Com. v. Shields, A. ( 2019 )


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  • J-S55011-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    ANTHONY DWAYNE SHIELDS                     :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 143 WDA 2019
    Appeal from the Order Entered May 30, 2018
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s):
    CP-25-CR-0002210-2015
    BEFORE:      MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                           FILED NOVEMBER 14, 2019
    Anthony Dwayne Shields (Appellant) appeals from the order dismissing
    his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42
    Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.         After careful review, we vacate and remand for
    further proceedings.
    On September 24, 2015, Appellant was charged with three counts each
    of possession of a controlled substance and contraband, and one count of
    possession of marijuana.1 Appellant’s first trial resulted in a mistrial after the
    jury could not reach a verdict. Appellant was retried and convicted of the
    aforementioned offenses. The trial court sentenced Appellant to 99 to 198
    ____________________________________________
    *   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5123(a), and 35 P.S. § 780-
    113(a)(31).
    J-S55011-19
    months of incarceration. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and this
    Court affirmed his judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Shields, 837
    WDA 2016 (Pa. Super. Apr. 10, 2017) (unpublished memorandum).
    On November 8, 2017, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition. The PCRA
    court appointed William J. Hathaway, Esquire, as counsel for Appellant, and
    on January 16, 2018, Attorney Hathaway filed a “Supplement to Motion for
    Post Conviction Collateral Relief.”       On April 27, 2018, the PCRA court issued
    notice of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a hearing pursuant
    to Rule of Criminal Procedure 907. Attorney Hathaway did not file a response
    to the court’s notice, and on May 30, 2018, the PCRA issued an order
    dismissing Appellant’s petition.2
    On August 3, 2018, Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal from the
    order dismissing his PCRA petition.            On August 13, 2018, the PCRA court
    ordered Appellant to file a statement of matters complained of on appeal
    pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) within 21 days. Appellant filed a pro se Rule
    1925(b) statement on August 29, 2018, and the PCRA court issued its Rule
    1925(a) opinion on September 4, 2018. On November 20, 2018, this Court
    sua sponte quashed Appellant’s appeal as untimely.3
    ____________________________________________
    2On July 1, 2018, Appellant mailed a letter to Attorney Hathaway requesting
    verification that Attorney Hathaway filed a response to the PCRA court’s Rule
    907 notice. Correspondence, 11/1/18. The record reflects, and Attorney
    Hathaway concedes, that no response was ever filed. Id.
    3 It appears there may have been a delay in docketing this order in the trial
    court as the order does not appear on the docket until January 7, 2019.
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    On December 19, 2018, Appellant filed a second pro se PCRA petition,
    alleging ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel for failing to file a notice of
    appeal from the denial of Appellant’s first PCRA petition. On December 27,
    2018, the PCRA court granted Appellant’s PCRA petition and reinstated his
    collateral appeal rights nunc pro tunc.          Attorney Hathaway4 filed a timely
    notice of appeal on January 25, 2019.
    On February 13, 2019, Appellant, relevant to this appeal, filed the
    following pro se motion with the Superior Court:
    President Judge[:]
    Sir, I filed my PCRA. Attorney Hathaway was appointed, [a]gain.
    He, Mr. Hathaway[,] abandoned me on my first PCRA leaving me,
    a lay man, no choice but to file an [sic] hybrid appeal to this
    Superior Court Doc # 1125 WDA 2018.
    My concern is that Att. Hathaway never meaningfully
    Amended my PCRA for the [PCRA court] to reach the merits
    of my claims. Could your Court please remand my case back
    down to the Erie County for further proceedings so I can
    experience [e]ffective assistance of counsel[?] I have merit, but
    I am a lay man who is learning as [I] go and that is not enough.
    Please and Thank you.
    [Appellant]
    ____________________________________________
    4 As noted, Attorney Hathaway was appointed to represent Appellant after
    Appellant filed his first pro se PCRA petition. Attorney Hathaway failed to file
    a notice of appeal on Appellant’s behalf, and consequently, the court
    reinstated Appellant’s appeal rights nunc pro tunc. After Appellant filed his
    second pro se PCRA petition, the PCRA court reappointed Attorney Hathaway
    to file a notice of appeal nunc pro tunc.
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    Application for Remand, 2/13/19 (emphasis added).
    On February 19, 2019, this Court entered an order remanding the case
    for a Grazier5 hearing. On March 25, 2019, the PCRA court held a Grazier
    hearing, “during which Appellant stated he did not wish to proceed pro se and
    he wished to continue to be represented by counsel.” PCRA Court Opinion,
    6/7/19, at 2.      Accordingly, the PCRA court ordered Attorney Hathaway’s
    continued representation of Appellant.
    On August 22, 2019, Attorney Hathaway filed an appellate brief on
    behalf of Appellant, identifying the following six issues for our review:
    1. Whether the trial [c]ourt denied the Petitioner his constitutional
    right to represent himself without legal basis or justification?
    2. Whether counsel was ineffective in failing to strike or request
    the removal of a juror [Karen Beebe] who engaged in
    communication with a prosecution witness?
    3. Whether the trial was tainted given this juror misconduct?
    4. Whether counsel was ineffective in failing to object to or move
    for a mistrial based upon the Commonwealth’s prejudicial
    reference to the Defendant’s parole and incarcerated status?
    5. Whether counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the
    Commonwealth trying Defendant for several unrelated offenses
    at trial?
    6. Whether counsel was ineffective in failing to object to or move
    for a mistrial based upon the Commonwealth’s expression of
    his personal opinion in regard to the Defendant’s guilty and
    credibility?
    Appellant’s Brief at 2.
    ____________________________________________
    5   Commonwealth v. Grazier, 
    713 A.2d 81
     (Pa. 1998).
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    We review the denial of a PCRA petition to determine whether the record
    supports the PCRA court’s findings and whether its order is otherwise free of
    legal error. Commonwealth v. Fears, 
    86 A.3d 795
    , 803 (Pa. 2014).
    Petitioners have a general rule-based right to the assistance of counsel
    for their first PCRA petition.         Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(C); Commonwealth v.
    Robinson, 
    970 A.2d 455
    , 457 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc) (stating, “a
    criminal defendant has a right to representation of counsel for purposes of
    litigating a first PCRA petition through the entire appellate process [ ]”). “The
    indigent petitioner’s right to counsel must be honored regardless of the merits
    of his underlying claims, even where those claims were previously addressed
    on direct appeal, so long as the petition in question is his first.”
    Commonwealth v. Powell, 
    787 A.2d 1017
    , 1019 (Pa. Super. 2001).
    “Moreover, once counsel is appointed, he [or she] must take affirmative steps
    to discharge his [or her] duties.” 
    Id.
    When appointed, counsel’s duty is to either (1) amend the petitioner’s
    pro se petition and present the petitioner’s claims in acceptable legal terms,
    or (2) certify that the claims lack merit by complying with the mandates of
    Turner/Finley.6 “If appointed counsel fails to take either of these steps, our
    courts have not hesitated to find that the petition was effectively
    uncounseled.” Powell, 
    787 A.2d at 1019
    .
    ____________________________________________
    6Commonwealth v. Turner, 
    544 A.2d 927
     (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v.
    Finley, 
    550 A.2d 213
     (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
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    The right to counsel on an indigent petitioner’s first PCRA petition is not
    limited to the mere naming of an attorney. Commonwealth v. Hampton,
    
    718 A.2d 1250
     (Pa. Super. 1998). To have any meaning, the rule also requires
    appointed counsel to provide meaningful representation. 
    Id.
     This Court has
    stated:
    “[W]hen appointed counsel fails to amend an inarticulately drafted
    pro se [post-conviction] petition, or fails otherwise to
    participate meaningfully, this [C]ourt will conclude that the
    proceedings were, for all practical purposes, uncounseled and in
    violation    of  the    representation   requirement.    .   .   .”
    [Commonwealth v.] Ollie, 450 A.2d [1026,] 1028 [(Pa. Super.
    1982)] [(]quoting Commonwealth v. Sangricco, 
    490 Pa. 126
    ,
    
    415 A.2d 65
     (1980)[)] (internal quotation marks omitted). Both
    this Court and our Supreme Court have recognized that a post-
    conviction petition is effectively uncounseled under a variety of
    circumstances whenever omissions of record demonstrate that
    counsel’s inaction “deprived the petitioner ‘the opportunity of
    legally trained counsel to advance his position in acceptable legal
    terms.’”     Sangricco, at 133, 
    415 A.2d at 68
    , quoting
    [Commonwealth v.] Fiero, [ ] 341 A.2d [448,] 450 [(Pa. 1975)].
    *      *      *
    Though the foregoing decisions predate adoption of the Post
    Conviction Relief Act and current Rules of Criminal Procedure 1504
    and 1507, this Court has held more recently that “one constant
    remains as a holdover, from the prior law: an indigent defendant
    shall be availed the opportunity to secure the appointment of
    counsel to aid in the perfection of his first petition seeking post-
    conviction collateral relief.” [Commonwealth v.] Kaufmann,
    592 A.2d [691,] 698 [(Pa. Super. 1991)]. We find also that, as
    under our prior law, “[t]his rule is not limited to mere naming of
    an attorney to represent an accused, but also envisions that
    counsel so appointed shall have the opportunity and in fact
    discharge the responsibilities required by his representation.”
    Fiero, 341 A.2d at 450. Accordingly, where, as under our prior
    case law, the record fails to demonstrate meaningful
    participation by counsel appointed to represent an indigent
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    petitioner filing his first petition, we will remand for appointment
    of new counsel.
    Hampton, 
    718 A.2d at 1253-54
     (some emphasis original, some emphasis
    added). Therefore, where an appellant’s right to representation has “been
    effectively denied by the action of court or counsel, the petitioner is entitled
    to a remand to the PCRA court for appointment of counsel to prosecute the
    PCRA petition.   The remand serves to give the petitioner the benefit of
    competent     counsel    at   each    stage    of   post-conviction    review.”
    Commonwealth v. Kenney, 
    732 A.2d 1161
    , 1164 (Pa. 1999).
    In this case, the PCRA court found that Attorney Hathaway provided
    ineffective assistance when he failed to file a notice of appeal on behalf of
    Appellant following the denial of Appellant’s first PCRA petition. Despite that
    finding, the PCRA court reappointed Attorney Hathaway to represent
    Appellant.
    Appellant once again challenged Attorney Hathaway’s effectiveness as
    PCRA counsel, asserting that Attorney Hathaway failed to meaningfully amend
    Appellant’s PCRA petition beyond what was averred in Appellant’s pro se filing.
    Our review of the certified record reveals that the “Supplement to Motion for
    Post Conviction Relief” filed by Attorney Hathaway is deficient. For example,
    in his first paragraph, Attorney Hathaway states:
    The Petitioner has instructed counsel that he does not want any
    changes made to his pro se PCRA Petitions and the claims
    enumerated therein and said claims are to be submitted to the
    Court as is. Therefore, counsel respectfully submits the pro se
    pleading of the Petitioner in support of his prayer for collateral
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    relief in the nature of the provision of a new trial or the entry of
    an arrest of judgment.
    Supplement to Motion for Post Conviction Relief, 1/16/18 (emphasis added).
    Yet, in the following paragraph, Attorney Hathaway contradicts the prior
    paragraph, stating: “The Petitioner does seek to amend his claims to
    include two additional claims. . . .” 
    Id.
     (emphasis added).
    Moreover, our review of Appellant’s appellate brief reveals numerous
    errors and omissions in violation of the Rules of Appellate Procedure; these
    errors are significant in that they provide this Court with no basis upon which
    to review Appellant’s claims. Commonwealth v. Hakala, 
    900 A.2d 404
    , 406
    (Pa. Super. 2006). As stated above, Appellant presents six questions for our
    review. See Appellant’s Brief at 2. However, Appellant’s argument section
    fails to provide support for any of his six issues.   For example, the entire
    argument relative to Appellant’s first issue reads: “The trial Court denied the
    Petitioner his constitutional right to represent himself without legal basis or
    justification. The appellant had the absolute right to self-representation at
    time of trial, which the trial Court rejected and compelled him to proceed with
    court-appointed counsel.”    Id. at 4.     This issue is unreviewable for two
    reasons. First, this argument fails to include any pertinent discussion of the
    issue, including citations to legal authority or the record.     See Pa.R.A.P.
    2119(a) (requiring that an appellant develop an argument with citation to and
    analysis of relevant legal authority).   Second, Attorney Hathaway failed to
    request transcription of the Grazier hearing. Our law is unequivocal that the
    responsibility rests on the appellant to ensure that the record certified on
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    appeal is complete in the sense that it contain all of the material necessary
    for the reviewing court to perform its duty. Commonwealth v. Kleinicke,
    
    895 A.2d 562
    , 575 (Pa. Super. 2006) (en banc).            The Rules of Appellate
    Procedure require an appellant to order and pay for any transcript necessary
    to permit resolution of the issues raised on appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 1911(a). When
    the appellant fails to conform to the requirements of Rule 1911, any claims
    that cannot be resolved in the absence of the necessary transcripts must be
    deemed waived for the purposes of appellate review.          Commonwealth v.
    Williams, 
    715 A.2d 1101
    , 1105 (Pa. 1998).
    In another example, relative to issue three – “whether the trial was
    tainted given juror misconduct” – Attorney Hathaway abandoned this issue on
    appeal by failing to brief the issue. See Appellant’s Brief at 4-7; see also
    Gurley v. Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
    113 A.3d 283
    , 288 n.11 (Pa.
    Super. 2015) (issue is waived for purposes of appellate review when an
    appellant does not develop it in brief). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
    long held that it is not this Court’s obligation to formulate arguments on behalf
    of an appellant. Commonwealth v. Wright, 
    961 A.2d 119
    , 135 (Pa. 2008);
    see also Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
    985 A.2d 915
    , 924 (Pa. 2009)
    (stating “where an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim
    with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other
    meaningful    fashion   capable    of    review,   that    claim   is   waived”);
    Commonwealth v. Clayton, 
    816 A.2d 217
    , 221 (Pa. 2002) (“[I]t is a well-
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    settled principle of appellate jurisprudence that undeveloped claims are
    waived and unreviewable on appeal.”).
    In sum, because Appellant did not waive his right to representation by
    counsel and PCRA counsel failed to meaningfully represent Appellant on the
    merits of Appellant’s PCRA petition, we vacate the PCRA court’s order
    dismissing Appellant’s petition and remand to the PCRA court for appointment
    of new PCRA counsel.7 Upon remand, we direct the PCRA court to withhold
    compensation from Attorney Hathaway for representation in this case. The
    PCRA court is directed to appoint Appellant new counsel within 15 days of the
    date of this memorandum. Following his or her appointment, new counsel
    shall be permitted to file an amended PCRA petition, or, if counsel concludes
    in the exercise of his or her professional judgment that the issues raised in
    the PCRA proceeding are without merit, counsel may file an adequate no-merit
    letter that addresses all of the issues raised in Appellant’s pro se PCRA petition
    and move to withdraw.
    Order vacated.        Case remanded with instructions relative to the
    appointment of new PCRA counsel. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    ____________________________________________
    7 We note this Court’s recent findings of Attorney Hathaway’s ineffective
    assistance in the following unrelated appeals: Nos. 116 & 118 WDA 2019 (per
    se ineffectiveness, all issues waived), and No. 216 WDA 2019 (per se
    ineffectiveness, all issues waived).
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    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 11/14/2019
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