Com. v. McKinley, A. ( 2016 )


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  • J. S52006/16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :       IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :             PENNSYLVANIA
    v.                     :
    :
    ALLEN DALE McKINLEY,                       :          No. 2152 EDA 2015
    :
    Appellant         :
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, December 16, 2014,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
    Criminal Division at No. CP-09-CR-0001977-2014
    BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., STABILE AND STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.:                   FILED AUGUST 18, 2016
    Allen Dale McKinley appeals from the December 16, 2014 aggregate
    judgment of sentence of 9 to 30 years’ imprisonment, followed by 5 years’
    probation, imposed after he pled guilty to statutory sexual assault, unlawful
    contact with a minor, corruption of minors, and 3 counts each of aggravated
    indecent assault -- person less than 16 years of age and indecent assault --
    person less than 16 years of age.1 After careful review, we affirm.
    The relevant facts of the case are as follows. On January 22, 2014,
    Detective   Daryl   Lewis   of   the   Pennridge    Regional   Police   Department
    interviewed a 17-year-old female victim, M.C., regarding a series of sexual
    * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1
    18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3122.1, 6318, 6301, 3125(a)(8), and 3126(a)(8),
    respectively.
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    assaults that occurred at appellant’s home between 2009 and 2010. (Notes
    of testimony, 7/29/14 at 41.)    M.C. stated that appellant, a friend of her
    family, had sexually assaulted her on multiple occasions while she was
    between the ages of 12 and 14. (Id. at 41-42.) Specifically, M.C. reported
    that appellant touched and fondled her breasts, kissed her breasts and
    vagina, and inserted his fingers into her vagina on multiple occasions. (Id.
    at 42-43.)    M.C. further informed Detective Lewis that the sexual assaults
    occurred once or twice a month between the ages of 13 and 14, and that on
    at least two occasions, she had engaged in sexual intercourse with appellant.
    (Id. at 43-44.) On February 6, 2014, appellant was subsequently arrested
    after he acknowledged during an intercepted telephone conversation that he
    had engaged in sexual contact with M.C. on multiple occasions.       (Id. at
    44-45.)    At all relevant times during these incidents, appellant was 39 to
    42 years of age. (Id.)
    On February 7, 2014, appellant was charged with statutory sexual
    assault, unlawful contact with a minor, corruption of minors, three counts of
    aggravated indecent assault, and four counts of indecent assault.         On
    July 29, 2014, appellant pled guilty to all charges except one count of
    indecent assault -- person less than 13 years of age,2 which was
    nolle prossed upon motion of the Commonwealth.              Sentencing was
    deferred pending an evaluation by the Sexual Offenders Assessment Board
    2
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(7).
    -2-
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    (“SOAB”) to determine whether appellant met the criteria for a sexually
    violent predator (“SVP”).          Following a hearing, the trial court entered an
    order on December 16, 2014, classifying appellant as an SVP.                 That same
    day, the trial court sentenced appellant to an aggregate term of 9 to
    30 years’ imprisonment, followed by 5 years’ probation. On December 23,
    2014, appellant filed a post-sentence motion for reconsideration of sentence.
    Following a hearing, the trial court denied appellant’s motion on June 24,
    2015. This timely appeal followed on July 15, 2015.3
    On appeal, appellant raises the following issue for our review:
    A.       Did the trial court err in finding that the
    Commonwealth established that appellant
    meets the statutory criteria for classification as
    [an SVP] as there was insufficient evidence to
    establish appellant suffered from a mental
    abnormality or personality disorder?
    Appellant’s    brief     at   4.     Specifically,   appellant   maintains    that   the
    Commonwealth failed to establish that he suffers from a mental abnormality,
    as there is no mental abnormality of hebephilia recognized by the DSM-IV or
    ICD-10, the primary reference material of psychiatrists. (Id. at 13-14.)
    The standard governing our review of the sufficiency of the evidence
    with respect to an SVP determination is well established:
    A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is a
    question of law subject to plenary review. We must
    determine whether the evidence admitted at [the
    SVP hearing] and all reasonable inferences drawn
    therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable
    3
    Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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    to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, is
    sufficient to support all elements of the [statute]. A
    reviewing court may not weigh the evidence or
    substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.
    At a hearing prior to sentencing the court shall
    determine whether the Commonwealth has proved
    by clear and convincing evidence that the individual
    is a sexually violent predator. In reviewing the
    sufficiency   of   the  evidence     regarding    the
    determination of SVP status, we will reverse the trial
    court only if the Commonwealth has not presented
    clear and convincing evidence sufficient to establish
    each element required by the statute.
    Commonwealth v. Evans, 
    901 A.2d 528
    , 534 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal
    denied, 
    909 A.2d 303
    (Pa. 2006) (citations omitted; bracketed information
    in original).
    The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A.
    § 9791, et seq. (“SORNA”), defines a “sexually violent predator” as:
    [a] person who has been convicted of a sexually
    violent offense as set forth in § 9795.1 (relating to
    registration) and who is determined to be a sexually
    violent predator under § 9795.4 (relating to
    assessments) due to a mental abnormality or
    personality disorder that makes the person likely to
    engage in predatory sexually violent offenses.
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9792.
    SORNA defines “mental abnormality” as “[a] congenital or acquired
    condition of a person that affects the emotional or volitional capacity of the
    person in a manner that predisposes that person to the commission of
    criminal sexual acts to a degree that makes the person a menace to the
    health and safety of other persons.”            
    Id. In turn,
    SORNA defines
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    “predatory” as “[a]n act directed at a stranger or at a person with whom a
    relationship has been initiated, established, maintained or promoted, in
    whole or in part, in order to facilitate or support victimization.” 
    Id. We begin
    by addressing whether appellant has properly preserved his
    claim for appellate review.    At the December 16, 2014 SVP hearing, the
    Commonwealth presented the testimony of Dr. John M. Shanken-Kaye, a
    15-year veteran of Pennsylvania’s SOAB who was qualified as an expert in
    the assessment and treatment of adult sexual offenders.                (Notes of
    testimony, 12/16/14 at 5, 7.) Dr. Shanken-Kaye testified that he completed
    an assessment of appellant based upon his “past history, past offenses [and]
    past treatment . . . [.]”     (Id. at 8-10.)     Dr. Shanken-Kaye opined to a
    reasonable    degree   of   professional   and    psychological   certainty   that
    “[appellant] me[t] the diagnostic criterion for something called Otherwise
    Specified Paraphiliac Disorder, notably hebephilia or the sexual arousal and
    attraction to pubescent females or females undergoing puberty, which is
    considered a congenital or acquired condition.” (Id. at 14.) In reaching this
    conclusion, Dr. Shanken-Kaye further explained that:
    The victim was between the ages of 12 and 14
    and -- according to the information given me. And
    one of the delineations that I have to make or any of
    the individuals doing these types of assessment have
    to make, is whether this is an issue of pedophilia or
    an issue of hebephilia or a different type of deviant
    behavior.
    In looking at sexuality or the sexual
    development of boys and girls we can look at
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    individuals that are prepubescent and that has a
    wide age range. In the diagnostic manuals they will
    speak of being up to 13 but we know that many
    individuals begin puberty, particularly in current
    times, as early as 7 or 8.
    So there’s a long period of time called
    pubescence, puberty, and that is typically between
    the ages of about 10 and 14, sometimes 15. And
    what differentiates it from full-fledged adolescence is
    the fact that during that age range, particularly in
    the lower end of the age range, the individual is
    typically not fully sexually developed but is
    undergoing sexual development.
    And that is why there is a special category of
    hebephilia for individuals that are attracted to boys
    or girls that are in the early stages of puberty versus
    individuals, for instance, that are only attracted to
    people who have no developed sexual characteristics
    at all.
    
    Id. at 21-22.
    The record reflects that appellant failed to challenge or object to
    Dr. Shanken-Kaye’s diagnosis on the basis that it is not recognized in the
    DSM-IV or ICD-10. Appellant also failed to present his own expert witness
    on the diagnosis of hebephilia or cite to any legal authority in his appellate
    brief to support the conclusion that SORNA requires that the diagnosis of a
    mental abnormality appear in the DSM-IV or ICD-10. “[W]here an appellate
    brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant
    authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion
    capable of review, that claim is waived.” Commonwealth v. Rahman, 
    75 A.3d 497
    ,     504    (Pa.Super.    2013)    (citation   omitted);     see   also
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    Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are waived and
    cannot be raised for the first time on appeal[]”); Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c)
    (requiring citation to place in record where issue has been preserved).
    Accordingly, we conclude that appellant’s claim is waived.4
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/18/2016
    4
    Alternatively, even if appellant had not waived his claim, we agree with the
    trial court’s well-reasoned conclusion that the Commonwealth established by
    clear and convincing evidence that appellant met the criteria for SVP status.
    (See notes of testimony, 12/16/14 at 48-50; trial court opinion, 12/29/15 at
    7.)
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2152 EDA 2015

Filed Date: 8/18/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/18/2016