Com. v. One (1) 1988 Ford Mustang LX Automobile ( 2016 )


Menu:
  • J-S96011-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    v.
    ONE (1) 1988 FORD MUSTANG LX
    AUTOMOBILE VIN 1FABP443JF259018
    WITH FORD ENGINE
    VIN1FACP42E8LF225606 AND COIL
    WIRE AND ASSORTED ITEMS OF
    PERSONAL PROPERTY
    APPEAL OF: ANDY LARGE                                No. 226 WDA 2016
    Appeal from the Order Entered January 14, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-10-MD-0000054-2015
    BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SOLANO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                   FILED DECEMBER 29, 2016
    Andy Large appeals pro se from the trial court’s January 14, 2016
    order denying his “Motion in Opposition to Order of Forfeiture.”           Large
    contends that the trial court erred by granting the Commonwealth’s petition
    for forfeiture of certain property owned by Large because the forfeiture
    petition was filed outside the 2-year statute of limitations. We affirm.
    In its brief to this Court, the Commonwealth provides a summary of
    the facts and procedural history that culminated in Large’s filing of this
    appeal:1
    ____________________________________________
    1
    The trial court did not provide a factual or procedural history in its
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, and Large has only set forth, in his pro se brief, a
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    J-S96011-16
    On October 13, 2006[,] the Pennsylvania State Police
    executed a search warrant at 1103 Euclid School Road in Clay
    Township, Butler County. As a result of this search, the items of
    property that are the subject of this appeal were seized. The
    execution of this warrant was part of an investigation into a
    burglary, auto theft, and [a] “chop shop” ring operating in Butler
    County. Based on the totality of the circumstances of the case,
    the Commonwealth believed that these items constituted
    derivative contraband and were therefore forfeitable under the
    Motor Vehicle Chop Shop and Illegally Obtained and Altered
    Property Act[2] and/or Pennsylvania common law. In addition to
    the items at issue in this case, numerous other items were
    seized in the course of this investigation and ownership of these
    other items has been litigated in various proceedings, including
    before this Court [in] [Commonwealth v. Large, No.] 1335
    WDA 2008[, unpublished memorandum at 1-8 (Pa. Super. filed
    July 28, 2009)].
    On March 2, 2007[,] Large was charged with numerous
    offenses relating to his involvement in this criminal enterprise.
    On September 12, 2007[,] Large entered into an open plea
    agreement to four felony counts of owning, operating, or
    conducting a chop shop.3 On November 11, 2007, Large was
    sentenced to an aggregate sentence of six to twelve years of
    incarceration and ordered to pay a $300 fine and approximately
    $53,000 in restitution. Litigation not pertinent to the instant
    matter then ensued.
    3
    18 P.S. §1.3[, repealed and] now [found at] 18 Pa.C.S.A.
    §7702.
    The next event relevant for the purposes of this appeal
    occurred on February 17, 2015[,] when the Commonwealth filed
    a Petition for Forfeiture and Condemnation in the Court of
    Common Pleas of Butler County, which was docketed at CP-10-
    MD-54-2015. The following day, [the trial court] issued a Rule
    to Show Cause on [] Large and any other individual or entity
    with a possible claim on the property[,] to show [cause] why the
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    cursory overview of the history underlying his appeal. Thus, we rely on the
    Commonwealth’s more developed explanation.
    2
    See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 7701-7708.
    -2-
    J-S96011-16
    Petition should not be granted. Although Large was served with
    this filing, there was no response. On January 8, 2016[,] the
    Commonwealth moved for an Order of Forfeiture, which was
    granted on January 11, 2016. On January 13, 2016[,] Large
    filed a Motion in Opposition to Order of Forfeiture…. In that
    Motion, Large alleged only that the Commonwealth’s February
    17, 2015 Petition had not been filed in a timely manner.
    Commonwealth’s Brief at 2-4 (some footnotes omitted).
    On January 14, 2016, the trial court denied Large’s “Motion in
    Opposition to Order of Forfeiture.” Large then filed a timely, pro se notice of
    appeal with this Court.3 He also timely complied with the trial court’s order
    to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on
    appeal, presenting the following, verbatim issue:
    On November 9th, 2006 property belonging to Andy Large was
    seized. An action of forfeiture was filed in 2015. Trial court
    erred in denying appellants motion in opposition to forfeiture due
    ____________________________________________
    3
    We recognize “that, ordinarily, appeals from decisions in forfeiture actions
    fall under the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court.” Commonwealth v.
    Smith, 
    722 A.2d 167
    , 169 (Pa. Super. 1998) (citing, inter alia, 42 Pa.C.S. §
    762 (vesting jurisdiction in the Commonwealth Court over appeals from final
    orders entered by the trial court in civil actions commenced by the
    Commonwealth government)). However, this Court has also “declined to
    transfer an appeal to the Commonwealth Court where neither party timely
    objected to the jurisdiction of the Superior Court[,]” and where the interests
    of judicial economy weigh in favor of this Court’s retaining jurisdiction. 
    Id. (quoting Commonwealth
    v. Griffin, 
    595 A.2d 101
    , 104 (Pa. Super. 1991)).
    Because neither party in the present case questions the jurisdiction of this
    Court to hear Large’s appeal, any challenge on this basis is waived, and we
    retain jurisdiction in the interest of judicial economy. 
    Id. (citing Pa.R.A.P.
    741(a) and General Municipal Authority v. Yuhas, 
    572 A.2d 1291
    , 1293
    (Pa. Super. 1990) (stating that it is within a panel’s discretion to decline to
    transfer a case even where the Commonwealth Court has exclusive
    jurisdiction over matters raised on appeal if neither party objects to the
    exercise of appellate jurisdiction by the Superior Court)).
    -3-
    J-S96011-16
    to violation of procedural due process of law. An action of
    forfeiture was not commenced within the (2) year statute of
    limitation to do so according to 42 PaCSA § 5524.
    Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement, 3/7/16.
    In his brief to this Court, Large presents three claims for our review,
    two of which are encompassed within the issue he preserved in his Rule
    1925(b) statement. See Large’s Brief at 3 (stating two of his issues as: “Did
    [the] Commonwealth violate [] Larges [sic] rights by filing for forfeiture
    []nine years after seizing [the] property?” and “Did [the trial court] err in
    denying [] Large’s motion in opposition to forfeiture?”) (unnecessary
    capitalization omitted). However, Large’s third issue, in which he claims that
    the Commonwealth “should have returned [the] property to [] Large that
    was not derivative contraband nor had nexus to [the] crime[,]” was not set
    forth    in,   nor   suggested     by,   Large’s   Rule   1925(b)   statement.   
    Id. (unnecessary capitalization
    omitted).          Thus, this claim is waived for our
    review.4       See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in the
    Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions of this
    paragraph (b)(4) are waived.”).
    ____________________________________________
    4
    We also note that Large did not raise this claim in his “Motion in Opposition
    to Order of Forfeiture” filed on January 13, 2016. Therefore, it is waived on
    this basis, as well. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower
    court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).
    -4-
    J-S96011-16
    In regard to Large’s preserved claims, we are guided by the following
    standard of review:
    The Court's review of a forfeiture proceeding is limited to
    examining whether the findings of fact made by the trial court
    are supported by competent evidence and whether the trial court
    abused its discretion or committed an error of law.
    Commonwealth v. Funds in Merrill Lynch Account Owned by Peart,
    
    777 A.2d 519
    , 523 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001) (citing Strand v. Chester Police
    Department, 
    687 A.2d 872
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997)).
    Here, Large argues that the Commonwealth’s petition for forfeiture
    was filed outside the 2-year statute of limitations and, therefore, the court
    should have denied it. In rejecting Large’s argument, the court concluded
    that he had waived this claim by failing to raise it in response to the
    Commonwealth’s petition for forfeiture.       The court stressed that the
    Commonwealth’s petition, as well as a Rule to Show Cause issued by the
    court, were “served upon [Appellant] on or about February 24, 2015[,]” yet
    Appellant never filed a response. Trial Court Opinion, 5/25/16, at 1. The
    court further noted that,
    [o]nly after [it] issued the order granting forfeiture … on January
    11, 2016 did [Appellant] file a Motion in Opposition to Order of
    Forfeiture. In Commonwealth v. Romberger, 
    474 Pa. 190
    ,
    
    378 A.2d 283
    , 286 (1977), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
    explains, “it is a fundamental doctrine in this jurisdiction that
    where an issue is cognizable in a given proceeding and it is not
    raised it is waived and will not be considered on a review of that
    proceeding.”
    -5-
    J-S96011-16
    
    Id. at 1-2
    (one internal citation omitted).      For these reasons, the court
    deemed Large’s challenge to the order granting forfeiture waived and,
    consequently, it denied his “Motion in Opposition to Order of Forfeiture.”
    On appeal, Large offers no response to the trial court’s conclusion that
    he waived his statute-of-limitations challenge to the Commonwealth’s
    petition for forfeiture. Notably, Large acknowledges that he was served with
    a copy of that petition. See Large’s Brief at 6. The record also reveals that
    the forfeiture petition contained a “Notice to Answer Petition for Forfeiture
    and Condemnation” that explicitly informed Large that he was “required to
    file an answer to [the] petition, setting forth [his] title in, and right to
    possession of, said property within thirty (30) days from the service
    hereof….”   See Petition for Forfeiture and Condemnation, 2/17/15, at 1
    (unnumbered; unnecessary capitalization omitted). The notice attached to
    the petition further declared that “if [Large] fail[ed] to file said answer, a
    decree of forfeiture and condemnation [would] be entered against said
    property.” 
    Id. (unnecessary capitalization
    omitted).
    Thus, it is clear that Large received explicit notice that he was required
    to file an answer to the Commonwealth’s forfeiture petition, and he also was
    informed that forfeiture would be granted if he failed to do so. Nevertheless,
    Large made no effort to assert his claim that forfeiture was time-barred by
    the statute of limitations until after the court issued the order granting
    forfeiture in January of 2016, nearly one year after the Commonwealth’s
    forfeiture petition was filed. Large offers no explanation for his failure to file
    -6-
    J-S96011-16
    a response to the Commonwealth’s petition, nor any argument that the court
    erred by concluding that he waived his statute-of-limitations claim by failing
    to do so. In light of this record, Large has not demonstrated that the trial
    court abused its discretion or committed an error of law by denying his
    “Motion in Opposition to Order of Forfeiture.”
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 12/29/2016
    -7-