Mitchell, A. v. Highland Park Care ( 2016 )


Menu:
  • J-A13006-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    ARTIS MITCHELL, AS THE                        IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF                      PENNSYLVANIA
    CAROLYN MITCHELL, DECEASED,
    Appellant
    v.
    HIGHLAND PARK CARE CENTER, LLC,
    OPERATING UNDER THE FICTITIOUS
    NAME HIGHLAND PARK CARE CENTER
    AND LUTHERAN SENIORLIFE,
    OPERATING UNDER THE FICTITIOUS
    NAME ST. JOHN SPECIALTY CARE
    CENTER,
    Appellee                   No. 1057 WDA 2015
    Appeal from the Judgment Entered August 11, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
    Civil Division at No(s): GD-12-000832
    BEFORE: OLSON, STABILE AND MUSMANNO, JJ.:
    MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                         FILED AUGUST 24, 2016
    Appellant, Artis Mitchell, as the administrator of the estate of Carolyn
    Mitchell, deceased, appeals from the judgment entered on August 11, 2015.
    We affirm.
    The trial court succinctly explained the relevant, underlying facts and
    procedural posture of this case:
    [Appellant] brought a survival action alleging that Highland
    Park Care Center [(“HPCC”)] failed to create and implement
    a proper treatment care plan for [Carolyn Mitchell (“Ms.
    Mitchell”)], and failed to promptly notify a physician of a
    significant change in [Ms. Mitchell’s] condition.
    J-A13006-16
    In 1992, [Ms.] Mitchell experienced cardiac arrest, resulting
    in a severe anoxic brain injury, which required her to need
    skilled nursing care on a full-time basis for the rest of her
    life. [Shorty thereafter, Ms. Mitchell became a resident of
    HPCC, which is a skilled nursing facility in Pittsburgh.] . . .
    [Appellant] claims specifically that in the weeks leading up
    to February 15, 2010, [Ms.] Mitchell experienced repeated
    episodes of emesis, which is vomiting, that went unreported
    to her physician.      [Appellant] further claims that said
    episodes of emesis led to substances entering the lungs of
    Ms. Mitchell causing her to suffer aspiration pneumonia.
    [Appellant] further alleges that said negligence resulted in a
    downward spiral in the health of Ms. Mitchell, eventually
    resulting in her death on February 7, 2011.
    ...
    This matter was initiated by the filing of a praecipe for writ
    of summons on January 12, 2012. Said praecipe was
    followed by a complaint in civil action filed [on] September
    17, 2012. . . .
    Prior to trial, [Appellant] settled his claims with defendant
    Lutheran Seniorlife, operating under the fictitious name of
    St. John Specialty Care Center.
    A trial commenced on March 18, 2015, lasting until March
    25, 2015, at which time the jury empaneled returned a
    verdict for [HPCC] and against [Appellant], finding an
    absence of negligence on the part of [HPCC. The trial court
    denied Appellant’s post-trial motion and judgment on the
    verdict was entered on August 11, 2015].
    Trial Court Opinion, 10/1/15, at 1-3 (some internal capitalization omitted).
    Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and, on appeal, Appellant
    raises the following claims:
    [1.] Did the trial court err in denying [Appellant’s]   motion
    for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”)       on the
    issue of negligence when the verdict was such that      no two
    reasonable minds could disagree that the verdict        should
    -2-
    J-A13006-16
    have been rendered in favor of [Appellant]? Specifically,
    based upon the evidence that was offered at trial, along
    with the fact that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
    Department of Health (the “DOH”) specifically found that
    [HPCC] failed to promptly notify a physician of a significant
    change, which ultimately caused Ms. Mitchell to suffer
    aspiration pneumonia, the jury’s finding of “no negligence”
    is indeed such that it shocks one’s “sense of justice,” as the
    jury was charged on the issue of negligence per se.
    Further, the court committed an error by denying
    [Appellant’s] motion for JNOV on the issue of negligence,
    despite the fact that [HPCC’s] own experts admitted that
    [HPCC] violated applicable standards of care. The [trial]
    court committed an error by dismissing [Appellant’s] claim
    for punitive damages at the close of [Appellant’s] case,
    upon [HPCC’s] motion for a directed verdict. [Appellant]
    preserved this issue in his motion for post-trial relief. Based
    upon the evidence adduced at trial, it is clear that the issue
    of punitive damages should have been one presented to the
    jury.
    [2.] Did the trial court err in denying [Appellant’s] motion
    for a new trial on the issue of negligence when the verdict
    was against the clear and substantial weight of the
    evidence, particularly in light of the fact that based on the
    evidence that was offered at trial, along with the fact that
    the DOH specifically found that [HPCC] failed to promptly
    notify a physician of a significant change, which ultimately
    caused Ms. Mitchell to suffer aspiration pneumonia, the
    jury’s finding of “no negligence” is indeed such that it
    shocks one’s “sense of justice,” especially in light of the fact
    that the jury was charged on negligence per se. Further,
    the [trial] court committed an error by denying [Appellant’s]
    motion for a new trial on the issue of negligence, despite
    the fact that [HPCC’s] own experts admitted that [HPCC]
    violated applicable standards of care. The [trial] court
    committed an error by dismissing [Appellant’s] claim for
    punitive damages at the close of [Appellant’s] case, upon
    [HPCC’s] motion for a directed verdict.             [Appellant]
    preserved this issue in his motion for post-trial relief. Based
    upon the evidence adduced at trial, it is clear that the issue
    of punitive damages should have been one presented to the
    jury.
    -3-
    J-A13006-16
    Appellant’s Brief at 5-6 (some internal capitalization omitted).
    We reviewed the briefs of the parties, the relevant law, the certified
    record, the notes of testimony, and the opinion of the able trial court judge,
    the Honorable Michael A. Della Vecchia. We conclude that there has been no
    error in this case and that Judge Della Vecchia’s opinion, entered on October
    1, 2015, meticulously and accurately disposes of Appellant’s issues on
    appeal. Therefore, we affirm on the basis of Judge Della Vecchia’s opinion
    and adopt it as our own. In any future filings with this or any other court
    addressing this ruling, the filing party shall attach a copy of the trial court
    opinion.
    Judgment affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/24/2016
    -4-
    Circulated 08/05/2016 03:29 PM
    IN THE COURT                          OF COMMON      PLEAS OF ALLEGHENY   COUNTY,           PENNSYLVANIA
    CIVIL DIVISION
    ARTIS MITCHELL, as Administrator                                            No. GD 12-000832
    of the Estate of CAROLYN MITCHELL,
    Deceased,
    ..... ,
    <::                          r >
    ~
    Plaintiff,                                       ' TO~:...                c.,,
    t.':> ,. ..
    :   I       :
    vs.                                                                                       ..
    C)
    C)
    -l
    ,.....
    =.'              L..:
    HIGHLAND PARK CARE CENTER,                                                                             ·-·             I
    LU
    __ J
    LLC, operating under the fictitious name                                                                          v
    HIGHLAND PARK CARE CENTER and                                                                                                LL
    w
    LUTHERAN SENIORLIFE operating under                                                  ...·- ~:. .J ~-i
    I
    en
    the fictitious name ST. JOHN SPECIALTY                                               ":J
    l'-..l
    CAR ECENTER,
    Defendants.
    OPINION
    Honorable Michael A Della Vecchia
    710 City-County Building
    414 Grant Street
    Pittsburgh, PA 15219
    ~~~
    . ~,_:,u..
    ....:s     ··~>-
    (')        .. •·1,---
    0                            .-
    :   ~r    •   •    ""
    ::!:                         :,
    w        o,                           .)
    _J
    --
    u_       f-
    (.)
    ,,~      ..,,
    a          :.::::!~
    - .,.-"" _J
    l()       ---1
    rjU954 A.2d 1199
    , 1206 (Pa.Super. 2008), citing
    Northeast Fence & Iron Works v. Murphy Quigley Co .. Inc., 
    933 A.2d 664
    , 668
    (Pa.Super. 2007).
    The Plaintiff believes he provided the jury with a 'smoking gun' pointing to a
    finding by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Health ("DOH")
    specifically holding that Highland Park failed to promptly notify a physician of a
    significant change, which ultimately caused Ms. Mitchell to suffer aspiration pneumonia.
    The Plaintiff requested and the trial court incorporated Plaintiff's proposed charge of
    negligence per se into the court's instructions to the jury. The jury obviously rejected
    Plaintiff's argument as to this point.
    This writer accepts that the jury was not convinced by the Plaintiff's argument as
    to causation. specifically. the fact that both the Plaintiff and the Defendant's experts
    opined that Ms. Mitchell's aspiration pneumonia developed from events in the hospital,
    or immediately prior to her admission, not from any negligence noted in the DOH report.
    The DOH finding concerns failures following events reported January 24, 2010,
    February 3, 2010, and February 8, 201 O.
    The defense expert, Dr. Adam Sohnen stated that. "there was absolutely no
    relationship between any of the emesis events, at least until the most recently
    documented one on the (February) 111h and her pneumonia" (Trial Transcript ("Tr.") at
    574). Dr. Sohnen explained convincingly to the jury that the initial chest x-rays
    5
    examined following the events of emesis failed to show any signs of pneumonia and
    were in fact "clear", "if she had pneumonia that was brewing or developing     over those
    several days, you would have seen a very abnormal appearing chest x-ray" (See, Tr. at
    574).
    It was consistently the Plaintiff's position that the emesis was caused by the
    negligence in the defendant's choice to feed and medicate Ms. Mitchell through       a G-port
    rather than a J-port. When specifically asked whether a change in ports would have
    alleviated Ms. Mitchell's instances of vomiting, Dr. Sohnen answer was "no, absolutely
    not" (Tr. at 578}.
    The Plaintiff's expert, Dr. Bruce Kinosian opined that "l'rn pretty sure that she
    aspirated on the (February) 131h I which is when she developed the wheezing. Whether
    that developed into something or whether she had new events) l don't know. My guess
    is that she probably had a new event" (Tr. at 244).
    The Plaintiff's own expert failed to advance the theory proffered by the Plaintiff,
    that being; that the DOH finding that Highland Park failed to promptly notify a physician
    of Ms. Mitchell's change of condition caused the aspiration pneumonia, leading, if not
    contributing to her eventual death. Further, the DOH itself later made a finding of "no
    harm" with regard to its earlier report of the deficiency at Highland Park Care Center
    concerning the lack of notification.
    Ms. Mitchell enjoyed additional care provided by private duty nurses. These
    private duty nurses were not affiliated or employed by Highland Park Care Center. The
    jury could have plausibly concluded that negligence on the part of said private care
    nurses was not attributable to Highland Park Care Center.
    6
    The Plaintiff raises additional error with this Court's decision to deny a request
    made by the Plaintiff for a charge on punitive damages. As the Superior Court is well
    aware, "punitive damages are awarded only for outrageous conduct, that isl for acts
    done with a bad motive or with a reckless Indifference to the interests of others. Thus,
    the Pennsylvania rule allows the awarding of punitive damages when the act is done
    with reckless indifference as well as with bad motive (Focht v. Rabada, 
    268 A.2d 157
    ,
    159 (Pa. Super. 1970), citing, Chambers v. Montgomery, 
    192 A.2d 355
     (Pa. 1963)).
    This writer finds this case completely devoid of bad motive or reckless
    indifference. Only 'false charting' assertions made by the Plaintiff could possibly be
    construed as a basis for punitive damages. Presumably, the jury found that any
    discrepancies were merely mistakes or inaccuracies within the medical charting. In light
    of the fact that the jury found that the Defendant was not negligent, any charge on
    punitive damages was not warranted.
    IV. CONCLUSION
    This Court found the jury's Verdict in the above captioned case to be in accord
    with the evidence presented at trial. For the aforesaid reasons, this writer respectfully
    requests the Superior Court of Pennsylvania to affirm this Court's Order dated June 24,
    2015, and the judgment entered on the Verdict rendered.
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1057 WDA 2015

Filed Date: 8/24/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/24/2016