Com. v. Hanna, T. ( 2015 )


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  • J-S45012-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    TRACY DEL HANNA,
    Appellant                  No. 2046 MDA 2014
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 24, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0007808-2013
    BEFORE: BOWES, WECHT, AND FITZGERALD * JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J:                           FILED OCTOBER 09, 2015
    Tracy Del Hanna appeals from the September 24, 2014 judgement of
    sentence of seven and one-half years to fifteen years incarceration, which
    was imposed following his conviction of two counts of aggravated assault
    and one count each of simple assault and possession of marijuana.        We
    affirm.
    On September 28, 2013, Appellant and Timothy Morton fought over an
    electric bill. During the course of the altercation, Appellant stabbed Morton
    with a knife. Morton was transported by ambulance to the emergency room
    and treated for a five and one-half inch deep stab wound to the buttocks.
    Appellant was charged with aggravated assault (serious bodily injury),
    *
    Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S45012-15
    aggravated assault (causing bodily injury with a deadly weapon), simple
    assault, and possession of marijuana.
    Appellant   filed   a   post-sentence   motion    alleging   that   the   jury
    instruction regarding aggravated assault was erroneous and warranted a
    new trial. The motion was denied. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal
    and complied with the trial court’s order to file a concise statement of errors
    complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). He raises one issue
    for our review:
    1. Whether the trial court committed an error of law by
    commingling the standards for attempting to cause serious
    bodily injury and causing serious bodily injury under 18
    Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1) when it gave instructions to the jury?
    Appellant’s brief at 4.
    Appellant was charged with two counts of aggravated assault, the first
    count being a violation of 18 Pa.C.S. §2702(a)(1):
    § 2702. Aggravated assault.
    (a)   Offense defined. –
    A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he:
    (1)    attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or
    causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or
    recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme
    indifference to the value of human life;
    18 Pa.C.S. §2702(a)(1).
    The law is established that, “Where the injury actually inflicted did not
    constitute serious bodily injury, the charge of aggravated assault can be”
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    sustained only when the evidence supports a finding the defendant’s actions
    toward the victim were “accompanied by the intent to inflict serious bodily
    injury.”   Commonwealth v. Alexander, 
    383 A.2d 887
    , 889 (Pa. 1978);
    see also Commonwealth v. Matthew, 
    909 A.2d 1254
     (Pa. 2006). Thus, if
    serious bodily injury results, the mens rea requirement is that the defendant
    may have acted knowingly, recklessly or intentionally; if no such injury
    occurred, a defendant must act with specific intent to cause such injury to
    be guilty of the crime.
    Appellant contends that the trial court’s aggravated assault instruction
    erroneously led the jury to believe that he could be convicted of this offense
    if he recklessly attempted to cause serious bodily injury. He points to three
    instances during the charge when the trial court incorrectly told the jury that
    an attempt to cause serious bodily injury could be based on a reckless
    attempt to cause serious bodily injury.
    In reviewing claims of improper or incorrect jury instructions,
    this Court will look to the instructions as a whole, and not simply
    isolated portions, to determine if the instructions were improper.
    We further note that, it is an unquestionable maxim of law in
    this Commonwealth that a trial court has broad discretion in
    phrasing its instructions, and may choose its own wording so
    long as the law is clearly, adequately, and accurately presented
    to the jury for its consideration. Only where there is an abuse of
    discretion or an inaccurate statement of the law is there
    reversible error.
    Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 
    84 A.3d 736
    , 754 (Pa.Super. 2014)
    (citations omitted).
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    J-S45012-15
    Appellant first directs our attention to that portion of the charge where
    the court instructed the jury as follows. In describing the type of mens rea
    required, the court blurred the distinction between the situation where
    serious bodily injury actually results and where serious bodily injury was
    only attempted.       The court advised the jury: “as you recall, I said the
    Defendant     needs     to   intentionally,   knowingly   or   recklessly   under
    circumstances indicating an indifference to the value of human life cause or
    attempt to cause serious bodily injury.” Id. at 125.
    A moment later, the court instructed the jury that
    You must find that the Defendant intentionally or
    knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting an
    extreme indifference to the value of human life caused or
    attempted to cause serious bodily injury to the victim in this
    case.
    N.T. Jury Trial, 8/6/14, at 126.       According to Appellant, the court again
    commingled the attempt to cause serious bodily injury with causing serious
    bodily injury when it advised the jury:
    In order to find the Defendant guilty of this aggravated
    assault, you must find that the Commonwealth has proven
    beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant intentionally,
    knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting an
    extreme indifference to the value of human life caused serious
    bodily injury or attempted to cause serious bodily injury.
    Id. at 136.
    Although the trial court subsequently clarified that an attempt
    required the intent to causes serious bodily injury and a substantial step
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    taken toward that end, id. at 137, Appellant contends that the instruction
    as a whole was confusing. Furthermore, the confusion was not harmless as
    Appellant received a self-defense instruction acknowledging that he used
    deadly force, i.e., force capable of causing serious bodily injury. He argues
    that the aggravated assault charge incorrectly implied that the self-defense
    could be overcome if Appellant used a reckless amount of force sufficient to
    cause serious bodily injury, which was a lower threshold.
    We agree with Appellant that the trial court’s charge regarding
    aggravated assault impermissibly invited the jury to find Appellant guilty if
    he recklessly attempted to cause serious bodily injury. Counsel for Appellant
    registered an objection to the charge on this ground. However, after further
    discussion with Appellant, counsel advised the court that the instruction was
    acceptable as they wished to downplay the aggravated assault. Id. at 132.
    Nonetheless, the court decided to address Appellant’s concern regarding the
    attempt to cause serious bodily injury portion of its charge. Counsel noted
    an exception for the record, explaining, “we are prepared to leave it as it is
    without rehashing all of them.”    Id. at 134.   The trial court revisited the
    attempt to cause serious bodily injury language in § 2702(a)(2):
    There’s another aspect to that also that he attempted to
    cause serious bodily injury. With regard to attempt, it’s the
    same thing as intentional, it’s that I want to cause serious bodily
    injury, and with regard to attempt, it’s that I want to cause
    serious bodily injury and I do a substantial step towards causing
    that serious bodily injury.
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    J-S45012-15
    You don’t have to actually make a determination that
    serious bodily injury resulted, but that I wanted to cause serious
    bodily injury.
    Go back to my analogy previously with regard to the
    aggravated assault. I take a baseball bat and I swing it at your
    head and you duck, didn’t cause serious bodily injury, but I can
    tell you if I do that, and I would never do it, I’m attempting to
    cause serious bodily injury.      That’s the aggravated assault
    serious bodily injury.
    Id. at 136.
    We find that the aforementioned instruction corrected the trial court’s
    earlier instruction that erroneously implied that an aggravated assault
    conviction could be based on a reckless attempt to cause serious bodily
    injury. Moreover, Appellant, by choosing to acquiesce in the court’s earlier
    misstatement of the law, waived any claim that the trial court’s charge as to
    the mens rea for an attempt to cause serious bodily injury constituted
    reversible error.1 Hence, no relief is due.
    ____________________________________________
    1
    After the jury was excused to begin its deliberations, it sent a note to the
    trial court asking it to “[p]lease define the states of mind and confirm that
    any one of them can cause guilt.” Id. at 158. The court re-instructed the
    jury: “. . . any one of [the states of mind], intentional, knowing or reckless,
    with regard to the aggravated assault is fine. If you find any one of those
    states of mind for the first aggravated assault, that’s sufficient.” Id. at 160.
    “So the states of mind necessary for the first aggravated assault,
    intentionally, knowingly or recklessly, any one of those.” Id. “With regard
    to the attempt to cause serious bodily injury, again, I want to cause serious
    bodily injury and serious bodily injury does in fact occur.” Id. at 162.
    Appellant did not object or renew his earlier objection to this instruction.
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    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 10/9/2015
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2046 MDA 2014

Filed Date: 10/9/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/9/2015