Com. v. Grove, S. ( 2016 )

J-A09025-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
SAMUEL ADDISON GROVE
Appellant No. 1822 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 17, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Union County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-60-CR-0000212-2002
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., JENKINS, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED AUGUST 12, 2016
In 2002, Samuel Grove was sentenced to 4-8 years’ imprisonment plus
12 years’ probation for involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (“IDSI”). 1 In
2010, he completed his entire term of imprisonment. Subsequently, the trial
court revoked his probation and resentenced him four times. The first three
revocations were for failure to have an approved residence upon completion
of his term of imprisonment. The fourth revocation of probation - the
revocation at issue in this appeal - was for violating an order dated October
9, 2013 requiring Grove to obtain sex offender treatment while on
“supervision”. The trial court held that Grove violated this term by failing to
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S. § 3123.
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obtain sex offender treatment in prison. We agree with Grove that this term
only required Grove to obtain sex offender treatment after his release from
prison. Accordingly, we reverse.
A detailed factual history is necessary. On December 18, 2002, Grove,
who has an I.Q. of 66, pled guilty to IDSI and was sentenced to 4-8 years’
imprisonment and 12 years’ consecutive probation. The original sentencing
order said nothing about the terms of probation other than directing him to
serve 144 months under the supervision of the Pennsylvania Board of
Probation and Parole. Grove served his full prison term and was released on
July 18, 2010.
First revocation. Grove’s release was short-lived. Just two days after
his release, he was detained on a probation violation for not obtaining
permission to live at his current residence.
On February 18, 2011, the trial court revoked Grove’s probation and
sentenced him to 52-106 months’ imprisonment with credit of 102 months
and 29 days, followed by 134 months’ probation. The net effect was for
Grove to serve an additional 3 months and 1 day of incarceration while his
family found suitable housing for him upon his release.
The February 18, 2011 sentencing order stated with regard to
probation:
The period of incarceration imposed above shall be followed by a
period of one hundred thirty-four (134) months of consecutive
probation to be supervised by the Pennsylvania State Board of
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Probation and Parole. The Defendant shall be subject to such
terms and conditions of supervision as set forth in Judicial
Administrative Order AD-0000001-2007 and such other terms
and conditions as may reasonably be imposed by the
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole or such other
appropriate supervising authority which shall include, but not be
limited to, the following [11 conditions]: …
2. The Defendant shall successfully enroll in, participate in, and
complete a program for sex offenders approved by the
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole. The Defendant shall
be responsible for all costs related to said treatment and shall
satisfy those costs in a reasonable time period.
3. The Defendant shall permit his sex offender treatment
provider unrestricted communication with the probation officer
regarding his attendance level, participation, and any other
information deemed necessary by the probation officer to protect
the community from his sexually abusive behavior …
Order, 2/18/11 (emphasis added).
Second revocation. Grove was unable to provide a home plan during
his three months of imprisonment. As a result, he was detained again after
the three-month term expired, and the Commonwealth again moved to
revoke his probation.
During a hearing on July 26, 2011, Grove stipulated that he did not
have an acceptable place to live. The trial court revoked Grove’s probation
and sentenced him to 1-2 years’ imprisonment followed by 110 months’
probation. The July 26, 2011 sentencing order provided:
1. That the 134-month consecutive probation on Count No. 1 is
revoked.
2. The Defendant is sentenced to a period of not less than one
(1) nor more than two (2) years[’] incarceration in a State
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Correctional Institution, that to be followed by 110 months of
probation.
3. The period of probation is to be specially supervised by the
Pennsylvania State Board of Probation and Parole. While on
probation, he will be subject to the conditions of probation set
forth in a Judicial Administration Order filed to CP-60-AD-
0000001 of 2007. He will also be subject to a condition that he
not reside in any residence where any minors reside and that he
not be left in the company of any minors by anyone.
4. In addition to the conditions of supervision imposed above,
the Defendant will be subject to the conditions of supervision in
Numbered Paragraphs 1 through 11 in the Court's Order and
Sentence of February 18, 2011.
5. Upon the Defendant’s maxing out on the incarceration portion
of this Sentence, the Pennsylvania State Board of Probation and
Parole is ORDERED to work with the Defendant and the
Defendant’s family to find appropriate housing for the
Defendant. For purpose of clarity, the Court does not believe it is
sufficient to leave the matter in the Defendant’s hands. The
State Board of Probation and Parole is to assist in the
supervision and rehabilitation of its clients. The Court expects
the Board to do exactly that with this Defendant of limited
intellectual ability and apparently equally limited means.
Order, 7/26/11 (emphasis added).
Grove appealed to this Court at 1550 MDA 2011, but we quashed his
appeal for his failure to include a Rule 2119 statement in his brief explaining
why this Court should consider a discretionary challenge to his sentence.
Grove served his entire two year sentence.
Third revocation. At the conclusion of this term of imprisonment,
Grove was detained for a third time for failure to provide a suitable home
plan. On October 9, 2013, the trial court again revoked his probation
because of his failure to obtain an approved home.
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The October 9, 2013 sentencing order stated:
The Defendant is sentenced on Count No. 1 to a period of
incarceration in a State Correctional Institution of not less than
one hundred fifty-three (153) days nor more than twenty-four
(24) months. The Defendant shall receive credit for time served
from May 19, 2013, to today’s date, that sentence to be followed
by a period of eighty-six (86) months of consecutive probation.
While under supervision, the Defendant shall be subject to the
terms and conditions of supervision as set forth in Judicial
Administration Order AD-0000001 of 2007 and the Standard
Special Conditions for Sex Offenders as set forth by the
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole which were effective
in March 2012 and attached hereto as Appendix 1. In addition,
the Defendant shall be subject to the Optional Special Conditions
for Sex Offenders established by the Pennsylvania Board of
Probation and Parole with an effective date of March 2012 and
attached hereto as Appendix 2.
Order, 10/9/13 (emphasis added). Appended to the sentencing order were
the Probation and Parole Board’s Standard Special Conditions For Sex
Offenders, which stated in relevant part:
1. You must obtain a sex offender evaluation from a sex
offender treatment provider who is approved by probation/parole
supervision staff. You must comply with and successfully
complete all treatment recommendations including polygraph
examinations, resulting from this evaluation. You must pay the
cost of the evaluation, polygraph(s) and treatment. You must
also provide written authorization for release of confidential
information between your sex offender treatment provider and
the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole.
Special Conditions For Sex Offenders (emphasis added). Notably, this
condition does not authorize the trial court or the Department of Corrections
(“DOC”) to select the sex offender evaluator; only the probation/parole
supervision staff may select the evaluator.
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Fourth revocation (the revocation presently in question). On May 18,
2015, the imprisonment portion of Grove’s sentence concluded, and the
probationary period began. Instead of releasing Grove, law enforcement
officials transported him from state prison to county prison. On May 29,
2015, the Commonwealth moved to revoke Grove’s probation, again alleging
that Grove did not have a suitable home plan.
On August 3, 2015, the trial court held a revocation hearing on the
Commonwealth’s motion. Grove’s attorney informed the trial court that
Grove had finally found housing with the Just for Jesus Ministry in Jefferson
County, Pennsylvania. At this moment, the Commonwealth claimed - for the
first time - that Grove violated the October 9, 2013 sentencing order by
failing to “seek and complete” sex offender treatment while in jail and
“[taking] himself out of … sex offender treatment programs.” N.T., 8/3/15,
at 4. The trial court responded: “Well, that changes the dynamics of this
case dramatically. The last time we were here, I was told the sole reason he
wasn’t paroled was he didn’t have a house. That’s not the case, obviously.”
Id. at 4.
Later in the hearing, the following took place:
THE COURT: Well, I would note in my sentence of October [9 th] -
and this may shorten this entire process - ‘while under
supervision, the Defendant shall be subject to the terms and
conditions of supervision as set forth in Judicial Administration
Order AD-01 of 2007, and the standard special conditions for sex
offenders as set forth by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation
and Parole which were effective March 2012 and attached hereto
as Appendix 1. Condition No. 1, you must obtain a sex offender
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evaluation from a sex offender treatment provider who is
approved by probation and parole supervision staff. You must
comply with and successfully complete all treatment
recommendations.’ It would seem to me that the Department of
Corrections’ assessment would be an evaluation from a sex
offender treatment provider and the recommendation is to
complete -- successfully complete the treatment program. If he
has refused to do that, he has clearly violated the condition of
the Court. That is a ground[] for revocation and resentencing
because he has chosen not to do that. It’s not a matter of
funding, it’s not a matter of no one wanting him here, it’s not a
matter of putting him back on the street. So if in his entire time
that he is in the state prison he has refused to complete the
programming, that is an obvious violation which he had total
control of to vindicate the authority of the Court which required
that, incarceration - or revocation and reincarceration would be
appropriate to complete the sex offender program which he has
not done.
Do we have an answer to the question? Mr. Ulmer, do you want
to ask your client whether I am going to inconvenience the Court
and everyone else one more time by continuing this matter to
get an answer to that question or is he going to make this a little
easier and allow him to get back to state prison to complete the
recommended and required treatment which would then allow
him to go to a halfway house and may solve the entire dilemma
with which he is faced?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, I don’t even need to ask my
client. On his behalf I’m going to say, yes, we are going to
inconvenience the Court. With all due respect, I believe what
you were just referencing, and this may put us in a Catch-22,
was prefaced with, ‘while under supervision’. My client wasn’t
just under supervision at the time, he was still incarcerated, so,
therefore, he did not violate the term of his supervision; in
addition to which, that has not been pled as a violation here
today; and finally, and certainly based off of what’s here today, I
don’t think the defense would be willing to make that concession
without further investigation. And, no, we don’t like the idea of
inconveniencing the Court. And practically speaking, we
understand the concerns of the Court and the Commonwealth,
but I’m not going to push my client out an open window.
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THE COURT: It’s my word ‘supervision’. It does not say
probation or parole. He’s under supervision while he’s in the
state system. He could have obtained the evaluation while in the
state system and complied with the treatment. My word, not
necessarily meaning - if I wanted to say probation and parole, I
would have said, ‘While under probation and parole’.2 I said,
while under supervision. Supervision of the Department of
Corrections, the Board of Probation or Parole, it doesn’t matter
whom he’s under the supervision of. So let’s get that on the
record right now. It’s my word. It’s my definition, not somebody
else’s, including the legislature.
N.T., 8/3/15, at 34-36 (emphasis added). The trial court continued
revocation proceedings to a later date while stating: “I will be curious to
know whether the defendant has completed any sex offender programming
while in the state system.” Id. at 41.
On August 13, 2015, the Commonwealth filed an amended motion to
revoke probation/parole, this time alleging that Grove had mandatory sexual
offender treatment requirements under the February 18, 2011, July 26,
2011 and October 9, 2013 orders but failed to complete them while
incarcerated. Grove’s failure to obtain treatment, the Commonwealth
continued, made it likely that he would violate his probationary conditions on
the street.
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2
The trial court was incorrect. As stated above, Condition 1 of the Special
Conditions For Sex Offenders, which the court incorporated into its October
9, 2013 order, states that Grove must obtain a sex offender evaluation by a
provider who is approved by “parole and probation supervision staff”.
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On September 15, 2015, the trial court held another revocation
hearing. At the outset, the trial court observed with regard to its October 9,
2013 sentencing order:
I’m just saying: ‘The Court entered sentencing’ - Paragraph 3:
‘The Court entered sentencing orders making sexual offender
treatment mandatory during his periods of probation
supervision,’ well, that and - I didn’t say probation. It was
supervision. Paragraph 2 of this Court’s February 18th, 2011
sentence says: The Defendant shall successfully enroll in,
participate in, and complete a program for sex offenders
approved by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole.
That was required back in 2011.
N.T., 9/15/15, at 7. David Gorman, a psychological services specialist at
SCI Waymart, a state prison facility, testified that Grove refused to attend
sex offender treatment while he was an inmate at SCI Waymart in 2014.
Id. at 10. Gorman testified: “[A]ll our DOC programming is voluntary.
There are consequences for not participating. It is unlikely an inmate will be
granted parole if he doesn’t participate in programming; but other than that,
there’s no consequences.” Id. at 20.
The trial court declined to revoke probation for the original alleged
violation, failure to have a home plan. The trial court considered the
Commonwealth’s motion on this subject as seeking an “anticipatory violation
of probation. I am not persuaded that we can revoke someone’s probation
because of what we think they may or may not do once they are placed on
probation … The defendant will not be revoked on any anticipatory violation
for not having a home plan…” Id. at 45.
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Instead, the trial court stated that Grove violated the October 9, 2013
sentencing order by refusing to attend sex offender treatment while serving
the imprisonment portion of his sentence:
This is a situation where the Defendant was facing a split
sentence, the first period of incarceration where he was given
the opportunity for the treatment was to be followed by
probation. This is not an anticipatory violation. This was a
violation that occurred prior to that aspect of the sentence taking
effect. The law is clear, a defendant can violate a condition of
probation prior to that aspect of the sentence taking effect. That
is exactly what happened here. The Defendant was required to
complete sex offender treatment and participate in that. He
refused multiple times. At that point, he violated the conditions
of his probation even though that aspect of the sentence has not
been in place – or had not been in place.
Id. at 46-47.
The trial court sentenced Grove to 4-86 months in state prison. Id. at
48. This appeal followed.3 Grove complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. The trial
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3
On September 25, 2015, Grove filed post-sentence motions seeking
reconsideration of his sentence. On October 15, 2015, Grove appealed to
this Court. This appeal was premature, because the trial court had not yet
ruled on Grove’s post-sentence motions. Commonwealth v. Claffey, 80
A.3d 780, 783 (Pa.Super.2013).
We have remedied this problem in the following manner. Pa.R.Crim.P. 720
provides, with one exception not relevant here, that “if the judge fails to
decide the motion within 120 days … the motion shall be deemed denied by
operation of law.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(b). On June 3, 2016, we
directed the trial court to enter an order denying Grove’s post-sentence
motions by operation of law. On June 7, 2016, the trial court entered this
order on its docket, thus perfecting our jurisdiction over this appeal on that
date. See Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5) (“A notice of appeal filed after the
announcement of a determination but before the entry of an appealable
order shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof”).
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court did not file a formal opinion but simply entered an order referring us to
the reasons it gave during the September 15, 2015 hearing for revoking
Grove’s probation.
Grove raises four issues in this appeal:
1. Were [Grove]’s procedural due process rights violated when
the Court sentenced him for an alleged violation which was not
raised by the Commonwealth in either of its two Motions to
Revoke?
2. Did [Grove] violate any existing probation order where there
was no order requiring him to complete sexual offender’s
programming while in the State Prison[?]
3. Should [Grove] have been sentenced to a period of total
confinement following a probation revocation where the
conditions permitting a court to order total confinement, as
contained in [] 42 Pa.C.S. [§] 9771(c), had not been met?
4. Should Grove have been given credit in his sentencing order
for the time he spent detained from May 19, 2015 until his
sentence of September 15, 2015 pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. [§]
9760?
Brief For Appellant, at 3. The second issue is dispositive.
In an appeal from a sentence imposed following the revocation of
probation, “[o]ur review is limited to determining the validity of the
probation revocation proceedings and the authority of the sentencing court
to consider the same sentencing alternatives that it had at the time of the
initial sentencing.” Commonwealth v. Fish, 752 A.2d 921, 923
(Pa.Super.2000) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(b)). Revocation of a probationary
sentence is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will
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not disturb that court’s decision in the absence of an error of law or an
abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Smith, 669 A.2d 1008, 1011
(Pa.Super.1996).
A violation of probation merits revocation when the Commonwealth
proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the probationer’s conduct
violated the terms and conditions of his probation, and that probation has
proven an ineffective rehabilitation tool incapable of deterring him from
future antisocial conduct. Commonwealth v. Sims, 770 A.2d 346, 350
(Pa.Super.2001).
Since 2002, Grove has been in jail for all but 2 days (the brief period
following his release in 2010). None of his sentencing orders stated that he
was required to undergo sex offender treatment during “imprisonment”;
they only required sex offender treatment while on “supervision”.
The trial court construed the term “supervision” in its October 9, 2013
order to mean that the court itself was Grove’s supervisor while Grove was
in prison. The trial court determined that Grove was required to obtain sex
offender treatment while on the court’s “supervision”, i.e, while in prison,
and that Grove’s failure to do so constituted a violation of probation. We do
not agree with this interpretation of the order. Imprisonment and
supervision are separate and distinct levels of restriction. Imprisonment, the
more restrictive of the two, occurs when the defendant is a prison inmate.
Supervision, the lesser restriction, occurs when the individual is released
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into the community and his daily activities are supervised by a parole and
probation officer in a manner that protects society. The natural meaning of
“supervision” is that it would begin after Grove’s release from prison into the
community. “Supervision” did not take place during Grove’s imprisonment,
as the trial court contends. Since Grove was never out of jail after October
9, 2013, it was impossible from October 9, 2013 onward for him to violate
the term of “supervision” requiring sex offender treatment.
It is instructive to examine the language in the court’s 2011
sentencing orders, the same orders that the trial court referenced in the
course of interpreting the October 9, 2013 order. N.T., 9/15/15, at 7
(court’s observation that its 2011 orders mandated sex offender treatment).
The February 18, 2011 sentencing order states that following Grove’s term
of imprisonment, there was to be:
one hundred thirty-four (134) months of consecutive probation
to be supervised by the Pennsylvania State Board of Probation
and Parole. The Defendant shall be subject to such terms and
conditions of supervision as set forth in Judicial Administrative
Order AD-0000001-2007 and such other terms and conditions as
may reasonably be imposed by the Pennsylvania Board of
Probation and Parole or such other appropriate supervising
authority which shall include, but not be limited to, the following
[11 conditions]: … 2. The Defendant shall successfully enroll in,
participate in, and complete a program for sex offenders
approved by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole.
Order, 2/18/11 (emphasis added). This language clearly moors
“supervision” and sex offender treatment to Grove’s probationary period, not
to his term of imprisonment.
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Similarly, in Grove’s July 26, 2011 sentencing order, paragraph 2
states that Grove is sentenced to 110 months’ probation after a term of
imprisonment. Paragraph 3 states that
the period of probation is to be specially supervised by the
Pennsylvania State Board of Probation and Parole. While on
probation, he will be subject to the conditions of probation set
forth in a Judicial Administration Order filed to CP-60-AD-
0000001 of 2007. He will also be subject to a condition that he
not reside in any residence where any minors reside and that he
not be left in the company of any minors by anyone.
Order, 7/26/11 (emphasis added). Paragraph 4 continues that “in addition
to the conditions of supervision imposed above, the Defendant will be
subject to the conditions of supervision in Numbered Paragraphs 1 through
11 in the Court’s Order and Sentence of February 18, 2011.” Id. (emphasis
added). Once again, “supervision” and sex offender treatment are tethered
to Grove’s probation, not his term of imprisonment.
The October 9, 2013 order again imposes probation consecutive to
imprisonment, stating:
The Defendant is sentenced on Count No. 1 to a period of
incarceration in a State Correctional Institution of not less than
one hundred fifty-three (153) days nor more than twenty-four
(24) months. The Defendant shall receive credit for time served
from May 19, 2013, to today’s date, that sentence to be followed
by a period of eighty-six (86) months of consecutive probation.
While under supervision, the Defendant shall be subject to the
terms and conditions of supervision as set forth in Judicial
Administration Order AD-0000001 of 2007 and the Standard
Special Conditions for Sex Offenders as set forth by the
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole which were effective
in March 2012 and attached hereto as Appendix 1.
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Order, 10/19/13 (emphasis added). “While under supervision” immediately
follows “eighty-six (86) months of consecutive probation” imposed in the
preceding paragraph. Moreover, “terms and conditions of supervision as set
forth in Judicial Administration Order AD-0000001 of 2007” is the same
condition that the trial court imposed in the probationary portions of Grove’s
February 18, 2011 and July 26, 2011 revocation orders. Finally, the
Standard Special Conditions for Sex Offenders4 requires sex offender
treatment under conditions prescribed by the Pennsylvania Board of
Probation and Parole. Standard Special Condition 1 requires a sex offender
evaluation by a provider approved by “probation/parole supervision staff.”
Nothing in the Standard Special Conditions vests authority in the trial court.
Nothing in the Standard Special Conditions requires sex offender treatment
in prison; they do not take effect until the defendant’s release from prison.
Thus, like Grove’s prior sentencing orders, the October 9, 2013 order
demonstrates that sex offender treatment was a condition of probation that
Grove only had to satisfy after his release, not a condition that he had to
fulfill in prison. The trial court’s ruling to the contrary was erroneous.
Compounding this error was the trial court’s fictitious assertion that
the court itself was Grove’s “supervisor” during his imprisonment. There is
simply no authority for the proposition that the trial court is an inmate’s
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4
See page 5, supra.
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“supervisor” during his imprisonment. The DOC is the only supervisor of
prison inmates’ daily life. Outside of jail, probation officers are the only
supervisors of state parolees’ or probationers’ daily lives. Because Grove’s
only supervisor in prison was the DOC, the trial court erred by deeming itself
Grove’s “supervisor” in prison and using this determination to revoke
Grove’s probation before it began.
Although some decisions authorize the trial court to revoke probation
before the probationary term has begun, these decisions are distinguishable
from Grove’s case. In multiple cases, this Court has held that the court can
revoke probation when the defendant commits new crimes before the
probationary term begins.5 In another case, this Court upheld revocation of
probation when the defendant violated a condition of work release during the
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5
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wendowski, 420 A.2d 628(Pa.Super.1980) (when defendant pled guilty to receiving stolen property
before another judge, Judge Carson revoked probation, even though
defendant had not completed sentences before other judges; on appeal,
Judge Carson’s revocation order affirmed on ground that probation was a
privilege instead of a contract, thus commission of new offenses warranted
revocation of privilege of probation because it showed that defendant “is
unworthy of probation and that the granting of the same would not be in
subservience to the ends of justice and the best interests of the public”);
Commonwealth v. Dickens, 475 A.2d 141 (Pa.Super.1984) (same result
where defendant committed new crimes of assault, reckless endangerment
and endangering welfare of children before beginning probationary term for
voluntary manslaughter); Commonwealth v. Ware, 737 A.2d 251(Pa.Super.1999) (same result where defendant committed new retail theft
before beginning probationary term for prior retail theft).
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imprisonment portion of his sentence by consuming alcohol.
Commonwealth v. Hoover, 909 A.2d 321 (Pa.Super.2006). We reasoned:
Although Appellant did not, strictly speaking, violate the law by
becoming intoxicated, he clearly violated the terms of his work
release and demonstrated to the court that he is unworthy of
probation. The record reflects that the trial judge was cognizant
of Appellant’s extensive history of alcohol abuse, numerous prior
DUI convictions, and apparent inability to control his addiction to
alcohol. The court concluded that, in light of Appellant’s
behavior, Appellant would be difficult to supervise while on
probation and posed a risk to the community in that he was
likely to commit new crimes.
Id. at 324. Revocation of probation in advance of the probationary term
was permissible in these cases because it was foreseeable to the defendant
that new crimes or violations of work release terms would result in
sanctions. Here, in contrast, Grove did not commit any new crime in prison
or violate express terms of work release. Indeed, Grove did not violate
anything at all. The October 9, 2013 order only required him to obtain sex
offender treatment after his release from jail. It did not require him to
obtain sex offender treatment in prison as well.6
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6
Tellingly, the lone DOC witness at Grove’s revocation hearing, Mr. Gorman,
testified that failure to attend sex offender treatment in prison does not
result in sanctions against the prisoner, because the sex offender treatment
program is voluntary. N.T., 9/15/15 at 20 (“[A]ll our DOC programming is
voluntary. There are consequences for not participating. It is unlikely an
inmate will be granted parole if he doesn’t participate in programming; but
other than that, there’s no consequences”).
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For these reasons, we resolve the second issue in Grove’s appeal by
concluding that the trial court erred in revoking his probation. Given this
decision, we need not address Grove’s first, third or fourth issues.
Judgment of sentence reversed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/12/2016
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