Com. v. Mathis, C. ( 2016 )


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  • J-S42019-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    CARLOS QUENTO MATHIS
    Appellant                 No. 1381 WDA 2015
    Appeal from the PCRA Order August 6, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0002715-2008
    BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., OTT, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.:                              FILED AUGUST 31, 2016
    Carlos Quento Mathis appeals from the order entered August 6, 2015,
    in the Erie County Court of Common Pleas, dismissing his first petition for
    collateral relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42
    Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. Mathis seeks relief from an aggregate term of 15 to
    40 years’ imprisonment, imposed May 14, 2009, after a jury found him
    guilty of, inter alia, robbery, kidnapping, and conspiracy.1    On appeal, he
    challenges the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and the legality of his
    sentence. For the reasons below, we affirm.
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    1
    18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3701(a)(1)(ii), 2901(a)(2), and 903, respectively.
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    The facts and procedural history underlying this appeal are detailed in
    the PCRA court’s July 14, 2015, opinion. See 7/14/2015, at 4-5. For our
    purposes, we note Mathis and a group of individuals robbed the Jockey
    Health Club during the early morning hours of August 3, 2008.                The co-
    conspirators threatened the female employees at gunpoint and held them in
    a second floor room.         The actors, inside the building, communicated via
    speakerphone with the getaway driver, co-conspirator Kaytlin Kramer, who
    was an employee at the club.             Kramer later provided the details of the
    robbery to the police, and implicated Mathis.
    Mathis was subsequently convicted of robbery, conspiracy, kidnapping,
    burglary, terroristic threats, theft, and receiving stolen property.2 As noted
    above, he was sentenced to an aggregate term of 15 to 40 years’
    imprisonment.       His 15-year minimum sentence was comprised of three
    mandatory minimum five-year sentences imposed on the charges of
    robbery, conspiracy, and kidnapping, for his use of a firearm during the
    commission of those offenses. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712.
    A panel of this Court affirmed Mathis’s judgment of sentence on direct
    appeal in May of 2011, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his
    petition   for   allowance      of   appeal    on   December   27,   2012.      See
    ____________________________________________
    2
    18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3701(a)(1)(ii), 903, 2901(a)(2), 3502, 2706, 3921, and
    3925, respectively.
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    Commonwealth v. Mathis, 
    30 A.3d 530
    (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied,
    
    60 A.3d 535
    (Pa. 2012).            He subsequently filed this timely, first PCRA
    petition on December 27, 2013. After the PCRA court mistakenly considered
    the petition to be Mathis’s third, and dismissed it without appointing counsel,
    a panel of this Court vacated the order and remanded the case for the
    appointment of counsel.3 See Commonwealth v. Mathis, 
    120 A.3d 1057
    (Pa. Super. 2015) (unpublished memorandum). Counsel was subsequently
    appointed and filed a supplemental petition on June 30, 2015. On July 15,
    2015, the PCRA court issued notice of its intent to dismiss the petition
    without first conducting an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P.
    907. Mathis did not respond to the court’s Rule 907 notice, and, on August
    6, 2015, the PCRA court dismissed the petition.              This timely appeal
    followed.4
    ____________________________________________
    3
    Mathis’s first petition, filed in December of 2009, resulted in the
    reinstatement of his direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc. His second petition,
    filed in March of 2012, resulted in the reinstatement of his right to petition
    the Supreme Court for allowance of appeal, nunc pro tunc. Consequently,
    the present petition, although technically his third, was the first filed after
    his judgment of sentence became final. See Commonwealth v. Mathis,
    
    120 A.3d 1057
    (Pa. Super. 2015) (unpublished memorandum at *2).
    4
    On September 8, 2015, the PCRA court ordered Mathis to file a concise
    statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
    Mathis complied with the court’s directive, and filed a concise statement on
    September 29, 2015.
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    In his first issue, Mathis asserts trial counsel was ineffective for failing
    to request a continuance when counsel entered his appearance on the first
    day of trial. Mathis explains that, prior to trial, he had been represented by
    Bruce Sandmeyer, Esq., who complained of late discovery in January of
    2009, and filed a notice of alibi in March of 2009.            However, on May 11,
    2009, the first day of jury selection, Kevin Kallenbach, Esq., entered his
    appearance on Mathis’s behalf.          Mathis claims “it is unfathomable that an
    attorney can be assigned and competently represent an individual on
    charges like these – four felony and three misdemeanor 1 charges, on such
    short notice.”5     Mathis’s Brief at 5.         In particular, Mathis contends trial
    counsel was ineffective in failing to pursue an alibi defense, failing to obtain
    cell phone tower records to show the location of his phone during the
    robbery, failing to obtain prison phone records, and failing to review the
    inventory list of items seized from Kaytlin Kramer’s truck “for possible
    suppression and/or cross-examination of police in their testimony.” 
    Id. at 6.
    When reviewing an order dismissing a PCRA petition, we must
    determine whether the PCRA court’s findings of fact are supported by the
    record,    and    whether      its   legal     conclusions   are   free   from   error.
    Commonwealth v. Spotz, 
    84 A.3d 294
    , 311 (Pa. 2014). “Great deference
    ____________________________________________
    5
    The record reveals that Mathis’s first attorney, Sandmeyer, was retained.
    However, the record does not reveal whether Kallenbach was also retained
    or appointed.
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    is granted to the findings of the PCRA court, and these findings will not be
    disturbed    unless   they     have   no   support     in   the     certified   record.”
    Commonwealth v. Carter, 
    21 A.3d 680
    , 682 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation
    omitted).
    “[T]o prove counsel ineffective, the petitioner must show that: (1) his
    underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable basis
    for his action or inaction; and (3) the petitioner suffered actual prejudice as
    a result.” 
    Spotz, supra
    , 84 A.3d at 311. Moreover, “[c]ounsel is presumed
    to have rendered effective assistance, and, if a claim fails under any
    required element …, the court may dismiss the claim on that basis.”
    Commonwealth v. Reid, 
    99 A.3d 470
    , 481 (Pa. 2014) (quotation omitted).
    Here, Mathis’s claim focuses on counsel’s failure to request a
    continuance when he first entered his appearance on the morning of jury
    selection.   Although Mathis insinuates counsel had inadequate time to
    prepare for trial, he is not entitled to relief based on mere supposition.
    Rather, in order to establish prejudice, Mathis must plead and prove that a
    continuance would have “materially aided counsel in rebutting the testimony
    of the Commonwealth’s witness[es.]” Commonwealth v. Goins, 
    495 A.2d 527
    ,   531    (Pa.    1985),   superseded    by      statute   on     other     grounds,
    Commonwealth v. Moran, 
    636 A.2d 612
    (Pa. 1993), cert denied, 
    511 U.S. 1152
    (1994).
    To that end, Mathis asserts trial counsel failed to (1) properly pursue
    an alibi defense; (2) obtain cell phone tower records to show where Mathis’s
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    phone was located at the time of the robbery; (3) obtain Kramer’s prison
    phone records to demonstrate her post-arrest contact with Mathis; and (4)
    review the list of items seized from Kramer’s truck “for possible suppression
    and/or cross-examination of police in their testimony.” Mathis’s Brief at 6.
    Based upon our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the trial court’s
    opinions, we find Mathis is entitled to no relief on these claims.
    First, Mathis did present an alibi defense at trial.      Jillian Krastins,
    Mathis’s girlfriend at the time of trial, testified that Mathis was with her in
    her apartment on the evening of August 2, 2009, and did not leave until
    approximately 6:00 a.m. the next morning when Kramer came looking for
    him. See N.T., 5/13/2009, at 30-35. Mathis corroborated his whereabouts
    with his own testimony.        See 
    id. at 57-65.
       Nevertheless, he does not
    explain how his alibi would have been more credible had counsel requested a
    continuance.
    Moreover, with regard to Mathis’s cell phone records, the PCRA court
    noted the records were subpoenaed by the Commonwealth, entered into
    evidence   at   trial,   and   corroborated   Kramer’s   testimony    that   she
    communicated with Mathis during the robbery while she waited in the
    getaway car. See PCRA Court Opinion, 2/14/2014, at 11. Although Mathis
    contends counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain the cell phone tower
    records in order to determine where Mathis’s phone was located at the time
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    of the calls,6 the PCRA court concluded this claim had no merit because, in
    contravention of Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(D),7 Mathis “failed to attach the ‘cell
    phone tower records’ to his petition and has additionally failed to attach
    documentation or an affidavit stating that such records were available at the
    time of the trial.” 
    Id. at 12.
    We agree. Without some proof that the cell
    phone tower records would have established he was not at the club at the
    time of the robbery, Mathis has failed to demonstrate how he was prejudiced
    by counsel’s failure to obtain the records.
    Mathis also asserts counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain
    Kramer’s prison phone call records to impeach her testimony. He does not
    explain, however, what these records would have contained, or how they
    could have been used to impeach Kramer.          Accordingly, Mathis has again
    failed to demonstrate how this issue has arguable merit, or how he was
    prejudiced by counsel’s omission. Indeed, absent some showing regarding
    ____________________________________________
    6
    At trial, Mathis conceded he spoke with Kramer on his cell phone on the
    night of the robbery, but claimed he was in Krastins’ apartment when he did
    so. N.T., 5/13/2009, at 61-64.
    7
    Rule 902 provides, in relevant part:
    (D) The defendant shall attach to the petition any affidavits,
    records, documents, or other evidence which show the facts
    stated in support of the grounds for relief, or the petition shall
    state why they are not attached.
    Pa.R.Crim. P. 902(D).
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    the relevance of these records, we will not find counsel ineffective for failing
    to request a continuance prior to trial.
    Further, with regard to Mathis’s contention that trial counsel was
    ineffective for failing to review the inventory list of items seized from
    Kramer’s truck, we again find his unsubstantiated insinuation that the
    inventory list might contain something exculpatory is not a basis for relief.
    Moreover, Mathis failed to include this specific claim in either his pro se or
    amended      PCRA    petition.      For   that   reason,   it   is   waived.     See
    Commonwealth v. Elliott, 
    80 A.3d 415
    , 430 (Pa. 2013) (holding petitioner
    waived claim on appeal; it was not raised in PCRA petition and petitioner did
    not obtain permission to amend his petition to include the claim), cert.
    denied, 
    135 S. Ct. 50
    (U.S. 2014). Accordingly, we conclude Mathis is not
    entitled to relief on his first issue.
    Next, Mathis argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a
    more    specific    corrupt      source   jury   instruction,   considering     “[t]he
    Commonwealth’s case was largely predicated upon the testimony of Kaytlin
    Kramer, [his] former girlfriend” and accomplice. Mathis’s Brief at 7. Mathis
    emphasizes that Kramer had “much to gain by being a witness for the
    Commonwealth.”       
    Id. Indeed, he
    notes “[i]n exchange for her testimony
    she was offered reduced charges and a diminished sentence.”               
    Id. While Mathis
    recognizes the trial court did provide a corrupt source instruction, he
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    claims the court’s charge “did not adequately cover the situation, especially
    due to the personal relationship he had with Ms. Kramer.”8 
    Id. Our review
    of the certified record, and in particular the court’s charge,
    reveals the trial court provided the jury with a corrupt source instruction
    taken     almost   verbatim     from    Pennsylvania      Standard   Suggested   Jury
    Instructions (Criminal) 4.01. See N.T., 5/13/2009, at 176-177. Mathis does
    not explain how the charge was inadequate, or what more the trial court
    should have told the jury.         Accordingly, he is entitled to no relief on this
    claim.
    In his final issue, Mathis challenges the sentence imposed by the trial
    court.     Specifically, he contends:          (1) his sentence is illegal pursuant to
    Alleyne v. United States, 
    133 S. Ct. 2151
    (U.S. 2013); (2) the imposition
    of a consecutive mandatory minimum sentence on the charge of conspiracy
    “runs in opposition to the intent of 42 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 9716 and subsequent
    provisions[;]”9 and (3) counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
    consecutive mandatory minimum sentences.                  See Mathis’s Brief at 8-12.
    We again find no relief is warranted.
    ____________________________________________
    8
    Kramer was Mathis’s girlfriend at the time of the crime.
    9
    Mathis’s Brief at 11.
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    With regard to Mathis’s contention that his sentence is illegal,10 we
    note that, in Alleyne, the United States Supreme Court held “[a]ny fact
    that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ that must be
    submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.”                   
    Alleyne, supra
    , 133 S. Ct. at 2155. In interpreting that decision, the courts of this
    Commonwealth have determined that our mandatory minimum sentencing
    statutes, including Section 9712, are unconstitutional where the language of
    those statutes “permits the trial court, as opposed to the jury, to increase
    the defendant’s minimum sentence based upon a preponderance of the
    evidence” standard.         Commonwealth v. Newman, 
    99 A.3d 86
    , 98 (Pa.
    Super. 2014) (en banc), appeal denied, 
    121 A.3d 247
    (Pa. 2015);
    Commonwealth           v.   Valentine,         
    101 A.3d 801
      (Pa.   Super.   2014)
    (invalidating 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712), appeal denied, 
    124 A.3d 309
    (Pa. 2015).
    However, recently, in Commonwealth v. Washington, ___ A.3d
    ___, ___, 
    2016 WL 3909088
    , at *8 (Pa. July 19, 2016), the Pennsylvania
    Supreme Court definitively held that “Alleyne does not apply retroactively
    to cases pending on collateral review.”              The Court found Alleyne did not
    meet either criteria for the retroactive application of a new constitutional law
    outlined in Teague v. Lane, 
    489 U.S. 288
    (1989) (plurality), in that it was
    neither “substantive in character, [nor a] watershed rule[] of criminal
    ____________________________________________
    10
    PCRA counsel raised this claim in Mathis’s supplemental petition.
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    procedure.” 
    Washington, supra
    , ___ A.3d at ___, 
    2016 WL 3909088
    , at
    *2 (citations and internal punctuation omitted).             Moreover, the Court also
    declined to “recognize an independent state-level retroactivity jurisprudence
    grounded on fairness considerations.” Id. at ___, 
    2016 WL 3909088
    , at *7.
    In the present case, Mathis’s judgment of sentence was final on March
    27, 2013, 90 days after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his petition
    to appeal, and Mathis failed to petition the United States Supreme Court for
    a writ of certiorari. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3). See also U.S.Sup.Ct.R.
    13.    Accordingly, Mathis’s sentence was final at the time Alleyne was
    decided in June of 2013, and, pursuant to the holding of 
    Washington, supra
    , he is not entitled to relief from his Section 9712 sentences.
    With regard to Mathis’s other sentencing claims, we find they are
    waived    for   our   review.       Mathis     did   not   challenge   either   counsel’s
    ineffectiveness for failing to object to the imposition of three consecutive
    mandatory sentences, or the court’s imposition of a consecutive sentence on
    the count of conspiracy in either his pro se or supplemental PCRA petitions.
    See 
    Elliott, supra
    .         Accordingly, we may not consider these claims on
    appeal.11
    Order affirmed.
    ____________________________________________
    11
    We note neither of these claims involve the legality of Mathis’s sentence.
    See Commonwealth v. Miller, 
    102 A.3d 988
    , 995 (Pa. Super. 2014)
    (noting this Court may raise a legality of sentencing claim sua sponte).
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    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/31/2016
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