Com. v. Vega, A. ( 2019 )

J-S23004-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
ASHLEY ROSE VEGA,
Appellant No. 204 WDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 8, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County
Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-33-CR-0000084-2016
CP-33-CR-0000086-2016
CP-33-CR-0000281-2016
CP-33-CR-0000282-2016
CP-33-CR-0000525-2015
CP-33-CR-0000526-2015
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 12, 2019/
Appellant, Ashley Rose Vega, appeals from the judgment of sentence of
an aggregate term of 6 to 17 years’ imprisonment, imposed after the court
revoked her probation based on a new conviction in an unrelated case.
Counsel seeks permission to withdraw from further representation pursuant
to Anders v. California, 386 A.2d 738 (Pa. 1967). Upon review, we find that
counsel’s Anders brief satisfies the requirements set forth in
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 97 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). Accordingly, we
grant counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm the judgment of sentence.
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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We glean the following relevant facts and procedural history from the
record. On March 2, 2016, in the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County,
Appellant entered a guilty plea to one count of possession with intent to deliver
a controlled substance1 at CP-33-CR-525-2015, one count of delivery of a
controlled substance2 at CP-33-CR-526-2015, one count of possession of drug
paraphernalia3 at CP-33-CR-084-2016, and one count of using drug-free
urine4 at CP-33-CR-086-2016. On that same date, Appellant was sentenced
to an aggregate term of 9 months to 2 years less 1 day of incarceration,
followed by 3 years’ probation.
On July 20, 2016, Appellant entered a guilty plea to one count of delivery
of a controlled substance5 at CP-33-CR-281-2016 and CP-33-CR-282-2016.
On that same date, Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 3 years’
probation to run concurrently with the sentence imposed at CP-33-CR-525-
2015.
On February 15, 2017, after Appellant admitted to technical violations
of using a controlled substance, the trial court revoked all of Appellant’s
sentences and re-sentenced her to: (a) 5 years’ drug and alcohol restrictive
intermediate punishment and 6 months’ house arrest at CP-33-CR-525-2015;
____________________________________________
1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
2 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
3 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32).
4 18 Pa.C.S. § 7509(b).
5 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
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(b) 5 years’ probation at CP-33-CR-526-2015 (to run consecutive to the
sentence imposed at CP-33-CR-525-2015); and (c) an aggregate of 5 years’
probation at CP-33-CR-084-2016, CP-33-CR-086-2016, CP-33-CR-281-2016,
and CP-33-CR-282-2016 (to run concurrent with the sentence imposed at CP-
33-CR-526-2015).
On July 5, 2017, after again admitting to technical violations of using a
controlled substance at each of the foregoing docket numbers, the trial court
ordered Appellant to be committed to the Department of Corrections for an
evaluation to determine if Appellant qualified for the State Intermediate
Punishment (“SIP”) Program. After receiving a determination from the
Department of Corrections that Appellant was not suitable for the SIP
Program, the trial court entered an order on December 8, 2017, sentencing
Appellant to an aggregate term of 6 to 17 years’ incarceration with a
consecutive 1-year term of probation.
On December 21, 2017, the trial court denied Appellant’s pro se motion
for reconsideration, but granted her request for counsel. On January 25,
2018, counsel for Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration nunc pro tunc.
On that same date, the trial court granted counsel’s request to file the motion
nunc pro tunc, but denied the request for reconsideration. On February 2,
2018, Appellant filed a timely appeal.6 Appellant now presents the following
____________________________________________
6We recognize that our Supreme Court recently held that “the proper practice
under Rule 341(a) is to file separate appeals from an order that resolves issues
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issue for our review, via counsel’s Anders brief: “Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt
committed an abuse of discretion when it revoked Appellant’s
probation/parole and re-sentenced her to serve sentences aggregating to a
minimum of … six (6) years [and] to a maximum of [seventeen] (17) years in
a state correctional institution given the circumstances of the case[?]”
Anders Brief at 4.
“When faced with a purported Anders brief, this Court may not review
the merits of the underlying issues without first passing on the request to
withdraw.” Commonwealth v. Rojas, 875 A.2d 638, 639 (Pa. Super. 2005)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 700 A.2d 1301, 1303 (Pa. Super.
1997)).
Court-appointed counsel who seeks to withdraw from representing
an appellant on direct appeal on the basis that the appeal is
frivolous must:
(1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that,
after making a conscientious examination of the record,
counsel has determined that the appeal would be frivolous;
(2) file a brief referring to anything that arguably might
support the appeal but which does not resemble a “no-
merit” letter to amicus curiae brief; and (3) furnish a copy
of the brief to the [appellant] and advise the [appellant] of
his or her right to retain new counsel or raise any additional
points that he or she deems worthy of the court’s attention.
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arising on more than one docket. The failure to do so requires the appellate
court to quash the appeal.” Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969, 977
(Pa. 2018). The Court tempered its holding, however, by making it
prospective only. The Walker opinion was filed on June 1, 2018; hence, this
holding is not applicable in the instant matter, as Appellant filed her notice of
appeal on February 2, 2018.
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Commonwealth v. Miller, 715 A.2d 1203 (Pa. Super. 1998)
(citation omitted).
Rojas, 874 A.2d at 639. Appellant’s counsel has complied with these
requirements. Counsel petitioned for leave to withdraw, and filed a brief
satisfying the requirements of Anders, as discussed, infra. Counsel also
provided a copy of the brief to Appellant, and submitted proof that he advised
Appellant of her right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se, and/or to raise
new points not addressed in the Anders brief.
Our Supreme Court has held, in addition, that counsel must explain the
reasons underlying his assessment of Appellant’s case and his conclusion that
the claims are frivolous. Thus, counsel’s Anders brief must satisfy the
following criteria before we may consider the merits of the underlying appeal:
[W]e hold that in the Anders brief that accompanies court-
appointed counsel’s petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1)
provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that
counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth
counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state
counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous.
Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling
case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion
that the appeal is frivolous.
Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.
Upon review of the Anders brief submitted by Appellant’s counsel, we
find it complies with the technical requirements of Santiago. Counsel’s
Anders brief (1) provides a summary of the procedural history and facts of
this case; (2) directs our attention, when applicable, to the portions of the
record that ostensibly support Appellant’s claim of error; (3) concludes that
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Appellant’s claim is frivolous; and (4) does so by citation to the record and
appropriate/applicable legal authorities. Thus, we now examine whether
Appellant’s claim is, indeed, frivolous. We also must “conduct a simple review
of the record to ascertain if there appears on its face to be arguably
meritorious issues that counsel, intentionally or not, missed or misstated.”
Commonwealth v. Dempster, 187 A.3d 266, 277 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en
banc).
Appellant’s allegations relate to the discretionary aspects of her
sentence.
Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not
entitle an appellant to review as of right. An appellant challenging
the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this Court’s
jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:
We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
[the] appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and
modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether [the]
appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and
(4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence
appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing
Code, 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9781(b).
Objections to the discretionary aspects of a sentence are generally
waived if they are not raised at the sentencing hearing or in a
motion to modify the sentence imposed.
Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations
and internal quotations omitted).
Here, the record reflects that Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal,
properly preserved her claim in her post-sentence motion, and counsel has
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included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his Anders brief in compliance with
Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.7 Thus, we proceed to determine
whether Appellant has raised a substantial question to meet the fourth
requirement of the four-part test outlined above.
As we explained in Moury:
The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must
be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. A substantial question
exists only when the appellant advances a colorable argument
that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent
with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary
to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.
Id. at 170 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
Appellant maintains in her Rule 2119(f) statement that her revocation
sentence is manifestly unreasonable “in that it was excessive and constituted
too severe of a punishment under the circumstances of the case[] and the
probation violation….” Appellant’s Brief at 10. Appellant further avers that
the reasons given by the trial court for the sentence do not justify the severity
of the sentence. Id. Based on the arguments presented in Appellant’s Rule
2119(f) statement, and the case law on which she relies, we conclude that
she has presented a substantial question for our review. See
Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 913 (Pa. Super. 2000) (“On appeal
from a revocation proceeding, we find a substantial question is presented
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7 We recognize that where counsel files an Anders brief, we may review the
issue even absent a Rule 2119(f) statement. See Commonwealth v.
Ziegler, 112 A.3d 656, 661 (Pa. Super. 2015).
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when a sentence of total confinement, in excess of the original sentence, is
imposed as a result of a technical violation of parole or probation.”).
Accordingly, we will review the merits of Appellant’s claim, mindful of
the following standard of review:
Sentencing is a matter vested within the discretion of the trial
court and will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of
discretion. An abuse of discretion requires the trial court to have
acted with manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice,
bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly
erroneous. It is also now accepted that in an appeal following the
revocation of probation, it is within our scope of review to consider
challenges to both the legality of the final sentence and the
discretionary aspects of an appellant’s sentence.
Commonwealth v. Crump, 995 A.2d 1280, 1282 (Pa. Super. 2010)
(citations omitted). Moreover, when we consider an appeal from a sentence
imposed following the revocation of probation,
[o]ur review is limited to determining the validity of the probation
revocation proceedings and the authority of the sentencing court
to consider the same sentencing alternatives that it had at the
time of the initial sentencing. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(b). Also, upon
sentencing following a revocation of probation, the trial court is
limited only by the maximum sentence that it could have imposed
originally at the time of the probationary sentence.
Commonwealth v. MacGregor, 912 A.2d 315, 317 (Pa. Super. 2006)
(internal citation omitted).
The reason for the trial court’s broad discretion in sentencing and the
deferential standard of appellate review is that “the sentencing court is in the
best position to measure various factors and determine the proper penalty for
a particular offense based upon an evaluation of the individual circumstances
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before it.” Commonwealth v. Perry, 32 A.3d 232, 236 (Pa. 2011) (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted). Our Supreme Court has recognized
that the sentencing court’s “institutional advantage” is, perhaps, even “more
pronounced in fashioning a sentence following the revocation of probation,
which is qualitatively different than an initial sentencing proceeding.”
Commonwealth v. Pasture, 107 A.3d 21, 27 (Pa. 2014).
At initial sentencing, all of the rules and procedures designed to
inform the court and to cabin its discretionary sentencing
authority properly are involved and play a crucial role. However,
it is a different matter when a defendant reappears before the
court for sentencing proceedings following a violation of the mercy
bestowed upon him in the form of a probationary sentence. For
example, in such a case, contrary to when an initial sentence is
imposed, the Sentencing Guidelines do not apply, and the
revocation court is not cabined by Section 9721(b)’s requirement
that “the sentence imposed should call for confinement that is
consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the
offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on
the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.”
42 Pa.C.S. § 9721. See Commonwealth v. Reaves, … 923 A.2d
1119, 1129 ([Pa.] 2007) (citing 204 Pa.Code. § 303.1(b)
(Sentencing Guidelines do not apply to sentences imposed as
result of revocation of probation)).
Id.
Here, Appellant contends that an aggregate term of 6 to 17 years’
incarceration was not warranted. Appellant’s Brief at 12. Appellant states
that all of her convictions and technical violations were drug-related and that
they were merely consequences of her addiction. She argues, therefore, that
her sentence was too harsh. Id. at 12-13.
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Having carefully reviewed the record of Appellant’s sentencing
proceeding, we ascertain no abuse of discretion by the court. Initially, we
stress that the court had the benefit of a pre-sentence investigation report
and reviewed that report prior to the sentencing proceeding. N.T. Sentencing,
12/8/17, at 6. Additionally, the trial court indicated that it took into
consideration relevant factors, such as Appellant’s age, background, and prior
record, as well as the determination that Appellant was not eligible for the SIP
Program. Id.
The trial court summarized its reasoning in support of Appellant’s post-
revocation sentence in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, in which it so aptly opined:
Each of [the] subject docket numbers pertains to a drug-
related conviction, four for felony counts of delivery of a controlled
substance and two for misdemeanor drug-related offenses. In
each instance, the record suggests [Appellant] was not selling
drugs just to earn money; like so many in her position, she was
selling to support her addiction.
As the record reflects, the charges pending in the first two
cases did nothing to curb [Appellant’s] drug use. On the contrary,
within weeks of signing her conditions to be released on bail,
[Appellant] once tested positive for and twice admitted [to] using
heroin. Because of that, the court revoked her bail, after which
she remained incarcerated for the next nine months, at which
point she was released on parole.
Four months after being paroled, [Appellant] again admitted
to using heroin. She also admitted to using cocaine and was
charged with technical violations because of it. The court’s
solution in that instance was to revoke her split sentence and re-
sentence her to the county’s Drug & Alcohol Restrictive
Intermediate Punishment Program, which included a stint at an
inpatient rehab facility, followed first by further treatment at a
halfway house, intensive outpatient treatment, and non-intensive
outpatient treatment. That was on February 15, 2017. The allure
of drugs was too strong, though, and [Appellant] did not even
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make it through her scheduled stay at the halfway house.
Instead[,] she was back in front of the court on July 5, 2017[,]
because of her inability to stay away from drugs, and it was then
that the court ordered an SIP evaluation. The Department of
Corrections concluded, however, that [Appellant’s] “mental health
stability” made her inappropriate for the program.
With SIP no longer an option, the most reasonable
alternative, in the court’s estimation, was to impose a significantly
longer term of confinement than that to which [Appellant] had
previously been subject[ed], together with a recommendation
that she be afforded the opportunity to engage with the
therapeutic community and hopefully learn to control her addictive
impulses. Nine months of forced sobriety at the county jail had
not accomplished that, … nor had inpatient rehab and the
structure of a halfway house. What [Appellant] needed—for her
own good as well as [for] that of the community—was a long-
term, treatment-oriented disposition in a restrictive environment.
Lesser options had already proven to be ineffective.
With credit for time served, and accounting for the lapse
between when she was sentenced and [when she] will have the
benefit of appellate review, [Appellant] will remain incarcerated
for four more years before becoming eligible for parole, and once
the parole board determines she is a suitable candidate, she will
still remain accountable to a state agent long enough to make sure
the therapeutic community achieved its purpose and did not
merely give [Appellant] an alternative environment in which to
bide her time until she could again gain access to drugs.
What the record indicates, therefore, is that the court did
not render an arbitrary or uninformed sentencing decision in this
case. It was well aware of [Appellant’s] criminal history and her
struggle with addiction, and it had the benefit of a pre-sentence
investigation report to further guide it in fully considering her
background and the other factors relevant to sentencing. Guided
by those considerations, it deliberately and expressly rejected
other alternatives and imposed a sentence it thought was best
suited to address [Appellant’s] particular rehabilitative needs and
[to] protect society from her drug-seeking activities in the
process.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/31/18, at 1-3 (unnecessary capitalization and citations
to record omitted).
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In response to Appellant’s assertion that the court’s reasoning for the
post-revocation sentence imposed on her fails to justify the severity of the
punishment, we note that:
[F]ollowing revocation, a sentencing court need not undertake a
lengthy discourse for its reasons for imposing a sentence or
specifically reference the statutes in question. Simply put, since
the defendant has previously appeared before the sentencing
court, the stated reasons for a revocation sentence need not be
as elaborate as that which is required at initial sentencing. The
rationale for this is obvious. When sentencing is a consequence
of the revocation of probation, the trial judge is already fully
informed as to the facts and circumstances of both the crime and
the nature of the defendant….
Pasture, 107 A.3d at 28. The Pasture Court further emphasized that “a trial
court does not necessarily abuse its discretion in imposing a seemingly
harsher post-revocation sentence where the defendant received a lenient
sentence and then failed to adhere to the conditions imposed on him.” Id.
Based on our review of the record, we are satisfied with the justification
provided for the sentence imposed on Appellant post-revocation, and we
discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court.
Finally, our review of the record reveals no other potential, non-frivolous
issues which Appellant could raise on appeal. As such, we agree with counsel
that a direct appeal in this case is wholly frivolous. Accordingly, we grant
counsel’s motion to withdraw.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/12/2019
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