Est. of Swenson, R. Appeal of: L.S. & R.S.-C. ( 2014 )

J-S48002-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
IN THE ESTATE OF: RICHARD C. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
SWENSON : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
:
APPEAL OF: LORA SWENSON AND :
RENEE SWENSON-CAMPBELL : No. 2289 MDA 2013
Appeal from the Order entered December 4, 2013,
Court of Common Pleas, Bradford County,
-0171
BEFORE: DONOHUE, JENKINS and PLATT*, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED AUGUST 01, 2014
Lora Swenson and Renee Swenson-
from the order of court striking their appeal from the admission of Richard
The trial court summarized the relevant factual and procedural history
of this case as follows:
Decedent, Richard Swenson, succumbed to
illness on April 25, 2013. His Last Will and
Testament dated June 10, 2009 was admitted into
probate by decree of the Bradford County Register of
Wills on May 11, 2013. Appellants filed an appeal to
the admittance of the Will claiming the Will was not a
valid instrument, and [that] they were entitled to his
estate through intestacy laws. Appellants are the
believed and expected to be able to prove that
Decedent was not of sound mind at the time of the
execution of the Will, and that it was procured by
undue influence, duress, constraint and fraud by the
named Executor and residual beneficiary, Nancy
Kitchin. The June 10, 2009 Will appoints Nancy
Kitchin as executrix and the residual beneficiary.
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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On September 20, 2013, [Kitchin] filed a
[m]otion to [s]trike the appeal arguing that
Appellants lacked standing pursuant to Estate of
Luongo, 823 A.2d 942 (2003 Pa.Super) [sic]. [It]
further alleged that [Kitchin] had been a neighbor
and a friend, as well as an employee to Mr. Swenson
for over [21] years, and that she had been named as
executrix in all three prior wills as well as a
beneficiary. Attached to the [m]otion to [s]trike
April 11, 2008, February 6, 2009, and June 2, 2009.
Appellants were not mentioned in these wills.
[Kitchin] was appointed executrix and a beneficiary
in all three prior wills.
Argument was heard on October 28, 2013.
[The trial court] entered an order on December 4,
2013, gran
[a]ppeal and decreed that the assets be turned over
to her so she could distribute them as executrix
accordingly.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/10/14, at 1-2 (footnote omitted).
This timely appeal follows. Appellants present the sole issue on appeal
the
We begin by acknowledging the following principles:
On appeal from the Register of Wills' decree
admitting a will to probate, the Orphans' court must
iss the
petition, grant an issue in case of a substantial
Wagner's Estate,
137 A. 616, 618 ([Pa.] 1927). With respect to this
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Court's standard and scope of appellate review in will
contests, the Orphans' court decision will not be
reversed unless there has been an abuse of
discretion or a fundamental error in applying the
correct principles of law. In re Elias' Estate, 4 239
A.2d 393 ([Pa.] 1968). See also In re Estate of
Presutti, 783 A.2d 803 (Pa. Super. 2001). If the
record supports the court's factual findings, we will
defer to these findings and will not reverse absent an
abuse of discretion. In re Estate of Blumenthal,
812 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Pa. Super. 2002). We are not
constrained, however, to give the same deference to
the court's legal conclusions. Id.In re Estate of Luongo, 823 A.2d 942, 951 (Pa. Super. 2003) (footnote
omitted).
decedent's will. In will contests, the right to an appeal is statutory as is the
designation of the parties on whom the right is conferred, and is defined at
Id. at 953(internal citation omitted). This statute provides that,
[a]ny party in interest seeking to challenge the
probate of a will or who is otherwise aggrieved
by a decree of the register, or a fiduciary whose
estate or trust is so aggrieved, may appeal
therefrom to the court within one year of the decree:
Provided, That the executor designated in an
instrument shall not by virtue of such designation be
deemed a party in interest who may appeal from a
decree refusing probate of it. The court, upon
petition of a party in interest, may limit the time for
appeal to three months.
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20 Pa.C.S.A. §908 (em
validity of a will does not have standing to do so unless he can prove he
would be entitled to participate in the decedent's estate if the will before the
Luongo, 823 A.2d at 954. (citing In re Ash's
Estate
the contestant's share of the estate must be smaller because of probate or
Id.from a decree of probate turns delicately on the specific facts and
Id. at 955.
nieces, but were not named in his June 2009 will. We encountered a similar
situation in In re Estate of Briskman, 808 A.2d 928 (Pa. Super. 2002). In
that case, the decedent left the entirety of her estate to a male friend in a
will, arguing, inter alia, that it was the product of undue influence exerted by
few specific bequests (but none to the niece) and directed that the residue of
her estate be held in a charitable trust. The 1984 will did not name the
niece as a beneficiary, but only as a successor trustee, should the named
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trustee, her attorney, be unable to serve.1 Eventually, the trial court
reversed the decision of the Register of Wills to admit the 1993 will to
probate and vacated the letters testamentary that had been granted to the
. The executor appealed that decision
to this Court. We did not reach the merits of the issues raised by the
executor, however, as we concluded that the niece had lacked standing to
named successor
Id. at 931 (emphasis in the original). We concluded that the
niece was not aggrieved by probate of the 1993 will because she did not
have an interest thereunder and that she would not have any interest under
ve as
executor. Relevant to the case presently before us, we noted that the
Id. at 932. We then
considered whether the possibility of an interest, which would arise only
upon the invalidation of at least one prior will and the subsequent invocation
1
Although not germane to our discussion, we note that upon discovering
this will, the niece filed a petition seeking to have it admitted to probate if
the later will were set aside.
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of the laws of intestacy, was sufficient to create standing to challenge the
probate of a will:
Although our research has not uncovered any
appellate court decisions on this issue, we have
found two Common Pleas Court cases which reach
the opposite result; that is, in both cases, an heir at
law, who was not named as a beneficiary in a prior
will, was found to have standing to contest the
v
his coming into an intestate share may appear to be
Heffner Estate, 43 Pa.D. & C.2d 365, 369,
1967 WL 5834 (1967). See also Holtz Estate, 30
Pa.D. & C.2d 396, 1963 WL 6253 (1963). The trial
court in Holtz Estate explained,
If appellant, as an heir at law, were
excluded as a party in interest, the court
in this proceeding would be deciding that
the prior testamentary document was
admissible to probate. Such a
determination cannot be made
collaterally in this proceeding. It can only
be made when the will in question is
offered for probate. Only in the probate
proceedings could the possible existence
of later wills or the partial destruction or
revocation of the will be authoritatively
determined. Holtz Estate, supra at
400. See also Heffner Estate, supra at
of decedent in existence, this, of itself,
would not be a compelling reason for this
court to foreclose contestant's efforts to
prove that decedent died
However, if we were to follow this line of
reasoning, then an heir at law would always be
permitted to file an appeal from probate of a will in
which the heir is not a named beneficiary. If the
Legislature had intended that result, it could have
permitted to appeal the decision of a Register in
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[20 Pa.C.S.A.] § 908. It did not do so. Moreover, the
statute was amended three times, in 1972, 1974,
and 1976, since the Holtz and Heffner decisions.
The clear and unambiguous language of the statute
permits a party to appeal a Register's decision only if
that party has an interest that has been aggrieved.
as a successor trustee under the 1984 will, or as an
intestate heir at law if both wills are deemed invalid,
is too remote to confer upon her an interest in the
probate of the 1993 will.
Moreover, even if we were to assume Appellee has a
legitimate interest in the outcome of the will contest,
historically, that interest must be substantial, direct,
and immediate to confer standing. In Re Francis
Edward McGillick Foundation, 642 A.2d 467, 469
([Pa.] 1994).
the outcome of the litigation which
surpasses the common interest of all
citizens in procuring obedience to the
showing that the matter complained of
caused harm to the party's interest. An
of the causal connection between the
action complained of and the injury to
the party challenging it, and is shown
where the interest the party seeks to
protect is within the zone of interests
sought to be protected by the statute or
constitutional guarantee in question.
South Whitehall Township Police Serv. v. South
Whitehall Township, 555 A.2d 793, 795 ([Pa.]
1989) (internal citations omitted). Here, although
substantial, that is, one that surpasses the common
interest of all citizens, it is neither direct nor
immediate. As we discussed supra, her interest
arises only if the named trustee is unavailable to
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serve under the 1984 will, or if both the 1993 will
and the 1984 will are invalidated
Id. at 932-33.
Here, as in Briskman f an interest in
Briskman, we
conclude that this possibility is too remote to bring Appellants within the
sphere of the people upon whom Section 908 confers standing. We further
conclude, as in Briskman, that any possible interest they might have is not
direct or immediate, as it would only come to fruition after successfully
challenging a total of four wills.
Appellants argue that the trial court erred by not having an evidentiary
at 8. However, this request is based on essentially the same premise that
this Court rejected in Briskman: that an heir at law who is not a named
beneficiary would always have standing to file an appeal from probate of a
will on the theory that eventually, no matter how many prior wills there may
have been, he or she will have an interest because he or she is entitled to
take under the laws of intestacy.2 As stated above, in Briskman we noted
2
This is distinguishable from a situation in which there is no prior will, as
-at-law has the right to be heard on the validity of a will,
where there is no prior will, and the estate would pass by the laws of
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that the Legislature has chosen not to include unnamed heirs at law among
those permitted to appeal from the decision of the Register of Wills in
Section 908; rather, the Legislature has chosen to define that category as
simply by virtue of their status as an heir at law.
For t
determination and so we affirm its order.
Order affirmed.
Platt, J. concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/1/2014
Luongo, 823 A.2d at
954.
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