JP Morgan v. Ustinova, S. ( 2023 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
SVETLANA USTINOVA :
:
Appellant : No. 344 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered December 15, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Civil Division at No(s):
4613-CV-2020
BEFORE: BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 22, 2023
In this guaranty contract matter, Svetlana Ustinova (Appellant) takes
this counseled appeal from the order entered in the Monroe County Court of
Common Pleas, granting summary judgment in favor JP Morgan Chase Bank,
N.A (Bank).1 Appellant avers the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment where: (1) discovery was not completed; (2) the guaranty contract
was ambiguous, and this issue of ambiguity should have been submitted to a
jury to resolve; (3) the contract was unconscionable because Appellant did
not fully understand its terms; (4) the contract was impossible to perform;
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1 On the following day, December 16, 2021, the trial court also entered
judgment in favor of Bank in the amount of $204,685.86.
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and (5) parol evidence should have been admitted to show she did not
understand the terms of the contract. We affirm.
I. Procedural History
We summarize the relevant pleadings. On August 27, 2020, Bank
commenced by instant action by filing a complaint, which averred the
following: on July 31, 2017, Best Video Studio LLC (Borrower) executed a
“Promissory Note,” in favor of Bank, for the amount of $200,000. On the
same day, Appellant executed a “Commercial Guaranty” (the contract), which
provided she “absolutely and unconditionally guarantees and promises to pay”
the indebtedness of Borrower.2 See Commercial Guaranty, 7/31/17, at 1,
Exh. B to Bank’s Complaint, 8/27/20. It is undisputed that Borrower defaulted
on the promissory note. Bank accelerated the full amount of the indebtedness
under the terms of that note, but Appellant has failed to cure the Borrower’s
default as required by the guaranty contract. Bank thus demanded judgment
against Appellant in the amount of $203,895.59.3 Appellant filed a counseled
answer and new matter.
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2 The pleadings do not explain the relationship between Appellant and
Borrower.
3This amount included: (1) the principal balance of $190,925.38; (2) interest
of $11,915.92; and (3) late fees and costs of $1,054.29. Bank’s Complaint at
3.
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On February 26, 2021, the trial court issued a case management order,
which stated discovery shall be completed by November 30, 2021. Prior to
that deadline, however, on September 16, 2021, Bank filed the underlying
motion for summary judgment.
Appellant filed an answer and brief, arguing: (1) summary judgment
should be denied because this matter is not ripe, where the discovery deadline
had yet to pass and Appellant had not deposed Bank’s corporate
representative or fact witnesses; (2) the contract was unconscionable because
“there is a dispute over whether [Appellant] understood the term[s] she was
signing[;]” and (3) the contract was ambiguous, where Appellant believed
“she merely signed a Guaranty on behalf of [B]orrower and not a personal
guaranty” and the parties disagreed as to whether the contract required Bank
to seek payment first from Borrower before seeking payment from the
guarantor. Appellant’s Brief in Opposition to Bank’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, 11/8/21, at 4-5 (unpaginated) (Brief in Opposition to SJ). Finally,
Appellant set forth case law about the impossibility of a contract, but
presented no discussion on the application of that doctrine to this case. See
id. at 3-4. Relevant to her argument on appeal, Appellant stated elsewhere
that Borrower was “in active Chapter 11 bankruptcy.” Appellant’s Answer to
Bank’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 9/20/21, at 2 (Appellant’s Answer to
SJ) (unpaginated).
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On December 15, 2021, the trial court granted Bank’s motion for
summary judgment and directed judgment to be entered in its favor in the
requested amount, $204,685.86. Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was denied. She took a timely appeal and complied with the court’s
order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal.
II. Statement of Questions Presented
Appellant presents the following issues for our review:
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it decided the
Motion for Summary Judgment while discovery in this matter had
yet to be completed and, as the record was incomplete, there was
an absence of material facts?
2. Did the trial Court err as a matter of law when it granted
[Bank’s] Motion for Summary Judgment by failing to take the facts
in the light most favorable to [Appellant] by:
a. Finding the contract terms unambiguous when in fact the
terms of the contract were ambiguous to the extent that
[Appellant] did not understand terms of the Guaranty;
b. Failed to find the Guaranty clause in question
unconscionable because [Appellant] did not understand what
she was signing, and this left [Appellant] with a lack of
meaningful choice;
c. Failing to find the contract was impossible to perform
because [Borrower] had filed for Bankruptcy, and this would
make performance of the Guaranty clause impossible to
perform; and
d. Failing to consider allowing parol[ ] evidence that
[Appellant] thought she was signing the Guaranty on behalf
of the borrower and not a personal Guaranty?
Appellant’s Brief at 3-4.
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III. Standard of Review &
General Summary Judgment and Contract Principles
At this juncture, we consider the following principles. In reviewing a
challenge to the entry of summary judgment, we may disturb the trial court’s
order “only where it is established that the court committed an error of law or
abused its discretion. As with all questions of law, our review is plenary.”
Pass v. Palmiero Auto. of Butler, Inc., 229 A.3d 1, 5 (Pa. Super. 2020)
(citation omitted). Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1035.2 provides
that where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to relief as a matter of law, summary
judgment may be entered. Where the nonmoving party bears the
burden of proof on an issue, he may not merely rely on his
pleadings or answers in order to survive summary judgment.
Failure of a non-moving party to adduce sufficient evidence on an
issue essential to his case and on which he bears the burden of
proof establishes the entitlement of the moving party to judgment
as a matter of law. Lastly, we will review the record in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all doubts as to the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved
against the moving party.
Id. (citation omitted).
With respect to contract interpretation, this Court has stated:
The interpretation of any contract is a question of law and this
Court’s scope of review is plenary. Moreover, “[w]e need not defer
to the conclusions of the trial court and are free to draw our own
inferences. In interpreting a contract, the ultimate goal is to
ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties as reasonably
manifested by the language of their written agreement.” . . .
Humberston v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 75 A.3d 504, 509-10 (Pa. Super.
2013) (citations omitted).
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. . . If contractual terms are clear and unambiguous, they are
deemed the best reflection of the parties’ intent. If they are
ambiguous, it is permissible to ascertain their meaning through
parol (i.e., extrinsic) evidence. Contractual terms are ambiguous
“if they are subject to more than one reasonable interpretation
when applied to a particular set of facts.” A contract is not
ambiguous, however, merely because the parties do not agree on
its construction.
Pass, 229 A.3d at 5 (citations omitted).
IV. Completion of Discovery
We first summarize that Appellant has averred the underlying contract
is ambiguous, unconscionable, as well as impossible to perform. Although the
trial court stated its reasons for denying relief on each claim, Appellant fails
to address, let alone dispute, them. Instead, on appeal, Appellant merely
presents the same broad claims that have been rejected by the trial court.
In her first issue, Appellant reiterates her assertion that summary
judgment was premature because discovery was not completed. The sum of
her argument is that there have not been any depositions, answers to
interrogatories, or admissions on which she could establish a genuine issue of
material fact. Appellant’s Brief at 8-9. We conclude no relief is due.
In considering her argument, the trial court reviewed the discovery in
this matter. As stated above, a case management order was issued on
February 26, 2021, and it directed that discovery was to be completed by
November 30, 2021. The court noted Appellant served Bank with
interrogatories and requests to produce documents, and Bank provided its
responses on April 11th. The court pointed out Appellant had not alleged any
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deficiencies in Bank’s responses, “never sought to extend” the discovery
deadline, and did not explain why additional discovery was not taken before
Bank’s September 16th filing of the summary judgment motion. Trial Ct. Op.,
12/15/21, at 3, 4. The court reasoned:
[Appellant] claimed to want depositions and/or to subpoena
witnesses after the [summary judgment] motion had been filed.
There was plenty of time to do those things prior to the filing of
the . . . motion, but no action was taken by [Appellant].
Furthermore, [Appellant] had not even filed a motion . . . to
compel discovery. [Appellant] took no action, despite reasonable
time given to complete discovery [before] the motion [was] filed.
Therefore, we do not find that the [summary judgment] motion
was filed prematurely.
Id. at 4-5 (emphasis added).
Appellant does not address, let alone dispute, any of this discussion by
the trial court. She has not —in the trial court proceedings nor on appeal —
identified any issue of fact that requires additional discovery. Accordingly, we
do not disturb the court’s well-reasoned rationale. See Pass, 229 A.3d at 5.
V. Contract Ambiguity
In her second issue, Appellant avers the trial court erred in failing to
take the facts in the light most favorable to her, and in not finding the guaranty
clause is ambiguous. Although “[t]he guaranty clause states that [Appellant]
absolutely and unconditionally guaranteed or promised to pay for [Borrower’s]
indebtedness[,]” Appellant posits that she believed “she was signing on behalf
of the borrower and not herself.” Appellant’s Brief at 9, 10. She reasons that
“[i]f she could have” interpreted the contract in this manner, then “another
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person could have read the contract in the same way.” Id. at 10. Appellant
further claims that while she believes the contract requires Bank to seek
payment first from Borrower before seeking payment from the guarantor,
Bank denies there is such a requirement. Id. Appellant contends, as she did
before the trial court, that contract interpretation is a factual issue for the trier
of fact. See id.; Appellant’s Brief in Opposition to SJ at 6. No relief is due.
As the trial court summarized, a guaranty is “a promise to pay the debt
of another when the creditor is unable, after due prosecution, to collect the
amount owed by the debtor.” See Osprey Portfolio, LLC v. Izett, 67 A.3d
749, 755 (Pa. 2013). Here, the guaranty contract provided:
CONTINUING UNLIMITED GUARANTY. For good and valuable
consideration, [Appellant] (“Guarantor”) absolutely and
unconditionally guarantees and promises to pay [Bank]
(“Lender”) . . . the indebtedness (as the term is defined below) of
[Borrower] to [Bank] on the terms and conditions set forth in this
Guaranty. Under this Guaranty, the liability of Guarantor is
unlimited and the obligations of Guarantor are continuing.
* * *
NATURE OF GUARANTY. The Guaranty is a guaranty of payment
and not of collection. Therefore, [Bank] can insist that the
Guarantor pay immediately, and [Bank] is not required to attempt
to collect first from the Borrower, any collateral, or any other
person liable for the indebtedness.
Commercial Guaranty at 1.
The trial court found the above terms were clear and unambiguous:
“[They] set forth that [Appellant] was obligated on the debt of the Borrower.”
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Trial Ct. Op. at 5-6. The court rejected Appellant’s reasoning that the contract
was ambiguous simply because she did not understand its terms:
[Appellant] has not identified what terms she didn’t understand or
that were ambiguous. Nor does the Guaranty appear to be
ambiguous or difficult to understand. [Appellant’s] assertion is
self-serving and insufficient to overcome a motion for summary
judgment.
Id. at 6.
Again, Appellant does not address or dispute this rationale. We agree
with the court’s reasoning. See Pass, 229 A.3d at 5 (contract is not
ambiguous merely because the parties do not agree on its construction).
Furthermore, Appellant is mistaken that the interpretation of a contract is an
issue of fact for a jury. See Humberston, 75 A.3d at 509 (the interpretation
of a contract is a question of law). Finally, we add that Appellant’s assertion —
that she was signing the guaranty contract on behalf of Borrower — is not
logical. Under Appellant’s reading, Borrower would contract itself to be both
the borrower and guarantor of the same loan. For all the foregoing reasons,
we do not disturb the trial court’s findings.
VI. Unconscionability of Contract
In her third issue, Appellant avers the trial court erred in not finding the
contract was unconscionable. In support, her sole arguments are that: (1)
because she “did not fully understand” the contract terms, she had no
“meaningful choice as to what she signed,” and (2) “the contract term was
unreasonably favorable to [the] drafter because [Bank’s interpretation] would
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allow [Bank] to go after [Appellant] without going after [B]orrower first and
to go after a significantly large sum of money.” Appellant’s Brief at 12. This
claim is meritless.
This Court has explained:
Whether a contract is unconscionable is a matter of law.
[U]nconscionability is a defensive contractual remedy that relieves
a party from an unfair contract or an unfair portion of a contract.
Further, in general, unconscionability has been recognized to
include an absence of a meaningful choice on the part of one of
the parties together with contract terms that are unreasonably
favorable to the other party. “Unconscionability [does] nothing
more than reaffirm the most basic tenet of the law of contracts —
that parties must be free to choose the terms to which they will
be bound.”
Centric Bank v. Sciore, 263 A.3d 31, 39 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citations
omitted).
“The party challenging the agreement bears the burden of proof.”
Cardinal v. Kindred Healthcare, Inc., 155 A.3d 46, 53 (Pa. Super. 2017).
An unconscionability analysis requires a two-fold determination:
(1) that the contractual terms are unreasonably favorable to the
drafter (“substantive unconscionability”), and (2) that there is no
meaningful choice on the part of the other party regarding the
acceptance of the provisions (“procedural unconscionability”). . . .
Id. (citation omitted).
The trial court correctly pointed out that in her pleadings, Appellant did
not identify any contract term as allegedly unconscionable. Trial Ct. Op. at 7.
Instead, she argued the contract was unconscionable solely because “there is
a dispute over whether [she] fully understood the term she was signing[.]”
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Appellant’s Brief in Opposition to SJ at 5.4 To this end, Appellant failed to
establish both prongs of an unconscionable-contract claim. See Cardinal,
155 A.3d at 53.
On appeal, Appellant asserts, for the first time, that the contract terms
are “unreasonably favorable to the drafter[.]” See Appellant’s Brief at 12.
Because this argument was not raised before the trial court, it is waived. See
Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Furthermore, the merits of such a claim are specious —
that the contract is unreasonably favorable to Bank because the contract
“would allow [Bank] to go after [Appellant] without going after [B]orrower
first and to go after a significantly large sum of money.” See Appellant’s Brief
at 12. Appellant does not explain why it would be unfair for Bank to not pursue
repayment from Borrower first, and she overlooks the fact that the amount to
be repaid by the guarantor is simply the amount of Borrower’s debt. We
conclude no relief is due.
VII. Impossibility of Contract
In her fourth issue, Appellant avers the trial court erred in not finding
the contract was impossible to perform. She first claims the contract required
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4 Appellant’s answer to the summary judgment motion did not raise any
particular defense, and instead merely stated “there are a number of defenses
to the formation of the contract . . . which would defeat enforceability of any
contract.” Appellant’s Answer to Bank’s Motion for Summary Judgment, at 1-
2.
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Bank to seek repayment from Borrower before seeking payment from her.
Appellant’s Brief at 13. She then reasons:
[Borrower] has filed for Bankruptcy which means that as of now[,
Bank] cannot go after [B]orrower for the loan. Since [Bank]
cannot exhaust its remedies by going after [Borrower,] it makes
the contract impossible to perform because the Guaranty against
[Appellant] can never come into play.
Id. No relief is due.
This Court has stated:
Legal impossibility is defined in § 261 of the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts as follows:
Where, after a contract is made, a party’s performance
is made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence
of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic
assumption on which the contract was made, his duty to
render that performance is discharged, unless the
language or the circumstances indicate to the contrary.
Felix v. Giuseppe Kitchens & Baths, Inc., 848 A.2d 943, 947-48 (Pa.
Super. 2004), quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 (1981).
In her pleadings before the trial court, Appellant merely cited case
authority concerning the contract doctrine of impossibility, without presenting
any legal argument. See Appellant’s Brief in Opposition to SJ at 3-4. In
another pleading, she stated Borrower was in bankruptcy petition, similarly
without presenting any explanatory discussion. See Appellant’s Answer to SJ
at 2. Appellant’s present line of reasoning is thus arguably waived. See
Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).
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Nevertheless, to the extent Appellant has preserved her argument, we
conclude no relief is due. First, in insisting the guaranty contract required
Bank to pursue repayment from Borrower first, Appellant wholly ignores the
plain language of the contract:
NATURE OF GUARANTY. The Guaranty is a guaranty of payment
and not of collection. Therefore, [Bank] can insist that the
Guarantor pay immediately, and [Bank] is not required to
attempt to collect first from the Borrower, any collateral, or
any other person liable for the indebtedness.
See Commercial Guaranty at 1 (emphasis added). The trial court found, and
we agree, that this language is clear and unambiguous. See Trial Ct. Op. at
5. The court further pointed out that additional discovery will not change this
conclusion. Id. at 8.
VIII. Parol Evidence
In her final issue, Appellant avers the trial court erred in not allowing
parol evidence to show she believed “she was signing the Guaranty on behalf
of [B]orrower and not a personal Guaranty.” Appellant’s Brief at 14. She
insists the “meaning of the contract term is in question,” and this question
“must go before a trier of fact to make that determination.” Id. We disagree.
This Court has explained:
Pennsylvania law defines the parol evidence rule as:
Where the parties, without any fraud or mistake, have
deliberately put their engagements in writing, the law
declares the writing to be not only the best, but the only,
evidence of their agreement. All preliminary
negotiations, conversations and verbal agreements are
merged in and superseded by the subsequent written
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contract . . . and unless fraud, accident or mistake be
averred, the writing constitutes the agreement between
the parties, and its terms and agreements cannot be
added to nor subtracted from by parol evidence.
The parol evidence rule seeks to preserve the integrity of a written
agreement by barring the contracting parties from trying to alter
the meaning of their agreement through use of contemporaneous
oral declarations.
DeArmitt v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 73 A.3d 578, 589 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations
omitted). As stated above, parol evidence is permissible if a contract term is
ambiguous, and a contract term is not ambiguous “merely because the parties
do not agree on its construction.” Pass, 229 A.3d at 5.
First, we note Appellant has not identified what parol evidence she
wished to introduce. Additionally, because the trial court found the guaranty
contract terms are clear and unambiguous, it properly precluded any parol
evidence as to any contrary interpretation Appellant had. See Pass, 229 A.3d
at 5.
Finally, the trial court considered the integration clause of the guaranty
contract:
Integration. [Appellant] further agrees that [Appellant] has read
and fully understands the terms of this Guaranty[. T]he Guaranty
fully reflects [Appellant’s] intentions and parol evidence is not
required to interpret the terms of this Guaranty. . . .
Trial Ct. Op. at 9, quoting Commercial Guaranty at 2. “An integration clause
stating the parties intend the writing to represent their entire agreement is a
‘clear sign’ the writing ‘expresses all of the parties’ negotiations, conversations
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and agreements made prior to its execution.’” DeArmitt, 73 A.3d at 589-90
(citation omitted).
The trial court properly pointed out Appellant raised no claim there is a
genuine issue of material facts as to whether this clause “clearly set[ ] out the
intent of the parties[.]” Trial Ct. Op. at 9. Appellant does not address nor
dispute this discussion concerning the integration clause. Accordingly, no
relief is due.
IX. Conclusion
In sum, we determine all of Appellant’s multiple challenges to the
guaranty contract are meritless. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order
granting summary judgment in favor of Bank, in the amount of $204,685.86.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/22/2023
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