Com. v. Clayborne, V. ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
VANDER K. CLAYBORNE
Appellant No. 3354 EDA 2015
Appeal from the PCRA Order October 22, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0009696-1990
BEFORE: BOWES, J., SOLANO, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY SOLANO, J.: FILED AUGUST 19, 2016
Appellant, Vander K. Clayborne, appeals pro se from the order
dismissing Appellant’s fourth petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction
Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546, for lack of jurisdiction. We
affirm.
The PCRA court summarized the pertinent factual and procedural
history of this case as follows:
On October 3, 1991, [Appellant] entered a
guilty plea to murder generally for the killing of
Jeffrey Savage and to aggravated assault for
shooting Raymond Craig. The Honorable Frank T.
Hazel held a non-jury degree of guilt hearing from
October 7, 1991 – October 9, 1991 and found
[Appellant] guilty of first degree murder. A jury was
empaneled for the death penalty phase but was
unable to reach a unanimous verdict. As a result, on
September 14, 1992, [Appellant] was sentenced to a
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term of life imprisonment plus 78-240 months’
incarceration.
[Appellant] filed a direct appeal and on August
9, 1993, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed
[Appellant’s] judgment of sentence by memorandum
opinion. On December 15, 1994, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court denied [Appellant’s] petition for
allowance of appeal.
On April 18, 1995, [Appellant] filed a PCRA
petition. Counsel was appointed and on May 22,
1995, filed an amended petition. An evidentiary
hearing took place on June 12, 1995. The PCRA
court denied the petition.
On July 28, 2011, [Appellant] filed a petition
entitled “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and
Declaratory Judgment.” The court treated the
petition as a second PCRA. On August 22, 2011, the
PCRA court filed its notice of intent to dismiss
without a hearing based upon its finding that the
petition was untimely and that [Appellant] failed to
satisfy any of the exceptions to the time bar.
[Appellant] responded to the notice of intent to
dismiss on September 28, 2011 and the petition was
dismissed on September 29, 2011.
[Appellant] filed a notice of appeal on
December 13, 2011. The Pennsylvania Superior
Court affirmed the dismissal on December 12, 2012.
On January 17, 2013, [Appellant] filed an application
for reconsideration, which was denied on March 14,
2013.
On July 25, 2014, [Appellant] filed this instant
Petition, entitled “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,
with Motion to Vacate Waivers and Judgment of
Conviction/Sentence.” The case was reassigned to
this Court. [Appellant] raised claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel as well as an illegal sentence
claim; therefore, this Court treated the motion as
[Appellant’s] third PCRA petition. On September 15,
2014, this Court issued a notice of intent to dismiss
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without a hearing. [Appellant] responded on
October 7, 2014. On October 8, 2014, this Court
issued an Order dismissing the Petition. [Appellant]
filed a notice of appeal on November 6, 2014.
On June 8, 2015, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court affirmed the [PCRA c]ourt’s dismissal of
Appellant’s untimely third PCRA petition. On June
24, 2015, Appellant filed an Application for
Reargument/Reconsideration, which was denied on
August 6, 2015.
On August 17, 2015, a mere eleven days after
the Superior Court’s denial of Appellant’s
reconsideration application, Appellant filed a “Motion
to Renew PCRA/Habeas Petition” which this Court
treated as his fourth PCRA petition. Appellant raises
the exact same issues that were in his third PCRA
petition but adds that he is entitled to relief pursuant
to Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 117 A.2d 247 (Pa.
2015).
This Court issued a notice of intent to dismiss
on August 18, 2015. [Appellant] wrote to this Court
and asked for additional time to file a response,
which this Court granted. Appellant filed a response
on September 8, 2015. On October 22, 2015, this
Court dismissed the Petition. On November 6, 2015,
Appellant filed a notice of appeal.
PCRA Court Opinion, 11/12/15, at 1-3. As noted above, Appellant
unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief in prior PCRA petitions filed in
1995, 2011, and 2014. This is Appellant’s fourth PCRA petition.
On this appeal, Appellant raises the following issues, as stated:
1. Did the lower court deny Appellant due process by
not allowing Appellant a hearing and-or assistance
of counsel, thereby violating his rights secured by
the U.S. Constitution, Amendments 1, 5, 6, 14?
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2. May the state legislature or courts suspend the
writ of habeas corpus and did they deny Appellant
due process in violation of Amendments 1, 5, 14
and Article 1, § 9(2) and Pennsylvania
Constitution Article 1, § 14?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
The PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition for lack of jurisdiction
because the petition was not filed with the time limits set forth in the PCRA.
In fact, the court noted that Appellant’s fourth PCRA petition “is facially
untimely by approximately twenty years.” PCRA Court Opinion, 11/12/15, at
4. We agree.
This Court’s standard of review regarding an order dismissing a
petition under the PCRA is “to determine whether the determination of the
PCRA court is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error.
The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for
the findings in the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d
185, 191-92 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal citations omitted).
The timeliness of a post-conviction petition is jurisdictional.
Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013).
Generally, a petition for relief under the PCRA, including a second or
subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment
is final unless the petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, one of the
three statutory exceptions to these time limitations set forth in Section
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9545(b)(1) of the statute.1 See 42 Pa. C.S. § 9545(b). A PCRA petition
invoking one of these statutory exceptions must “be filed within 60 days of
the date the claims could have been presented.” Hernandez, 79 A.3d at
651-52; see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). Any asserted exceptions to the
time limitations must be alleged in the petition to the PCRA court; they may
not be raised for the first time on appeal. Commonwealth v. Burton, 936
A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super. 2007)
Here, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on March 15,
1995 (ninety days after our Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance
of appeal). See Commonwealth v. Clayborne, No. 3380 EDA 2014, slip
op. at 6 (Pa. Super. June 8, 2015). Appellant’s latest PCRA petition is
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1
The exceptions to the timeliness requirement are:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference of government officials with the presentation of the
claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States.
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown
to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the
exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in
this section and has been held by that court to apply
retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).
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therefore patently untimely unless he has satisfied his burden of pleading
and proving that one of the enumerated exceptions applies. See
Hernandez.
As the PCRA court noted, Appellant’s latest PCRA petition “fail[s] to
plead any facts that, if proven, would satisfy any of the exceptions to the
timeliness requirement.” PCRA Court Opinion, 11/12/15, at 5. In particular,
the petition fails to plead any ground under Section 9545(b)(1) that would
entitle Appellant to litigate the two issues that he frames in his brief, which
he has filed twenty years after his judgment of sentence became final.
In his brief, Appellant asserts that he is entitled to post-conviction
relief because he was illegally sentenced in light of Alleyne v. United
States, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2015) (any fact that by law increases
a mandatory minimum sentence must be treated as an element of the
offense and found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt). He also cites
Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 117 A.3d 247 (Pa. 2015) (under Alleyne,
mandatory minimum sentencing aspects of Section 6317 of Crimes Code are
constitutionally infirm). See Appellant’s Brief at 5. But the constitutional
rights recognized in those decisions may be a basis for PCRA relief only if the
decisions apply retroactively. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii). The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania has held that “Alleyne does not apply retroactively to
cases pending on collateral review,” and that a sentence imposed in violation
of Alleyne is not in fact “illegal.” Commonwealth v. Washington, ___
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A.3d ____, 2016 WL 3909088, *8 (Pa. July 19, 2016). That holding
necessarily disposes of “illegal sentencing” claims under Hopkins as well.
See id. at *1. Accordingly, Appellant’s citation to Alleyne and Hopkins
cannot save his petition from the PCRA’s jurisdictional bar.
Based on the foregoing, the PCRA court correctly concluded that it
lacked jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s latest PCRA petition. We therefore
affirm the PCRA court’s order denying Appellant post-conviction relief.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/19/2016
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