Fed. Nat. Mortgage Assoc. v. Stranieri, S. & J. ( 2019 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
ASSOCIATION : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
v. :
:
:
SARA STRANIERI AND JOHN J. :
STRANIERI, III : No. 641 MDA 2018
:
Appellants :
Appeal from the Order Entered March 12, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County Civil Division at
No(s): 16-CV-4848
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., OLSON, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED: MARCH 27, 2019
Appellants Sara Stranieri and John J. Stranieri, III, appeal, pro se, in
this mortgage foreclosure action initiated by Appellee, Federal National
Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”), from orders entered in the Lackawanna
County Court of Common Pleas on March 12, 2018.1 We quash the appeal.
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1 We note that the caption reflects that the appeal is from a single order; in
actuality, it is from three orders filed the same day. On March 12, 2018, the
trial court entered three orders, discussed infra. The first sustained the
preliminary objections of Judge Julia Munley filed October 30, 2017, to
Appellants’ “New Matter/Affirmative Defense/Counterclaim. The second
sustained the preliminary objections of Fannie Mae filed November 21, 2017,
to Appellants’ counterclaims. The third sustained the preliminary objections
of the successor plaintiff to Fannie Mae, MTGLQ Investors, L.P. [“MTGLQ”],
filed on October 27, 2017, to Appellants’ new matter and counterclaims.
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The trial court provided the following statement of the history of this
case in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion,2 in pertinent part:
1.) On August 29, 2016, a complaint in residential mortgage
foreclosure was filed by [Fannie Mae] against both Stranieri
[Appellants]. Said complaint also contained a notice relative to
the [c]ourt’s mortgage foreclosure diversion program. The
complaint noted both [Appellants] entered into a mortgage and a
promissory note on March 18, 2006. Their realty encumbered was
132 South Filmore Avenue, Scranton, Pennsylvania. [Fannie Mae]
held the mortgage at the time suit was commenced.
2.) On September 22, 2016, the Lackawanna County Sheriff’s
office filed returns of service indicating both Stranieri [Appellants]
were (NF), meaning not found, on September 20, 2016 by the
serving officers.
3.) On October 31, 2016, an order to allow service per Pa.R.C.P.
430 was signed by Honorable Vito P. Geroulo.
4.) On November 7, 2016, [Fannie Mae] reinstated [its]
complaint in residential mortgage foreclosure against both
Stranieri [Appellants].
5.) On November 29, 2016, Sheriff’s return of service of the
complaint in residential mortgage foreclosure showed both
Stranieri [Appellants] were once again not found.
6.) Pursuant to [an] earlier order, the Sheriff’s return of service
of December 7, 2016 indicated that the property located at 132
Filmore Avenue, Scranton, Pennsylvania, Lackawanna County was
posted and on December 19, 2016 this type of return of service
was filed.
7.) On January 7, 2017, pro se [Appellants] filed preliminary
objections to the residential mortgage foreclosure complaint and
those were referred to the Court Administrator for assignment.
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2 One of the myriad defects in Appellants’ Brief is their failure to attach the
opinion of the trial court in violation of Pa.R.A.P. 2111(b).
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8.) On January 30, 201[7],[3] judgment in the amount of
$94,106.51 was entered in favor of [Fannie Mae] and against both
Stranieri [Appellants].
9.) On February 6, 2017, a Petition and Rule to Show Cause
why the defective improper default judgment of [Fannie Mae]
versus both Stranieri [Appellants] was signed by the Honorable
James A. Gibbons with a rule returnable before the Honorable Julia
Munley on March 7, 2017.
10.) On February 21, 2017, a petition for writ of execution in
mortgage foreclosure was filed in the amount of $94,106.51.
11.) At some point, a briefing schedule and argument was
ordered by the Honorable Julia Munley to hear Stranieri
[Appellants’] preliminary objections noted above.[4]
12.) On September 8, 2017, Judge Munley denied the
preliminary objections filed by the Stranieri [Appellants].
13.) On October 10, 2017, pro se [Appellants] filed answers to
the mortgage foreclosure complaint along with new matter,
affirmative defenses and counterclaims for wrongful foreclosure
and fraud.
* * *
15.) On October 16, 2017, a substitution of successor Plaintiff
was filed pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 2352(a). [Appellee MTGLQ]
became substitute Plaintiff[] in place of [Fannie Mae] in both the
foreclosure action as well as [the] Counterclaim Defendants.
16.) On October 27, 2017, preliminary objections of MTGLQ
Investors, L.P. were filed-against the new matter, affirmative
defenses and counterclaims of both Stranieri [Appellants]
addressing wrongful foreclosure and fraud and naming the
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3 Our review of the record reveals that the trial court made a typographical
error in referring to the date of the default judgment as January 30, 2018.
4 The trial court failed to note that by order dated March 7, 2017, and filed
March 8, 2017, the January 30, 2017 default judgment entered against
Appellants was “vacated and stricken.” Order, 3/8/17.
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Honorable Julia Munley as a defendant for her denial of Stranieris’
preliminary objections.
* * *
21.) On March 12, 2018, after review of the pleadings and briefs
and after entertaining oral arguments on all of the outstanding
preliminary objections, this [c]ourt signed three (3) orders
relative to the outstanding preliminary objections.
(a). The first order provided that the preliminary
objections filed on behalf of Judge Munley were
sustained. [Appellants] joined Judge Munley because
they were unhappy that Judge Munley quite properly
dismissed their earlier preliminary objections.
[Appellants] then improperly joined Judge Munley as
an additional defendant, thus forcing her to recuse
herself. There was no basis in law or in fact with this
procedure. It was at its essence a dilatory spite move.
To that extent, it worked because it bought
[Appellants] additional time. [Appellants] defaulted
on their mortgage and are totally lacking in a
meritorious defense. The result is delay.
(b.) The next order was entered on behalf of original
Defendant, [Fannie Mae,] to the counterclaim of
[Appellants]. The counterclaims were totally devoid
of merit and were essential in a rambling document
lacking in conformity to the substantive law as well as
to the procedural prerequisites[. Fannie Mae’s]
preliminary objections were therefore sustained and
[Appellants’] counterclaims were dismissed.
Furthermore, [Fannie Mae] had already indirectly
assigned their rights under the mortgage to MTGLQ .
. . who are and have been the successor plaintiff to
[Fannie Mae] and the true present Plaintiff in interest
in this case.
(c.) The final order of March 12, 2018 was to address
the preliminary objections of . . . MTGLQ . . . successor
Plaintiff to [Fannie Mae]. The objections herein were
in response to the new matter, affirmative defenses
and counterclaims of [Appellants] Stranieri.
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Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, 6/14/18, at 1–5. Appellants filed a notice of
appeal to this Court on April 11, 2018. The trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a) but did not order Appellants to file a Rule 1925(b) statement.
Appellants raise the following issues in the Statement of Questions
Involved in their brief:
Point I.
Whether a conflict of interest exists in this case, as Senior Judge
Carmen D. Minora made a ruling in favor of his colleague and
associate Julia K. Munley?
Point II.
Whether [Appellants] have the right of rescission of an agreement
based upon misrepresentation, fraud, etc., under the Federal
Reserve System?
Point III.
Whether the counterclaims come within the purview of federal
subject matter jurisdiction and outside the judicial authority of the
state court?
Point IV.
Whether the court committed harmful and palpable error when it
dismissed the counterclaims against three (3) counterclaim
defendants, specifically, [Fannie Mae], [MTGLQ], and Julia K.
Munley?
Point V.
Whether the Lackawanna County Court Of Common Pleas is a
“Kangaroo Court” and a “Coram Non Judice?”
Point VI.
Whether Senior Judge Carmen D. Minora acted in a ministerial,
administrative, and clerical capacity when he executed the three
(3) orders dismissing the counterclaims with prejudice, the only
subject matter of this case?
Appellants’ Brief at ix.
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We first note that Appellants’ Brief is a rambling, obscure, unintelligible
stream of consciousness and Latin maxims that are unconnected and
irrelevant to the case.5 Thus, we cannot discern the true nature of Appellants’
claims. Pa.R.A.P. 2101 (“Conformance with Requirements”) provides:
Briefs and reproduced records shall conform in all material
respects with the requirements of these rules as nearly as the
circumstances of the particular case will admit, otherwise they
may be suppressed, and, if the defects are in the brief or
reproduced record of the appellant and are substantial, the appeal
or other matter may be quashed or dismissed.
“Although this Court is willing to liberally construe materials filed by a pro se
litigant, pro se status confers no special benefit upon the appellant. To the
contrary, any person choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding must,
to a reasonable extent, assume that his lack of expertise and legal training
will be his undoing.” In re Ullman, 995 A.2d 1207, 1211–1212 (Pa. Super.
2010). Accordingly, pro se litigants must comply with the procedural rules set
forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Court. Commonwealth v. Tchirkow, 160
A.3d 798, 804 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).
The defects in Appellants’ brief and their failure to adequately develop
arguments and support bald assertions impair our ability to conduct
meaningful judicial review of their claims. For this reason, we could find all of
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5 By way of example, we offer Appellants’ assertion that “[t]he lower
court/tribunal while sitting within a municipal form of government under
“Military Colors” is nothing less than a “Kangaroo Court.” Appellants’ Brief
at 9.
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the issues waived. See Stimmler v. Chestnut Hill Hosp., 981 A.2d 145,
153 n.9 (Pa. 2009) (argument portion of brief must contain “sufficient citation
to the record and legal authority, together with analysis, to guide this Court
in its review of the issue.”). Instead, however, we are compelled to agree
with Fannie Mae and MTGLQ and quash the appeal because Appellants seek
to appeal interlocutory trial court orders, and none of the exceptions by which
this Court could properly consider the appeal apply.
It is well settled that an appeal may be taken from: (1) a final order or
an order certified as a final order (Pa.R.A.P. 341); (2) an interlocutory order
as of right (Pa.R.A.P. 311); (3) an interlocutory order by permission (Pa.R.A.P.
312, 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b)); or (4) a collateral order (Pa.R.A.P. 313). See In
re Estate of McAleer, 194 A.3d 587, 592 (Pa. Super. 2018) (discussing
appealability of orders). Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 341 defines
final orders as follows:
(a) General rule. Except as prescribed in paragraphs (d) and
(e) of this rule, an appeal may be taken as of right from any final
order of a government unit or trial court.
(b) Definition of Final Order. A final order is any order that:
(1) disposes of all claims and of all parties; or
(2) RESCINDED[6]
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6 Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(2) previously stated that final orders included “any order
that is expressly defined as a final order by statute[.]” Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(2)
(rescinded). Subsection (b)(2) was rescinded December 14, 2015, and
replaced with Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(8), which became effective on April 1, 2016.
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(3) is entered as a final order pursuant to paragraph
(c) of this rule.
(c) Determination of finality. When more than one claim for
relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim or when multiple parties are
involved, the trial court or other governmental unit may enter a
final order as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims and
parties only upon an express determination that an immediate
appeal would facilitate resolution of the entire case. Such an order
becomes appealable when entered. In the absence of such a
determination and entry of a final order, any order or other
form of decision that adjudicates fewer than all the claims
and parties shall not constitute a final order. . . .
Pa.R.A.P. 341 (emphasis added). Thus, pursuant to Rule 341, an order is final
if it disposes of all claims and all parties or if a statute expressly defines it as
final. The orders entered March 12, 2018, from which the appeal lies,
dismissed Appellants’ counterclaims. As such, they did not terminate the
underlying foreclosure action7 because the orders did not dispose of all claims
and all parties. See United States Organizations for Bankruptcy
Alternatives, Inc. v. Department of Banking, 26 A.3d 474, 480 (Pa.
2011). (If order in question merely narrows scope of litigation and does not
resolve the entirety of the parties’ eligibility for relief, the order is interlocutory
and not immediately appealable). This outcome comports with this Court’s
long-standing and well-founded policy against piecemeal litigation.
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7 Indeed, subsequent to the instant appeal, MTGLQ filed a motion for
summary judgment on August 16, 2018. See Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(6) (“After an
appeal is taken . . . the trial court . . . may [p]roceed further in any matter in
which a non-appealable interlocutory order has been entered, notwithstanding
the filing of a notice of appeal.”).
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Pennsylvania Bankers Ass’n v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Banking, 948
A.2d 790, 798–799 (Pa. 2008).
Further, the orders appealed cannot serve as a basis for an interlocutory
appeal as of right. “[A]n order sustaining preliminary objections to new matter
and counterclaim does not constitute a basis for an interlocutory appeal as of
right” pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311. Continental Bank v. Andrew Bldg. Co.,
648 A.2d 551, 553–554 (Pa. Super. 1994). Neither an order overruling
preliminary objections to a complaint, nor an order sustaining preliminary
objections to new matter and counterclaims, are included in the list of
interlocutory orders to which an appeal of right attaches.8
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8 Pa.R.A.P. 311(a) provides, in pertinent part:
General rule.--An appeal may be taken as of right and without
reference to Pa.R.A.P. 341(c) from:
(1) Affecting judgments.--An order refusing to open, vacate, or
strike off a judgment. If orders opening, vacating, or striking off
a judgment are sought in the alternative, no appeal may be filed
until the court has disposed of each claim for relief.
(2) Attachments, etc.--An order confirming, modifying, dissolving,
or refusing to confirm, modify or dissolve an attachment,
custodianship, receivership, or similar matter affecting the
possession or control of property, except for orders pursuant to
23 Pa.C.S. §§ 3323(f), 3505(a).
(3) Change of criminal venue or venire.--An order changing venue
or venire in a criminal proceeding.
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Moreover, the March 12, 2018 orders are not appealable as collateral
orders. Pa.R.A.P. 313 defines a collateral order as “an order separable from
and collateral to the main cause of action where the right involved is too
important to be denied review and the question presented is such that if
review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be
irreparably lost.” Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). The instant orders cannot be considered
as collateral orders because Appellants’ counterclaims do not “form separate
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(4) Injunctions.--An order that grants or denies, modifies or
refuses to modify, continues or refuses to continue, or dissolves
or refuses to dissolve an injunction unless the order was entered:
(i) Pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 3323(f), 3505(a); or
(ii) After a trial but before entry of the final order.
Such order is immediately appealable, however, if the
order enjoins conduct previously permitted or
mandated or permits or mandates conduct not
previously mandated or permitted, and is effective
before entry of the final order.
(5) Peremptory judgment in mandamus.--An order granting
peremptory judgment in mandamus.
(6) New trials.--An order in a civil action or proceeding awarding
a new trial, or an order in a criminal proceeding awarding a new
trial where the defendant claims that the proper disposition of the
matter would be an absolute discharge or where the
Commonwealth claims that the trial court committed an error of
law.
(7) Partition.--An order directing partition.
(8) Other cases.--An order that is made final or appealable by
statute or general rule, even though the order does not dispose of
all claims and of all parties.
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cause[s] of action which [are] not so integrated [with] the claim at issue . . .
that denial of an appeal from the trial court’s orders would result in the claimed
right being irretrievably lost.” Continental, 648 A.2d at 555.
Finally, Pa.R.A.P. 312 provides for the appeal of an interlocutory order
by permission. Appellants did not file a petition for permission to appeal nor
did the trial court certify that the “order[s] involve[] a controlling question of
law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that
an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the matter[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b); Pa.R.A.P. 1311
(Interlocutory Appeals by Permission). Thus, the March 12, 2018 orders also
are not appealable as interlocutory by permission.
Appeal quashed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 03/27/2019
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