Ridgley, J. v. GEICO ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
JERRY RIDGLEY IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE INSURANCE
COMPANY
Appellee No. 427 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered January 6, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Civil Division at No(s): 150201909
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OTT, J., and SOLANO, J.
JUDGMENT ORDER BY OTT, J.: FILED AUGUST 15, 2016
Jerry Ridgley appeals from the order entered on January 6, 2016, in
the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, granting summary
judgment in favor of Government Employee Insurance Company (GEICO).1
In this appeal, Ridgley has attempted to raise five claims of error. However,
none of these issues have been properly preserved because Ridgley filed the
court ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement of Errors Complained of on
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1
We note this is not an interlocutory order. Although GEICO’s answer
included an indication that GEICO was raising a cross claim, no cross claim
was presented in the pleadings. Indeed, as there are no co-defendants, no
cross claim was possible. Accordingly, there were no unresolved issues
before the trial court. It appears the title of the answer was simply cut and
pasted from another document. We ask all counsel to take care in such
instances to provide accurate headings and titles.
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Appeal 11 days late. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that all
claims have been waived.
Briefly, Ridgley was injured in an automobile accident. He settled with
the alleged tortfeasor, and signed a general release without first seeking
permission from GEICO, his insurer, as required by the insurance contract.
Ridgely then sought underinsurance coverage from GEICO. In its motion for
summary judgment, GEICO claimed Ridgely violated the consent to settle
clause found in the contract, thereby violating the terms of the contract,
rendering the underinsured coverage uncollectable. The trial court agreed
with GEICO’s position and on January 6, 2016, granted GEICO summary
judgment.2
Ridgley filed a timely notice of appeal on January 15, 2016. On
January 22, 2016, the trial court entered an order compelling Ridgley to file
a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement within 21 days. This order complied with the
requirements of Rule 1925 and was served on Ridgley pursuant to the
dictates of Pa.R.C.P. 236. However, Ridgley did not seek permission to file
the statement late; instead he filed the required document on February 23,
2016, 11 days after the statement was due.
Our Supreme Court intended the holding in Lord to operate as a
bright-line rule, such that “failure to comply with the minimal
requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 1025(b) will result in automatic
waiver of the issues raised.” Commonwealth v. Schofield,
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2
The order was not docketed until January 7, 2016.
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585 Pa. 389, 888 A.2d 771, 774 (2005) (emphasis added); see
also Castillo, 888 A.2d at 780. Given the automatic nature of
this type of waiver, we are required to address the issue once it
comes to our attention. Indeed, our Supreme Court does not
countenance anything less than stringent application of waiver
pursuant to Rule 1925(b): “[A] bright-line rule eliminates the
potential for inconsistent results that existed prior to Lord, when
... appellate courts had discretion to address or to waive issues
raised in non-compliant Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statements.” Id.Succinctly put, it is no longer within this Court's discretion to
ignore the internal deficiencies of Rule 1925(b) statements.
Greater Erie Indus. Dev. Corp. v. Presque Isle Downs, Inc., 88 A.3d
222, 224 (Pa. Super. 2014).
Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925 and subsequent case law, we agree with
the trial court that all issues have been waived and there are no claims for
this Court to review.3
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/15/2016
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3
We are aware that Rule 1925 allows our Court to remand for the filing of a
1925(b) statement upon application of appellant and for good cause shown.
See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(2). Ridgley has not applied for a remand nor has
good cause been offered for the failure to timely file.
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