Weaver, R. v. Commonwealth of PA ( 2016 )

J-S73042-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
RONALD D. WEAVER IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
SUSAN SHOFF, OFFICER EVANISKO,
EUGENE SANTORELLA, TREVOR
WINGARD, AND DORINA VARNER
Appellee No. 608 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Order March 31, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County
Civil Division at No(s): 610 Civil 2013
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 29, 2016
Appellant Ronald D. Weaver appeals from the order entered in the
Somerset County Court of Common Pleas, which revoked his In Forma
Pauperis (“IFP”) status upon motion of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections (“DOC”) employees Susan Shoff, Officer
Evanisko, Eugene Santorella, Trevor Wingard, and Dorina Varner
(collectively “DOC Appellees”). We transfer this appeal to Commonwealth
Court.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows.
On September 27, 2013, Appellant filed a civil complaint against Appellees
along with an application to proceed IFP. On December 30, 2015, the trial
court granted Appellant’s application. On February 18, 2016, DOC Appellees
J-S73042-16
filed a motion to revoke Appellant’s IFP status. On March 10, 2016,
Appellant filed a response to this motion. On March 29, 2016, the trial court
conducted a hearing to address this motion along with Appellant’s motion for
medical treatment. After the hearing, the trial court issued an order denying
Appellant’s application for medical treatment and an order granting DOC
Appellees’ motion to revoke Appellant’s IFP status. On April 27, 2016,
Appellant filed a notice of appeal to the court’s order revoking his IFP
status.1, 2 Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REVOKING
APPELLANT’S [IFP] STATUS AND BY MISSTATING THE
INTENT OF THE CONFLICTING LAWS THAT GRANTS THE
ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO ACCESS TO THE COURTS FOR ALL
CITIZENS WHILE DENYING ACCESS TO THE COURTS
UNOBSTRUCTED TO INDIGENT PRISONERS WHO ARE
SUBJECT TO THE ABUSE OF CORRECTIONAL EMPLOYEES;
AND, DOES THE CRIME OF BARRATRY PROVIDE THE
PUBLIC WITH A MEANS FOR PROTECTION FROM UNJUST,
INTENTIONAL FRIVOLOUS OR HARASSING LAWSUITS?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
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1
On May 2, 2016, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
After the court granted Appellant’s motion for an extension of time to file his
statement, Appellant complied, and the trial court issued a Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a) opinion on June 22, 2016.
2
See Grant v. Blaine, 868 A.2d 400, 403 (Pa.2005) (holding “an order
denying in forma pauperis status is a final, appealable order.”).
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Before we address Appellant’s claim, we must decide whether to
transfer this appeal to the Commonwealth Court. Although the parties do
not contest this Court’s jurisdiction, we may sua sponte address whether to
transfer a case to the Commonwealth Court. See Trumbull Corp. v. Boss
Const., Inc., 747 A.2d 395, 399 (Pa.Super.2000). “Transfers between the
intermediate appellate courts may be effected by the Superior Court and the
Commonwealth Court on their own motion or upon petition of any party, to
transfer any appeal to the other court for consideration and decision with a
matter pending in such other court involving the same or related questions
of fact, law or discretion.” Karpe v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 461 A.2d
859, 860–61 (Pa.Super.1983) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 705) (internal quotations
omitted).
When deciding whether to transfer an appeal to Commonwealth Court,
this Court must weigh the following factors: “(1) whether the case has
already been transferred; (2) whether our retention will disrupt the
legislatively ordained division of labor between the intermediate appellate
courts; and (3) whether there is a possibility of establishing two conflicting
lines of authority on a particular subject.” Trumbull Corp., 747 A.2d at 399
(internal citations omitted).
Here, the case has not yet been transferred between the courts. The
Commonwealth Court has an established line of authority on interpreting the
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Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”),3 which governs a prisoner’s
opportunity to proceed IFP. Appellant and Appellees cite to the
Commonwealth Court to support their legal propositions. Further,
Commonwealth government DOC employees filed the motion to revoke
Appellant’s IFP status, which is the subject of this appeal. See 42 Pa.C.S. §
762(a)(1)(ii) (giving Commonwealth Court exclusive jurisdiction over
appeals from final orders of courts of common pleas in civil actions or
proceedings by the Commonwealth government); See also
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 858 A.2d 627, 629 (Pa.Super.2004) (the DOC
is the Commonwealth government).
Accordingly, we transfer this appeal and the accompanying record to
Commonwealth Court.
Appeal TRANSFERRED to Commonwealth Court. Jurisdiction
RELINQUISHED.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/29/2016
____________________________________________
3
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6601-08.
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