Com. v. Keys, J. ( 2016 )


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  • J-S68014-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    JAMES KEYS,
    Appellant                 No. 1761 WDA 2015
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 7, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0008520-2013
    BEFORE: SHOGAN, SOLANO, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.:                        FILED NOVEMBER 30, 2016
    Appellant James Keys appeals from the judgment of sentence entered
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, following revocation of
    his probation. The judgment of sentence entered on October 7, 2015, was
    rendered final by the denial of Appellant’s post-sentence motion on
    October 20, 2015. We affirm.
    The trial court recounted the relevant history as follows:
    In this case, [Appellant] originally pled guilty to one count
    of robbery on December 11, 2013. On March 31, 2014, he was
    sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than nine
    months nor more than 18 months followed by three years’
    probation. On October 7, 2015, [Appellant] appeared before this
    [c]ourt to address allegations that he violated the terms of his
    probation due to a conviction on July 7, 2015 for terroristic
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S68014-16
    threats and criminal mischief. The conviction stemmed from
    [Appellant’s] actions on December 23, 2014 when he threatened
    to kill his ex-paramour and flattened tires of her automobile.
    [Appellant] attempted to physically assault his ex-paramour but
    was stopped from doing so by his 12 year-old son. He was
    sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than three
    months nor more than six months. On that date, this [c]ourt
    revoked [Appellant’s] probation and imposed a term of
    incarceration of not less than 18 months nor more than 48
    months followed by three years’ probation. This appeal followed.
    Trial Court Opinion, 1/19/16, at 1–2.
    Appellant raises the following issue on appeal: “Was the sentence of
    eighteen to [forty-eight] months of incarceration, manifestly excessive and
    an abuse of discretion, where the court did not consider the availability of
    community-based resources to address Mr. Keys’ serious rehabilitative
    needs?” Appellant’s Brief at 7 (full capitalization omitted).
    As presented, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his
    sentence. See Commonwealth v. Rhoades, 
    8 A.3d 912
    , 915 (Pa. Super.
    2010) (an appellant’s claim that his sentence is excessive implicates the
    sentence’s discretionary aspects).      This Court has held that our scope of
    review in an appeal “from a revocation sentencing includes discretionary
    sentencing challenges.” Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 
    83 A.3d 1030
    , 1034
    (Pa. Super. 2013). Nonetheless, Appellant’s challenge to the discretionary
    aspect of his sentence does not entitle him to review as of right.
    Commonwealth v. Allen, 
    24 A.3d 1058
    , 1064 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation
    omitted).   Rather, before this Court can address such a discretionary
    challenge, an appellant must satisfy a four-part test:
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    J-S68014-16
    (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
    Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
    preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify
    sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief
    has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a
    substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not
    appropriate under the Sentencing Code.
    
    Id. Appellant herein
    filed a timely notice of appeal and preserved his issue
    in a post-sentence motion to reconsider his sentence.            Additionally,
    Appellant’s brief includes a concise statement of reasons relied upon for
    allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of his sentence
    pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f).    Appellant’s Brief at 12.   Thus, we turn to
    whether Appellant presents a substantial question that the sentence
    appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code.
    “The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be
    evaluated on a case-by-case basis.”     Commonwealth v. Prisk, 
    13 A.3d 526
    , 533 (Pa. Super. 2011).      A substantial question exists only when the
    appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions
    were either:   (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing
    Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the
    sentencing process.     Commonwealth v. Swope, 
    123 A.3d 333
    , 338 (Pa.
    Super. 2015) (quoting 
    Prisk, 13 A.3d at 533
    ).
    We conclude that Appellant’s assertion that the trial court failed to
    consider his rehabilitative needs resulting in an excessive sentence raises a
    substantial question.    See Commonwealth v. Baker, 
    72 A.3d 652
    , 662
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    J-S68014-16
    (Pa. Super. 2013) (finding, inter alia, assertion that trial court failed to
    account for an appellant’s rehabilitative needs was substantial question
    suitable for review). Accordingly, we grant Appellant’s petition for allowance
    of appeal and address the merits of his claim.
    Appellant’s allegation that the sentencing court did not consider that
    his rehabilitative needs would be best served by community-based resources
    is contradicted by the transcript of the probation revocation proceeding. At
    the hearing, a representative from Allegheny County Adult Probation, Ashley
    Lynn, related that Appellant had been previously paroled to Justice Related
    Services “Pyramid’s 3/4 house.”    N.T., 10/7/15, at 17.    She recalled that
    when Appellant discovered that his stay at the Pyramid house could extend
    beyond thirty days, “he was very agitated, very disrespectful with staff.” 
    Id. Ms. Lynn
    further informed the court: “There were allegations from the
    program that [Appellant] had been cheating his medications, snorting his
    medications, not following program rules.    [Appellant] threatened to leave
    the program. When [Appellant] was confronted about these, he advised that
    Probation would never find him.” 
    Id. After considering
    the testimony and entertaining argument of counsel,
    the sentencing court stated:   “I did read the presentence report and I did
    read that [Appellant] threatened to leave [the Pryamid 3/4 house]. . . .
    And, indeed, after the [c]ourt addressed him, [Appellant] left and got on the
    phone and said he didn’t care what the [c]ourt said. . . .        [Appellant]
    -4-
    J-S68014-16
    indicated he won’t follow the rules.” N.T., 10/7/15, at 20. After the court
    announced that it was imposing a term of incarceration, it addressed
    Appellant: “I will not agree with a sentence that allows you to walk out the
    door and you can do whatever you want.” 
    Id. at 23–24.
    The sentencing court further explained its reasons in its opinion filed
    pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) why community-based resources would not
    address Appellant’s rehabilitative needs:
    The record in this case supports the sentence imposed by
    this [c]ourt. This [c]ourt considered the presentence report. The
    presentence report and the probation officer at the revocation
    hearing set forth a history of [Appellant’s] non-compliance with
    various jail programs and [Justice Related Services] plans during
    his original incarceration on this case. [Appellant] was recorded
    on a jail telephone boasting that he would not follow this [c]ourt’s
    orders. This [c]ourt is particularly concerned that [Appellant] has
    disregarded this [c]ourt’s admonition that he not have contact
    with his ex-paramour. This [c]ourt had made such a provision a
    condition of the probation imposed in the underlying terroristic
    threats offense that caused his probation to be violated. Nothing
    less than a sentence of total confinement is appropriate in this
    case because [Appellant] is an actual, physical threat to his ex-
    paramour. Considering [Appellant’s] brazen willingness to defy
    court orders, this [c]ourt was not willing to risk the safety of
    [Appellant’s] ex-paramour by imposing a non-custodial sentence
    that provided for mental health treatment.            This [c]ourt
    recognized that [Appellant] may have mental health issues and
    may [require] treatment but due to his conscious, repeated
    decisions to avoid taking medication, this [c]ourt believed that
    rehabilitation and treatment should occur while [Appellant] was
    incarcerated and under the security of a prison. In sum, this
    [c]ourt imposed the sentence it did because of [Appellant’s]
    refusal to follow court directives and the risk of danger he posed
    to his ex-paramour.
    Trial Court Opinion, 1/19/16, at 4–5.
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    J-S68014-16
    Thus, it is evident that the sentencing court considered Appellant’s
    prior efforts at rehabilitation supervised by community-based resources to
    be unsatisfactory.    The court also noted Appellant’s statement that he
    intended to defy the orders of the court. For these reasons, the sentencing
    court determined that Appellant’s rehabilitative needs would be better
    addressed while serving a term of incarceration.   We discern no abuse of
    discretion in the sentencing court’s decision.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 11/30/2016
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1761 WDA 2015

Filed Date: 11/30/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/1/2016