Com. v. Brown, K. ( 2016 )


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  • J-S46024-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                         IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    KAREEN BROWN
    Appellant                     No. 3110 EDA 2015
    Appeal from the PCRA Order September 1, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0000837-2007
    BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OTT, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.:                                  FILED AUGUST 18, 2016
    Kareen1 Brown appeals, pro se, from the order entered in the Court of
    Common Pleas of Chester County, on September 1, 2015, denying him relief
    on his pro se second petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act
    (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541 et seq.              The PCRA court determined Brown’s
    PCRA petition was untimely.         In this appeal, Brown claims the PCRA court
    erred in determining this was Brown’s second PCRA petition and in failing to
    recognize he is serving an illegal sentence pursuant to Alleyne v. United
    States, ___ U.S. ___, 
    133 S. Ct. 2151
    , 
    186 L. Ed. 2d 314
    (2013).            After a
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1
    This name is spelled “Kareen” or “Kareem” throughout the certified record.
    However, in documents that appear to have been filled out by the appellant,
    it is spelled “Kareen”. Accordingly, we use that spelling.
    J-S46024-16
    thorough review of the submissions by the parties, relevant law, and the
    certified record, we affirm.
    Before we can address any of Brown’s substantive claims, we must
    address the timeliness of his petition.
    [T]he timeliness of a PCRA petition implicates the jurisdiction of
    this Court and the PCRA court. Commonwealth v. Williams,
    
    35 A.3d 44
    , 52 (Pa. Super. 2011)(citation omitted), appeal
    denied, 
    616 Pa. 467
    , 
    50 A.3d 121
    (2012). “Pennsylvania law
    makes clear no court has jurisdiction to hear an untimely PCRA
    petition.” 
    Id. The PCRA
    “confers no authority upon this Court to
    fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the PCRA time-bar [.]”
    Commonwealth v. Watts, 
    611 Pa. 80
    , 
    23 A.3d 980
    , 983
    (2011) (citation omitted). This is to “accord finality to the
    collateral review process.” 
    Id. “A petition
    for relief under the
    PCRA, including a second or subsequent petition, must be filed
    within one year of the date the judgment becomes final unless
    the petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, that an exception
    to the time for filing the petition, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
    9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii), is met.” The act provides, in
    relevant part, as follows.
    § 9545. Jurisdiction and proceedings
    ...
    (b) Time for filing petition.—
    (1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a
    second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within
    one year of the date the judgment becomes final,
    unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves
    that:
    (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was
    the result of interference by government officials
    with the presentation of the claim in violation of
    the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or
    the Constitution or laws of the United States;
    (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated
    were unknown to the petitioner and could not
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    have been ascertained by the exercise of due
    diligence; or
    (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that
    was recognized by the Supreme Court of the
    United States or the Supreme Court of
    Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this
    section and has been held by that court to apply
    retroactively.
    (2) Any petition invoking an exception provided in
    paragraph (1) shall be filed within 60 days of the
    date the claim could have been presented.
    ...
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b).
    Commonwealth v. Medina, 
    92 A.3d 1210
    , 1215 (Pa. Super. 2014).
    Brown’s underlying claims implicate the legality of his sentence. Such
    claims are, generally, not subject to waiver. However,
    “[A] court may entertain a challenge to the legality of the
    sentence so long as the court has jurisdiction to hear the claim.
    In the PCRA context, jurisdiction is tied to the filing of a timely
    PCRA petition.” [Commonwealth v. Fowler, 
    930 A.2d 586
    , 592
    (Pa. Super. 2007)] (quoting Commonwealth v. Berry, 
    877 A.2d 479
    , 482 (Pa. Super. 2005) (en banc), appeal denied, 
    591 Pa. 688
    , 
    917 A.2d 844
    (2007)). “Although legality of sentence is
    always subject to review within the PCRA, claims must still first
    satisfy the PCRA's time limits or one of the exceptions thereto.”
    
    Fowler, supra
    , Pennsylvania law makes clear no court has
    jurisdiction to hear an untimely PCRA petition. Commonwealth
    v. Robinson, 
    575 Pa. 500
    , 
    837 A.2d 1157
    (2003). Thus, a
    collateral claim regarding the legality of a sentence can be lost
    for failure to raise it in a timely manner under the PCRA.
    Commonwealth v. Wojtaszek, 
    951 A.2d 1169
    , 1173 n. 9 (Pa.
    Super. 2008), appeal denied, 
    600 Pa. 733
    , 
    963 A.2d 470
    (2009).
    Commonwealth v. Infante, 
    63 A.3d 358
    , 375 (Pa. Super. 2013).
    Accordingly, we need not examine the merits of Brown’s claim of
    illegal sentence if the claim itself has not been raised in a timely manner.
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    J-S46024-16
    Here, the PCRA court determined, and the certified record confirms, that
    Brown’s judgment of sentence became final on March 7, 2011 when the
    United States Supreme Court denied Brown’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari
    on direct appeal. Pursuant to statute, Brown had one year from that date,
    or until March 7, 2012, to file his PCRA petition. On June 15, 2015, Brown
    2
    filed this petition, his second.        It is facially untimely by greater than three
    years.    Nonetheless, Brown claims the petition is timely based upon the
    newly recognized constitutional right announced by the United States
    Supreme Court in Alleyne, supra. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii). This
    argument is unavailing.
    In order to qualify for any of the three exceptions to the one-year
    timeliness limit, the petitioner must file the claim within 60 days of the date
    the claim could have been presented.             42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).    In that
    regard, the PCRA court found that Alleyne was filed on June 17, 2013,
    which meant Brown had until Friday, August 16, 2013 in which to file his
    petition. See Notice of Intent to Dismiss PCRA Petition, at 3-5 (7/28/2015).
    The certified record confirms Brown did not file the instant petition until June
    ____________________________________________
    2
    Brown filed a prior petition, seeking permission to file a PCRA petition nunc
    pro tunc. That petition was denied by the PCRA court, which decision was
    affirmed by a panel of our Court. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 
    106 A.3d 181
    (Pa. Super. 2014) (unpublished memorandum), allowance of
    appeal denied, 
    109 A.3d 677
    (Pa. 2015).
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    J-S46024-16
    15, 2015.      Accordingly, he is not entitled to the benefit of the newly
    recognized constitutional right exception.3
    Because     the   petition    was       untimely,   the   PCRA   court   correctly
    determined it did not have jurisdiction to address the merits of Brown’s
    petition. Accordingly, the PCRA court did not err in dismissing the petition. 4
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/18/2016
    ____________________________________________
    3
    Because the petition does not satisfy the requirements of Section
    9545(b)(2), we need not discuss the fact that Alleyne is not subject to
    retroactive application, which would be another reason why Brown is not
    entitled to relief. See Commonwealth v. Washington, ___ A.3d ___,
    
    2016 WL 3900988
    (Pa. 2016) (7/19/2016)
    4
    The PCRA court also asserted that Brown’s appeal of the denial of his PCRA
    petition was untimely filed. We recognize our prerogative to remand this
    matter for a hearing to determine Brown’s compliance with the prisoner
    mailbox rule. See Smith v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and
    Parole, 
    683 A.2d 278
    , 282-83 (Pa. 1996). However, given our disposition,
    we decline as it “would be futile to do so.” See Commonwealth v.
    Chambers, 
    35 A.3d 34
    , 40 (Pa. Super. 2011).
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