Com. v. Fegley, R. ( 2015 )


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  • J-S28009-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    RALPH C. FEGLEY,
    Appellant                    No. 1397 MDA 2014
    Appeal from the Order Dated July 30, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CR-0420-1977
    BEFORE: BOWES, ALLEN, and LAZARUS, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                              FILED JUNE 15, 2015
    Ralph C. Fegley appeals from the July 30, 2014 order denying his
    “Motion to Compel” and “Motion for Conflict.” We affirm.
    On January 24, 1986, a Northumberland County jury found Appellant
    guilty of the first-degree murder of his wife after he shot her five times with
    a shotgun.    The court sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment without
    parole on February 6, 1987.        The murder occurred in 1977.      Appellant
    walked into a police station following the killing and admitted to the crime.
    Appellant initially pleaded guilty but withdrew his plea.      Thereafter, he
    requested a change of venue, which was granted, and he was found guilty
    by a jury in Luzerne County in 1978. During post-conviction review, under
    the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (“PCHA”), Appellant was awarded a new
    trial. As noted, a subsequent jury found Appellant guilty of killing his wife.
    J-S28009-15
    This Court affirmed on direct appeal, Commonwealth v. Fegley, 
    544 A.2d 1040
    (Pa.Super. 1988) (unpublished memorandum), and Appellant did not
    timely seek review with our Supreme Court.
    Appellant subsequently filed a PCHA petition alleging that appellate
    counsel was ineffective in failing to request allowance of appeal. The PCHA
    court denied that petition.     This Court affirmed.    Commonwealth v.
    Fegley, 
    598 A.2d 1327
    (Pa.Super. 1991) (unpublished memorandum).
    Appellant again sought post-conviction relief, this time under the Post-
    Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). The PCRA court dismissed his petition, and
    this Court upheld that decision. Commonwealth v. Fegley, 
    627 A.2d 201
    (Pa.Super. 1993).    Appellant filed a third collateral petition on March 15,
    1994. The PCRA court denied the petition that same date. Appellant did not
    appeal.
    This matter arose when Appellant filed a self-styled “Motion to
    Compel” on July 8, 2014 at his criminal docket number.       In that motion,
    Appellant alleged that the Clerk of Courts refused to supply him with a
    certification of the nonexistence of an affidavit of probable cause for his
    arrest. The trial court issued a rule to show cause on July 10, 2014. The
    Clerk of Courts filed a reply and answer on July 29, 2014. That same date,
    Appellant filed a “motion for conflict” wherein he asked that this matter be
    transferred to federal court.
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    According to Appellant, the district attorney of Northumberland County
    had previously represented him in PCRA proceedings; therefore, a conflict of
    interest existed in having the case heard before the Northumberland County
    Court of Common Pleas.1 The trial court dismissed both Appellant’s motion
    to compel and motion for conflict.             This timely appeal ensued.   The trial
    court directed Appellant to file and serve a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise
    statement of errors complained of on appeal. Appellant complied, and the
    trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) order.           The matter is now ready for this
    Court’s review. Appellant presents five issues for our consideration:
    1. Did the trial court error [sic] in denying this Appellant’s
    motion to compel the Clerk of Court to issue a certified
    statement concerning the demand presented to this Clerk of
    Court?.[sic]
    2. Did the Clerk of Court deny this Appellant his constitutional
    right to access to the court, by outright refusing to issue a
    certified statement concerning the demand presented to the
    Clerk of Court?.[sic]
    3. Is there intentional prejudice and irreparable harm present if
    this Appellant is not granted relief?.[sic]
    4. Is there a direct conflict present by the Office of Attorney
    General representing the Northumberland County Clerk of
    Court, wherein, this Appellant is only challenging the denial of
    the Clerk of Court in the responsibilities mandated under
    statute?.[sic]
    ____________________________________________
    1
    The Attorney General’s Office is representing the Commonwealth in this
    matter.
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    5. Has this Appellant submitted critical information and evidence
    that warrant the transfer of this Appellant’s entire file to the
    jurisdiction of the federal forum, whereas, the direct conflicts
    present, deny this Appellant a fair and unbias [sic] ruling in
    what is and will be presented to the courts for a review of the
    entirety of the case?.[sic]
    Appellant’s brief at V.
    Although Appellant purports to raise five issues, his brief contains only
    two separate argument sections. Aside from a citation to 42 Pa.C.S. § 2757,
    defining the duties of a Clerk of Court, Appellant provides no citation to
    authority in his initial argument. He baldly asserts that the Northumberland
    Clerk of Court was required to prepare a certification that no affidavit of
    probable cause existed in his criminal case file.
    He further maintains, for the first time, that the Office of Attorney
    General is improperly acting as an appellee in this case and that the proper
    appellee is the solicitor for the office of the Clerk of Court.   According to
    Appellant, the Northumberland County Clerk of Court has denied him access
    to unspecified records and a certification of the non-existence of a record.2
    The Commonwealth responds that the sole issue preserved for appeal
    is Appellant’s initial claim. It adds that Appellant erroneously filed a motion
    ____________________________________________
    2
    According to Appellant, the Clerk of Court responded to his request for a
    copy of his criminal complaint, an affidavit of probable cause for his arrest,
    and printout of the docket entries in his criminal case by informing him that
    no affidavit of probable cause for arrest was filed.
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    to compel where the proper action would have been a writ of mandamus.
    Appellant himself in his own brief acknowledges that this “appeal is in the
    Nature of a Petition for Writ of Mandamus[.]”         Appellant’s brief at 5.    The
    Commonwealth maintains that Appellant improperly filed a motion in his
    criminal case instead of a separate writ of mandamus.              In addition, the
    Commonwealth submits that there is no statutory authority requiring a Clerk
    of Court to certify the non-existence of a record.
    Preliminarily, we note that a Clerk of Court is a public official,
    Pa.Const. Art. 9, § 4; see also Richardson v. Peters, 
    19 A.3d 1047
    , 1048
    (Pa.   2011),   and   the   acts   of   a     Clerk   of   Court   are   ministerial.
    Commonwealth v. Williams, 
    106 A.3d 583
    , 588 (Pa. 2014). In order to
    compel a public official to perform an official mandatory act or duty, the
    proper action is a writ of mandamus. Brown v. Levy, 
    73 A.3d 514
    , 516 n.2
    (Pa. 2013) (“mandamus will lie to compel action by an official where his
    refusal to act in the requested way stems from his erroneous interpretation
    of the law.”); Commonwealth Department of Health v. Hanes, 
    78 A.3d 676
    , 685 n. 19 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2013) (“When the petitioner seeks the official
    performance of a ministerial act or mandatory duty, the petitioner properly
    sounds in mandamus.”). Mandamus does not lie where the public official’s
    act or duty requires the exercise of judgment, i.e., is discretionary.          See
    
    Levy, supra
    .
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    The writ, however, when involving a Commonwealth government
    official acting in his official capacity, must ordinarily be filed with the
    Commonwealth Court. 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1) (“The Commonwealth Court
    shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions or proceedings: (1) Against
    the Commonwealth government, including any officer thereof, acting in his
    official   capacity[.]”);   cf.   
    Peters, supra
    ;   see   also   Humphrey   v.
    Department of Corrections, 
    939 A.2d 987
    , 991 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2007), aff'd
    in part, appeal denied in part, 
    955 A.2d 348
    (Pa. 2008); compare
    Commonwealth v. LeBar, 
    860 A.2d 1105
    (Pa.Super. 2004) (court of
    common pleas had jurisdiction over motion to compel against Clerk of Court
    and Department of Corrections).
    Of course, where a party erroneously files a legal document with the
    wrong court, that court is required to transfer the matter to the proper
    court. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103;3 Pa.R.A.P. 751. In this case, Appellant did
    ____________________________________________
    3
    42 Pa.C.S. § 5103 provides:
    If an appeal or other matter is taken to or brought in a court or
    magisterial district of this Commonwealth which does not have
    jurisdiction of the appeal or other matter, the court or
    magisterial district judge shall not quash such appeal or dismiss
    the matter, but shall transfer the record thereof to the proper
    tribunal of this Commonwealth, where the appeal or other
    matter shall be treated as if originally filed in the transferee
    tribunal on the date when the appeal or other matter was first
    filed in a court or magisterial district of this Commonwealth. A
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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    not file a writ of mandamus with the court of common pleas, thereby
    triggering the transfer requirement.             We acknowledge that the title of a
    motion is not necessarily dispositive. However, in 
    LeBar, supra
    , this Court
    considered an appeal from a motion to compel a Clerk of Court and the
    Department of Corrections to return money to LeBar because he was not
    ordered to pay fines and costs.             We did not conclude that the court of
    common pleas did not have jurisdiction and should have considered the
    matter as a writ of mandamus and then transferred the case. Instead, we
    reached the merits and determined that the Clerk of Court and DOC had
    violated governing statutory law by taking $406.            Accordingly, we ordered
    the return of that money.          In light of LeBar, we decline to hold that the
    court of common pleas lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion to compel.
    Further, there is no obligation on the part of a Clerk of Court to certify the
    non-existence of a record; indeed, such a rule would be nonsensical since
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    matter which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of a court or
    magisterial district judge of this Commonwealth but which is
    commenced in any other tribunal of this Commonwealth shall be
    transferred by the other tribunal to the proper court or
    magisterial district of this Commonwealth where it shall be
    treated as if originally filed in the transferee court or magisterial
    district of this Commonwealth on the date when first filed in the
    other tribunal.
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    items dehors the record are not considered to exist for purposes of litigation.
    Thus, the court did not err in dismissing the motion.
    With respect to Appellant’s second argument, since he did not cite to
    any legal authority, it fails. Appellant’s position is that because the district
    attorney represented him during earlier proceedings in this case and a senior
    judge in Northumberland County prosecuted him, the matter should have
    been transferred to the federal courts.     Initially, no conflict exists because
    neither individual with an alleged conflict was involved in the underlying
    litigation in this appeal.   Moreover, Appellant provides no indication under
    what authority a federal court would have jurisdiction in this case. Where a
    conflict of interest does exist, the proper remedy is not a transfer to federal
    court, but to remove the conflict. Since there is no conflict, Appellant’s claim
    is baseless.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 6/15/2015
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Document Info

Docket Number: 1397 MDA 2014

Filed Date: 6/15/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/15/2015