Com. v. I.J.-W. ( 2016 )


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  • J-S77012-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    v.
    I. J.-W.
    Appellant                No. 2018 MDA 2015
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 4, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-49-CR-0001078-2015
    BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., PLATT, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J.                        FILED DECEMBER 12, 2016
    Appellant, I. J.-W., appeals from the judgment of sentence entered by
    the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County following Appellant’s
    guilty plea to criminal conspiracy to commit robbery.1 Appellant alleges that
    ____________________________________________
    
    Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1
    Appellant purports to appeal the order entered October 13, 2015, which
    certified Appellant’s case for adult criminal court. See Notice of Appeal,
    11/5/15. However, the October 13 order was an interlocutory order. See In
    the Interest of McCord, 
    664 A.2d 1046
    , 1048 (Pa. Super. 1995) (“Where a
    juvenile appeals the transfer of his case to the criminal division or the denial
    of transfer from the criminal division, double jeopardy protections are not
    implicated. Such orders are, in every sense, interlocutory, and are not
    appealable until judgment of sentence has been entered.”) Despite
    Appellant’s error, this appeal is properly before us. The judgment of
    sentence was entered on April 4, 2016. Further, we will treat Appellant’s
    notice of appeal as timely filed from the April 4, 2016 judgment of sentence.
    See Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5) (a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of
    a determination but before the entry of an appealable order shall be treated
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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    the juvenile court erred and abused its discretion by certifying her for trial as
    an adult. After careful review, we affirm.
    The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. On July 30,
    2015, police were notified that four female juvenile residents had stolen a
    vehicle and absconded from the Building Bridges program at Northwestern
    Academy in Coal Township, Northumberland County, Pennsylvania. Upon
    arrival at Northwestern Academy, Officer Matthew Hashuga spoke with Angel
    Wright, an employee of Northwestern Academy who had been assaulted by
    the four juveniles prior to their escape.
    Wright had been sitting in the dormitory common room with Appellant,
    who was fourteen years of age at the time, and another juvenile, S.Q., when
    someone approached her from behind and wrapped a sheet around her
    head. Wright was repeatedly struck in the head, causing her to become dizzy
    and nauseous. The assault continued until Wright stated, “[j]ust take what
    you want.” N.T. Certification Hearing, 10/7/15, at 9. At a certain point
    towards the end of the assault, the sheet slipped from her eyes and Wright
    observed Appellant standing over her, Appellant’s bracelet scattered in
    pieces on the floor, and S.Q. on the other side of the room. Appellant
    removed Wright’s staff keys from Wright’s belt, tossed the keys to S.Q. and
    stood watch over Wright as S.Q. opened the staff station and removed
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    as filed after such entry and on the day thereof). We have corrected the
    caption accordingly.
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    Wright’s purse and other items from the station. Appellant subsequently
    instructed Wright to stand up, and led her by the wrist to a closet. Wright
    was locked in the closet while Appellant and the other juveniles escaped in
    Wright’s vehicle.
    Although Wright was not able to see the person who tied the sheet
    around her head, she concluded that it was Appellant, as Appellant was the
    only person located behind her with a sheet prior to the attack. Further,
    while Wright had the sheet tied around her head during the entire attack,
    the sheet shifted at one point and she was able to identify Appellant
    standing above her. From Wright’s account, Officer Hashuga concluded that
    Appellant was the main actor in Wright’s attack. Appellant was charged with
    robbery, three counts of aggravated assault, theft by unlawful taking,
    conspiracy to commit robbery, conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, and
    simple assault.
    The   Commonwealth      requested    that   the   juvenile   court   transfer
    Appellant’s case to adult court. A certification hearing was held on October
    7, 2015. At the hearing, Wright testified that she sustained multiple injuries
    to her face, neck, shoulders, and upper back because of the attack. Further,
    Wright states that the attack left her “afraid of everything.” Id. at 16.
    Jessica McKee testified on behalf of Dauphin County Children and
    Youth Services. McKee testified that Appellant had a long history with
    Children and Youth, and had been placed in approximately 38 different
    homes between 2006 and 2009. Appellant was initially placed in March 2006
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    and was removed in April 2007 at the request of the foster parents due to
    Appellant’s disrespectful behaviors, aggression, and destruction of property.
    Appellant was placed with another family from April 2007 through January
    2008, and though concerns with Appellant’s behaviors were noted, she was
    ultimately removed due to the instability of the foster family. From January
    2008 through August 2008, Appellant was placed into three different foster
    homes before being returned home. Appellant re-entered foster care in
    September 2008 and was returned home in June 2009.
    Appellant did not have contact with Children and Youth again until May
    2015. Appellant’s mother reported that Appellant had been staying with a
    family friend, and that Appellant was engaging in physical altercations and
    was running away from the family friend’s residence. Children and Youth
    took Appellant into their custody on May 5, 2015 and placed her at
    Stormbreak’s Girls Home until May 13, 2015, when they released her to a
    family member. The following day, Appellant ran away from the family
    member’s home. Appellant was subsequently placed at Schaffner Youth
    Center. While living at Schaffner, Appellant was involved in two physical
    altercations with peers and was physically and verbally aggressive towards
    staff members. Following a psychological evaluation at Schnaffer, an
    increased level of care for Appellant was recommended and she was placed
    in the Building Bridges program at Northwestern Academy.
    Devin Yeager testified on behalf of Northumberland County Juvenile
    Probation. Yeager stated that prior to the instant charges, Appellant was on
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    probation for retail theft and other theft charges. In addition to her charged
    crimes, Yeager reported that Appellant was reported to have stolen a
    vehicle, but that the vehicle’s owner did not wish to press charges. Despite
    these incidents, Yeager testified that Appellant was performing well
    academically. However, Appellant had frequent conflicts with teachers and
    significant absences from school. Further, because of Appellant’s placements
    within the foster care system, Yeager reported that Appellant had been
    receiving services that she would receive in the juvenile court system for
    years. Due to Appellant’s history, Yeager testified that he did not believe
    that Appellant was amenable to treatment in the juvenile court system.
    Finally, Appellant’s mother, M. C., testified on behalf of Appellant. C.
    testified that both she and Appellant’s father had criminal histories and
    significant problems with drugs. C. testified that Appellant was forced to be a
    caretaker for her younger siblings at a young age, and that she was
    physically abused by her father to the extent that Appellant’s father received
    child endangerment charges for his treatment of her.
    Following the conclusion of testimony, the juvenile court found that
    based upon Appellant’s placement history, treatment history, criminal
    history, the nature of the crime, and the fact that she was not committable
    to an institution for the mentally ill, there was enough evidence to certify the
    case to the adult court, permitting Appellant to be tried as an adult. On April
    4, 2016, Appellant entered a guilty plea to criminal conspiracy to commit
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    robbery, and was immediately sentenced to time served to 23 months’
    imprisonment, followed by 1-year probation. This timely appeal follows.
    On appeal, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in certifying her
    case for adult court. See Appellant’s Brief, at 5. Specifically, Appellant
    asserts that the court erred in determining that the Commonwealth
    established a prima facie case of aggravated assault pursuant to 42
    Pa.C.S.A. § 6355(4)(i). See id. Additionally, Appellant argues that the
    Commonwealth did not prove that the transfer should have occurred as
    required by the factors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6355(4)(iii). See id. at 5-
    6.
    Our standard of review for evaluating the certification decision of the
    juvenile court is as follows.
    The Superior Court must not upset the certification decision of a
    juvenile court unless the court has either failed to provide
    specific reasons for its conclusion that the juvenile is not
    amenable to treatment or the court committed a gross abuse of
    discretion. The existence of facts in the record that would
    support a contrary result does not demonstrate a gross abuse of
    discretion. To rise to a level of gross abuse of discretion, the
    court rendering the adult certification decision must have
    misapplied the law, exercised unreasonable judgment, or based
    its decision on ill will, bias, or prejudice.
    Commonwealth v. Jackson, 
    722 A.2d 1030
    , 1032 (Pa. 1999) (internal
    citation and quotation marks omitted).
    Turning to Appellant’s first issue on appeal, Appellant challenges the
    juvenile court’s determination that the Commonwealth presented sufficient
    evidence to support a prima facie case of aggravated assault necessary to
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    support the transfer of charges to adult court. See Appellant’s Brief, at 5.
    Appellant argues that the Commonwealth was unable to show sufficient
    probable cause of aggravated assault because Wright was unable to identify
    her attacker and did not suffer from serious bodily injury. See id. at 8-9. We
    disagree.
    In order to support a transfer of a juvenile matter to criminal court,
    the juvenile court must find that “there is a prima facie case that the child
    committed the delinquent act alleged.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6355(a)(4)(i). We
    have previously held that
    [a] prima facie case consists of evidence, read in the light most
    favorable to the Commonwealth, that sufficiently establishes
    both the commission of a crime and that the accused is probably
    the perpetrator of that crime. The Commonwealth need not
    prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather
    the Commonwealth must show sufficient probable cause that the
    defendant committed the offense, and the evidence should be
    such that if presented at trial, and accepted as true, the judge
    would be warranted in allowing the case to go to the jury. In
    determining the presence or absence of a prima facie case,
    inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence of record that
    would support a verdict of guilty are to be given effect, but
    suspicion and conjecture are not evidence and are unacceptable
    as such.
    Commonwealth v. Hendricks, 
    927 A.2d 289
    , 291 (Pa. Super. 2007)
    (internal citations, emphasis, and quotation marks omitted).
    The statute defining aggravated assault provides in relevant part, “[a]
    person is guilty of aggravated assault if he: (1) attempts to cause serious
    bodily injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or
    recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the
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    value of human life.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1). “Serious bodily injury” is
    defined as, “[b]odily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which
    causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment
    of the function of any bodily member or organ.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301.
    Where the victim does not suffer serious bodily injury, the
    charge of aggravated assault can be supported only if the
    evidence supports a finding of an attempt to cause such injury. A
    person commits an attempt when, with intent to commit a
    specific crime, he does any act which constitutes a substantial
    step toward the commission of that crime. An attempt under
    Subsection § 2702(a)(1) requires some act, albeit not one
    causing serious bodily injury, accompanied by an intent to inflict
    serious bodily injury. A person acts intentionally with respect to
    a material element of an offense when … it is his conscious
    object to engage in conduct of that nature of to cause such a
    result. As intent is a subjective frame of mind, it is of necessity
    difficult of direct proof. The intent to cause serious bodily injury
    may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence.
    Commonwealth v. Martuscelli, 
    54 A.3d 940
    , 948 (Pa. Super. 2012)
    (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
    Here, contrary to Appellant’s assertion, Wright identified Appellant as
    her attacker. Although the nature of the attack left Wright unable to see
    during much of the attack, Wright was able to reasonably infer that
    Appellant was the perpetrator. Wright noted that Appellant was the only
    person in the common room with a sheet prior to a sheet being tied around
    her head. Further, Wright testified that there were only two other people in
    the room with her prior to the attack, and Appellant was the only person
    located in the position necessary to commit the initial attack. Additionally,
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    although Wright was blindfolded with a sheet for most of the hits she
    received to her head, she testified that the sheet slipped at one point, and
    she was able to observe Appellant standing over her, and Appellant’s
    bracelet broken on the floor next to Wright.
    Wright’s testimony was certainly enough for the Commonwealth to
    show that Appellant was “probably the perpetrator” and fulfill its first
    obligation in establishing a prima facie case.
    Further, we find that the Commonwealth has sufficiently established
    the “commission of a crime” necessary to establish a prima facie case. Even
    agreeing with Appellant purely for the sake of argument that the evidence
    does not support a finding that Wright suffered serious bodily injury from the
    attack, we find that there was enough evidence to support a finding that
    Appellant intended to cause serious bodily injury to Wright during the attack.
    Wright testified that she was blindfolded and repeatedly struck in the head.
    Wright noted that Appellant only ceased hitting her in the head when she
    told Appellant to take whatever she wanted.
    Based upon the nature of the incident and the totality of the
    circumstances, it is reasonable to infer that the attack would have continued
    if Wright had not offered items to Appellant. We find that this evidence
    provided sufficient probable cause that Appellant intended to cause serious
    bodily injury to Wright to support the allegation that Appellant committed an
    aggravated assault. Thus, because probable cause is all that is needed to
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    support a prima facie case, we find Appellant’s first issue on appeal to be
    without merit.
    Next, Appellant challenges the public interest factor of 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
    6355(a)(4)(iii), alleging that the Commonwealth failed to prove that the
    public interest would be served by certifying Appellant to be tried as an
    adult. See Appellant’s Brief, at 5-6, 9-22. Specifically, Appellant alleges that
    the public interest would not be served by Appellant’s certification as an
    adult for a number of reasons: (1) the impact of Appellant’s attack on the
    victim was short term; (2) the community impact of Appellant’s offense was
    minimal; (3) Appellant did not pose a threat to the safety of the public
    through her commission of the offense; (4) the nature and circumstances of
    the offense involved four girls, and Appellant, who was the youngest, was
    the only girl certified as an adult; and (5) Appellant is amenable to
    treatment as a juvenile. See id. None has merit.
    The Juvenile Act provides that a juvenile 14 years of age or older at
    the time of the alleged crime, may have their case transferred to adult
    criminal court for prosecution. See Commonwealth v. Rush, 
    562 A.2d 285
    , 286 (Pa. 1989). In order to support a transfer to criminal court, the
    court must find, in pertinent part:
    (iii) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the public
    interest is served by the transfer of the case for criminal
    prosecution. In determining whether the public interest can
    be served, the court shall consider the following factors:
    (A) the impact of the offense on the victim or victims;
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    (B) the impact of the offense on the community;
    (C) the threat to the safety of the public or any individual
    posed by the child;
    (D) the nature and circumstances of the offense allegedly
    committed by the child;
    (E) the degree of the child’s culpability;
    (F) the adequacy and duration of disposition alternatives
    available under this chapter and in the adult criminal
    justice system; and
    (G) whether the child is amenable to treatment, supervision
    or rehabilitation as a juvenile by considering the
    following factors:
    (I) age;
    (II) mental capacity;
    (III) maturity;
    (IV) the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by
    the child;
    (V) previous records; if any;
    (VI) the nature and extent of any prior delinquent
    history, including the success or failure of any
    previous attempts by the juvenile court to
    rehabilitate the child;
    (VII) whether the child can be rehabilitated prior to the
    expiration of the juvenile court jurisdiction;
    (VIII) probation or institutional reports, if any;
    (IX) any other relevant factors;
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    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6355(a)(4)(iii). “Section 6355(g) places the burden of proof
    upon the Commonwealth to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence,
    that the public interest is served by the transfer of the case to criminal court
    and that a child is not amenable to treatment, supervision, or rehabilitation
    as a juvenile.” Commonwealth v. In re E.F., 
    995 A.2d 326
    , 331 (Pa.
    2010) (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6355(g)).
    At the certification hearing, the juvenile court heard testimony from
    the victim of Appellant’s attack, Wright, the Appellant’s probation officer,
    Yeager, the Appellant’s social worker, McKee, and the Appellant’s mother, C.
    The court also heard argument from the parties, evaluated Appellant’s
    Children and Youth placement history, Appellant’s juvenile file, and
    Appellant’s treatment history.
    The evidence presented by the Commonwealth provided that Appellant
    was the main actor in a sophisticated criminal attack, which left its victim
    with long-term psychological injuries. Appellant’s social worker noted that
    Appellant had a long history of receiving services through Children and Youth
    and that many of her placements were marked with assaultive and defiant
    behaviors. Appellant’s juvenile probation officer testified that her review of
    the Appellant’s prior delinquent behaviors and treatment history led her to
    believe that Appellant was no longer amenable to treatment within the
    juvenile system. Appellant presented evidence that she was the youngest of
    four actors in the attack and suffered from a highly dysfunctional family life.
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    The record indicates that the juvenile court properly considered all of
    these factors, as well as the additional factors required to be considered
    under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6355(a)(4)(iii). In reviewing the determination reached
    by the juvenile court in regards to Appellant, we note that
    [i]n the end, certification depends on a complex balancing of
    numerous factors, not the least of which is the general
    demeanor of the juvenile as observed by the juvenile court
    during the certification hearing, a factor which this Court is ill-
    equipped to evaluate on appeal. When a juvenile judge is
    provided with a comprehensive juvenile file and has the benefit
    of argument from prosecution and defense, both common sense
    and our Supreme Court’s precedent require that we assume the
    trial court duly considered the evidence and arguments
    presented. In such cases, our focus on review must be limited to
    whether the record as a whole reveals an abuse of discretion. ...
    Commonwealth v. Saez, 
    925 A.2d 776
    , 781 (Pa. Super. 2007) (quoting
    Commonwealth v. McDonald, 
    582 A.2d 328
    , 335 (Pa. Super. 1990)).
    While Appellant does not agree with the manner in which the juvenile
    court weighed these factors, the weight given to the factors considered by
    the juvenile court will not, and cannot, be overturned by this Court when
    supported by evidence of record. Thus, we find that the juvenile court did
    not abuse its discretion, and consequently, Appellant’s second issue on
    appeal merits no relief.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 12/12/2016
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Document Info

Docket Number: 2018 MDA 2015

Filed Date: 12/12/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/12/2016