Com. v. Brown, W. ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
WILLIAM BROWN, :
:
Appellant : No. 180 WDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order December 21, 2015
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
Criminal Division, No(s): CP-02-CR-0004266-2005;
CP-02-CR-0013412-2003; CP-02-CR-0015665-2003
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OTT and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED AUGUST 04, 2016
William Brown (“Brown”) appeals, pro se, from the Order dismissing
his second Petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act
(“PCRA”). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
On April 16, 2009, following a bench trial, the trial court found Brown
guilty of the first-degree murder of Tiffany Griffin, two counts of first-degree
murder for the deaths of her two unborn children, and the third-degree
murder of Carmen Griffin. On May 28, 2009, the trial court sentenced
Brown to three consecutive terms of life in prison for the first-degree
murders of Tiffany Griffin and her unborn children, and a consecutive term of
20 to 40 years in prison for the third-degree murder of Carmen Griffin. This
Court affirmed Brown’s judgment of sentence, and the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. See Commonwealth v.
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Brown, 31 A.3d 746 (Pa. Super. 2011) (unpublished memorandum), appeal
denied, 31 A.3d 290 (Pa. 2011).
On July 13, 2012, Brown filed a pro se PCRA Petition. The PCRA court
denied the Petition. This Court affirmed the denial, and the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. See Commonwealth v.
Brown, 121 A.3d 1141 (Pa. Super. 2015) (unpublished memorandum),
appeal denied, 128 A.3d 218 (Pa. 2015).
On October 15, 2015, Brown filed the instant PCRA Petition, his
second. The PCRA court subsequently entered a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 Notice of
Intent to Dismiss. Thereafter, on December 21, 2015, the PCRA court
dismissed Brown’s PCRA Petition. Brown then filed a timely Notice of
Appeal.
On appeal, Brown raises the following question for our review:
Did the lower [PCRA] court [err] when it dismissed Brown’s PCRA
[Petition] as untimely filed where Brown satisfied subsection 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(1)(ii)[], presenting newly discovered evidence,
submitted within (60) days of learning of this newly-discovered
evidence, and thus, satisfying subsection 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9545(b)(2)[]?
Brief for Appellant at 4 (capitalization omitted).
We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA
level. This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court
and the evidence of record. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s
ruling if it is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal
error. This Court may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any
grounds if the record supports it. Further, we grant great
deference to the factual findings of the PCRA court and will not
disturb those findings unless they have no support in the record.
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However, we afford no such deference to its legal conclusions.
Where the petitioner raises questions of law, our standard of
review is de novo and our scope of review plenary.
Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations
omitted).
Under the PCRA, a defendant must file any PCRA petition within one
year of the date that the judgment becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence becomes final “at the conclusion of
direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the
United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or the expiration of
time for seeking review.” Id. § 9545(b)(3). The PCRA’s timeliness
requirements are jurisdictional in nature, and a court may not address the
merits of the issues raised if the PCRA petition was not timely filed.
Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010).
Here, Brown’s judgment of sentence became final on January 23,
2012, when the time to seek review with the Supreme Court of the United
States expired. See U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13. Brown had until January 23, 2013,
to file a timely PCRA Petition. Therefore, Brown’s 2015 Petition is facially
untimely.
However, in the event that a petition is not filed within the one-year
time limitation, the PCRA provides three timeliness exceptions: (1) the
failure to raise the claim was the result of government interference; (2) the
facts of the new claim were unknown to the petitioner and could not have
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been discovered with due diligence; or (3) the right asserted is a
constitutional right recognized by the United States Supreme Court or the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court after the time period provided in the section
and has been held to apply retroactively. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii).
Any PCRA petition invoking one of these exceptions shall be filed within sixty
days of the date the claim could have been presented. Id. § 9545(b)(2).
Here, Brown invokes the newly discovered facts exception based upon
the decisions in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), and
Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 117 A.3d 247 (Pa. 2015). Brief for Appellant
at 16. Brown argues that his sentence is illegal based upon Alleyne and
Hopkins. See id. at 12-14, 16-17, 19.
In Alleyne, the Supreme Court held that any fact that increases the
sentence for a given crime must be submitted to the jury and found beyond
a reasonable doubt. Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2155. The Supreme Court
reasoned that a Sixth Amendment violation occurs where these sentence-
determinative facts are not submitted to a jury. Id. at 2156. In Hopkins,
our Supreme Court held that under Alleyne, the mandatory minimum
sentencing scheme set forth in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6317 (“Drug-free school
zones”) was unconstitutional in its entirety, as certain provisions of the
statute did not adhere to the Alleyne holding, and were not severable from
the remaining portions of the statute. See Hopkins, 117 A.3d at 262.
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Brown’s reliance upon Alleyne and Hopkins as newly-discovered facts
is without merit, as judicial decisions do not constitute newly-discovered
facts for the purposes of Section 9545(b)(1)(ii). See Commonwealth v.
Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 986 (Pa. 2011).
Moreover, even if Brown had invoked the newly-recognized
constitutional right exception, he filed the instant PCRA Petition over sixty
days after both Alleyne and Hopkins were decided.1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9545(b)(2); see also Commonwealth v. Boyd, 923 A.2d 513, 517 (Pa.
Super. 2007) (stating that “[w]ith regard to a[ newly]-recognized
constitutional right, this Court has held that the sixty-day period begins to
run upon the date of the underlying judicial decision.”).2
Based on the foregoing, the PCRA court properly dismissed Brown’s
PCRA Petition.
Order affirmed.
1
Alleyne was decided on June 17, 2013, and Hopkins was decided on June
15, 2015. Brown filed the instant Petition on October 15, 2015.
2
We additionally note that the rule established in Alleyne does not apply
retroactively where the judgment of sentence is final. See Commonwealth
v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 995 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating that neither the
United States Supreme Court nor the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held
that Alleyne applies retroactively where the judgment of sentence has
become final); id. (stating that although Alleyne claims implicate the
legality of the sentence, courts cannot review a legality claim where the
court does not have jurisdiction). Additionally, our Supreme Court did not
hold that Hopkins applies retroactively to post-conviction petitioners such
as Brown.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/4/2016
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