Cisneros, A. v. Rouse, F. D. ( 2016 )


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  • J-A27013-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    ALFREDO CISNEROS                                           IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    FRED D. ROUSE, III; AND FINANCIAL
    MANAGEMENT GROUP, UBO
    Appellants                        No. 775 EDA 2016
    Appeal from the Order Entered February 16, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Civil Division at No(s): 3285 September Term, 2013
    BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                                 FILED DECEMBER 13, 2016
    Fred   D.   Rouse,     III,   and      Financial   Management   Group,    UBO,
    (collectively “Rouse”) appeal from the order, entered in the Court of
    Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, granting Appellee Alfred Cisneros’s
    second motion to enforce a settlement and entering judgment in Cisneros’s
    favor.1 After careful review, we quash.
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    1
    In Casey v. GAF Corp., 
    828 A.2d 362
     (Pa. Super. 2003), our Court set
    forth the standard of review of a trial court’s grant of a motion to enforce a
    settlement as follows:
    Our Court's standard of review of a trial court's grant or denial of
    a motion to enforce a settlement agreement is plenary, as the
    challenge is to the trial court's conclusion of law. The appellate
    court is free to draw its own inferences and reach its own
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    J-A27013-16
    Rouse is Cisneros’s step-son and the managing director of Financial
    Management Group, UBO.              In 2001, Rouse made monthly advances to
    Cisneros and his late wife, Diana Cisneros, to help them meet their
    expenses.    The parties orally agreed that Rouse would be repaid for his
    monetary advances from the value of the Cisneroses’ Morris Street,
    Philadelphia, home after they passed away.          On July 31, 2012, Rouse
    presented a written “Pledge Security Agreement and Note” (“Note”) to the
    Cisneroses in the hospital after Diana had had major surgery.      The Note,
    which had an effective date of November 1, 2001, stated that all advances
    made under the parties’ oral agreement “shall accrue interest at the rate of
    13% as calculated by the Financial Management Group, UBO[,] and be
    treated as a Reverse Mortgage with the above named Secured Creditor as
    Mortgagee.” The Cisneroses signed the Note; it was later recorded with the
    Philadelphia Recorder of Deeds.
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    conclusions from the facts as found by the trial court. However,
    the appellate court is only bound by those findings of fact by the
    trial court that are supported by competent evidence.
    
    Id. at 367
     (citation omitted). Ordinarily, enforcement of a settlement
    agreement is governed by principles of contract law. Nationwide Ins.
    Enterprise and Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Anastasis, 
    830 A.2d 1288
    (Pa. Super. 2003). Accordingly, in order to enforce a settlement agreement,
    the court must find that the record evidences all the requisite elements of a
    valid contract: offer, acceptance, and consideration. The court reviews the
    evidence with these elements in mind and in light of a judicial policy that
    favors settlements of legal disputes in Pennsylvania.         Compu Forms
    Control, Inc. v. Altus Group, Inc., 
    574 A.2d 618
     (Pa. Super. 1990).
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    J-A27013-16
    Diana Cisneros passed away on September 30, 2012, leaving Mr.
    Cisneros as the sole owner of the Morris Street residence. On September
    26, 2013, Cisneros filed an action against Rouse alleging various violations
    of consumer protection laws based on the Note, claiming that he and his
    wife were under duress when they were asked to sign the document. Rouse
    filed an answer, new matter and counterclaims for unjust enrichment,
    quantum meruit and to quiet title.
    On February 9, 2015, the parties appeared for trial before the
    Honorable Idee C. Fox. However, after Cisneros presented his case-in-chief,
    the parties engaged in further settlement negotiations and ultimately settled
    all claims and counterclaims. N.T. Agreement from Trial, 2/9/15, at 4 (“The
    Court will mark this settlement pursuant to the statements placed on the
    record.”).   To evidence the settlement there is a February 10, 2015 trial
    court docket entry stating:
    THE COURT HAVING BEEN ADVISED THAT THE WITHIN CASE
    HAS BEEN SETTLED, THE CASE SHALL BE MARKED
    "DISCONTINUED" ON THE PROTHONOTARY'S DOCKET AND
    REMOVED FROM THE APPLICABLE LIST AND INVENTORY OF
    PENDING CASES. IF THE INSTANT PROCEEDINGS INVOLVE AN
    APPEAL FROM A COMPULSORY ARBITRATION AWARD, ANY LIEN
    FROM THE ARBITRATION AWARD IS RELEASED. THIS CASE MAY
    BE RESTORED TO THE TRIAL LIST ONLY UPON WRITTEN ORDER
    OF THE TEAM/PROGRAM LEADER. THIS RELIEF SHALL BE
    REQUESTED BY FORMAL MOTION. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED
    AND DECREED THAT IN THE FOLLOWING TYPES OF CASES
    ADDITIONAL STEPS MUST BE TAKEN TO OFFICIALLY CONCLUDE
    THE    CASE:   MINOR'S    COMPROMISES,      INCOMPETENT
    /INCAPACITATED PERSON'S COMPROMISES, WRONGFUL DEATH
    /SURVIVAL ACTIONS (SEE PA. R.C.P. 2039, 2064, 2206, PHILA
    CIV. R. NO. 2039.1, 2206, AND JOINT GENERAL COURT
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    J-A27013-16
    REGULATION 97 -1) AND JOINDER (SEE PA.R.C.P. 2231). . . .
    BY THE COURT: FOX, J. 2/9/15.
    On May 11, 2015, Cisneros filed a motion to enforce the settlement when
    Rouse did not have the recorded Note marked satisfied (removal of recorded
    lien) and failed to execute settlement documents prepared by Cisneros in
    accordance with the parties’ agreement in open court on February 9, 2015.
    On July 6, 2015,2 the Honorable Nina Wright Padilla granted Cisneros’s
    motion to enforce the settlement and attorney’s fees,3 ordering Rouse to
    “execute documents to effectuate the settlement agreed to in Court on
    February 9, 2015 within 30 days of this order or risk sanctions.”          Order,
    7/2/15.    On August 13, 2015, Cisneros filed a second motion to enforce
    settlement.     On August 18, 2015, Rouse filed a response to the motion
    averring that on July 27, 2015, his attorney emailed him a copy of the
    court’s order granting Cisneros’s first motion to enforce and informed him
    that he intended to withdraw from the case.4 See Defendants’ Response to
    ____________________________________________
    2
    Notice of the order, pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 236, was given to the parties on
    July 6, 2015. See Pa.R.A.P. 108 (date of entry of orders).
    3
    In his motion to enforce, Cisneros also requested payment of reasonable
    attorney’s fees for counsel’s preparation and presentation of the motion.
    Motion to Enforce, 5/11/15, at V.
    4
    In response to the second motion to enforce, Rouse alleged that counsel
    “was totally ineffective . . . on the day of trial,” and that his attorney “poorly
    negotiated the settlement on the record that does little to nothing in
    protecting [his] interests.” Answer to Plaintiff’s Second Motion to Enforce, at
    ¶¶ 28-29.
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    J-A27013-16
    Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Settlement and for Attorneys’ Fees, 8/18/15, at
    ¶¶ 43-44.   After a hearing on the second motion, the trial court entered an
    order on February 16, 2016, granting Cisneros’s motion to enforce and
    setting forth the following:
    1. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of [Cisneros] and against
    [Rouse] and title to the Property 1220 Morris Street,
    Philadelphia, Pennsylvania[,] is quieted and the Pledge
    Security Agreement and Note, recorded on August 13,
    2012[,] at Document No. 52521814 in the Philadelphia
    Department of Records is hereby deemed SATISFIED and
    the Commissioner of Records is directed to mark said
    agreement and note satisfied. [Rouse is] forever barred from
    any claim on said security agreement and note.
    2. [Rouse is] to be named as loss payee on [Cisneros’s]
    homeowner’s insurance.
    3. Within sixty (60) days of the docketing of this Order
    [Cisneros] shall execute and record with the Philadelphia
    Department of Records a mortgage as prepared by [Cisneros]
    with [Cisneros] as the Mortgagor and Defendant, FINANCIAL
    MANAGEMENT GROUP, UBO, as Mortgagee with the terms of
    the Mortgage as follows: $107,634.38, with interest accrued
    at the simple rate of four (4%) percent commencing August
    1, 2012, and recorded against the Property at issue, 1220
    South Morris Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The funds
    due under the Mortgage shall be payable upon [Cisneros’s]
    death or sale of the Property. The remaining terms of the
    Mortgage are to be in compliance with State and Federal law.
    4. [Cisneros] shall obtain a certified copy of this Order and
    deliver it to the Philadelphia Commissioner of Records to be
    recorded.     The Commissioner shall accept and record a
    certified copy of this Order.
    Order, 2/16/16.
    On March 7, 2016, Rouse filed a notice of appeal raising the following
    issues for our consideration:
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    (1)   Where the record evidence demonstrated that the parties
    had failed to reach an agreement on an essential term of
    their attempted settlement, did the trial court err by
    concluding that a settlement had been reached?
    (2)   Did the trial court err in purporting to enforce the parties’
    settlement by imposing terms of performance that
    contradict the terms that were agreed upon by the parties
    and placed on the record?
    Rouse’s claims on appeal can be consolidated into one fundamental
    issue: whether the trial court erred in enforcing the settlement where the
    parties did not agree on an essential term and later imposed terms that
    were not originally agreed to by the parties.
    Prior to reaching the merits of this appeal, we must first determine
    whether Rouse’s claims are waived due to his failure to appeal from the
    court’s July 7, 2015 order granting Cisneros’s first motion to enforce.     On
    August 18, 2015, Rouse filed a response to Cisneros’s second motion to
    enforce settlement, asserting that on July 27, 2015, he became aware of the
    court’s first order enforcing the parties’ settlement, as agreed to in open
    court on February 9, 2015. Therefore, at that point when he was no longer
    represented by counsel, he was obligated to file, either pro se or with newly-
    retained private counsel, a notice of appeal to that final order in order to
    preserve his claims on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1) (order is final if it
    disposes of all claims and all parties or effectively ends litigation in case);
    but see. Robinson v. City of Philadelphia, 
    706 A.2d 1295
     (Pa. Commw.
    2010) (where order enforcing settlement agreement disposed of litigation
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    between appellants and appellee, but did not end underlying litigation as to
    Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, order not final under Rule 341); Knisel v.
    Oaks, 
    645 A.2d 253
     (Pa. Super. 1994) (denial of motion to enforce
    settlement is interlocutory, non-final order under Rule 341(b)).    Because
    Rouse failed to file a notice of appeal from the court’s final order granting
    Cisneros’s first motion to enforce, we quash the instant appeal.   Pa.R.A.P.
    903(a).
    Appeal quashed.5
    ____________________________________________
    5
    Even if we did not quash the instant appeal, we would find no merit to
    Rouse’s claims. The notes of testimony from the parties’ February 9, 2015
    hearing confirm their intention to settle the underlying matter.    See N.T.
    Trial/Settlement, 2/9/15, at 2-5. The parties each stated to the trial judge
    that they understood the settlement agreement placed on the record, id. at
    5-6, and the matter was marked “settled pursuant to the statements placed
    on the record.” Id. at 4.
    Under the clear and unambiguous settlement terms and the mutual
    assent by the parties of the settlement, a binding agreement was entered
    into on February 9, 2015. See Mastroni-Mucker v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
    976 A.2d 510
     (Pa. Super. 2009) (where settlement agreement contains all
    requisites for valid contract, court must enforce terms of agreement even if
    terms of agreement are not yet formalized in writing; agreement is binding if
    parties come to meeting of minds on all essential terms, even if they expect
    agreement to be reduced to writing but that formality does not take place).
    Here, the parties had a meeting of the minds on the essential terms of
    settlement.     The only formality to take place after the parties’ oral
    settlement in court was to execute the agreement incorporating all the new
    loan documents and releasing each other from all claims involving the
    underlying action, loan, original note and property. This, however, did not
    change the binding nature of the settlement. Mastroni-Mucker, supra.
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    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 12/13/2016
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