Com. v. Tyson, J. ( 2015 )

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2015 PA Super 138COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
JERMEEL OMAR TYSON, :
:
Appellee : No. 1292 MDA 2013
Appeal from the Order June 18, 2013,
Court of Common Pleas, Berks County,
Criminal Division at No. CP-06-CR-0005578-2012
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BENDER, P.J.E., PANELLA,
DONOHUE, SHOGAN, MUNDY, OLSON and OTT, JJ.
DISSENTING OPINION BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED JUNE 10, 2015
Because I disagree with the learned Majority’s conclusion that the
circumstances surrounding Tyson’s prior rape conviction and the instant
matter are sufficiently similar to satisfy the common plan or scheme and
absence of mistake exceptions to Rule 404(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of
Evidence, I respectfully dissent. In my view, the Majority’s analysis
overemphasizes the few similarities that exist between Tyson’s prior rape
conviction and the present matter while completely dismissing the several
important differences between the two incidents. The Majority also
incorrectly resolves the issues of remoteness and undue prejudice, with its
analysis on these points clearly influenced by its desire to find the evidence
of Tyson’s prior rape conviction admissible. I also believe that the Majority’s
analysis of the Commonwealth’s need to present the evidence of the prior
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rape conviction misconstrues existing case law to permit prior acts evidence
to bolster the credibility of the Commonwealth’s only witness where there is
no indication that the witness is otherwise impeachable. Based on the
certified record on appeal, I would conclude that Tyson’s prior rape
conviction was not admissible under either the common plan or scheme or
the absence of mistake exceptions to Rule 404(b).
As the Majority recognizes, Rule 404(b)(1) of the Pennsylvania Rules
of Evidence provides that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not
admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a
particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.”
Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1). Our Supreme Court has explained:
The purpose of this rule is to prevent the conviction
of an accused for one crime by the use of evidence
that he has committed other unrelated crimes, and
to preclude the inference that because he has
committed other crimes he was more likely to
commit that crime for which he is being tried. The
presumed effect of such evidence is to predispose
the minds of the jurors to believe the accused guilty,
and thus effectually to strip him of the presumption
of innocence[.]
Commonwealth v. Spruill, 391 A.2d 1048, 1049-50 (Pa. 1978)
(quotations and citations omitted). Rule 404(b)(2) also provides that “[t]his
evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of
mistake, or lack of accident.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2). In a criminal matter, “this
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evidence is admissible only if the probative value of the evidence outweighs
its potential for unfair prejudice.” Id.Recently, our Supreme Court explained the common plan or scheme
exception as follows:
Evidence of other crimes is said to be admissible [to]
prove other like crimes by the accused so nearly
identical in method as to earmark them as the
handiwork of the accused. Here much more is
demanded than the mere repeated commission of
crimes of the same class, such as repeated
burglaries or thefts. The device used must be so
unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature.
Commonwealth v. Roney, 79 A.3d 595, 606 (Pa. 2013) (quotations and
citation omitted), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 56 (2014).
Under the G.D.M., Sr. framework quoted by the Majority, see Maj.
Op. at 7-8, courts must examine the following: (1) whether the details and
surrounding circumstances of each criminal incident reveal criminal conduct
that is distinctive and so nearly identical that it represents the signature of
the same perpetrator; (2) if the criminal conduct represents the signature of
the same perpetrator, whether the common plan or scheme evidence is too
remote in time; and (3) if the common plan or scheme evidence represents
the signature of the same perpetrator and is not too remote in time, whether
the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by its potential prejudicial
impact. See Commonwealth v. G.D.M., Sr., 926 A.2d 984, 987
(Pa. Super. 2007). My examination of the certified record in the case at bar
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reveals insufficient similarities between the two criminal incidents to permit
the admission of the evidence of the earlier conviction, as there is
inadequate evidence to conclude that the methods employed by Tyson were
“distinctive and so nearly identical as to become the signature of the same
perpetrator.” See id.The Majority relies on the following facts in concluding that this case
falls within the common plan or scheme exception to Rule 404(b):
In each case, [Tyson] was acquainted with the
victim—a black female in her twenties—and he was
an invited guest in the victim’s home. [Tyson] was
aware that each victim was in a weakened or
compromised state. Each victim ultimately lost
consciousness. In each case, the victim awoke in
her bedroom in the early morning hours to find
[Tyson] having vaginal intercourse with her.
Maj. Op. at 11.
In my opinion, the Majority strips the details of the facts from the
incidents in order to incorrectly conclude that these simplified likenesses
make Tyson’s prior rape conviction sufficiently similar to the instant matter,
warranting the admission of Tyson’s prior crime under the common plan or
scheme exception. Further analysis of the two incidents reveals several
important dissimilarities. For example, the record reflects that the context in
which Tyson was in T.B.’s home and G.B.’s home was entirely different. For
his prior rape conviction, T.B.’s brother invited Tyson into their home for a
party. See N.T., 6/6/13, Exhibit C-1 at 3. Here, G.B. herself invited Tyson
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into her home because she was feeling ill. Commonwealth’s Motion In
Limine to Introduce Evidence of Defendant’s Prior Crime (hereinafter
“Commonwealth’s Motion In Limine”), 5/31/13, ¶¶ 3-4. G.B. also asked
Tyson to bring her food. Id. ¶ 4. Because G.B. and Tyson were friends with
each other, and because he stayed at her home late into the night, it
logically follows that some form of direct social interaction occurred between
the two throughout the evening. This differs greatly from the absence of
social interaction that took place between Tyson and T.B. before the events
that led to Tyson’s prior rape conviction because he was at T.B.’s home
partying and drinking as a friend of T.B.’s brother along with several other
individuals. See N.T., 6/6/13, Exhibit C-1 at 3-4.
The Majority relies heavily on the fact that during each event, Tyson
allegedly had sexual intercourse with T.B. and G.B. while each was sleeping.
See Maj. Op. at 11-12. My review of the record, however, once again
reveals important differences. For his prior rape conviction, there was no
dispute that T.B. was sleeping when Tyson began having sexual intercourse
with her. See N.T., 6/6/13, Exhibit C-1 at 3. For the instant crime, Tyson
disputes G.B.’s claims that she was sleeping when he began having sexual
intercourse with her. See Commonwealth’s Motion In Limine, 5/31/13, ¶
10. In fact, G.B. herself stated that the second time she awoke to find
Tyson having sexual intercourse with her, she asked him what he was doing
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and he responded: “What do you mean? Your eyes were open the whole
time.” Id.
When examined closely, other similarities relied upon by the Majority
to support the admissibility of the prior conviction are likewise unremarkable
and not indicative of a signature crime. The Majority points out that Tyson
was previously acquainted with both T.B. and G.B. See Maj. Op. at 11. As
previously noted, the record reflects that the two relationships clearly
differed. Tyson was an acquaintance of T.B. because he was friends with her
brother, while Tyson and G.B. were friends with each other. Similarly, while
the Majority is correct that Tyson was in both T.B.’s home and G.B.’s home
into the early morning hours, see id., the reasons for this differ markedly,
as Tyson was at T.B.’s home for her brother’s party, but was an invited
guest in G.B.’s home because she invited him to be there. See N.T.,
6/6/13, Exhibit C-1 at 3-4; Commonwealth’s Motion In Limine, 5/31/13, ¶¶
3-4. Additionally, I find it unremarkable that both events occurred in T.B.’s
and G.B.’s bedrooms – another similarity relied upon by the Majority. See
Maj. Op. at 11. This is not indicative of a signature crime because on both
occasions, the events at issue occurred when T.B. and G.B. were in bed,
making their bedrooms the obvious and expected location. Furthermore,
that both T.B. and G.B. were in their twenties is likewise insignificant,
considering that Tyson was in his twenties and early thirties, respectively,
when each event occurred. Contrary to the Majority’s opinion, there is
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nothing remarkable or remotely “signature” about an adult individual
spending time with and engaging in sexual intercourse with other adults
close in age.
My esteemed colleagues dismiss these distinguishing characteristics
between Tyson’s prior rape conviction and the instant matter, stating that
“[t]o the extent differences exists [sic] between the two incidents, these
differences concern details that are not essential to the alleged common
scheme of [Tyson].” Maj. Op. at 11-12 n.3. Consequently, the Majority
found wholly inconsequential that Tyson was in T.B.’s and G.B.’s homes for
different reasons, contending that the common plan or scheme
does not require the sexual assault of a women who
became tired or weak specifically after donating
plasma. The salient facts of each case are that
[Tyson] was allowed into the home of an
acquaintance, and [Tyson] knew each victim was in
a compromised state. After each victim lost
consciousness in the early morning hours, [Tyson]
had vaginal intercourse with each victim in
essentially the same manner.
Id.
In my opinion, the Majority’s limited analysis of the differences
between the two incidents completely misses the point of the common plan
or scheme exception. The Majority essentially contends that the differences
between Tyson’s prior rape conviction and the instant case do not matter.
These facts, however, are precisely the type of characteristics that, if similar,
would make the two incidents “distinctive and so nearly identical as to
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become the signature of the same perpetrator.” See G.D.M., Sr., 926 A.2d
at 987.
As it stands, the Majority is willing to invoke the common plan or
scheme exception, not for the commission of “signature” crimes, as the
standard requires, but for the commission of crimes of the same general
class, namely a statutorily defined type of rape. Section 3121(a)(3) of the
Pennsylvania Crimes Code states that an individual commits the crime of
rape “when the person engages in sexual intercourse with a complainant …
[w]ho is unconscious or where the person knows that the complainant is
unaware that the sexual intercourse is occurring.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
3121(a)(3). According to what the Majority classifies as the “salient facts” of
the two incidents, the commission of section 3121(a)(3) rape is the sole
similarity between Tyson’s prior rape conviction and the alleged crime that
occurred in this case. This Court has acknowledged that “[t]he essential
elements of the act of rape, as well as other sexual crimes, will necessarily
produce any number of similar characteristics when two acts of rape are
scrutinized for shared features[.]” Commonwealth v. Frank, 577 A.2d
609, 614 (Pa. Super. 1990) (quotations and citation omitted). Therefore,
under the Majority’s analysis, evidence is admissible as a common plan or
scheme simply because a person has allegedly committed the same crime
twice. This is in direct contravention to the general rule excluding evidence
of other crimes. See Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1); Spruill, 391 A.2d at 1049-50.
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Furthermore, another notable and distinguishing factor between the
Tyson’s prior rape conviction and the current matter is the fact that G.B.
allegedly awoke to find Tyson engaging in unwanted sexual contact with her
only to soon thereafter fall back to sleep and have Tyson allegedly engage in
non-consensual sexual intercourse with her again. Affidavit of Probable
Cause, 11/13/12. According to the Commonwealth’s affidavit of probable
cause, G.B. indicated that after the first time she awoke to find Tyson having
sexual intercourse with her, she told him to stop, fell asleep again, and then
awoke to find Tyson naked in her kitchen. Id. After she allegedly told him
again that she did not want to have sex with him, she went back to sleep
and awoke once more to find Tyson having sexual intercourse with her. Id.
Similar events are totally absent from the incident that resulted in Tyson’s
prior rape conviction. See N.T., 6/6/13, Exhibit C-1 at 3.
The Majority asserts that this distinguishing series of events “only
reinforces the conclusion that [Tyson] engaged in a common scheme of non-
consensual intercourse with unconscious victims” and that it tends to show
that Tyson “saw and seized yet another opportunity to have non-consensual
vaginal intercourse with a female acquaintance whose unconscious state
rendered her unable to consent or to resist verbally or physically.” Maj. Op.
at 12. While this may be true, this evidence also tends to show Tyson had
consent to engage in sexual contact with G.B., especially in light of his claim
that G.B. was awake during this encounter. Nevertheless, it is undisputed
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that this series of events is unlike anything that occurred during Tyson’s
prior rape, further distinguishing the two incidents.
Therefore, in my view, while there are some similarities between
Tyson’s prior rape and this case, these similarities do not satisfy the
standard of being “distinctive and so nearly identical as to become the
signature of the same perpetrator.” See G.D.M., Sr., 926 A.2d at 987. To
the contrary, the similarities between the two incidents establish, at most,
the commission of crimes or conduct of the same class, namely sexual
assault. See Roney, 79 A.3d at 606. In this regard, neither incident
provides proof of any particular distinctive pattern of behavior, and
therefore, does not provide evidence of a “signature” crime. Accordingly, I
must conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that the facts
surrounding Tyson’s prior rape conviction and this case did not present a
common plan or scheme and properly excluded the evidence of his prior
conviction.
Moreover, our Court has held that “‘the importance of the time period
is inversely proportional to the similarity of the crimes in question.’”
Commonwealth v. Aikens, 990 A.2d 1181, 1185 (Pa. Super. 2010)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Luktisch, 680 A.2d 877, 879 (Pa. Super.
1996)). Thus, in my opinion, because of the dissimilarities inherent in the
two incidents, the ten-year gap (or even the five-year gap that the Majority
asks for us to contemplate) weighs heavily against the admission of Tyson’s
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prior rape conviction. See Commonwealth v. Shively, 424 A.2d 1257,
1259 (Pa. 1981) (excluding evidence of a prior bad act that occurred only
seven months prior where the Court failed to “perceive enough similarity
between the two episodes to allow admission of the prior activity”).
I further agree with the trial court’s finding that “if the conviction was
allowed[,] it would be so prejudicial and inflammatory as to outweigh its
evidentiary value.” Trial Court Opinion, 9/18/13, at 4. Our Court has long
held that “[t]he Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
a defendant has committed the particular crime of which he is accused, and
it may not strip him of the presumption of innocence by proving that he has
committed other criminal acts.” Commonwealth v. Ross, 57 A.3d 85, 98-
99 (Pa. Super. 2012) (en banc), appeal denied, 72 A.3d 603 (Pa. 2013).
While I reach the conclusion that evidence of Tyson’s prior rape conviction is
not admissible under the common plan or scheme exception, I do so while
acknowledging that there are some similarities present between the two
incidents; namely, alleged non-consensual sexual intercourse with a sleeping
victim. Therefore, given that similarity between the two incidents, it is
entirely possible that evidence of Tyson’s prior rape conviction could lead the
factfinder to believe that Tyson raped G.B. without regard to the facts of this
case, which are significantly dissimilar to the prior case. Thus, the prior
conviction’s prejudicial impact on Tyson’s case far outweighs any probative
evidentiary value.
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Although the learned Majority acknowledges the prejudicial nature of
the evidence, it nonetheless asserts that the trial court can avoid the
potential for unfair prejudice by offering a cautionary instruction “to advise
the jury of the limited purpose of the evidence and to clarify that the jury
cannot treat the prior crime as proof of [Tyson]’s bad character or criminal
tendencies.” Maj. Op. at 14. In other words, the Majority believes that
instructing the jury to ignore the very reason for which the Commonwealth
seeks to offer the evidence of Tyson’s prior rape conviction will prevent any
unfair prejudice. See id. This further supports the notion that the evidence
of Tyson’s prior rape conviction, in the manner in which the Commonwealth
seeks to introduce it, is unfairly prejudicial.
The Majority also places undue emphasis on the Commonwealth’s need
to present evidence. See id. at 14-15. The Majority contends that because
identity is not an issue in this case, and the only issue is whether Tyson had
consent to engage in sexual contact with G.B., “[i]f evidence of [Tyson]’s
prior conviction is excluded, the Commonwealth must rely solely on the
uncorroborated testimony of G.B. to counter [Tyson]’s defense of consent to
vaginal intercourse.” Id. In my view, however, it is entirely possible that
G.B.’s testimony could cause a jury to find that she did not consent to
engage in sexual contact with Tyson. The most direct source of evidence of
whether G.B. consented to sexual contact with Tyson is G.B. More troubling
is that based on the Majority’s conclusion, in every case where the sole
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evidence is the testimony of the victim, the Commonwealth’s need to
present the prior bad acts evidence will trump the prohibition on the
presentation of such evidence.
The Majority relies on Commonwealth v. Gordon, 673 A.2d 866 (Pa.
1996), in support of its argument that the Commonwealth has demonstrated
a need to present evidence of Tyson’s prior rape conviction. See Maj. Op. at
14-15. In Gordon, our Supreme Court held that “[w]hether relevant
evidence is unduly prejudicial is a function in part of the degree to which it is
necessary to prove the case of the opposing party.” Gordon, 673 A.2d at
870. The Supreme Court determined in that case that
the Commonwealth was required to prove that a
non-consensual touching occurred, the purpose of
which was sexual gratification. [The defendant]
denies that the touching occurred, and since the
uncorroborated testimony of the alleged victim in
this case might reasonably lead a jury to determine
that there was a reasonable doubt as to whether
Gordon committed the crime charged, it is fair to
conclude that the other crimes evidence is necessary
for the prosecution of the case.
Id.
Gordon is clearly distinguishable from the instant matter. Here,
Tyson readily admits that he had sexual contact with G.B. The only issue
that the parties dispute, as the Majority acknowledges, is whether Tyson had
consent to engage in such contact. In Gordon, however, the defendant
denied that he ever touched the alleged victim at all. Id. Thus, because
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Tyson admits to engaging in sexual contact with G.B., and the only issue is
consent, the most direct source of whether Tyson had consent, as stated
above, is G.B. Thus, the Commonwealth’s need to present evidence here is
not akin to that in Gordon.
This case is also distinguishable from other cases in which this Court
has found that the Commonwealth had demonstrated a need to present prior
bad acts evidence. For example, this Court has held that the
Commonwealth demonstrated a need to present evidence of a defendant’s
prior bad acts where the alleged victim in a sexual assault case failed to
promptly report the molestation. Commonwealth v. Smith, 635 A.2d
1086, 1090 (Pa. Super. 1993); Commonwealth v. Frank, 577 A.2d 609,
618 (Pa. Super. 1990). Our Court also found that the Commonwealth
demonstrated a need for prior bad acts evidence where the defendant had
the ability to attack the credibility of the victims. Commonwealth v.
Luktisch, 680 A.2d 877, 879 (Pa. Super. 1996). Here, the record reflects
that G.B. promptly reported the alleged sexual assault, see Affidavit of
Probable Cause, 11/13/12, and there is no indication in the record that
Tyson will be able to attack G.B.’s credibility. Accordingly, there is no
support for the Majority’s argument that the Commonwealth demonstrated a
need to present evidence of Tyson’s prior rape conviction.
I also respectfully disagree with the Majority’s conclusion that Tyson’s
prior rape conviction is admissible pursuant to the absence of mistake
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exception to Rule 404(b). Because the application of the common plan or
scheme and absence of mistake exceptions are similar in nature, I rely on
my analysis of the common plan or scheme exception as applied in this case.
See Commonwealth v. Boczkowski, 846 A.2d 75, 86 (Pa. 2004) (stating
that courts may admit prior bad acts evidence under the “absence of
mistake or accident” exception where “the manner and circumstances” of
two crimes are “remarkably similar”). Based on that analysis, I cannot
conclude that Tyson’s prior rape conviction is “remarkably similar” to the
instant matter.
In its analysis of the applicability of the absence of mistake exception,
the Majority once again simply dismisses the differences between the two
incidents, concluding that “the exact reason the victim was in a
compromised state – [is] not essential to the question of whether [Tyson]
mistakenly believed G.B. consented to sexual intercourse.” Maj. Op. at 17
(emphasis in original). Although the reason T.B. and G.B. were in a
compromised state is not probative of whether Tyson had consent to engage
in sexual contact with G.B., it is nonetheless important to the determination
of whether the two incidents were “remarkably similar.” See Boczkowski,
846 A.2d at 86.
Notably, the Majority points to Tyson having been acquaintances with
both T.B. and G.B. and an invited guest in each of their homes as similarities
between the two incidents. See Maj. Op. at 16. These similarities between
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the two incidents are not probative of whether Tyson had consent to engage
in sexual contact with G.B., but the Majority nonetheless relies on them in
applying the absence of mistake exception. The Majority cannot rely on
those two similarities to argue that the absence of mistake exception applies
while dismissing the differences that exist between the two incidents as not
probative of the determination of consent. The Majority’s disregard for the
differences between the two incidents ignores the standard for admitting
prior bad acts evidence under the absence of mistake exception.
Finally, I cannot emphasize enough that our standard of review
requires a finding of an abuse of discretion by the trial court.
Commonwealth v. Flamer, 53 A.3d 82, 86 (Pa. Super. 2012). “[A]n
abuse of discretion may not be found merely because the appellate court
might have reached a different conclusion[.]” Commonwealth v.
Williams, 91 A.3d 240, 248-49 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Garcia, 661 A.2d 1388, 1394–95 (Pa. Super. 2004)).
Here, the trial court heard argument on this matter and made a decision
that is supported by the evidence of record. The trial court found that the
evidence of Tyson’s prior rape conviction did not fit within the common plan
or absence of mistake exceptions to the rule precluding evidence of prior
crimes. Trial Court Opinion, 9/18/13, at 4. Although there is one central
similarity alleged between Tyson’s prior rape conviction and the current
matter, i.e., a sleeping victim, I cannot conclude, based on my review of the
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certified record and pertinent case law, that the trial court abused its
discretion in refusing to focus solely on this similarity in making its decision.
Based on the foregoing, I would conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by excluding the evidence of Tyson’s prior rape
conviction and would therefore affirm.
Bender, P.J.E. and Ott, J. join this Dissenting Opinion.
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