In the Interest of: J.R., a Minor ( 2016 )

J-S63043-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: J. R., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA
No. 2294 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Order July 10, 2015
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division
at No(s): CP-51-JV-0080168-2007
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and FITZGERALD,* J.
MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 16, 2016
The Commonwealth, appeals from the order in the Court of Common
Pleas of Philadelphia County granting the petition of Appellee, J.R., for writ
of habeas corpus and releasing him from custody. We dismiss the appeal as
moot.
J.R. was born in May 1995. On April 7, 2008, he was adjudicated
delinquent by the trial court after he admitted to indecent assault graded as
a misdemeanor,1 and he was committed to Abraxes Academy, a secure
juvenile detention facility. Pursuant to statute, J.R. was to serve the lesser
of four years or the total he could have been sentenced by the court had he
been convicted as an adult. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6353(a). As an adult, the
maximum term J.R. could have received for indecent assault was five years’
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
J.R. admitted to sexually assaulting his nine-year-old sister when he was
twelve years of age.
J-S63043-16
imprisonment under 18 Pa.C.S. § 1104. The Juvenile Code allows for a
juvenile’s initial commitment to be extended or modified to “effectuate the
original purpose for which the order was entered.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6353(a).
J.R. remained in custody for over seven years. During that time,
multiple review hearings were held by the trial court and J.R. was moved to
several different juvenile facilities that were determined to better meet his
rehabilitative needs. On May 13, 2015, the Philadelphia Public Defenders’
Office filed the instant habeas corpus petition on J.R.’s behalf. After
conducting a hearing on June 11, 2015, the trial court issued an order
granting J.R.’s habeas corpus petition and released him from custody on
June 16, 2015. The Commonwealth filed a motion for reconsideration, and
the trial court vacated the June 16, 2015 order pending a hearing regarding
the Commonwealth’s reconsideration motion. After a hearing, the court
denied the Commonwealth’s motion and again granted J.R.’s habeas corpus
motion on July 10, 2015.
The Commonwealth filed the instant timely appeal and a Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal. The trial court filed a
responsive opinion.
The Commonwealth raises a single issue on appeal:
Whether the lower court erred in granting [J.R.’s] petition
for habeas corpus claiming he was being held in violation
of 42 Pa. C.S. § 6353 on the grounds that (1) there
allegedly was no hearing prior to expiration of the four
years of commitment, and (2) the Commonwealth had not
filed an application to extend, where: beginning March 12,
-2-
J-S63043-16
2008, hearings were held concerning [J.R.’s] commitment,
in which [J.R.] was present with notice and represented by
counsel, and it was decided by the court that his
commitment would continue; and the statute does not
require the Commonwealth to file an application?
Commonwealth’s Brief at 3.
The Commonwealth argues that the trial court erred by granting J.R.’s
petition for habeas corpus because the review hearings held by the trial
court in this case were sufficient to extend J.R.’s initial sentence as required
by 42 Pa.C.S. § 6353. J.R. disagrees by averring that the trial court aptly
found that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence that his
sentence had been properly modified under 42 Pa.C.S. § 6353 during the
review hearings. Further, J.R. asserts that the instant appeal is moot
because he is now twenty-one years of age, as of May 2016, and therefore
he is no longer subject to court supervision as a juvenile. We agree with
J.R. and dismiss this appeal as moot.
Pennsylvania Code divests the juvenile court of jurisdiction after an
individual turns twenty-one years of age:
§ 630. Loss of Court Jurisdiction
When the juvenile has attained the age of twenty-one, the
court shall enter an order terminating court supervision of
the juvenile.
237 Pa. Code § 630.
It is well settled that:
Generally, an actual claim or controversy must be present
at all stages of the judicial process for the case to be
-3-
J-S63043-16
actionable or reviewable. . . . If events occur to eliminate
the claim or controversy at any stage in the process, the
case becomes moot. An issue can become moot during
the pendency of an appeal due to an intervening change in
the facts of the case or due to an intervening change in the
applicable law. An issue before a court is moot if in ruling
upon the issue the court cannot enter an order that has
any legal force or effect.
Deutsche Bank Nat. Co. v. Butler, 868 A.2d 574, 577 (Pa. Super. 2005)
(citations and quotation marks omitted).
This court has emphasized that “[i]t is impermissible for courts to
render purely advisory opinions. In other words, judgments or decrees to
which no effect can be given will not, in most cases, be entered by this
Court.” Rivera v. Pa. Dep’t. of Corr., 837 A.2d 525, 527-28 (Pa. Super.
2003) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, if an event
occurs which causes an appellate court to be unable to grant any relief, the
appeal will generally be dismissed. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 486
A.2d 445, 447 (Pa. Super. 1984). However, “[e]xceptions to this principle
are made where the conduct complained of is capable of repetition yet likely
to evade review, where the case involves issues important to the public
interest or where a party will suffer some detriment without the court’s
decision.” Pub. Defender’s Office of Venango Cnty. v. Venango Cnty.
Ct. of Common Pleas, 893 A.2d 1275, 1279-80 (Pa. 2006) (citation
omitted).
In this case, the Commonwealth’s appeal was rendered moot when
J.R. turned twenty-one years of age and is therefore no longer subject to
-4-
J-S63043-16
court jurisdiction as a juvenile. See 237 Pa. Code § 630. Thus, any opinion
issued by this Court would be rendered purely advisory and therefore we
decline to address the factually specific issue presented by the
Commonwealth in the instant case. See Rivera, 837 A.2d at 527-28.
Further, we conclude that no exception to the mootness doctrine applies
because the Commonwealth could likely appeal a purported improper
modification of a juvenile sentence prior to the issue becoming moot. See
Pub. Defender’s Office of Venango Cnty., 837 A.2d at 1279-80.
Accordingly, we find the matter before this Court moot and we dismiss the
appeal.
Appeal dismissed as moot.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/16/2016
-5-
J-S63043-16
-6-