appellants. I concur with the majority’s disposition of the remaining issues.
The first reason provided by the majority for ordering a new trial is
that the trial court erred by permitting defense counsel to cross-examine
Wife with demonstrative exhibits depicting certain warning signs and
symptoms for breast cancer. Appellants argued that defense counsel
obtained diagrams from a website belonging to the Susan G. Komen Charity,
removed the website’s copyright insignia from the diagrams, and
misrepresented that his own office created the diagrams. The diagrams
were inadmissible, Appellants said, because they were hearsay and because
Wife, a lay witness, was not qualified to authenticate them. I agree that the
trial court erred by permitting defense counsel to cross-examine Wife with
the diagrams, but I conclude that this error was harmless.
We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Zieber v.
Bogert, 773 A.2d 758, 760 n.3 (Pa.2001). A ruling on evidence does not
constitute reversible error unless it is harmful or prejudicial to the
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complaining party. Yenchi v. Ameriprise Financial, Inc., 123 A.3d 1071,
1082 (Pa.Super.2015).
“To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of
evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” Pa.R.E. 901(a).
The purpose of demonstrative evidence is to “render[] other evidence more
comprehensible for the trier of fact.” Kopytin v. Aschinger, 947 A.2d 739,
747 (Pa.Super.2008). “As in the admission of other evidence, a trial court
may admit demonstrative evidence whose relevance outweighs any potential
prejudicial effect.” Id. “Demonstrative evidence may be authenticated by
testimony from a witness who has knowledge that a matter is what it
claimed to be.” Id. (citing Pa.R.E. 901(b)(1)).
The crux of this case was whether Appellees failed to diagnose and
treat Wife despite warning signs of cancer. Obviously, the exhibits from the
Susan G. Komen website depicting warning signs and symptoms of cancer
were relevant to this question. On the other hand, Appellants are correct
that the diagrams were hearsay, and that Wife was not qualified to
authenticate them as a layperson.
Despite these errors in form, I respectfully disagree with the majority
that Appellants suffered prejudice from the use of these diagrams. The
majority acknowledges that the diagrams would be admissible “if a qualified
medical expert … opined that the signs and symptoms enumerated on the
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slides were generally accepted and fairly depicted on the slides.”
Memorandum, at 9. That is exactly what happened here. Both Appellees
and the trial court point out that the diagrams’ representation of the signs
and symptoms of breast cancer is consistent with the testimony of
Appellants’ causation expert, Dr. Singer. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, at 5
(“Dr. Singer agreed with the signs and symptoms of breast cancer as
displayed on the diagrams”); Brief For OB/GYN Associates of Pittsburgh, et
al, at 40-41. Appellants do not disagree in their briefing that Dr. Singer’s
testimony was consistent with the diagrams. Thus, any error was harmless.
As a second reason for ordering a new trial, the majority asserts that
the trial court improperly cut off Dr. Singer’s testimony. To elaborate,
Appellees filed a motion in limine to preclude Dr. Singer from offering
standard of care testimony. In response, Appellants’ counsel stated that Dr.
Singer would not opine on the standard of care but would only testify about
what a diagnostic test should have shown had it been performed “at that
time.” R.R. 794a. Defense counsel said that he had no problem with this
question. R.R. 795a. Later, Appellants’ counsel asked Dr. Singer this very
question: “Doctor, had diagnostic imaging been ordered in September or
October 2009, would it have revealed the tumor?” R.R. 1056a. Dr. Singer
testified: “In my opinion, as an oncologist, yes. Because even though she
was stage IV one year later, I do believe that the cancer was present back in
2009. It wasn’t palpable, obviously, then because her breasts were
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engorged. And studies such as an ultrasound or MRI would be able to …”
Id. At that moment, defense counsel objected on the ground that Dr.
Singer was giving standard of care testimony: “This is backdooring standard
of care testimony. If you did these tests, what would they have shown?
Suggesting these tests should have been done … is standard of care
testimony.” R.R. 1057a. The court sustained defense counsel’s objection on
the ground that “we’re talking standard of care here, so it’s out.” R.R.
1058a. Appellants claim that defense counsel profited from this ruling by
arguing during his summation that it would be inappropriate to hold
Appellees liable for failing to order diagnostic imaging, because Appellants
failed to demonstrate what imaging would have shown.
In my view, the trial court’s ruling was improper. The purpose of
expert testimony on the standard of care is to demonstrate the steps that
Appellees should have taken. The purpose of expert testimony on causation
is to demonstrate what would have happened had Appellees taken certain
steps, but without opining whether Appellees should have taken these steps.
Dr. Singer’s answer fell into the latter category – had diagnostic imaging
been performed in 2009, he said, it would have revealed cancer because
cancer was present at that time. The trial court erred by ruling that the
final, truncated sentence of Dr. Singer’s answer constituted standard of care
testimony. All that Dr. Singer seemed poised to say was a causation opinion
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that an ultrasound or MRI in 2009 would have revealed cancer, not a
standard of care opinion that these tests should have been performed.
Nevertheless, I do not believe that the trial court’s ruling prejudiced
Appellants. The majority seems to believe that the trial court excluded Dr.
Singer’s entire answer, thus preventing Appellants from proving causation.
In my view, the trial court’s ruling did not prevent Appellants from proving
causation. The court merely excluded the final truncated sentence, “and
studies such as an ultrasound or MRI would be able to …” The court did not
exclude the first three sentences of Dr. Singer’s answer, which presented a
coherent theory of causation to the jury: had diagnostic imaging been
performed in 2009, it would have revealed cancer. As a result, Appellants
were able to present a complete theory of malpractice to the jury.
Appellants elicited standard of care testimony from Robert Hecht, M.D. that
Appellees were negligent for failing to order diagnostic imaging in 2009 1 and
causation testimony from Dr. Singer that diagnostic imaging would have
revealed Wife’s cancer in 2009.2
____________________________________________
1
Trial Transcript, Day 2, at 195 (Dr. Hecht’s testimony that when Wife
presented with severe pain, defendants “should have ordered diagnostic
testing”), 203 (when Wife presented with severe pain, Dr. Hoca should have
“ordered diagnostic imaging”), 206 (Dr. Hoca violated the standard of care
by not ordering any sort of diagnostic imaging to evaluate [Wife’s] breast
problem”).
2
The fact that the court permitted Appellants’ case to go to the jury
supports my interpretation of the evidence. Had the court excluded Dr.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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It is our duty to affirm the trial court’s decision if it can be justified on
any basis. Commonwealth v. Judge, 916 A.2d 511, 517 n.11 (Pa.2007).
For the reasons given above, I conclude that both of the trial court’s rulings
were harmless errors. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s
decision to grant Appellants a new trial.
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
Singer’s entire answer and thus excluded all causation testimony, Appellees’
attorneys no doubt would have obtained a directed verdict at the close of
evidence.
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