Nationstar Mortgage v. Williams, L. ( 2016 )

J-A08029-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, D/B/A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
CHAMPION MORTGAGE COMPANY, : PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
LEE AUDREY WILLIAMS AND GEORGE E. :
WILLIAMS :
:
APPEAL OF: LEE AUDREY WILLIAMS : No. 1742 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment Entered May 4, 2015
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Civil Division at No(s): July Term, 2013 No. 4566
BEFORE: BOWES, OLSON, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.:FILED SEPTEMBER 12, 2016
I respectfully dissent.
The fundamental rule in construing a contract is to ascertain and give
effect to the intention of the parties. Lower Frederick Township v.
Clemmer, 43 A.2d 502 (Pa. 1988). The intention of the parties must be
ascertained from the document itself, if its terms are clear and
unambiguous. Hutchison v. Sunbeam Coal Corp., 519 A.2d 385 (Pa.
1986). Further, it is well-settled that
the intent of the parties to a written contract is to be regarded
as being embodied in the writing itself, and when the words are
clear and unambiguous the intent is to be discovered only from
the express language of the agreement. As this Court [has]
stated…, [w]hen a written contract is clear and unequivocal, its
meaning must be determined by its contents alone. It speaks for
itself and a meaning cannot be given to it other than that
expressed. Where the intention of the parties is clear, there is no
need to resort to extrinsic aids or evidence. Hence, where
language is clear and unambiguous, the focus of interpretation is
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A08029-16
upon the terms of the agreement as manifestly expressed,
rather than as, perhaps, silently intended.
Steuart v. McChesney, 444 A.2d 659, 661 (Pa. 1982) (citations omitted;
emphasis in original).
Instantly, the first page of the mortgage document states as follows:
“The mortgagor is [decedent], as to a life estate interest and [Appellant] and
George E. Williams, as to the remainder, whose address is 5918 Larchwood
Avenue, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19143 (“Borrower”).” Mortgage,
3/9/2010, at 1. All three named borrowers signed this document. Id. at 8.
The above-quoted language is unequivocal: Appellant was intended as a
borrower under the terms of the mortgage. Therefore, the court erred in
relying on extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intent.
Even if there were some ambiguity with respect to this mortgage
language, “[a]s a general rule, agreements will be construed against the
drafter when terms are ambiguous.” Gallagher v. Fidelcor, Inc., 657 A.2d
31, 34 (Pa. Super. 1995). Construing the terms of the mortgage against
Nationstar compels the same result: Appellant is a named borrower and is
therefore entitled to remain in the property.
Accordingly, because I believe the trial court committed an error of law
in going outside of the mortgage document to ascertain its meaning, I would
reverse the trial court order.
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