Com. v. St. Rose, K. ( 2019 )


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  • J-S28016-19
    
    2019 Pa. Super. 242
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :         PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                           :
    :
    :
    KATRICE K. ST. ROSE                       :
    :
    Appellant              :    No. 1270 MDA 2018
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 24, 2018
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-21-CR-0003747-2016
    BEFORE:     BOWES, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.
    OPINION BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                           FILED AUGUST 14, 2019
    Katrice K. St. Rose appeals from the judgment of sentence following her
    jury trial conviction for obtaining public welfare funds by misrepresentation
    (“welfare fraud”), 62 P.S. § 481(a). St. Rose argues the trial court erred in
    instructing the jury as to the elements of the crime. We affirm.
    The trial court set forth the following factual history:
    On December 17, 2012, [St. Rose] had a face-to-face
    appointment with a county benefits eligibility specialist in
    order to apply for childcare assistance. At that time, she
    received information on her rights and responsibilities. The
    information included notification concerning her duty to
    report changes in her circumstances. The specialist
    emphasized that this duty obligated [St. Rose] to report,
    among other things, any changes in her hours of
    employment or employment status. On January 2, 2013,
    [St. Rose’s] childcare assistance was terminated because
    her status changed to unemployed.
    In September of 2013, [St. Rose] began working at
    MedStaffers as a Home Health Aide [“HHA”]. Her new
    employment allowed her to reapply for childcare assistance,
    which she did via a phone interview with the benefits
    ____________________________________
    * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S28016-19
    eligibility specialist. Again, [St. Rose] was notified of her
    duty to report any changes in her employment. As part of
    the yearly benefits renewal process, the eligibility specialist
    contacted [St. Rose] to update her benefits application on
    January 2, 2014. During that recertification call, the
    specialist reviewed the questions on the application. She
    specifically asked [St. Rose] if the employment information
    was correct. [St. Rose] confirmed that she was still working
    at MedStaffers as an HHA. She also confirmed the daycare
    provider that she was using for her childcare. As a result of
    the information, the specialist found that [St. Rose] still
    qualified for childcare assistance.
    [St. Rose] continued to receive the childcare assistance for
    her MedStaffers job until she filed to reopen her cash
    benefits through the County Assistance Office around June
    of 2014. At that time, the eligibility specialist realized that
    [St. Rose] was no longer working for her reported employer.
    When the specialist looked into [St. Rose’s] employment
    records at MedStaffers, she learned that [St. Rose] had
    been terminated from her position with the company on
    October 25, 2013, months prior to the 2014 recertification.
    At trial, the eligibility specialist testified about the benefits
    application process and her experiences with [St. Rose’s]
    case. The human resources director from MedStaffers also
    testified and confirmed that [St. Rose] had been terminated
    from her employment on October 25, 2013. Additionally, the
    operator of the daycare that cared for [St. Rose’s] children
    testified that [St. Rose] continued to use the daycare after
    October 25, 2013. He provided the daycare’s invoices for
    [St. Rose’s] three children from October 2013 through June
    2014. He also testified that he had an independent
    recollection of [St. Rose’s] children being at the daycare
    during that time.
    Trial Court Opinion, filed Nov. 13, 2018, at 1-3 (footnotes and citations to
    record omitted).
    St. Rose requested the following instruction as to the elements of
    welfare fraud:
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    The defendant has been charged with welfare fraud. To find
    the defendant guilty of this offense, you must find that the
    following elements have been proven beyond a reasonable
    doubt:
    First, that the defendant made a false statement or
    misrepresentation [or withheld information][1],
    Second, that the information provided [or withheld] was
    material to that agency’s determination in approving or
    disapproving a person for public assistance;
    and
    Third, that the defendant did so willfully — that is, knowingly
    and with the intent to defraud the public assistance agency.
    Defendant’s Proposed Jury Instructions, filed Mar. 22, 2018, at Exh. A.
    The trial court denied the request and issued the following instruction:
    In order to find the Defendant guilty of this offense, the
    Commonwealth must prove the following three elements
    beyond a reasonable doubt. First, that she made a false
    statement or withheld information. Second, the false
    statement provided or information withheld was material to
    the agency’s determination in approving or disapproving a
    person for public assistance. Three, the Defendant provided
    the false information or withheld the information willfully;
    i.e., she knew it was false at the time she made it or she
    knew the information withheld was material to the agency’s
    determination of her eligibility for public assistance.
    N.T., 3/22/18, at 118-119.
    The jury found St. Rose guilty of welfare fraud. In July 2018, the trial
    court sentenced St. Rose to five years’ probation. St. Rose filed a timely Notice
    of Appeal.
    ____________________________________________
    1   The bracketed words were handwritten on the proposed instruction.
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    St. Rose raises the following issue: “Did the instruction given by the trial
    court to the jury regarding the charge of welfare fraud, 62 P.S. § 481,
    inaccurately state the law such that it was prejudicial to the outcome of trial?”
    St. Rose’s Br. at 5.
    We review a challenge to a trial court’s decision as to jury instructions
    for an abuse of discretion or error of law. Commonwealth v. Galvin, 
    985 A.2d 783
    , 798-99 (Pa. 2009). “[Our] key inquiry is whether the instruction on
    a particular issue adequately, accurately and clearly presents the law to the
    jury, and is sufficient to guide the jury in its deliberations.” Commonwealth
    v.   Cannavo,      
    199 A.3d 1282
    ,   1286   (Pa.Super.    2018)       (quoting
    Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 
    766 A.2d 874
    , 878 (Pa.Super. 2001))
    (alteration in original).
    Welfare fraud is defined as:
    (a) Any person who, either prior to, or at the time of, or
    subsequent to the application for assistance, by means of a
    wilfully false statement or misrepresentation, or by
    impersonation or by wilfully failing to disclose a material fact
    regarding eligibility or other fraudulent means, secures, or
    attempts to secure, or aids or abets or attempts to aid or
    abet any person in securing assistance, or Federal food
    stamps, commits a crime which shall be graded as provided
    in subsection (b).
    62 P.S. § 481(a). Under this statute, a person is guilty of welfare fraud if, (1)
    before, during, or after applying for assistance, (2) the person makes a
    willfully false statement or misrepresentation, uses impersonation, willfully
    fails to disclose a material fact regarding eligibility, or uses other fraudulent
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    J-S28016-19
    means, and (3) the person secures or attempts to secure assistance, or aids,
    abets, or attempts to aid or abet any person in securing assistance.
    The Human Services Code does not define “willfully.” The Crimes Code
    defines “willfulness” as: “A requirement that an offense be committed willfully
    is satisfied if a person acts knowingly with respect to the material elements of
    the offense, unless a purpose to impose further requirements appears.” 18
    Pa.C.S.A. § 302(g). “Knowingly” is defined as:
    (2) A person acts knowingly with respect to a material
    element of an offense when:
    (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the
    attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of
    that nature or that such circumstances exist; and
    (ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is
    aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause
    such a result.
    
    Id. at §
    302(b)(2).
    St. Rose contends that the trial court improperly instructed the jury by
    defining “willfully in a way that obscured the mens rea requirement that a
    defendant act with the object of committing a fraud.” St. Rose’s Br. at 14. She
    maintains the trial court failed to require that the jury find St. Rose willfully
    used fraudulent means to secure or attempt to secure assistance. St. Rose
    analogizes the welfare fraud statute to other statutes, such as insurance fraud
    and worker’s compensation fraud, claiming that, similar to the other fraud
    statutes, the welfare fraud statute requires an intent to defraud. She
    concludes that the “jury should have been instructed that the Commonwealth
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    must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [St. Rose] act[ed] willfully with
    the intent to defraud the government.” 
    Id. at 18.
    St. Rose relies on two separate statutes—the insurance fraud statute
    and the worker’s compensation fraud statute—arguing that because the
    standard instructions for crimes committed under those statutes state that the
    jury must find the defendant had an intent to defraud, a jury must also find
    the defendant had an intent to defraud to find a defendant guilty of welfare
    fraud.
    The statute defining insurance fraud provides, in part:
    A person commits an offense if the person does any of the
    following:
    (1) Knowingly and with the intent to defraud a State or
    local government agency files, presents or causes to be filed
    with or presented to the government agency a document
    that contains false, incomplete or misleading information
    concerning any fact or thing material to the agency’s
    determination in approving or disapproving a motor vehicle
    insurance rate filing, a motor vehicle insurance transaction
    or other motor vehicle insurance action which is required or
    filed in response to an agency’s request.
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4117(a)(1) (emphasis added). Similarly, the Worker’s
    Compensation Statute provides that a person commits insurance fraud, in
    part, as follows:
    A person, including, but not limited to, the employer, the
    employe, the health care provider, the attorney, the insurer,
    the State Workmen's Insurance Fund and self-insureds,
    commits an offense if the person does any of the following:
    (1) Knowingly and with the intent to defraud a State or
    local government agency files, presents or causes to be filed
    with or presented to the government agency a document
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    that contains false, incomplete or misleading information
    concerning any fact or thing material to the agency’s
    determination in approving or disapproving a workers’
    compensation     insurance    rate    filing,    a   workers’
    compensation transaction or other workers' compensation
    insurance action which is required or filed in response to an
    agency’s request.
    77 P.S. § 1039.2(1) (emphasis added). The Standard Jury Instruction for both
    insurance   fraud   and   worker’s   compensation    fraud   include   that   the
    Commonwealth must prove that “the defendant did so knowingly and with
    intent to defraud.” Pa. SSJI (Crim) §§ 15.4117A, 15.4117B. For example, the
    standard instruction for insurance fraud includes:
    First, that the defendant presented or caused to be
    presented to a state or local government agency any
    document that contained false, incomplete, or misleading
    information;
    Second, that the information provided was material to that
    agency’s determination in approving or disapproving a
    motor vehicle insurance rate filing, a motor vehicle
    insurance transaction, or other motor vehicle insurance
    action that is required or filed in response to an agency’s
    request. Material information means information the agency
    would regularly rely on in making its official determinations
    or findings;
    Third, that the defendant did so knowingly and with the
    intent to defraud.
    Pa. SSJI (Crim) § 15.4117(a)(1).
    The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it instructed the jury as
    to the elements for welfare fraud. As required under the statute, the trial court
    instructed the jury that, to convict St. Rose, the jury had to conclude that the
    Commonwealth had established beyond a reasonable doubt that St. Rose
    made a false statement or withheld information; that the false statement
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    provided or information withheld was material to the agency’s decision to
    approve or disapprove a request for public assistance; and that St. Rose
    “provided the false statement or withheld information willfully,” that is, “she
    knew it was false at the time that she made it or she knew the information
    withheld was material to the agency’s determination of her eligibility for public
    assistance.” N.T., 3/22/18, at 118-19.; 62 P.S. § 481(a).
    Unlike the statutes cited by St. Rose as statutes analogous to the welfare
    fraud statute, the welfare fraud statute does not include in the text of the
    statute that, to be convicted, a defendant had to act with an “intent to
    defraud.” Rather, to sustain a conviction, the statute requires that (1) before,
    during, or after applying for assistance, (2) the person make a false statement
    or misrepresentation, use impersonation, willfully fail to disclose a material
    fact regarding eligibility, or use other fraudulent means, and (3) the person
    secure or attempt to secure assistance or aid, abet, or attempt to aid or abet
    any person in securing assistance. See 62 P.S. § 481(a). Here, the trial court
    accurately conveyed these requirements. It required that the jury find that
    the defendant made a false statement or failed to disclose information, that
    the false statement or withheld information was material, and that the
    defendant acted willfully, that is, knew the information was false or knew that
    the information withheld was material to the agency’s determination as to
    eligibility for benefits.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 08/14/2019
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Document Info

Docket Number: 1270 MDA 2018

Filed Date: 8/14/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/14/2019