Richmond & Hevenor v. Mirarchi, E. ( 2016 )


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  • J-A15035-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    RICHMOND & HEVENOR, ATTORNEYS AT                IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    LAW                                                   PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellants
    v.
    ERCOLE MIRACHI
    Appellee                     No. 2102 EDA 2015
    Appeal from the Order Dated June 5, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Civil Division at No(s): October Term, 2013 No. 00520
    BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and JENKINS, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.:                            FILED AUGUST 05, 2016
    Appellant Richmond & Hevenor, Attorneys at Law (“R&H”), appeals
    from an order entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas
    denying its post-trial motions and entering judgment in favor of Appellee
    Ercole Mirarchi following a bench trial. We affirm.
    On May 8, 2008, a commercial building owned by Mirarchi was
    destroyed by a fire.     Opinion, filed 10/23/2015, at 1 (“1925(a) Opinion”).
    Mirarchi hired R&H to represent him in a bad faith action Mirarchi filed
    against his insurance carrier, Seneca Insurance. 
    Id. Mirarchi claimed
    that
    after the fire damage, the building suffered additional damage. He claims
    the additional damages and resulting expenses were caused by the
    insurance company’s failure to reimburse him until more than a year after
    the fire. 
    Id. J-A15035-16 On
    November 1, 2009, Mirarchi entered into a Retainer Fee Agreement
    with R&H.      1925(a) Opinion at 1.    Mirarchi made an initial payment of
    $4,000.00 for the retainer. 
    Id. The agreement
    provided that R&H would bill
    Mirarchi $240.00 per hour and $2,500.00 per day. 
    Id. at 2.
    The Retainer
    Fee Agreement was mailed to Mirarchi, but not signed by either party. 
    Id. Mirarchi made
    payments to R&H, totaling $65,000.00 from October 29, 2009
    to March 22, 2011. 
    Id. In March
    2011, the parties discussed converting Mirarchi to a
    contingency-based agreement, due to the increasing legal and expert fees.
    1925(a) Opinion at 2. The first mention of a contingency-based agreement
    was on March 24, 2011, when Bill Hevenor sent Kenneth Richmond an email
    stating:
    He was not eager to change over to a contingent fee, but
    now has a full explication of the Jurenko decision and the
    State Farm case decided a year after Hollick restricting
    punitive in Pennsylvania. 33% is not in the cards because
    he needs 2.5 million to be made whole for his lost business
    plan. So we’ll see what he decides.
    
    Id. (quoting Exhibit
    P-8).
    On March 26, 2011, Mirarchi emailed his concerns about the
    Contingency Fee Agreement.        1925(a) Opinion at 3.    On May 13, 2011,
    Mirarchi sent an email to Richmond stating that they needed to work out the
    details of the Contingency Fee Agreement. 
    Id. On May
    18, 2011, Mirarchi
    wrote:
    Per our conversations on Monday 5/16/2011, this email is
    to confirm that I am agreeing to sign the Contingent Fee
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    Agreement with your firm, providing that all monies paid
    for my Consultation and Action with Seneca Insurance
    since inception to current date be credited back to my
    reserve. As you are aware from an earlier email, the
    amounts to be credited are listed below.
    
    Id. (quoting Exh.
    D-1).
    Richmond directed Mirarchi to read the third paragraph of the
    Contingent Fee Agreement, which provided:
    This agreement converts our legal representation from a
    fee for services rendered billed against a retainer
    arrangement effective April 1, 2011. All past fees paid for
    legal services will be credited dollar for dollar against the
    contingent fee recovered by [R&H] in the referenced legal
    proceeding.
    1925(a) Opinion at 3 n.7 (quoting Ex. P-3).         Mirarchi then wrote that he
    “was still going with the contingent fee. Use whatever is left in retainer for
    the financial expert.”1      
    Id. R&H mailed
    the Contingent Fee Agreement to
    Mirarchi.    
    Id. Following this,
    R&H no longer billed Mirarchi.     
    Id. Further, Mirarchi
    received no emails from R&H stating it was withdrawing money
    from his account. 
    Id. On October
    18, 2011, Richmond advised Mirarchi that R&H no longer
    wished to represent him and that Mirarchi should obtain independent legal
    representation. 1925(a) Opinion at 4.
    ____________________________________________
    1
    At some point, Allan Windt was retained as an expert. The trial court
    states this was after conversion to a contingent fee agreement. R&H
    maintains Windt was retained earlier. Additional experts also were retained.
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    In October, 2013, Mirarchi’s case against Seneca Insurance was
    dismissed on summary judgment. Opinion, 10/23/2015, at 4. The United
    States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. 
    Id. R&H filed
    an action in assumpsit against Mirarchi based upon an
    account stated. Mirarchi filed an Answer and New Matter, and R&H filed a
    reply.
    Following a bench trial, the trial court entered a verdict in favor of
    Mirarchi and against R&H.       Among other things, the trial court found the
    parties had entered the Contingent Fee Agreement as of May 18, 2011.
    Opinion, 10/23/2015, at 4. The trial court calculated the number of hours
    billed to Mirarchi prior to May 18, 2011, concluding R&H billed 190.4 hours,
    at $240.00 per hour, for Mirarchi’s case prior to May 18, 2011.       Mirarchi,
    therefore, owed $45,696.00 in attorneys fees. 
    Id. The trial
    court then concluded that the amount deposited into
    Mirarchi’s retainer account, $65,000.00, minus the expert fees that had a
    corresponding check number, which totaled $18,807.60, was sufficient to
    cover the $45,696.00 in fees owed. Opinion, 10/23/2015, at 5.
    R&H filed post-trial motions, which the trial court denied in an order
    dated June 5, 2015 and filed on June 9, 2015. In the order, the trial court
    also entered judgment in favor of Mirarchi.       On July 2, 2015, R&H filed a
    notice of appeal. Both R&H and the trial court complied with Pennsylvania
    Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.
    Appellants raise the following claims on appeal:
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    1. Whether the trial court erred in finding that there was
    an enforceable contingent fee agreement between the
    parties despite the admission of [Mirarchi] that he had not
    signed a contingent fee agreement nor had he paid experts
    as required by the contingent fee agreement?
    2. Whether the trial court erred in reforming the proposed
    contingent fee agreement so as to require [R&H] to pay
    the expert fees despite the plain language of the
    contingent fee agreement?
    3. Whether the trial court erred in reforming paragraph
    three of the proposed contingent fee agreement so as to
    credit pre-agreement fees to [Mirarchi’s] account despite
    unambiguous language in the agreement that legal fees
    paid would be credited only in the event of a contingent
    fee recovery?
    4. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law, in
    finding that the legal requirement of proof for an action on
    an [a]ccount [s]tated had not been satisfied because
    [Mirarchi] had communicated an unspecified issue with an
    invoice to his attorney that was never communicated to
    [R&H]?
    5. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in not
    estopping [Mirarchi] from any dispute for an invoice where
    it was accepted by [Mirarchi] as accurate evidence that his
    attorney intended to submit to a federal court?
    Appellants’ Brief at 5-6.
    This Court applies the following standard of review to verdicts
    following a bench trial:
    Our appellate role in cases arising from non-jury trial
    verdicts is to determine whether the findings of the trial
    court are supported by competent evidence and whether
    the trial court committed error in any application of the
    law. The findings of fact of the trial judge must be given
    the same weight and effect on appeal as the verdict of a
    jury. We consider the evidence in a light most favorable to
    the verdict winner. We will reverse the trial court only if its
    findings of fact are not supported by competent evidence
    in the record or if its findings are premised on an error of
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    law. However, [where] the issue . . . concerns a question
    of law, our scope of review is plenary.
    The trial court’s conclusions of law on appeal originating
    from a non-jury trial are not binding on an appellate court
    because it is the appellate court’s duty to determine if the
    trial court correctly applied the law to the facts of the case.
    Stephan v. Waldron Elec. Heating and Cooling LLC, 
    100 A.3d 660
    , 664-
    65 (Pa.Super.2014) (quoting Wyatt, Inc. v. Citizens Bank of Pa., 
    976 A.2d 557
    , 564 (Pa.Super.2009)).
    Further, this Court applies the following when interpreting a contract:
    The interpretation of any contract is a question of law and
    this Court’s scope of review is plenary. Moreover, we need
    not defer to the conclusions of the trial court and are free
    to draw our own inferences. In interpreting a contract, the
    ultimate goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of
    the parties as reasonably manifested by the language of
    their written agreement. When construing agreements
    involving clear and unambiguous terms, this Court need
    only examine the writing itself to give effect to the parties’
    understanding. This Court must construe the contract only
    as written and may not modify the plain meaning under
    the guise of interpretation.
    
    Stephans, 100 A.3d at 665
    (quoting Humberston v. Chevron U.S.A.,
    Inc., 
    75 A.3d 504
    , 509–10 (Pa.Super.2013)).
    Moreover:
    Contracts are enforceable when the parties reach a mutual
    agreement, exchange consideration, and have set forth the
    terms of their bargain with sufficient clarity. Greene v.
    Oliver Realty, Inc., []
    526 A.2d 1192
    ([Pa.Super.]1987).
    An agreement is sufficiently definite if it indicates that the
    parties intended to make a contract and if there is an
    appropriate basis upon which a court can fashion a
    remedy. 
    Id. Moreover, when
    the language of a contract
    is clear and unequivocal, courts interpret its meaning by its
    content alone, within the four corners of the document.
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    Id. (citing Mears,
    Inc. v. National Basic Sensors, []
    
    486 A.2d 1335
    , 1338 ([Pa.Super.]1984)).
    
    Stephans, 100 A.3d at 665
    .
    R&H first argues the trial court erred when it found the Contingent Fee
    Agreement enforceable even though the agreement was not signed and
    Mirarchi had not paid the expert fees. It argues that the expert fees drove
    the proposed contingent-fee agreement. Appellant’s Brief at 13. R&H cites
    Mirarchi’s email stating that he agreed to the Contingent Fee Agreement
    “providing that all monies paid for my [c]onsultation and [a]ction with
    Seneca Insurance since inception to the current date be credited back to
    [r]eserve.” 
    Id. Mirarchi was
    instructed to re-read paragraph three, which
    states that “[a]ll past fees paid for legal services will be credited dollar for
    dollar against the contingent fee recovered by [R&H] in the referenced legal
    matter.”    
    Id. at 13-14.
         R&H argues that it was error to find that the
    $65,000.00 in the retainer account met Mirarchi’s obligation to pay all past
    fees for legal services. 
    Id. at 14.
    The trial court found:
    [R&H’s] first claim is that this [c]ourt erroneously found as
    a matter of law that [R&H] and [Mirarchi] could enter into
    an unsigned Contingent Fee Agreement, which is expressly
    forbidden by Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct
    1.5(c).    [R&H] further claim[s] that, if there was a
    Contingent Fee Agreement, [the c]ourt erroneously
    determined that [Mirarchi] had a meeting of the minds
    with respect to his payment of the expert fees, and fulfilled
    his obligation in paying those expert fees. As [the c]ourt
    found, through the evidence admitted at trial, that there
    was a meeting of the minds with respect to converting the
    [Mirarchi’s] contract into a Contingent Fee Agreement, and
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    that all material obligations of the agreement were
    satisfied, this claim fails.
    The Contingent Fee Agreement, which was submitted into
    evidence, complied with the requirements of Rule 1.5(c) in
    laying out the terms of the agreement in writing. It
    provided that the original Retainer Agreement entered into
    between the parties would be converted to a Contingent
    Fee Agreement. The Contingent Fee Agreement stated
    that the fee collected by [R&H] - 30% of the amount
    awarded - would be calculated against the full judgment
    entered in the matter of Ercole Mirarchi v. Seneca
    Specialty Insurance Company if the claim were
    successful. The agreement also provided that, because
    attorney’s fees might also be awarded, attorney time
    records would be maintained for all past and future
    services rendered through the conclusion of the matter.
    With respect to fees, the agreement stated:
    Hereafter, the direct costs of filing, subpoenas,
    depositions, transcripts, copy production, telex,
    travel, delivery, stationary will not be separately
    billed and will, henceforth, be absorbed by Richmond
    & Hevenor within the contingent fee. Expert witness
    fees will be borne by Ercole Mirarchi, but, if and
    when a punitive damage award is made, a claim for
    their recovery will be submitted together with the
    request for attorney fees.
    Exhibit P -3.
    Rule 1.5(c) provides:
    (c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the
    matter for which the service is rendered, except in a
    matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by
    paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee
    agreement shall be in writing and shall state the
    method by which the fee is to be determined,
    including the percentage or percentages that shall
    accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial
    or appeal, litigation and other expenses to be
    deducted from the recovery, and whether such
    expenses are to be deducted before or after the
    contingent fee is calculated. Upon conclusion of a
    contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the
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    client with a written statement stating the outcome
    of the matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the
    remittance to the client and the method of its
    determination.
    Pa.R.P.C. 1.5(c).14
    14
    The reasoning behind requiring that contingent
    fee agreements be in writing is that “writings avoid
    misunderstandings regarding the fee and methods
    by which it is determined.” Eckell v. Wilson, 
    597 A.2d 696
    , 701 (Pa.Super. 1991), citing Pa.R.P.R.
    1.5, comment.
    As the Contingent Fee Agreement that [R&H] and
    [Mirarchi] entered into comports with the requirements of
    Rule 1.5(c), which makes no mention of whether the
    agreement must be signed, this claim fails. Exhibit P-3
    was introduced into evidence by [R&H], and provided that
    the Retainer Agreement would be converted to a
    Contingent Fee Agreement, effective April 1, 2011.15 The
    copy introduced into evidence was not signed, and neither
    [R&H] nor [Mirarchi] could provide [the c]ourt with a
    signed copy.16
    15
    However, [the c]ourt made a factual
    determination that the parties did not actually reach
    a meeting of the minds with respect to the
    Contingent Fee Agreement until May 18, 2011, and
    thus determined that the Contingent Fee Agreement
    did not become effective until that date. Exhibit D-1.
    16
    Although it was never produced, there was
    evidence that a signed copy of the Contingent Fee
    Agreement existed. An email dated October 19,
    2011 from [Mirarchi] to Kenneth Richmond notes:
    After review, I realized we do have a second
    signed contract which replaced our original. It was
    signed in your [o]ffice [l]ibrary when we were
    meeting to go over the Interogs [sic] and events.
    A signed copy was requested [sic] by prospective
    firms for their evaluation to accept my [laws]uit. I
    will need you to please send me an electronic PDF
    copy as soon as you possibly can so I can submit
    it.
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    Exhibit P -13.
    Contrary to [R&H’s] claim that there was no evidence to
    show there was a meeting of the minds, [the c]ourt found
    that the Contingent Fee Agreement, which was sent by
    [R&H] to [Mirarchi] and received by him, clearly outlined
    the terms of the agreement, and that there were no
    misunderstandings regarding the terms of the agreement.
    Through the emails introduced into evidence, it was clear
    to [the c]ourt that [Mirarchi] understood all the terms of
    the Contingent Fee Agreement, including the provision that
    [Mirarchi] was required to pay all expert fees.17 Exhibit D-
    1, D-2. See Sun Company, Inc. v. Pennsylvania
    Turnpike       Commission,        
    798 A.2d 875
    ,     878
    (Pa.Cmwlth.Ct.1998) (“[A]ny ambiguous language in a
    contract is construed against the drafter and in favor of the
    other party if the latter’s interpretation is reasonable.”).
    17
    [The c]ourt did find it curious that the Retainer
    Agreement, with which [R&H] had no dispute, was
    also introduced into evidence by [R&H] unsigned.
    Exhibit P-1.
    After considering all of the evidence, [the c]ourt then
    made a factual determination that the parties had a
    meeting of the minds with respect to the Contingent Fee
    Agreement. See City of Erie v. Fraternal Order of
    Police, Lodge 7, 
    977 A.2d 3
    , 11 (Pa.Cmwlth.Ct. 2009)
    (“[T]here must be a meeting of the minds on all terms of
    the contract,” which “requires the concurrence of both
    parties to the agreement[.]”).        [The c]ourt further
    determined, based on the evidence, that [Mirarchi] had
    fulfilled his obligations under the contract in payment of
    the expert fees - through the payments he made into his
    retainer account. See footnote 
    11, supra
    .
    Therefore, as [the c]ourt made a factual finding that there
    was a meeting of the minds by the parties to enter into the
    Contingent Fee Agreement, which Pa.R.P.C. 1.5(c) does
    not require to be signed, and [Mirarchi] fulfilled his
    obligations under the agreement, this claim fails.
    1925(a) Opinion at 8-10.
    - 10 -
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    Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mirarchi as verdict
    winner, we find the trial court did not err.        The parties discussed the
    Contingency Fee Agreement.          After being directed to the paragraph
    discussing the payment of past fees, Mirarchi stated he still agreed to the
    agreement.       Following Mirarchi’s email agreeing to the terms of the
    Contingency Fee Agreement, R&H stopped sending invoices for its legal
    services.    The court did not err in finding that the parties converted their
    arrangement to the Contingent Fee Agreement as of May 18, 2011.
    R&H’s next claim argues the trial court reformed the Contingent Fee
    Agreement because the court required R&H to pay the expert fees.            R&H
    claims that the trial court erred in finding that the expert witness, Allan
    Windt, was retained after conversion to a contingent-fee agreement.
    Appellant’s Brief at 16. It maintains Windt was retained and paid prior to
    May 18, 2011, and, therefore, the trial court erred in finding Mararchi had
    $65,000.00 in the escrow account as of May 18, 2011. 
    Id. R&H claims
    the
    court erred in finding that Mirarchi complied with all terms of the
    Contingency      Fee   Agreement,   even   though   there   were   expert   fees
    outstanding at the end of the attorney-client relationship. 
    Id. at 18.
    The trial court found:
    [R&H’s] second claim is that [the c]ourt factually found,
    without any evidence, that [Mirarchi] had satisfied and
    performed all of the unequivocal material terms of the
    unsigned Contingent Fee Agreement, including payment of
    expert fees.
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    As fact-finder, it was [the c]ourt’s duty to make factual
    determinations:
    In a bench trial, the trial judge acts as fact-finder
    and has the authority to make credibility
    determinations and to resolve conflicts in evidence.
    Ruthrau, Inc. v. Ravin, Inc., 
    914 A.2d 880
              (Pa.Super.2006). Consequently, the trial judge’s
    findings made after a bench trial must be given the
    same weight and effect as a jury verdict and will not
    be disturbed on appeal unless they are not supported
    by competent evidence in the record. Levitt v.
    Patrick, 
    976 A.2d 581
    (Pa.Super.2009). . . .
    Merrell v. Chartiers Valley School District, 
    51 A.3d 286
    , 293-94 (Pa.Cmwlth.Ct.2012).
    Upon review of the evidence presented in this case, [the
    c]ourt made a factual determination that there was a
    meeting of the minds in switching from the Retainer
    Agreement to the Contingent Fee Agreement, and that
    [Mirarchi] had satisfied his obligations under the
    Contingent Fee Agreement. [R&H] presented the written
    Contingent Fee Agreement, which states: “Expert witness
    fees will be borne by Ercole Mirarchi[.]” Exhibit P-3. The
    emails between [R&H] and [Mirarchi] discussing the
    conversion to a Contingent Fee Agreement supported the
    notion that [R&H] had wished to convert the contract.
    Exhibits P-8, P-9, P-10.        The emails submitted by
    [Mirarchi] showed that [R&H] and [Mirarchi] ultimately had
    an understanding that there was a Contingent Fee
    Agreement between the parties. Exhibits D-1, D-2. After a
    determination that there was a Contingent Fee Agreement,
    and after reviewing the evidence concerning the payments
    that [Mirarchi] had made, [the c]ourt concluded that the
    expert fees that [Mirarchi] was responsible for under the
    Contingent Fee Agreement were all covered by the retainer
    payments he had already made to [R&H]. See Footnotes
    10 and 
    11, supra
    . This determination, again, was made
    based upon the evidence introduced by [R&H] at trial in
    the form of the “Time & Expenditure Data Sheets” of
    Richmond & Hevenor Attorneys at Law. Exhibit P-2. In
    review of Exhibit P-2, [the c]ourt found that [Mirarchi] was
    responsible only for those payments to experts that had a
    corresponding check number on the chart. Without a
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    check number, this Court found that there was no evidence
    to prove whether a payment was actually made to the
    expert or not. Therefore, [the c]ourt only credited the
    payments for expert fees detailed in footnote 
    11, supra
    .
    Because [the c]ourt’s factual determinations were based
    upon the evidence introduced at trial, this claim fails.
    1925(a) Opinion at 10-11.
    The trial court also found:
    [R&H’s] fourteenth claim is that [the c]ourt [il]legally and
    erroneously neglected the material, unconditional, specific
    lawful requirement that [Mirarchi] cover expert fees which
    was the basis, at all times from October 17, 2011, for the
    termination of [R&H’s] representation.       [R&H] further
    claim[s] that [Mirarchi] never produced any evidence that
    his obligation to pay the experts under the Contingent Fee
    Agreement was fulfilled. As [R&H] failed to meet its burden
    of proof in showing that [Mirarchi] did not pay all of the
    expert fees, as required by the Contingent Fee Agreement,
    this claim fails.
    At trial, the only evidence of the fees owed to the experts,
    and for which [Mirarchi] was responsible, was set forth in
    Exhibit P-2, a “Time & Expenditure Data Sheet” created by
    [R&H]. [The c]ourt recognized and accepted that, under
    the Contingent Fee Agreement, [Mirarchi] was responsible
    for expert fees associated with his case. However, [R&H]
    failed to submit actual invoices from the experts, and also
    failed to submit any checks or receipts from payments to
    experts.     Although the invoices and payments were
    detailed on Exhibit P-2, [the c]ourt, as fact finder, found
    that this alone did not prove that these invoices existed or
    that the payments were actually made, as this was just a
    document created by [R&H]. As [R&H] possessed the
    burden of proof, it was not [Mirarchi’s] responsibility to
    provide proof of payment of the expert fees.
    Therefore, [the c]ourt exercised its discretion in
    determining whether [R&H] had provided sufficient
    evidence of the expert fees that were payable. As [the
    c]ourt did not ignore this requirement in the Contingent
    Fee Agreement, this claim fails.
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    1925(a) Opinion at 16-17 (internal footnotes omitted).
    Contrary to R&H’s contention, the trial court did not find that R&H
    owed any expert fees. Rather, the trial court found that R&H proved it paid
    expert fees only where it provided a check number associated with the
    expenditure. Without the check number, or any other proof that the invoice
    had been paid, the court properly found R&H failed to prove payment.
    Because the amount paid to experts did not exceed the retainer amount, the
    trial court found Mirarchi did not owe additional expert fees. This was not
    error, and R&H’s second claim fails.
    R&H’s third claim alleges the Contingent Fee Agreement provided that
    past fees paid for legal services would be credited only if a contingent fee
    was recovered.    Appellant’s Brief at 20.      R&H claims that when Mirarchi
    failed to pay the experts, it was a breach of the contingent-fee agreement.
    
    Id. Further, R&H
    claims that Mirarchi’s alleged failure to pay the expert fees
    destroyed the possibility of recovery in the bad faith action, because
    recovery was impossible without experts. 
    Id. at 21.
    The trial court concluded:
    [R&H’s] sixth claim is that the proposed unsigned
    Contingent Fee Agreement was an executory contract
    requiring future compliance by [Mirarchi], and [the c]ourt
    erroneously concluded that [Mirarchi] had fulfilled his
    material obligations under the agreement. Because [R&H]
    provided absolutely no evidence that the Contingent Fee
    Agreement was intended to be an executory contract, this
    claim fails.
    There was absolutely nothing in the Contingent Fee
    Agreement, nor in the evidence presented at trial, that
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    provides proof that the Contingent Fee Agreement was
    intended to be an executory contract.       An executory
    contract is a contract under which both parties have
    unperformed conditions or obligations that would
    constitute   a   material  breach    if  not  performed.
    Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 225, cmt.          A
    condition is “an event, not certain to occur, which must
    occur, unless its non-occurrence is excused, before
    performance under a contract becomes due.” 
    Id. § 224.
    The only mention of [Mirarchi’s] obligations in the
    Contingent Fee Agreement was the following: “Expert
    witness fees will be borne by Ercole Mirarchi, but, if and
    when a punitive damage award is made, a claim for their
    recovery will be submitted together with the request for
    attorney fees.” Exhibit P-3. The contract does not state
    that there is no contract unless the expert fees are paid.
    It merely assigns responsibility for the payment of expert
    fees to [Mirarchi]. In any event, [the c]ourt found that the
    expert fees that [Mirarchi] was responsible for were all
    covered by his payments into the retainer account.
    Therefore, if the Contingent Fee Agreement was in fact an
    executory contract, [Mirarchi’s] obligations under the
    contract were satisfied.
    1925(a) Opinion at 12 (footnote omitted).2          This was not error and
    Appellant’s third claim fails.
    R&H’s fourth claim asserts that it sued on an account stated and that
    Mirarchi accepted the accuracy of the account. Appellant’s Brief at 24. It
    ____________________________________________
    2
    R&H also maintains that there was no evidence to support the trial court’s
    determination that Mirarchi had paid R&H approximately $46,000.00 in
    attorneys’ fees for hours expended through May 18, 2011. Appellant’s Brief
    at 21-22. The trial court found that, because Mirarchi’s answer pled an
    offset, it properly found the amounts owed to R&H were offset by amounts
    Mirarchi paid into the retainer account, which was in the Plaintiff’s exhibit.
    1925(a) Opinion at 14-15; Plaintiff Trial Exh. P-2. This was not error.
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    J-A15035-16
    claims Mirarchi retained the account without objection, claiming Mirarchi
    communicated his objection to his attorney, not R&H. 
    Id. at 24-25.
    The trial court found:
    [R&H’s] final claim is that the evidence in the case
    demonstrated unequivocally that [R&H] proved an
    undisputed account stated which was acknowledged as
    received and reviewed by [Mirarchi’s] agent/attorney who
    requested forbearance while the underlying case
    proceeded. As the evidence in this case in fact
    demonstrated the opposite - that [Mirarchi] did take issue
    with the invoice - this claim fails.
    In an email dated July 3, 2012, from Andrew Swain [3] to
    Kenneth Richmond, Mr. Swain stated:
    I was working exclusively on the [summary
    judgment] reply motion and brief and asked
    [Mirarchi] as well to focus only [sic] that project,
    which was due and filed Monday. I have the asked
    [sic] the client to review your invoice to see if he
    identified any issues with your bill. I just returned
    from court and will be leaving early for the holiday.
    As the [summary judgment] hearing in federal court
    is late July, I would ask for you to file after the
    judge’s decision if payment arrangements or plans
    cannot be reached. I believe any filing now against
    [Mirarchi] will jeopardize our settlement negotiations
    with Seneca in the event [summary judgment] is
    denied. As there is a 4[-]year claim for breach of
    contract[,] I do believe you have time to file. Thank
    you for your consideration.
    Exhibit D-8.
    In another email dated July 3, 2012, from [Mirarchi] to
    Andrew Swain, [Mirarchi] states: “Andrew, I reviewed part
    of his bill today and I do have issue with it.” Exhibit D-8.
    ____________________________________________
    3
    Mr. Swain was Mirarchi’s successor counsel in the matter against Seneca
    Insurance.
    - 16 -
    J-A15035-16
    As [Mirarchi] clearly did take issue with the invoice, this
    claim fails.
    1925(a) Opinion at 19-20.
    The trial court did not err. The trial court relied on two emails to find
    Mirarchi disputed the account: one from Mirarchi’s attorney to R&H
    requesting that R&H not file a lawsuit until after the court ruled on the
    summary judgment motion and one from Mirarchi to his attorney.
    R&H’s final issue asserts the trial court erred as a matter of law when
    it found Mirarchi was not estopped from disputing the invoice. R&H claims
    estoppel was proper because Mirarchi accepted the invoice as evidence to
    submit to a federal court. Appellant’s Brief at 25-26.
    The court found the doctrine of judicial estoppel did not apply because
    there was no proof the invoice was admitted into evidence in Mirarchi’s
    federal court proceeding. Opinion, 10/23/2015, at 19. This was not error.
    See Black v. Labor Ready, Inc., 
    995 A.2d 875
    , 878 (Pa.Super.2010)
    (“judicial estoppel is properly applied only if the court concludes the
    following: (1) that the appellant assumed an inconsistent position in an
    earlier action; and (2) that the appellant’s contention was ‘successfully
    maintained’ in that action.” In re Adoption of S.A.J., 
    838 A.2d 616
    , 620,
    621 (Pa.2003)).
    Judgment affirmed.
    - 17 -
    J-A15035-16
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/5/2016
    - 18 -