Com. v. Noel, M. ( 2015 )


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  • J-A09013-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellant
    v.
    MALIK NOEL,
    Appellee                     No. 1087 EDA 2014
    Appeal from the Order Entered March 13, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006259-2013
    BEFORE: BOWES, DONOHUE, AND STABILE, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                              FILED JUNE 17, 2015
    The Commonwealth appeals from the order entered March 13, 2014,
    granting Malik Noel’s motion to suppress. After careful review, we reverse.
    The suppression court relayed the following facts.
    On February 14, 2013, at 2:59 pm, in the 3000 block of
    North 22nd Street, Police Sergeant William Schmid received three
    separate radio calls regarding anonymous tips of a black male in
    the area with a gun. The first radio call described a black male,
    medium complexion, white thermal shirt, black coat, bushy hair,
    and 30 years old, who arrived in a red and black Charger and
    went into a barbershop. The second radio call described a black
    male wearing a white jacket and blue jeans, who was armed,
    and went into a barbershop. The third radio call described a
    black male wearing a black jacket, white thermal top, blue jeans,
    and black shoes, with a gun on his hip. All of the radio calls
    were from anonymous sources.
    Sergeant Schmid and his partner arrived on the 3000 block
    of North 22nd Street one to two minutes after receiving the radio
    call. They initially entered a women’s hair salon on the first floor
    J-A09013-15
    of 3033 North 22nd Street. Sergeant Schmid inquired if anyone
    in the hair salon had called regarding a person with a gun. A
    female inside the salon said they had not called. The officers
    were ready to walk back outside when the female asked if the
    officers were aware that there is a barbershop upstairs. The
    officers went back outside and opened the door next to the door
    that opened the salon. The other door led to the second floor of
    the same building where the salon was located.
    The officers walked up the stairs to the second floor and
    entered a barbershop on the second floor of 3033 North 22 nd
    Street. The barbershop was a single, open room with two barber
    chairs. Each chair was occupied by a customer whose hair was
    being cut by a barber. As he stepped inside the barbershop,
    Sergeant Schmid looked to see if anyone in the shop matched
    the anonymous flash information. He also inquired if anyone had
    called the police regarding a person with a gun. Nobody in the
    barbershop responded.
    Sergeant Schmid then observed Defendant, who was
    seated facing away from the sergeant in a barber’s chair, with
    his back to the sergeant, and wearing a barber’s cape.
    Defendant was getting his haircut by one of the barbers.
    Defendant’s arms were outside the barber’s cape, and Sergeant
    Schmid observed that Defendant was wearing a white thermal
    shirt.
    When Sergeant Schmid made these observations, both of
    Defendant’s arms were resting on the arm rest of the barber
    chair. Sergeant Schmid also observed Defendant “take his left
    hand and start to slide it down between himself and the arm of
    the barber chair, starting to go under the black cape, that was
    draped over.” As he closed the less than 10 feet to the chair,
    Sergeant Schmid said to Defendant, “Let me see your hand.” He
    then pinched the cape and tossed it off of Defendant. When he
    pinched the cape, Defendant’s left hand was under the cape.
    Sergeant Schmid explained that he removed the cape
    because:
    The male fit the description for the person with the gun,
    there were multiple calls. He was the only one in the
    location that fit the description and he was concealing his
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    hand under the barber cape. I didn’t know what he was
    going for or what he was doing with his hand. I didn’t
    know if he was reaching for a weapon or trying to conceal
    something, drugs or gun. I don’t know what he was doing.
    Sergeant Schmid also testified that—when Defendant
    moved his hand—he was not reaching or grabbing at any specific
    pocket or area. Rather, Defendant simply moved his hand from
    on top of the cape to underneath the cape and rested his hand
    under the cape on the arm of the barber chair.
    After the apron was thrown off, Defendant leaned forward
    in the chair. As he leaned forward, Sergeant Schmid saw the
    outline of a very large handgun protruding from Defendant’s
    waistband. Sergeant Schmid recovered the gun and arrested
    Defendant.
    Suppression Court Opinion, 8/13/14, at 1-3 (emphasis in original) (internal
    citations omitted).
    The Commonwealth charged Appellee with person not to possess a
    firearm, carrying an unlicensed firearm, carrying a firearm in public in
    Philadelphia, and receiving stolen property. The non-firearms violation was
    dismissed at a preliminary hearing. Thereafter, on March 13, 2014, Appellee
    litigated a suppression motion “under Article One, Section Eight of the
    Pennsylvania Constitution.”         N.T., 3/13/14, at 5.1   Specifically, Appellee
    argued that “police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk the
    ____________________________________________
    1
    Appellee did not file a written motion. However, the Commonwealth did
    not object below, and since it raises the issue for the first time on appeal,
    such a position is waived.        See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).        Moreover, the
    Commonwealth did not forward this contention in its Rule 1925(b) concise
    statement of errors complained of on appeal.
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    defendant[.]”   Id.   According to Appellee, the anonymous information
    received by the police did not warrant the seizure and search.             The
    suppression court agreed, concluding:
    The anonymous source has, in my view, no indicia of
    [re]liability and although the defendant marginally fits part of
    the flash, that was he was a black male, wearing a tan to beige
    shirt with blue jeans, there’s insufficient information to
    corroborate the anonymous tip.             I’ll also regard—give
    appropriate regards to the area of arrest, which was inside of the
    barber shop, that this sergeant was not aware of—known for any
    criminal activity. Although, certainly the area itself is a high-
    crime area. This is like—unlike most of the cases, where there is
    due regard for the area of arrest, which would be on the street
    or corner or somewhere out in the public. This was actually
    inside private property, in a second floor, in a private business.
    I’ll also make a finding that there’s no movement by the
    defendant to suggest that he had a weapon or was armed and
    dangerous. The sergeant did not observe any bulge, any shape
    of a weapon prior to the defendant being seized and there was
    no failure to comply with any instruction or orders given by the
    officer and no nervousness displayed by the defendant.
    N.T., 3/13/14, at 63-64.
    This appeal ensued. The Commonwealth’s sole contention on appeal
    is:
    Did the suppression court err by suppressing the gun that
    experienced police officers recovered from defendant’s person in
    a frisk where he invited reasonable suspicion by concealing his
    hand under a barber’s cape as the officers approached him in a
    violent, high-crime area in response to flash information
    describing a gunman with his appearance?
    Commonwealth’s brief at 1.
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    This Court evaluates the grant of a suppression motion under well-
    established principles.   We consider the evidence of the defendant, as the
    prevailing party below, and any evidence of the prosecution that is
    uncontradicted when examined in the context of the suppression record.
    Commonwealth v. Peterson, 
    17 A.3d 935
    , 937 (Pa.Super. 2012).            This
    Court is bound by the factual findings of the suppression court where the
    record supports those findings and may only reverse when the legal
    conclusions drawn from those facts are in error. 
    Id.
     Importantly, we are
    not bound by the legal conclusions of the suppression court. In re T.B., 
    11 A.3d 500
    , 505 (Pa.Super. 2010).
    We begin by noting that in considering interaction between law
    enforcement and other citizens, Pennsylvania courts look to whether the
    subject interaction is a mere encounter, an investigatory detention, or a
    custodial detention, i.e., an arrest.   A mere encounter does not require
    police to have any level of suspicion that the person is engaged in
    wrongdoing.   Commonwealth v. Downey, 
    39 A.3d 401
    , 405 (Pa.Super.
    2012).   At the same time, such an encounter does not carry any official
    compulsion for the party to stop or respond. 
    Id.
     An investigative detention,
    however, subjects an individual to a stop and short period of detention. 
    Id.
    This seizure does not involve actions that are so coercive as to comprise the
    equivalent of an arrest. 
    Id.
     To conduct an investigative detention, police
    must have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 
    Id.
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    “[T]his standard is met ‘if the police officer's reasonable and articulable
    belief that criminal activity was afoot is linked with his observation of
    suspicious or irregular behavior on behalf of the particular defendant
    stopped.’”    Commonwealth v. Kearney, 
    601 A.2d 346
    , 348 (Pa.Super.
    1992) (citing Commonwealth v. Espada, 
    528 A.2d 968
     (Pa.Super. 1987)).
    It is well-settled that “[m]ere presence near a high crime area or in the
    vicinity of a recently reported crime, is not enough to warrant a Terry[2]
    stop.” 
    Id.
          Nonetheless, it is also established that “even a combination of
    innocent facts, when taken together, may warrant further investigation[.]”
    Commonwealth v. Kemp, 
    961 A.2d 1247
    , 1255 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en
    banc)); see also Commonwealth v. Cook, 
    735 A.2d 673
    , 676 (Pa. 1999).
    As this Court cogently stated in Commonwealth v. Riley, 
    715 A.2d 1131
    ,
    1135 (Pa.Super. 1998), “Merely because a suspect's activity may be
    consistent with innocent behavior does not alone make detention and limited
    investigation illegal. . . .     Rather, we view the circumstances through the
    eyes of a trained officer, not an ordinary citizen.”
    We consider what level of interaction occurred under a totality of the
    circumstances test.      Commonwealth v. Williams, 
    73 A.3d 609
    , 615-616
    (Pa.Super. 2013).        This standard is an objective one and looks to the
    reasonable belief of the citizen and not the subjective view of law
    ____________________________________________
    2
    Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
     (1968).
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    enforcement. Commonwealth v. Lyles, 
    54 A.3d 76
    , 83 (Pa.Super. 2012).
    “In evaluating the circumstances, the focus is directed toward whether, by
    means of physical force or show of authority, the citizen-subject's movement
    has in some way been restrained.” 
    Id. at 79-80
    . Accordingly, we look to
    whether “in view of all surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person
    would have believed that he was free to leave.” 
    Id. at 79
    .
    The Commonwealth maintains that the suppression court “disregarded
    the totality of the circumstances.”   Commonwealth’s brief at 7.   It asserts
    that “an eleven-year veteran police sergeant responsible for hundreds of gun
    arrests in the violent, high crime neighborhood in this case testified that
    [Appellant] fit the physical description and wore the clothing described in a
    police radio call of a ‘man with a gun.’” 
    Id.
     In addition, the Commonwealth
    notes that Appellant moved his hand under the barber’s cape after police
    entered the room and asked if anyone had called about a person with a gun.
    The Commonwealth continues that the suppression court did not
    properly consider that this case involved three separate anonymous phone
    calls describing a black male with a gun entering a barbershop.        Two of
    those calls identified the person as wearing a light colored thermal shirt.
    The   Commonwealth,    in   a   post-submission   communication    filed   with
    permission from this Court, relies on three separate cases to argue that the
    anonymous calls, in conjunction with the remaining circumstances, support
    the warrantless seizure and search.
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    Specifically,   the    Commonwealth        points    to   Commonwealth        v.
    Ranson, 
    103 A.3d 73
     (Pa.Super. 2014),3 Navarette v. California, 
    134 S.Ct. 1683
     (2014), and In the Interest of D.M., 
    781 A.2d 1161
     (Pa.
    2001).    In Ranson, a Pittsburgh police detective with eighteen years of
    experience was working as part of an approved off-duty detail at an after
    hours club. The club was located in a high crime area and the officer had
    worked security at the business for four years. As the club was closing, at
    approximately 3:30 a.m., a patron approached the detective and pointed out
    an individual whom the informant claimed had a gun. The detective did not
    know the informant’s name, but maintained that he saw the person every
    weekend at the club.
    The    detective    and    two    other   police    officers   working   security
    approached the identified person, Ranson.            As the officers, who were in
    uniform, came near, Ranson put his hands in his hooded sweatshirt and
    began to walk away. The police ordered him to stop, but he continued to
    walk away. The original detective pulled out his firearm and held it at his
    side and continued to instruct the defendant to stop.                    After walking
    approximately fifty feet, the defendant turned around. The police told the
    ____________________________________________
    3
    The Commonwealth incorrectly refers to the case as Commonwealth v.
    Ransom and failed to provide the citation to the case. However, it is
    evident from the Commonwealth’s recitation of the facts of that case, that it
    is discussing the case we reference.
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    defendant to remove his hands from his sweatshirt.           The defendant
    complied, at which point police could see the outline of a gun.        Police
    discovered a handgun in the front pocket of Ranson’s sweatshirt.
    This Court upheld the stop and search.      First, the panel noted the
    distinction between the typical anonymous tip where police have no
    information as to whom the tipster is and the situation presented therein.
    Since the tip was given in person, we concluded it had more indicia of
    reliability than the traditional anonymous tip.    We added that the stop
    occurred in a high crime area and that Ranson had walked away after seeing
    police approach him.
    Naverette, in contrast, involved a motor vehicle stop. There, police
    received an anonymous 911 call identifying a silver Ford pickup truck with a
    specific license plate as having run the caller off the road five minutes
    earlier. Approximately thirteen minutes later, police observed the truck in
    question.   Police followed the vehicle for five minutes. Although the police
    did not observe any driving infractions, they elected to stop the car.
    Ultimately, the police discovered thirty pounds of marijuana in the vehicle.
    The United States Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, upheld the stop.
    The majority ruled that the 911 call was sufficiently reliable and provided
    reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop.
    In D.M., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in a four-to-three decision
    upheld a search after police received an anonymous tip describing a man
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    with a gun at a precise location.    Police responded to the location, where
    they saw and identified D.M, who matched the description provided to police.
    Upon seeing police, D.M. fled. Originally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    ruled the stop illegal under the Fourth Amendment and the Pennsylvania
    Constitution. The United States Supreme Court vacated that decision. The
    D.M. Court, upon remand, ruled that the anonymous tip, coupled with flight,
    warranted the stop.
    Appellee counters that police lacked specific and articulable facts
    necessary to reasonably conclude he was armed. He contends that he was
    lawfully sitting in a barber chair during the day time, getting a haircut, and
    that he only marginally matched the descriptions given by the anonymous
    callers.   Appellee adds that the suppression court did not find his hand
    movement to be furtive as he merely placed his hand underneath the barber
    cape and there was no indication that he was reaching for anything.
    Appellee continues that the officer here only had a hunch that
    Appellant was the individual identified by the anonymous calls. He asserts
    that “the mere fact that a person fits a vague description given by an
    anonymous source does not constitute sufficient basis for a Terry search
    because tips are unreliable and therefore are treated with suspicion.”
    Appellee’s   brief   at   12.   In support,   Appellant   relies   principally   on
    Commonwealth v. Wiley, 
    858 A.2d 1191
     (Pa.Super. 2004).
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    In Wiley, at noon, a person saw Wiley inside a restaurant with a gun
    in his waistband. The concerned citizen followed the defendant and saw him
    enter a barbershop. The tipster called 911 and described the defendant as a
    five-foot-seven-inch black male, approximately twenty-five years of age. He
    indicated that he saw the defendant in the restaurant with a gun and
    observed him walk into a barbershop.         He provided the address of the
    barbershop. The tipster remained at the scene until police arrived and, after
    Wiley was arrested, told police that he had called. The police responded to
    the barbershop within one and one-half minutes of the call. An officer who
    was familiar with the barbershop entered the business with his gun drawn
    and directed Wiley to raise his hands. Police recovered a loaded .22 caliber
    revolver.
    A panel of this Court ruled that the police action therein was unlawful.
    Since police did not learn of the caller’s identity until after Wiley was
    arrested, we viewed the tip as anonymous. The Wiley Court reasoned that
    the single anonymous tip alone was insufficient to justify the seizure. The
    Court held that the mere corroboration of Wiley’s features with the
    information from the call did not create reasonable suspicion.
    Preliminarily, we find that none of the cases relied on by the
    Commonwealth are particularly apt, nor are they controlling.         Ranson
    involved an in-person identification. Naverrette relates to a motor vehicle
    stop and in D.M., the suspect attempted to flee. Nonetheless, we disagree
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    with Appellee that Wiley compels affirmance.            Unlike Wiley, this case
    involves multiple tips and the officer did not enter the barbershop with his
    weapon drawn. Further, Appellee moved his hand to where police could not
    see it when they asked if anyone had called to report a person with a gun.
    Thus, we are faced with a novel factual scenario.
    As    Appellee   litigated   his     motion   solely   under   Pennsylvania
    constitutional principles, we focus on Article I, § 8. That provision provides,
    The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
    possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no
    warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things
    shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor
    without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation
    subscribed by the affiant.
    Pa.Const., Article I, § 8. “[I]n several contexts, the Pennsylvania Supreme
    Court has interpreted Article I, § 8 to afford broader protections than
    interpretations of the Fourth Amendment by the United States Supreme
    Court.”    Commonwealth v. Haynes, 
    2015 PA Super 94
    , *5 (collecting
    cases).    “However, in other situations, our High Court has declined to
    interpret Article I, § 8 as providing greater protections than the United
    States Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.” Id. at *6. The
    law governing Terry stops, i.e., stops and searches based on reasonable
    suspicion, is the same under both the federal and Pennsylvania charters.
    See Wiley, 
    supra;
     see also Lyles, 
    supra at 302
    .
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    Both the U.S. Supreme Court and Pennsylvania Supreme Court have
    opined that the hallmark of any search or seizure is reasonableness.
    Brigham City v. Stuart, 
    547 U. S. 398
    , 403 (2006); Commonwealth v.
    Lagenella, 
    83 A.3d 94
    , 102 (Pa. 2013) (“The Fourth Amendment to the
    United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania
    Constitution, protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures.”).
    Accordingly, warrantless intrusions are generally considered unreasonable.
    Haynes, supra at *3; Commonwealth v. Davido, 
    106 A.3d 611
    , 622 (Pa.
    2014) (“Warrantless entries or searches are per se unreasonable under our
    federal   and    state   Constitutions,    albeit   subject   to   certain   delineated
    exceptions.”).
    Indeed, “[f]raming-era law enforcement could only justify felony
    warrantless arrests if a felony in fact had been committed, and such an
    arrest was ordinarily required to be based on exceptional circumstances.”
    Haynes, supra at *9. Hence, where a person was seen to have committed
    a felony by the officer or citizen, he could be stopped and arrested.              Id.
    (citing Wakely v. Hart, 
    6 Binn. 316
     (Pa. 1814)). In addition, “although not
    seen, yet if known to have committed a felony, and pursued with or without
    warrant, he may be arrested by any person.” Wakely, supra at 318
    (emphasis in original); see also Haynes, supra at *9 (citing William Waller
    Hening, The New Virginia Justice, 51 (Richmond, 2nd ed. 1810), stating, “a
    constable hath no power to arrest a man for an affray done out of his own
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    J-A09013-15
    view, without a warrant from a justice, unless a felony were done, or likely
    to be done”).
    “Since the constitutional prohibitions against general warrants was
    because such warrants provided discretionary authority to constables,
    customs officers, and other peace officers, ‘it is wholly implausible that the
    Framers would have approved of broad use of warrantless intrusions,
    because such intrusions would necessarily have rested solely on the officers’
    own judgment.’” Haynes, supra at *10. Pointedly, law enforcement could
    not enter a private home or business to conduct a search of a person or the
    place without a warrant unless the official believed that violence was
    occurring inside or he was in fresh pursuit of a person he observed commit a
    felony or affray. Id at *11. As this Court stated in Haynes, “at the time of
    Pennsylvania’s early constitutions, it was generally recognized by the people
    that an unreasonable search and seizure occurred unless a specific warrant
    authorized the search or seizure.”       Id.     Thus, Terry seizures based on
    reasonable suspicion of criminal activity find little to no support in the text or
    early    history   of   the   Pennsylvania   Constitution’s   prohibition   against
    unreasonable searches and seizures.             See generally Haynes, supra
    (discussing historical underpinnings of warrantless search and seizure law).
    However, the cases from both the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and
    this Court upholding Terry searches are too legion to cite.           As outlined
    previously, police must have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is
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    afoot, which is evaluated by the courts based on the totality of the
    circumstances. Our state Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court have
    addressed reasonable suspicion in the context of a single anonymous tip.
    Commonwealth           v.    Hawkins,      
    692 A.2d 1068
        (Pa.   1997)    (OAJC),
    Commonwealth           v.   Kue,    
    692 A.2d 1076
        (Pa.    1997)   (OAJC),      and
    Commonwealth v. Jackson, 
    698 A.2d 571
     (Pa. 1997), Florida v. J.L.,
    
    529 U.S. 266
     (2000).          The plurality decisions in Hawkins and Kue were
    decided on the same date with the votes of the justices involved being
    identical.
    In    Hawkins,       Philadelphia   police     received     information    from    an
    anonymous source that a black male wearing a blue hat, black jeans, and a
    gold or brownish coat was at Sydenham and York Streets with a gun.4 Police
    arrived within three minutes to that precise location and observed Hawkins.
    Hawkins matched the description given. Accordingly, the officer stopped and
    frisked Hawkins, “finding a .22 caliber revolver in his waistband.” Hawkins,
    supra at 1069. The Hawkins plurality5 ruled the stop illegal. The plurality
    opined that when police “respond to an anonymous call that a particular
    ____________________________________________
    4
    The Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision does not reference the time of
    day that the stop occurred.         However, this Court’s unpublished
    memorandum set forth that the stop occurred at approximately 8:40 p.m.
    5
    Chief Justice Flaherty authored the lead opinion and was joined by Justices
    Cappy and Zappala. Justice Nigro concurred in result and Justice Newman
    authored a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Castille.
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    J-A09013-15
    person at a specified location is engaged in criminal activity, and upon
    arriving at the location see a person matching the description but nothing
    more, they have no certain knowledge except that the caller accurately
    described someone at a particular location.”       Id. at 1070.    The Hawkins
    Court also found that the officer “had no independent reason to believe that
    the suspect may have been involved in criminal activity.” Id. at 1071.
    Similarly, in Kue, police received an anonymous tip at 2:30 a.m. that
    “an Asian male was ‘armed with a gun’ at the intersection of Second and
    Olney Streets in Philadelphia.” Kue, supra at 1077. The tip described the
    individual as wearing a striped shirt. The responding officer arrived at the
    scene within three minutes and saw four Asian men, one of whom was
    wearing a striped shirt.   Kue, the defendant, was not the individual in the
    striped shirt. The officer witnessed the men speak quickly to each other and
    look in different directions.   He then stopped and frisked each man.          The
    search of Kue revealed a .25 caliber firearm in his waistband.
    Utilizing the same rationale as the Hawkins plurality, the Kue
    plurality ruled that the stop and frisk was illegal. Specifically, it held that “in
    order for police to act on an anonymous tip, the Terry requirement of
    reasonable suspicion of criminal activity must still be satisfied and must be
    independent of the telephone tip itself.” Id. at 1078. Since “there was no
    independent reason to believe that criminal conduct was afoot,” the officer
    “had no reason to search anyone[.]” Id.
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    While the Hawkins and Kue decisions were pluralities, the High Court
    reached   a   majority   consensus   in   Jackson,   supra.    Therein,   “[a]t
    approximately 10:23 p.m., a Philadelphia police officer received a police
    radio report of a man in a green jacket carrying a gun. Other than the
    location, no additional details were provided.”      Jackson, supra at 572.
    Within two minutes of receiving the call, police arrived at the corner of
    Snyder and Seventh Street where the person was alleged to be located. The
    defendant was the only individual in a green jacket. There was no evidence
    that he acted suspiciously. However, the officer stopped the defendant and
    searched him. While the defendant was being searched, a small key box fell
    next to him, which contained fourteen packets of cocaine.
    The majority ruled that the case was factually indistinguishable from
    Hawkins. It reasoned that the fact that the police were able to corroborate
    the location of the suspect and his wearing of a green jacket was insufficient
    to warrant a Terry stop. The Jackson Court rejected the Commonwealth’s
    argument “that the degree of danger to the police and the public from armed
    criminals is so great that if an anonymous caller provides a physical
    description of the individual, an accurate location and an allegation that the
    individual is armed, a Terry stop is justified.” Id. at 575. Instead, it ruled,
    “[t]he danger to the police and public from firearms was already factored
    into the balance when the requirement of reasonable suspicion was
    articulated in Terry.” Id.
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    Consistent with our High Court’s expression in Jackson, the United
    States Supreme Court in J.L. ruled that an anonymous tip that a person is
    carrying a gun is, without additional evidence, insufficient to uphold a police
    officer’s stop and frisk.    In J.L., police received an anonymous tip that “a
    young black male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt
    was carrying a gun.”        J.L., supra at 1377.   Two officers responded and
    observed three black males in the area. J.L, a juvenile, was wearing a plaid
    shirt. “Apart from the tip, the officers had no reason to suspect any of the
    three of illegal conduct. The officers did not see a firearm, and J.L. made no
    threatening or otherwise unusual movements.”        Id. Despite not observing
    any suspicious behavior, one officer directed J.L. to place his hands up,
    frisked him, and found a gun.         The Supreme Court rejected creating a
    firearm exception to Terry, and ruled that the stop and search violated the
    Fourth Amendment.
    In the present case, police received three separate anonymous tips, all
    of which identified a black male with a gun entering a barbershop.      Two of
    the tipsters identified the individual as wearing a white thermal shirt. Officer
    Schmid, with eleven years experience, including six in the district in
    question, observed Appellee in the barbershop and described him as
    matching the description given. It is undisputed that Appellee was wearing
    a white thermal shirt.         The barbershop is located in a high crime
    neighborhood.    After Officer Schmid asked if anyone had called about a
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    J-A09013-15
    person with a gun, Appellee moved his hand under the barber’s cape
    concealing it from the Officer Schmid’s view. The officer asked Appellee to
    show his hands, and lifted the barber’s cape.       Appellee leaned forward to
    stand up, revealing the weapon. Although Appellee’s hand movement was
    not illegal, even activity consistent with innocent behavior may be
    considered as giving rise to reasonable suspicion.          Thus, this case is
    distinguishable from those cases that suppressed evidence seized as a result
    of receiving one anonymous tip without additional indicia of criminal activity.
    We add that we do not find that the number of anonymous tips
    received provides a greater indicia of reliability than a single tip. The tips
    remained anonymous, and one person may in fact provide multiple tips. The
    number of tips is simply not dispositive nor is it enough that police
    corroborate that a person matches the description of an anonymous tipster
    or tipsters. Rather, police must be able to articulate specific facts giving rise
    to a reasonable belief that the person matching the description by the
    tipsters is engaged in criminal activity. We hold that under the totality of
    these circumstances, police did have reasonable suspicion to detain
    Appellee. Accordingly, we find that the suppression court erred.
    Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judge Stabile joined the memorandum.
    Judge Donohue filed a dissenting memorandum.
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    J-A09013-15
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 6/17/2015
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