Com. v. Barlow, C. ( 2019 )


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  • J-A23034-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :         PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    CONNIE BARLOW,                             :
    :
    Appellant               :      No. 1793 WDA 2018
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 19, 2018
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0015831-2017
    BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:                         FILED NOVEMBER 21, 2019
    Connie Barlow (“Barlow”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
    entered following her convictions of one count of theft by deception, and three
    counts of forgery.1 We affirm.
    In its Opinion, the trial court set forth the relevant factual background
    as follows:
    [In February 2017, Barlow] was a member of the Hill District
    Federal Credit Union (“Credit Union”). The Credit Union is located
    in the Hill District section of the City of Pittsburgh[,] where the
    average income of its members is roughly $16,000 to $20,000 per
    year.   Accordingly, when a member makes a deposit over
    $2,000.00, Richard Witherspoon [“Witherspoon”], the chief
    executive officer of the [C]redit [U]nion, is notified so that he may
    monitor such deposits.
    On February 6, 2017, [Barlow] made three check deposits
    into one of the accounts she held at the Credit Union[,] totaling
    ____________________________________________
    1   See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3922(a)(1), 4101(a)(3).
    J-A23034-19
    $6,417.90. On February 10, 2017, [Barlow] withdrew $4,600.00
    from this account. Shortly thereafter, [Barlow] made transfers in
    the amounts of $200.00 and $1,400.00 from the account and
    moved the remaining money into another account she held with
    the Credit Union. [Barlow] made these withdrawals and transfers
    prior to the checks “clearing.”     On February 14, 2017, []
    Witherspoon learned that the checks were fraudulent.
    [] Witherspoon tried, without success, to contact [Barlow]
    on many occasions in an attempt to resolve the situation. [Barlow]
    alleges the checks were mailed to her as a result of work she
    performed through her business, AWB Remodel and Renovations.
    [Barlow] alleges the work performed was the result of three
    separate, local jobs in the neighborhoods of Mount Lebanon,
    Ambridge and South Park.          However, the three checks for
    payment for those jobs originated, without any credible
    explanation, out of Santa Ana, California; Vienna, Virginia; and
    Colquill, Georgia.      Furthermore, Detective Brittany Miles
    [(“Detective Miles”)] testified that she was never able to contact
    any of the alleged signatories/distributors of the checks.
    Following [Barlow’s] trial, she was sentenced to two years
    [of] probation at each count[,] to run concurrently. On December
    19, 2018, [Barlow] filed a [timely] Notice of Appeal, and on
    January 25, 2019, [she] filed her [Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)] Concise
    Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal.
    Trial Court Opinion, 2/27/19, at 1-2.
    On appeal, Barlow raises the following questions for our review:
    [1.] Under Pennsylvania’s forgery statute, the Commonwealth
    must show that a writing has been unlawfully altered or presents
    a writing that wrongly purports to be authorized by another. []
    Witherspoon failed to identify why the three checks cashed by []
    Barlow with the Credit Union ultimately bounced. Given the
    absence of testimony that the checks were defective, did the
    Commonwealth present sufficient evidence to find [that] each of
    the three checks cashed by [] Barlow were forged?
    [2.] In part, Pennsylvania’s forgery statute requires an intent to
    defraud another by uttering a writing known to be forged. Did the
    Commonwealth present sufficient evidence of intent[,] given the
    lack of unusual or suspicious actions by [] Barlow and her
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    J-A23034-19
    consistent explanations that she received the three checks for
    work done through her business?
    [3.] Pennsylvania’s theft by deception statute is premised on the
    creation or reinforcement of a false impression. [] Witherspoon
    failed to identify why the three checks cashed by [] Barlow with
    the Credit Union ultimately bounced. Given the absence of
    testimony that the checks were defective, did the Commonwealth
    present sufficient evidence to establish that any of the three
    checks created or reinforced a false impression?
    [4.] In part, Pennsylvania’s theft by deception statute requires an
    intent to obtain or withhold property of another by deception. Did
    the Commonwealth present sufficient evidence of intent[,] given
    the lack of unusual or suspicious actions by [] Barlow and her
    consistent explanations that she received the three checks for
    work done through her business?
    [5.] Whether [] Witherspoon’s testimony concerning fraudulent
    banking transactions went beyond the scope of his admitted
    expertise in banking regulations or credit union operation?
    Brief for Appellant at 6 (issues reordered). We will address Barlow’s first four
    issues together, as they all challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
    supporting her convictions.
    We apply the following standard of review when considering a challenge
    to the sufficiency of the evidence:
    [W]hether[,] viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the
    light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient
    evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the
    crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we
    may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the
    fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
    established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
    possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt
    may be resolved by the fact-finder[,] unless the evidence is so
    weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of
    fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The
    Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element
    of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly
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    J-A23034-19
    circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test,
    the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually
    received must be considered. Finally, the finder of fact[,] while
    passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the
    evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the
    evidence.
    Commonwealth v. Melvin, 
    103 A.3d 1
    , 39-40 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
    omitted).
    In her first issue, Barlow alleges that the evidence was insufficient to
    prove that the checks that she had deposited were forged.        See Brief for
    Appellant at 19-22. Barlow argues that (1) the Commonwealth did not present
    testimony from the check issuers; (2) Witherspoon testified that he could not
    remember whether the checks were returned as fraudulent because the check
    issuers had insufficient funds, or for some other reason; and (3) the
    photocopies of the checks submitted at trial did not contain any markings
    indicating that they were returned as fraudulent. 
    Id. at 20-21
    . According to
    Barlow, there are numerous, non-fraudulent reasons why the checks could
    have been returned, and the Commonwealth’s evidence at trial did not
    foreclose those possibilities. 
    Id. at 21
    .
    In her second issue, Barlow alleges that the evidence was insufficient to
    prove that she knew the checks were forged, and that she intended to deceive
    the Credit Union. 
    Id. at 25-31
    . Barlow argues that her testimony, that she
    had legitimately received the checks in exchange to work, was uncontradicted
    at trial by the Commonwealth. 
    Id. at 25
    . According to Barlow, her actions,
    following her deposit of the checks, and the fact that the checks originated
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    from out-of-state banks, do not prove that she knew the checks were forged.
    
    Id. at 27-31
    .
    Section 4101(a) states that
    [a] person is guilty of forgery if, with intent to defraud or injure
    anyone, or with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud or injury
    to be perpetrated by anyone, the actor:
    (1) alters any writing of another without his authority;
    (2) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues or
    transfers any writing so that it purports to be the act of another
    who did not authorize that act, or to have been executed at a
    time or place or in a numbered sequence other than was in fact
    the case, or to be a copy of an original when no such original
    existed; or
    (3) utters any writing which he knows to be forged in a manner
    specified in paragraphs (1) or (2) of this subsection.
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4101(a).     “We may look to the totality of the defendant’s
    conduct to infer fraudulent intent.    Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to
    establish the defendant’s knowledge that the document is a forgery.”
    Commonwealth v. Green, 
    203 A.3d 250
    , 253 (Pa. Super. 2019).
    In its Opinion, the trial court concisely addressed Barlow’s first two
    claims as follows:
    [Regarding Barlow’s first claim,] Witherspoon testified as to
    what occurs when a check is deposited with the Credit Union and
    the process by which the check is then cleared by the
    corresponding bank. In this instance, the checks deposited by
    [Barlow] were sent by the Credit Union to PNC Bank for clearance.
    PNC Bank returned the check to the Credit Union indicating that
    the checks were fraudulent. Additionally, Detective [] Miles
    testified that she was unable to contact any of the alleged
    distributors of the checks. … Therefore, based upon the totality of
    the circumstances, this [c]ourt believes the Commonwealth has
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    J-A23034-19
    carried [its] burden in proving that the checks deposited by
    [Barlow] were altered and/or unauthorized by another.
    … [Regarding Barlow’s second claim,] Witherspoon testified
    that out-of-state checks take additional processing time for
    clearance. Additionally, [] Witherspoon explained the federal
    regulation known as Regulation CC[,2] which requires the credit
    union to make deposited funds available to the depositor unless a
    financial institution has some apprehension about the check that
    has been deposited. More specifically, pursuant to Regulation CC,
    the Credit Union is required to make the funds available before
    clearance from a financial institution. This [c]ourt does not find it
    a coincidence that [Barlow] deposited three fraudulent out-of-
    state checks into her account with the Credit Union only to
    withdraw the majority of that money days later. Furthermore,
    [Barlow] shortly thereafter transferred the funds into a separate
    account. Additionally, this [c]ourt did not find [Barlow’s]
    testimony with respect to how she came into possession of the
    checks or the work she allegedly performed in exchange for the
    checks credible or persuasive. This [c]ourt was unpersuaded by
    [Barlow’s] claims that she performed work for three individuals
    locally and received three out-of-state checks for payment of that
    work[— t]hree out-of-state checks which were all deposited on
    the same day, and which were all returned by the bank after
    undergoing a clearance process as fraudulent. Furthermore, []
    Witherspoon testified that he contacted [Barlow] several times to
    inquire about the deposits and attempt to resolve the issue, all of
    which proved to be unfruitful. Accordingly, this [c]ourt found that
    [Barlow] knew the checks were fraudulent and/or deposited the
    checks with the intent to defraud the Credit Union.
    Trial Court Opinion, 2/27/19, at 4-5 (footnote added). The record supports
    the trial court’s findings in this regard.       We therefore agree with the trial
    court’s sound rationale and determination, and affirm on this basis in rejecting
    Barlow’s first and second claims. See 
    id.
    ____________________________________________
    2   See 
    12 C.F.R. §§ 229.1-229.60
    .
    -6-
    J-A23034-19
    In her third claim, Barlow alleges that the evidence was insufficient to
    prove that she had created or reinforced a false impression to support her
    conviction for theft by deception. See Brief for Appellant at 22-24. Similar
    to her argument regarding her conviction for fraud, Barlow argues that there
    was no evidence establishing that the checks were fraudulent.          
    Id. at 23
    .
    According to Barlow, without evidence that the checks were fraudulent, the
    evidence was insufficient to prove that she had created or reinforced a false
    impression. 
    Id. at 23-24
    .
    In her fourth claim, Barlow alleges that the evidence was insufficient to
    prove that she had intentionally deceived the Credit Union, to support her
    conviction for theft by deception. 
    Id. at 31-36
    . Barlow argues that the checks
    contained no facial defects indicating that the checks were invalid, and her
    actions following her deposit of the checks does not prove she knew the checks
    were invalid. 
    Id. at 33-36
    .
    Section 3922(a)(1) states that
    [a] person is guilty of theft if he intentionally obtains or withholds
    property of another by deception. A person deceives if he
    intentionally:
    (1) creates or reinforces a false impression, including false
    impressions as to law, value, intention or other state of mind;
    but deception as to a person’s intention to perform a promise
    shall not be inferred from the fact alone that he did not
    subsequently perform the promise[.]
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3922(a)(1). “Deception occurs when that person creates or
    reinforces   a   false   impression   regarding   the   value    of   property….”
    -7-
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    Commonwealth v. Fisher, 
    682 A.2d 811
    , 813 (Pa. Super. 1996). “To obtain
    a conviction of theft by deception, the Commonwealth must demonstrate the
    presence of a false impression and that the victim relied on that impression.”
    Commonwealth v. Thomas, 
    684 A.2d 1085
    , 1086 (Pa. Super. 1996).
    In its Opinion, the trial court concisely addressed Barlow’s third and
    fourth claims as follows:
    [Barlow] testified on her own behalf as to how she came into
    possession of the three fraudulent checks. [Barlow’s] testimony
    was neither persuasive nor credible. [Barlow] was unable to
    provide consistent details, names or addresses for the people she
    allegedly did the work for in exchange for these fraudulent checks.
    [] Witherspoon testified that he contacted [Barlow] the day after
    the checks were deposited to inquire where she obtained such a
    large deposit. The story [Barlow] gave that day to [] Witherspoon
    changed at a later date. [] Witherspoon testified that he contacted
    [Barlow] several times regarding the fraudulent checks in an
    attempt to resolve the issue, but [Barlow] never returned the
    money she withdrew after being advised the checks she had
    deposited were fraudulent. The Commonwealth also presented
    testimony from Detective [] Miles who testified that she was
    unable to contact the alleged distributors of the checks during the
    course of her investigation into this matter.
    Trial Court Opinion, 2/27/19, at 3. The trial court found that this claim lacked
    merit.   See id. at 6.   We agree with the trial court’s sound rationale and
    determination, and affirm on this basis in rejecting Barlow’s third and fourth
    claims. See id.
    In her fifth claim, Barlow alleges that the trial court erred in permitting
    Witherspoon to give expert testimony on fraudulent banking schemes. See
    Brief for Appellant at 37-40. Barlow argues that this testimony was beyond
    Witherspoon’s area of expertise.      Id. at 38-40. Barlow points out that
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    Witherspoon was admitted as an expert in “banking regulations or credit union
    operation.” Id. According to Barlow, the Commonwealth failed to establish
    how Witherspoon’s expertise in “banking regulations or credit union operation”
    made him an expert on fraudulent banking schemes. Id.
    In its Opinion, the trial court concisely addressed Barlow’s fifth claim as
    follows:
    [] Witherspoon testified at [] trial as to his 30 plus years’
    experience with the Credit Union and the experience he has had
    with members withdrawing money from deposited checks before
    the checks clear. [] Witherspoon testified that, in his experience,
    there can be several reasons why a check deposited by a member
    may not pass the clearance process, such as a check returned for
    insufficient funds, someone made an error in their checkbook[,]
    or the distributor of the check stopped payment on the check.
    Additionally, [] Witherspoon explained that he has observed
    members come to the Credit Union to deposit checks which they
    received in the mail with a letter stating they won a sweepstakes.
    Furthermore, [] Witherspoon testified that, in his experience,
    when a check has been returned as counterfeit, oftentimes it
    means that someone got ahold of another’s bank information
    and/or checks. That person sends the checks to multiple people in
    hopes that they will deposit the check. [] Witherspoon testified
    that he has copies of letters that are sent to individuals. The
    letters are sent with the counterfeit checks and request that the
    depositor send back a nominal amount of money as a “processing
    fee[.”] [] Witherspoon testified within his scope of expertise as
    well as within the scope of his experience working at the Credit
    Union for the past 30 years. Accordingly, [Barlow’s] fifth issue is
    without merit.
    Trial Court Opinion, 2/27/19, at 5-6. We agree with the trial court’s sound
    rationale and determination, and affirm on this basis in rejecting Barlow’s fifth
    claim. See id.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    -9-
    J-A23034-19
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 11/21/2019
    - 10 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1793 WDA 2018

Filed Date: 11/21/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/21/2019