Com. v. Moore, M. ( 2019 )


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  • J-S61023-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    MARQUIS AMIN MOORE                         :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 1306 EDA 2019
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 20, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-23-CR-0000027-2018
    BEFORE:      BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                            FILED DECEMBER 13, 2019
    Appellant, Marquis Amin Moore, appeals from the judgment of sentence
    entered on March 20, 2019, after the trial court found him in violation of his
    parole. On appeal, Appellant’s counsel filed a petition to withdraw as counsel
    and a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    (1967)
    and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 
    978 A.2d 349
    (Pa. 2009). Upon review,
    we grant counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm Appellant’s judgment of
    sentence.
    We briefly summarize the facts and procedural history of this case as
    follows. On December 16, 2017, Appellant was arrested and charged with
    knowing and intentional possession of a controlled substance pursuant to 35
    P.S. § 780-113(a)(16) and possession of drug paraphernalia under 35 P.S.
    ____________________________________________
    *   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S61023-19
    § 780-113(a)(32). See Police Criminal Complaint, 12/16/17. On March 5,
    2018, Appellant entered a guilty plea to simple possession and the trial court
    sentenced him to time served to 23 months’ incarceration.          One of the
    conditions of Appellant’s sentence required him to complete and follow the
    recommendations of Diagnostic Services at the Delaware County jail, including
    drug and alcohol evaluations.
    On February 11, 2019, Delaware County’s Adult Probation and Parole
    Services Department (the department) issued a request for a Gagnon II1
    hearing in which it alleged that Appellant engaged in inappropriate behavior
    during two sessions of a drug and alcohol program. This conduct included the
    use of foul language, aggressive gesturing, stealing supplies, extorting other
    participants, and making inappropriate remarks toward instructors.           On
    February 22, 2019, the department issued a Gagnon II hearing report in
    which it recommended that Appellant be held in violation of the terms of his
    probation and that he be resentenced to a period of total confinement.
    The trial court convened a hearing on March 20, 2019 to consider
    Appellant’s alleged parole violations. At the hearing, Appellant did not contest
    his alleged conduct and the trial court found him in violation of his parole.
    Consequently, the court sentenced Appellant to 303 days’ back time, in
    accordance with the recommendations of the department. In addition, the
    court ordered Appellant to undergo a psychiatric evaluation.
    ____________________________________________
    1   Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 
    411 U.S. 778
    (1973).
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    J-S61023-19
    Appellant filed a counseled notice of appeal on April 18, 2019.
    Thereafter, on April 24, 2019, the court ordered Appellant to file and serve a
    concise statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On May 13, 2019, counsel
    for Appellant filed a statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4) declaring that
    he intended to file an Anders brief and seek leave to withdraw. The trial court
    issued its opinion on June 11, 2019.
    Before reaching the merits of the appeal, we must first address the
    propriety of counsel's petition to withdraw and Anders brief.         We have
    previously determined:
    Direct appeal counsel seeking to withdraw under Anders must file
    a petition averring that, after a conscientious examination of the
    record, counsel finds the appeal to be wholly frivolous. Counsel
    must also file an Anders brief setting forth issues that might
    arguably support the appeal along with any other issues necessary
    for the effective appellate presentation thereof.
    Anders counsel must also provide a copy of the Anders petition
    and brief to the appellant, advising the appellant of the right to
    retain new counsel, proceed pro se or raise any additional points
    worthy of this Court's attention.
    If counsel does not fulfill the aforesaid technical requirements of
    Anders, this Court will deny the petition to withdraw and remand
    the case with appropriate instructions (e.g., directing counsel
    either to comply with Anders or file an advocate's brief on the
    appellant's behalf). By contrast, if counsel's petition and brief
    satisfy Anders, we will then undertake our own review of the
    appeal to determine if it is wholly frivolous. If the appeal is
    frivolous, we will grant the withdrawal petition and affirm the
    judgment of sentence. However, if there are non-frivolous issues,
    we will deny the petition and remand for the filing of an advocate's
    brief.
    Our Supreme Court has clarified portions of the Anders
    procedure:
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    J-S61023-19
    In the Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed
    counsel's petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1)
    provide a summary of the procedural history and
    facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer to
    anything in the record that counsel believes arguably
    supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel's conclusion
    that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel's
    reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous.
    Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record,
    controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that
    have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
    
    Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361
    .
    Commonwealth v. Cook, 
    175 A.3d 345
    , 348 (Pa. Super. 2017) (some
    citations omitted).
    Upon    review,   counsel   has   complied   with   all   of   the   foregoing
    requirements pursuant to Anders and Santiago.                   Appellant has not
    responded.    Thus, we proceed to review the issue set forth in counsel’s
    Anders brief before conducting an independent review of the record to discern
    if there are non-frivolous issues overlooked by counsel. 
    Id. Counsel for
    Appellant identifies only a single issue which arguably
    supports this appeal. This claim alleges that the trial court imposed an unduly
    harsh and excessive sentence in view of the trivial nature of Appellant’s
    alleged violations and the trial court imposed a sentence of incarceration
    without regard to counsel’s arguments. See Anders Brief at 3. In support of
    this claim, counsel asserts that Appellant’s sentence was unduly harsh and
    excessive since “the mitigating circumstances presented in the record far
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    J-S61023-19
    outweigh[ed] the need to impose the amount of jail time” ordered by the trial
    court. 
    Id. at 8.
    It is well-settled that discretionary sentencing challenges do not lie in
    the context of an appeal from the revocation of parole.
    [A] parole revocation does not involve the imposition of a new
    sentence. Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 
    632 A.2d 934
    , 936 (Pa.
    Super. 1993).      Indeed, there is no authority for a parole-
    revocation court to impose a new penalty. 
    Id. Rather, the
    only
    option for a court that decides to revoke parole is to recommit the
    defendant to serve the already-imposed, original sentence. 
    Id. At some
    point thereafter, the defendant may again be paroled.2
    
    Id. Therefore, the
    purposes of a court's parole-revocation hearing—
    the revocation court's tasks—are to determine whether the
    parolee violated parole and, if so, whether parole remains a viable
    means of rehabilitating the defendant and deterring future
    antisocial   conduct,    or    whether    revocation,    and    thus
    recommitment, are in order. 
    Mitchell, 632 A.2d at 936
    , 937. The
    Commonwealth must prove the violation by a preponderance of
    the evidence and, once it does so, the decision to revoke parole is
    a matter for the court's discretion. 
    Id. at 937.
    In the exercise of
    that discretion, a conviction for a new crime is a legally sufficient
    basis to revoke parole. Commonwealth v. Galletta, 
    864 A.2d 532
    , 539 (Pa. Super. 2004).
    Following parole revocation and recommitment, the proper issue
    on appeal is whether the revocation court erred, as a matter of
    law, in deciding to revoke parole and, therefore, to recommit the
    defendant to confinement.        
    Mitchell, 632 A.2d at 936
    .
    ____________________________________________
    2 Plainly, we are speaking of cases where the authority to grant and revoke
    parole is in the hands of the original sentencing court. Such cases occur when
    the maximum term of the original sentence involves incarceration of less than
    two years. Commonwealth v. Tilghman, 
    652 A.2d 390
    , 391 (Pa. Super.
    1995). When the sentence actually imposed on a defendant includes a
    maximum term of two years or more, the authority to parole rests not with
    the sentencing court but with the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole.
    
    Tilghman, 652 A.2d at 391
    .
    -5-
    J-S61023-19
    Accordingly, an appeal of a parole revocation is not an appeal of
    the discretionary aspects of sentence. 
    Id. As such,
    a defendant appealing recommitment cannot contend,
    for example, that the sentence is harsh and excessive. 
    Galletta, 864 A.2d at 539
    . Such a claim might implicate discretionary
    sentencing but it is improper in a parole-revocation appeal. 
    Id. Similarly, it
    is inappropriate for a parole-revocation appellant to
    challenge the sentence by arguing that the court failed to consider
    mitigating factors or failed to place reasons for sentence on the
    record. Commonwealth v. Shimonvich, 
    858 A.2d 132
    , 135 (Pa.
    Super. 2004). Challenges of those types again implicate the
    discretionary aspects of the underlying sentence, not the legal
    propriety of revoking parole. 
    Id. Commonwealth v.
    Kalichak, 
    943 A.2d 285
    , 290-291 (Pa. Super. 2008)
    (footnote in original).
    The Anders brief argues that the trial court’s sentence was unduly harsh
    and excessive given the technical nature of Appellant’s admitted parole
    violations and the asserted minimal need for incarceration for the period
    designated by the trial court. Since it is well-settled that such challenges are
    not cognizable in the context of an appeal from the revocation of parole, it is
    clear that Appellant is not entitled to relief on this issue. Finally, we have
    conducted an independent review of the entire record as required by Anders
    and have not identified any other non-frivolous issues.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.
    -6-
    J-S61023-19
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 12/13/19
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