Bank of New York Mellon v. Jordan, M. ( 2014 )

J-S66003-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON FKA THE IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
BANK OF NEW YORK AS TRUSTEE FOR PENNSYLVANIA
THE CERTIFICATE HOLDERS CWABS,
INC. ASSET BACKED CERTIFICATES
SERIES 6006-19
Appellee
v.
MICHELLE L. & WALTER T. JORDAN,
Appellants No. 680 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Entered March 12, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County
Civil Division at No(s): 13 CV 1323
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 12, 2014
Appellants, Michelle L. and Walter T. Jordan, appeal from the March
12, 2014 order denying their petition to open default judgment entered
against them and in favor of Appellee, Bank of New York Mellon, et al (“the
Bank”). After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court provided the following brief procedural history:
The Complaint in Mortgage Foreclosure was filed in the
instant action on March 21, 2013. On July 2, 2013, after
[Appellants] failed to file a responsive pleading, judgment was
entered in the amount of $305,592.02 in favor of the [Bank].
On July 11, 2013, [Appellants] filed a petition to open the
judgment pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 237.3. Oral argument was
heard on March 12, 2014, and an order denying the petition was
filed [on] that date.
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Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 7/20/14, at 1-2.
Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal. Herein, they present one
question for our review: “Did the Lower Court err in failing to open the
judgment against [] Appellants when the Petition to Open was filed within 10
days after the entry of judgment and [] Appellants pled a meritorious
defense?” Appellants’ Brief at 4. We review this claim under the following
standard:
Generally, a petition to open a default judgment is addressed to
the equitable powers of the court and is a matter of judicial
discretion. Aquilino [v. Philadelphia Catholic Archdiocese,]
884 A.2d [1269,] 1283 [(Pa. Super. 2005)]. “A lower court's
ruling refusing to open a default judgment will not be reversed
unless there has been an error of law or a clear, manifest abuse
of discretion.” Schultz v. Erie Insurance Exchange, [] 477
A.2d 471, 472 ([Pa.] 1984) (citation omitted).
Boatin v. Miller, 955 A.2d 424, 427 (Pa. Super. 2008).
In the present case, the trial court denied Appellants’ petition to open
after determining that they failed to prove two of the three requisites for
opening a default judgment. Specifically, the court stated: “It is well[-]
settled that in Pennsylvania a default judgment may be opened if the moving
party satisfie[s] three requirements: (1) act promptly, (2) allege a
meritorious defense, and (3) explain the reasonable excuse for the delay
that brought about the default judgment.” TCO at 3 (citing Seeger v. First
Union National Bank, 836 A.2d 163, 165 (Pa. Super. 2003)). The court
then concluded that Appellants “did respond promptly; however, they
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neither provided a meritorious defense nor did they explain the delay that
led to the default judgment being entered.” Id. at 4.
In challenging the court’s ruling on appeal, Appellants first contend
that the trial court erred by requiring them to provide an explanation for
their delay in responding to the Bank’s complaint. Appellants rely on
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 237.3(b), which states: “If the petition
is filed within ten days after the entry of the judgment on the docket, the
court shall open the judgment if the proposed complaint or answer states a
meritorious cause of action or defense.” Pa.R.C.P. 237.3(b). Appellants
argue that because here, their petition to open was filed within 10 days of
the entry of default judgment, under Rule 237.3(b) they were only required
to present a meritorious defense; they were not also required to provide a
reasonable excuse for their delay.
We are compelled to agree that the court erred in this regard.
[I]n Attix v. Lehman, 925 A.2d 864 (Pa. Super. 2007), we
interpreted Rule 237.3(b) based on [the] principles of rule
construction. We concluded that a petitioner does not need
to satisfy the common law requirement that he provide a
reasonable excuse for the failure that led to the judgment
by default, if his petition to open is filed within 10 days of
the judgment and states a meritorious defense. Id. at 866.
In doing so, we recognized that Rule 237.3(b) presupposes that
a petition filed within ten days of the default judgment is
promptly filed and sets forth a reasonable explanation or
legitimate excuse for the inactivity or delay resulting in the entry
of the judgment. Id. Thus, we held that under Rule
237.3(b), a trial court must open a default judgment, if
the petitioner files a petition to open within ten days of its
entry and states a meritorious defense. Id. at 867.
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Boatin, 955 A.2d at 427 (emphasis added). Based on our holding in Attix,
we conclude that because Appellants filed their petition to open within 10
days of the entry of default judgment, they were only required to assert a
meritorious defense to warrant their petition being granted. See also
Penn-Delco School Dist. v. Bell Atlantic-Pa, Inc., 745 A.2d 14, 19 (Pa.
Super. 1999) (“[W]here the petitioner files a petition to open the judgment
within ten days, … the petitioner need demonstrate only that the verified
pleading attached to the petition states a meritorious defense.”). Thus, the
trial court misapplied the law in this regard.
Nevertheless, the trial court also concluded that Appellants failed to
present a meritorious defense, and Appellants have not convinced us that
the court’s decision was an abuse of its discretion.
The requirement of a meritorious defense is only that a defense
must be pleaded that if proved at trial would justify relief. The
defense does not have to prove every element of its defense[;]
however, it must set forth the defense in precise, specific
and clear terms.
Seeger, 836 A.2d at 166 (emphasis added) (quoting Penn-Delco School v.
Bell Atlantic-Pa, Inc., 745 A.2d 14, 19 (Pa. Super. 1999) (citations
omitted)).
Here, in the Bank’s March 21, 2013 complaint in mortgage foreclosure,
it stated that Appellants executed the at-issue mortgage in August of 2006,
and that “[t]he mortgage is in default because monthly payments of
principal and interest upon said mortgage due 01/01/2010 and each month
thereafter are due and unpaid….” Complaint, 3/21/13, at 4 ¶ 5. The Bank
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then listed the amounts of principal, interest, and certain fees owed by
Appellants, and concluded that Appellants owed a total of $305,592.02. Id.at 4 ¶ 6.
In Appellants’ answer attached to their petition to open, they
responded to the Bank’s assertion that they failed to make mortgage
payments as follows:
Denied. It is specifically denied that [Appellants] failed to make
payments as indicated in the Complaint, by way of further
response, the Complaint fails to provide any evidence that
[Appellants] are in violation of the Mortgage Contract.
Answer, 7/11/13, at 2 ¶ 5. In response to the Bank’s statement of the total
amount owed by Appellants, Appellants again stated:
Denied. It is specifically denied that [Appellants] failed to make
payments of principal and interest, by way of further response,
the Complaint fails to provide any evidence that [Appellants] are
in violation of the Mortgage Contract.
Id. at 2 ¶ 6.
These answers are not sufficiently specific to constitute a meritorious
defense. Despite the Bank’s alleging over 36 months of non-payment, and
providing a specific amount owed by Appellants, Appellants failed to specify
any month(s) in which they did, in fact, pay their mortgage, or provide the
specific amount that they believe they currently owe. Clearly, Appellants
had access to this type of information, yet failed to include it in their answer.
Additionally, Appellants’ claim that “the Complaint fails to provide any
evidence that [Appellants] are in violation of the Mortgage Contract” does
not amount to a meritorious defense; instead, this assertion is merely a
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claim that the Bank’s complaint was inadequate. Even more notably,
Appellants again fail to specify what evidence the Bank was required to
include in the complaint, or how that omission defeated the Bank’s claim
against them.
Accordingly, we ascertain no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
decision to deny Appellants’ petition to open.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/12/2014
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