Heim, M. v. Eissler, H. ( 2019 )


Menu:
  • J-A20038-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    MARK HEIM AND WANDA HEIM,               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    TRUSTEE OF THE MARK HEIM AND            :        PENNSYLVANIA
    WANDA HEIM JOINT REVOCABLE              :
    TRUST                                   :
    :
    Appellees           :
    :
    v.                       :
    :
    HOWARD L. EISSLER AND ANN M.            :
    EISSLER                                 :
    :
    Appellants          :        No. 179 MDA 2019
    Appeal from the Judgment Entered January 16, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Sullivan County
    Civil Division at No(s): 2017CV-0000234
    BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
    MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.E.:         FILED: OCTOBER 18, 2019
    Appellants, Howard L. Eissler and Ann M. Eissler, appeal from the
    judgment entered in the Sullivan County Court of Common Pleas, in favor of
    Appellees, Mark Heim and Wanda Heim, Trustee of the Mark Heim and Wanda
    Heim Joint Revocable Trust, and against Appellants in this land boundary
    dispute. We affirm.
    In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly set forth the relevant
    facts and procedural history of this case. Therefore, we have no reason to
    restate them.
    Appellants raise the following issues for our review:
    1. WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ITS
    CONCLUSION AND GRANT OF CLEAR TITLE TO
    J-A20038-19
    APPELLEES BASED ON THE HOPKINS RETRACEMENT
    SURVEY. THE HOPKINS RETRACEMENT SURVEY FAILS
    TO CONFORM TO THE GRANTORS JOSEPH AND MARY
    HEIM’S INTENT AS IT DEVIATES FROM THE SECOND
    ENGLISH SURVEY AND IS BASED ON ERRONEOUS
    CONCLUSIONS     RELYING    UPON     SUSPICIOUS
    MONUMENTS “K,” “N,” AND “U.” THE LIGHT-HEIGEL
    BOUNDARY PLAN CONFORMS TO THE INTENT OF
    GRANTORS JOSEPH AND MARY HEIM AS IT ACCURATELY
    RETRACES THE SECOND ENGLISH SURVEY AND THE
    DEED FROM GRANTORS JOSEPH AND MARY HEIM TO
    [APPELLANTS].  TO THE EXTENT THE HONORABLE
    COURT RESTS ITS CONCLUSIONS ON FINDINGS OF
    FACT NOS. 5 THROUGH 18, THE HONORABLE COURT
    EITHER DISREGARDED CREDIBLE, RELEVANT EVIDENCE
    OF RECORD AND MADE NO FINDINGS OR MADE
    FINDINGS WHICH ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
    RECORD.
    2. WHERE THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ITS
    CONCLUSION AND GRANT OF CLEAR TITLE TO
    APPELLEES BASED ON THE HOPKINS RETRACEMENT
    SURVEY, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT
    FAILED TO FIND AND CONCLUDE THAT THE DECK
    CONSTRUCTED BY APPELLEES ENCROACHES ON
    [APPELLANTS’] PROPERTY.
    3. WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ITS
    CONCLUSION AND GRANT OF CLEAR TITLE TO
    APPELLEES BASED ON THE HOPKINS RETRACEMENT
    SURVEY WHERE THE HOPKINS RETRACEMENT SURVEY
    INCLUDES PROPERTY NOT DEPICTED IN THE FIRST OR
    SECOND ENGLISH SURVEY AND NOT CONVEYED IN
    APPELLEES’ CHAIN OF TITLE.
    4. WHETHER APPELLEES’ CLAIM OF TITLE RESTING ON
    ADVERSE POSSESSION AND POSSESSION RESTING ON
    DOCTRINE OF CONSENTABLE LINE FAILS AS A MATTER
    OF LAW. FINDINGS 19 AND 20 ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY
    THE EVIDENCE OF RECORD.
    5. WHETHER [APPELLANTS’] REPLY BRIEF WAS TIMELY
    FILED IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE RULES OF CIVIL
    PROCEDURE AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED BY
    -2-
    J-A20038-19
    THE COURT. TO THE EXTENT FINDING NO. 26 STATES
    OTHERWISE, IT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.
    6. WHETHER   [APPELLANTS]    WERE    DENIED   THE
    OPPORTUNITY TO OFFER EXHIBITS INTO THE RECORD.
    (Appellants’ Brief at 4-5).1, 2
    ____________________________________________
    1Regarding Appellants’ fifth issue, the court issued an order dated November
    19, 2018, expressly directing the parties to file reply briefs within fifteen days
    of the date of the order. In a civil case, however, the date of entry and
    service of the order (in this case November 26, 2018) controls. See Pa.R.C.P.
    236(a)(2), and (b) (governing notice required of Prothonotary to parties of
    entry of any order or judgment). See generally Mumma v. Boswell,
    Tintner, Piccola & Wickersham, 
    937 A.2d 459
     (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal
    denied, 
    599 Pa. 683
    , 
    960 A.2d 456
     (2008) (stating under relevant law, date
    of entry of any order is date court mails or delivers copies of order to parties).
    Here, the order directing reply briefs was not entered on the docket with notice
    sent until November 26, 2018. In its decision, the trial court stated Appellants
    had not filed a post-trial reply brief. Nevertheless, Appellants did file a reply
    brief on December 10, 2018, but they filed it the same day the trial court
    issued its final decision, unaware Appellants had filed a reply brief. Appellants’
    December 10, 2018 reply brief was filed more than fifteen days after
    November 19, 2018, but only fourteen days after the November 26, 2018
    entry of the order on the docket with proper notice sent. Therefore, the reply
    brief was timely filed. See 
    id.
     Further, Appellants did cite to Pa.R.C.P. 236
    and Pa.R.A.P. 108 to support their position that they had timely filed their
    reply brief. Appellants, however, have not alleged any prejudice suffered as
    a result of the court’s failure to consider their reply brief, which added nothing
    to their existing argument in any event.
    2 As a general rule, issues not raised in a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement will be
    deemed waived. Lineberger v. Wyeth, 
    894 A.2d 141
     (Pa.Super. 2006). A
    Rule 1925 statement must be specific enough for the trial court to identify and
    address the issue(s) an appellant wishes to raise on appeal. 
    Id.
     “[A] [c]oncise
    [s]tatement which is too vague to allow the court to identify the issues raised
    on appeal is the functional equivalent of no [c]oncise [s]tatement at all.” 
    Id. at 148
    . As well, where an appellant fails to raise or develop an issue on appeal
    properly, or where the appellant’s brief is wholly inadequate to present specific
    issues for review, this Court will not consider the merits of the claims raised.
    -3-
    J-A20038-19
    Our standard of review on appeal from an action to quiet title is
    deferential: “In reviewing an action to quiet title, an appellate court’s review
    is limited to determining whether the findings of fact are supported by
    competent evidence, whether an error of law has been committed, and
    whether there has been a manifest abuse of discretion.” Regions Mortgage,
    Inc. v. Muthler, 
    585 Pa. 464
    , 467, 
    889 A.2d 39
    , 41 (2005) (internal citation
    omitted).
    It is not the role of an appellate court to pass on the
    credibility of witnesses; hence we will not substitute our
    judgment for that of the factfinder. Thus, the test we apply
    is not whether we would have reached the same result on
    the evidence presented, but rather, after due consideration
    of the evidence which the trial court found credible, whether
    the trial court could have reasonably reached its conclusion.
    Hollock v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 
    842 A.2d 409
    , 414 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en
    banc), appeal dismissed as improvidently granted, 
    588 Pa. 231
    , 
    903 A.2d 1185
     (2006) (internal citations omitted).
    The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure define the scope of an action
    to quiet title, in pertinent part, as follows:
    Rule 1061. Conformity to Civil Action. Scope
    *       *   *
    ____________________________________________
    Butler v. Illes, 
    747 A.2d 943
     (Pa.Super. 2000). Instantly, regarding
    Appellants’ sixth issue, Appellants failed to identify in either their concise
    statement or their brief which exhibits the trial court prohibited them from
    introducing at trial, the relevance of those exhibits, and any prejudice
    Appellants suffered as a result of the exhibits’ exclusion. Thus, Appellants’
    sixth issue is waived. See Lineberger, 
    supra;
     Butler, 
    supra.
    -4-
    J-A20038-19
    (b)    The action may be brought
    *     *    *
    (2) where an action of ejectment will not lie, to
    determine any right, lien, title, or interest in the land
    or determine the validity or discharge of any
    document, obligation or deed affecting any right, lien,
    title or interest in land;
    (3) to compel an adverse party to file, record, cancel,
    surrender or satisfy of record, or admit the validity,
    invalidity or discharge of, any document, obligation or
    deed affecting any right, lien, title or interest in land.
    *     *    *
    Pa.R.C.P. 1061(b)(2), (3). An action to quiet title, unlike an ejectment action,
    does not restrict a court to finding the rights only of the immediate plaintiff
    and defendant involved in the controversy. Wells Fargo, N.A. v. Long, 
    934 A.2d 76
    , 78 (Pa.Super. 2007). Rather, an action to quiet title determines the
    “relative and respective rights of all potential titleholders.”      
    Id.
     (emphasis
    added).
    After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
    applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Russell D.
    Shurtleff, P.J., we conclude Appellants’ issues merit no relief. The trial court
    opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions
    presented.      (See Trial Court Opinion, filed December 11, 2018, at 10-13)
    (finding: Appellees had their property surveyed by Eric Hopkins, while
    Appellants had their property surveyed by Keith Heigel of Light-Heigel and
    Associates; Mr. Hopkins testified that he found 11 pre-existing pins on
    -5-
    J-A20038-19
    properties at time of his survey; Mr. Hopkins correctly and accurately applied
    special rules of preference to determine location of boundary line, and used
    found artificial monuments and adjoining properties’ boundaries to establish
    legal description of Appellees’ property; further, Mr. Hopkins relied on both
    parties’ legal descriptions, which conformed to approved subdivision plan
    prepared by Curtis English in 1974; by contrast, Mr. Heigel testified that he
    did not survey adjacent properties and ignored them in conducting his
    retracement; Appellants allege that several pins on ground were suspicious
    and suggested Appellees moved pins; court conducted site view of property
    and specifically observed pins at site; pins appeared to be in their original
    state, and court finds that Appellants’ assertion that Appellees moved existing
    pins lacks merit; after considering artificial monuments, including all existing
    pins placed prior to surveys of Mr. Hopkins and Mr. Heigel, and iron pin near
    waterfront, court found that Mr. Hopkins’ determinations are true and accurate
    and must be accepted; in adopting Mr. Hopkins’ survey, notably neither party
    is losing or gaining lake frontage, with no adverse effects on adjoining
    property owners; given court’s decision, issues of consentable boundary line
    and adverse possession are moot). Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the
    trial court opinion.
    Judgment affirmed.
    -6-
    J-A20038-19
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 10/18/2019
    -7-
    Circulated 09/13/2019 01:23 PM