Com. v. Lavon, Z. ( 2015 )


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  • J-S30034-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    ZAVON LAVON
    Appellant              No. 620 EDA 2014
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 29, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0007006-2011
    BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., and JENKINS, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.:                           FILED JULY 01, 2015
    Appellant Zavon Lavon appeals from the judgment of sentence entered
    on January 29, 2014, in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas
    following his jury trial convictions for robbery1 and possession of a small
    amount of marijuana.2 We affirm.
    On May 26, 2011, when the victim exited a small grocery store,
    Appellant offered him marijuana, which the victim declined.           N.T.,
    6/19/2013, at 17-23; Opinion, 11/7/2014, at 2. Appellant then held a gun
    to the side of the victim’s stomach and told the victim to “give [him]
    everything that [he] had.” N.T., 6/19/2013, at 24; Opinion, 11/7/2014, at
    ____________________________________________
    1
    18 P.S. § 3701(a)(1).
    2
    35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(31).
    J-S30034-15
    2. The victim gave Appellant approximately $675.00. N.T., 6/19/2013, at
    19-20, 27. Appellant began to run away, and the victim pursued him. Id.
    at 28.    As the victim chased Appellant, he called the Philadelphia Police
    Department and saw Appellant throw something under a vehicle.                   N.T.,
    6/19/2013, at 28-29; Opinion, 11/7/2014, at 2.                 Police officers later
    retrieved a gun at this location.              N.T., 6/19/2013, at 95-96; Opinion,
    11/7/2014, at 2.
    Philadelphia police officers arrived and chased Appellant.          Opinion,
    11/7/2014, at 2. Two police officers testified that they saw Appellant throw
    a large amount of money on the sidewalk.              N.T., 6/19/2013, at 90; N.T.,
    6/20/2013, at 48.3        The officers apprehended Appellant and placed him
    under arrest. N.T., 6/19/2013, at 93-95; N.T., 6/20/2013, at 49; Opinion,
    11/7/2014, at 3. The victim’s money was not recovered. N.T., 6/19/2013,
    at 93; N.T., 6/20/2013, at 49; Opinion, 11/7/2014, at 3.
    On June 24, 2013, a jury found Appellant guilty of possession of a
    small amount of marijuana and robbery.                N.T., 6/24/2013, at 4.4     On
    ____________________________________________
    3
    The trial court opinion stated that one officer observed Appellant throw
    money. Opinion, 11/7/2014, at 2. At trial, however, both officers testified
    that they observed Appellant throw money. N.T., 6/19/2013, at 90; N.T.,
    6/20/2013, at 48.
    4
    The jury found Appellant not guilty of firearms not to be carried without a
    license, carrying a firearm on public streets or public property in
    Philadelphia, and altering or obliterating marks of identification. 18 Pa.C.S.
    §§ 6106(a)(1); 6108; 6117(a), respectively.
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    January 29, 2014, the trial court sentenced Appellant to four-to-ten years’
    incarceration for robbery.        Appellant received no further penalty for the
    possession charge.
    On February 12, 2014, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Both
    Appellant and the trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
    Procedure 1925.5
    Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:
    1. Did not the court err by allowing the detective to testify
    indirectly regarding [Appellant’s] discharged robbery cases
    in rebuttal of proposed defense testimony of good
    reputation for peacefulness causing the defense not to
    adduce evidence of his good character?
    2. Did not the court err by disallowing impeachment of the
    complainant      with     his     prior   conviction    for
    conspiracy/possession with intent to deliver a controlled
    substance?
    Appellant’s Brief at 2.
    Appellant’s issues challenge the trial court’s evidentiary rulings.        The
    admissibility of evidence is a matter solely within the discretion of the trial
    court, and we will reverse an evidentiary ruling only if an abuse of discretion
    has   occurred.        Commonwealth            v.   Nypaver,   
    69 A.3d 708
    ,   716
    (Pa.Super.2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 
    39 A.3d 406
    ____________________________________________
    5
    With his Rule 1925(b) statement, Appellant filed a motion for an extension
    of time to file an amended Rule 1925(b) statement. The trial court granted
    the motion. Counsel subsequently informed the court he would not file an
    amended statement.
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    (Pa.Super.2012)).    “An abuse of discretion may not be found merely
    because an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but
    requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias,
    or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.”
    Commonwealth v. Dillon, 
    925 A.2d 131
    , 136 (Pa.2007) (quoting Grady v.
    Frito–Lay, Inc., 
    839 A.2d 1038
    , 1046 (Pa.2003)).
    Appellant’s first issue maintains the trial court erred when it ruled that
    if Appellant introduced evidence of his reputation for peacefulness, then “a
    detective could testify that [Appellant] had a bad reputation for peacefulness
    based on [the detective’s] conversations with [two] putative robbery
    complainants from cases that had been dismissed.” Appellant’s Brief at 8.
    Appellant claims this error caused him to not present evidence of his good
    character. Id. at 6-7. Appellant concludes two alleged robbery victims are
    not a “community” and the trial court’s ruling would have permitted the
    Commonwealth to indirectly introduce evidence of Appellant’s alleged prior
    bad acts to show he acted in accordance therewith. Id. at 11-12.
    The Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence provides:
    (a) By Reputation. When evidence of a person’s
    character or character trait is admissible, it may be proved
    by testimony about the person’s reputation. Testimony
    about the witness’s opinion as to the character or
    character trait of the person is not admissible.
    (1) On cross-examination of the character witness, the
    court may allow an inquiry into relevant specific instances
    of the person’s conduct probative of the character trait in
    question.
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    (2) In a criminal case, on cross-examination of a character
    witness, inquiry into allegations of other criminal conduct
    by the defendant, not resulting in conviction, is not
    permissible.
    Pa.R.Evid. 405(a). If a defendant offers evidence of his good reputation, the
    Commonwealth is permitted to offer evidence of his bad reputation on
    rebuttal.       Commonwealth        v.    Johnson,   
    615 A.2d 1322
    ,   1331
    (Pa.Super.1992). Reputation testimony “must relate to a period at or about
    the time the offense was committed, and must be established by testimony
    of witnesses as to the community opinion of the individual in question, not
    through specific acts or mere rumor.”          Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
    27 A.3d 244
    , 248 (Pa.Super.2011) (quoting Commonwealth v. Luther, 
    463 A.2d 1073
    , 1077–78 (1983)) (emphasis deleted). Further, pursuant to Rule
    404(b), which governs the admission of crimes, wrongs, and other acts:
    “Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a
    person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person
    acted in accordance with the character.” Pa.R.Evid. 404(b).
    The trial court made the following ruling regarding reputation
    testimony:
    THE COURT: However, if the Commonwealth wants to
    bring on a detective who cannot identify himself as a
    detective but he can testify he knows people from the
    community and from those people as to reputation as to
    [Appellant] is not good as being [a] peaceful person[,]
    which is what [the] Commonwealth asked to do this
    morning. But he cannot identify himself as a police officer
    and he cannot — and I’m sure Ms. Zeccardi will ask how
    he knows, if these are victims or crime victims — he can
    testify as to any other character witness and I know people
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    in the community and among those people the reputation
    for being peaceful is not good. The rest is up to cross-
    examination. Obviously if the doors are open, but he must
    not and cannot identify himself as [a] detective. So that
    will be my ruling.
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. Based on the Court’s ruling,
    we will not be proceeding with character testimony. Note
    my objection to the Court’s ruling.
    N.T., 06/20/2014, at 76.     This ruling limited the Commonwealth’s rebuttal
    witness   testimony   to   Appellant’s    reputation   for   peacefulness    in   the
    community and precluded the witness from testifying that he was a
    detective or that the sources of his information regarding Appellant’s
    reputation were two individuals who alleged Appellant robbed them.
    The trial court acted within its discretion when it found that if Appellant
    introduced testimony regarding his reputation for peacefulness then the
    Commonwealth could present rebuttal testimony of his reputation for not
    being peaceful. See Johnson, 615 A.2d at 1331.               The trial court’s ruling
    ensured the jury did not learn of the prior alleged bad acts.
    Appellant next contends the trial court erred because it did not allow
    Appellant to impeach the victim with the victim’s prior conviction for
    possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (“PWID”).
    Appellant’s Brief at 12-14.     Appellant alleged the conviction was proper
    impeachment evidence because the victim testified he did not use drugs and
    was not knowledgeable about drugs. Id. We agree.
    Appellant relies on Commonwealth v. Petrakovich, 
    329 A.2d 844
    (Pa.1974), to support his contention the victim’s drug conviction was
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    J-S30034-15
    admissible to impeach the victim’s testimony, which, Appellant alleges, was
    that the victim was “a naïf when it came to drugs.” Appellant’s Brief at 8,
    13-14. In Petrakovich, the defendant was convicted of the murder of his
    wife. The defendant testified at trial that his relationship with his wife when
    they lived in Arizona was “‘beautiful’ and relatively care-free.” Id. at 850.
    On cross-examination, the Commonwealth questioned Appellant as to
    whether his wife had caused his arrest on charges of assault.      Id. at 850.
    Our Supreme Court found the Commonwealth could ask the defendant about
    the arrests. Id. at 850-51. The Court reasoned:
    [A]ppellant in his case in chief had testified to the highly
    compatible relationship he and his wife had enjoyed in
    Arizona. This was obviously to prove lack of motive to
    commit the crime. The prosecution was entitled to meet
    this testimony with evidence of disharmony between the
    spouses. Evidence that appellant’s wife had caused his
    arrest for alleged assault upon her was clearly rebuttal,
    and it was not improper to accomplish that rebuttal by
    means of cross-examination, notwithstanding that the
    question involved reference to an arrest.
    Id. at 851.
    At trial, the victim stated he received an unsolicited offer from
    Appellant to purchase marijuana.       On cross-examination, the following
    exchange occurred:
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And he starts, you say he comes
    up and starts talking to you about pot?
    [VICTIM]: Yes.
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:         And it wasn’t the other way
    around; was it?
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    [VICTIM]: No.
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Are you sure?
    [VICTIM]: Yes.
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And he pulls some out; right?
    [VICTIM]: He pulled some marijuana out, yes, he did.
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Pulled out a couple bags?
    [VICTIM]: Yes.
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And it wasn’t the other way around?
    [VICTIM]: Why would I have marijuana in my pocket for?
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: He didn’t snatch it out of your hand;
    did he?
    [VICTIM]: Why would I have marijuana in my pocket if I
    had money in my pocket? I don’t smoke. You can take [a]
    urine test or hair sample of my hair and you can see that I
    don’t smoke. I have no marijuana in my house. You are
    more than welcome to come in my house, more than
    welcome to come in my family. And you are welcome to
    take my hair sample because hair is longer that urine and
    you can check if I did any drugs in my life.
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Not everybody who sells drugs does
    drugs; correct, sir?
    [VICTIM]: But from watching movies, if it stays, if it got in
    your pores, it stays in your system. That’s what I'm going
    by. I’m not sure. I’m not sure if that is true or not, but if
    you touch anything it goes in your pores. You got pores all
    in your hand.
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: May I see the Court at sidebar?
    [THE COURT]: Excuse us.
    (Discussion with court at sidebar.)
    [THE COURT]: Counsel may proceed
    ...
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    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Now, before we went into the back,
    I was questioning you regarding whether you were the one
    that had the marijuana –
    [VICTIM]: Yes.
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:            -- that day, and you denied that
    you were?
    [VICTIM]: Yes, because I didn’t.
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And in denying that you were the
    person selling the marijuana that day, you said, I don’t do
    drugs?
    [VICTIM]: I don’t.
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And my question then was, you
    don’t have to do drugs in order to sell drugs; isn’t that
    correct?
    [VICTIM]: Yes.
    N.T., 6/19/2013, at 68-70. During the victim’s testimony, Appellant sought
    to impeach the testimony with evidence of the victim’s prior PWID
    conviction.
    The trial court found no evidence the victim had a PWID conviction6
    and, if he did, Appellant would not have been able to use this conviction to
    impeach the victim.7 Opinion, 11/7/2014, at 6. The trial court reasoned a
    ____________________________________________
    6
    At trial, defense counsel argued, and the Commonwealth did not dispute,
    that the victim had a juvenile adjudication for possession with intent to
    deliver. N.T., 6/20/2013, at 3-4.
    7
    The trial court also found Appellant did not properly preserve the claim.
    Opinion, 11/7/2014, at 4 n.3. Appellant stated he made a contemporaneous
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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    defendant may cross-examine a witness regarding criminal charges that are
    pending at the time of trial because the defense is permitted to show
    possible bias due to the potential leniency following his testimony. Id. at 5.
    Here, Appellant sought to use a prior conviction, not pending charges, and
    there was no evidence the victim would “curry favor with the prosecutor
    through his testimony.” Id. The trial court further noted that, pursuant to
    Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 609, only convictions for crimes involving
    dishonesty or false statement may be used to impeach a witness’s
    credibility, and the victim’s drug conviction was not a crime involving
    dishonesty or false statement. Id.8 This was error.
    Appellant did not seek to introduce the PWID conviction to rebut the
    witness’s character trait for truthfulness.         Rather, Appellant sought to
    introduce the PWID conviction to impeach the victim’s testimony that he did
    not sell drugs and the implication that he did not know anything about
    drugs.
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    objection to a trial court ruling that he could not impeach the victim with the
    drug conviction on June 19, 2013, and argued for its admissibility on June
    20, 2013. Appellant’s Brief at 14 n.1. Although the discussion at sidebar
    was not transcribed, the transcript states a discussion took place at sidebar
    during the victim’s June 19, 2013 testimony that he did not do drugs. N.T.,
    6/19/2013, at 69. Further, the parties presented argument on the issue on
    June 20, 2013. N.T., 6/20/2013, at 3-4.
    8
    At trial, the Commonwealth argued the testimony did not open the door to
    permit cross-examination with the prior conviction. N.T., 9/20/2013, at 4.
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    J-S30034-15
    This Court has stated:
    One who induces a trial court to let down the bars to a
    field of inquiry that is not competent or relevant to the
    issues cannot complain if his adversary is also allowed to
    avail himself of that opening. The phrase ‘opening the
    door’ . . . by cross examination involves a waiver. If
    defendant delves into what would be objectionable
    testimony on the part of the Commonwealth, then the
    Commonwealth can probe further into the objectionable
    area.
    Commonwealth v. Lewis, 
    885 A.2d 51
    , 54-55 (Pa.Super.2005); accord
    Commonwealth v. Boyzk, 
    987 A.2d 753
     (Pa.Super.2009) (defendant
    permitted to cross-examine police witness “about misconduct as long as the
    wrongdoing is in some way related to the defendant’s underlying criminal
    charges and establishes a motive to fabricate”); See Commonwealth v.
    Hernandez, 
    862 A.2d 647
    , 651 (Pa.Super.2004) (where defendant asserted
    he did not sell drugs, Commonwealth was permitted to question defendant
    about prior convictions that contradicted this assertion); Commonwealth v.
    Trignani, 
    483 A.2d 862
    , 869 (Pa.Super.1984) (where Appellant claimed he
    never shot anyone, Commonwealth was allowed to introduce his prior
    conviction for aggravated robbery where Appellant shot a store clerk during
    the robbery); Commonwealth v. Smith, 
    467 A.2d 1120
    , 1125 (Pa.1983)
    (counsel ineffective for failure to argue for use of witness’s prior conviction
    for robbery and homicide, in which Appellant could not have participated,
    where witness admitted to being present at the robbery and homicide at
    issue in Smith but claimed Appellant forced her to participate and Appellant
    denied participating the robbery and murder); see also Commonwealth v.
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    Mullins, 
    665 A.2d 1275
    , 1278 (Pa.Super.1995) (“witness’[s] status as
    accuser does not obviate the need for full cross-examination. To the
    contrary, ‘the victim, as accuser, must be subject to the utmost scrutiny if
    his accusations are to fairly form the basis of the criminal prosecution at
    hand.’”).
    On cross-examination, victim stated: “why would I have marijuana in
    my pocket if I had money in my pocket?”        Further, he implied his only
    knowledge of drugs and drug testing was from movies.          Such testimony
    opened the door to cross-examination by Appellant as to the victim’s prior
    PWID conviction. The trial court erred when it denied Appellant’s request to
    impeach the victim with the prior PWID conviction.
    Although the trial court erred in denying Appellant’ request to use the
    PWID conviction as impeachment evidence, the error was harmless. “[A]n
    error may be harmless where the properly admitted evidence of guilt is so
    overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error is so insignificant by
    comparison that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the error could
    not have contributed to the verdict.”   Commonwealth v. Noel, 
    104 A.3d 1156
    , 1172 (Pa.2014) (quoting Commonwealth v. Story, 
    383 A.2d 155
    ,
    166 (Pa.1978)).   If Appellant had impeached the victim’s testimony with
    evidence of the prior PWID conviction, the jury may have questioned
    whether the victim attempted to sell Appellant drugs, rather than the
    Appellant attempting to sell the victim drugs.       However, the victim also
    testified that he saw Appellant throw something under a car, and the police
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    officers retrieved a gun from the location.        Further, two police officers
    testified that, as they pursued Appellant, they observed Appellant throw
    money and, when he was arrested, Appellant possessed a small amount of
    marijuana. Regardless which individual attempted to sell drugs, Appellant or
    the victim, the testimony and evidence presented support Appellant’s
    convictions for robbery and possession of a small amount of marijuana.9
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 7/1/2015
    ____________________________________________
    9
    Appellant filed three motions reiterating various arguments raised on
    appeal: (1) Motion to dismiss all charges; (2) motion to dismiss fraudulent
    charge; and (3) motion to order a retrial. We deny these motions.
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