Com. v. Brown, V. ( 2019 )


Menu:
  • J-A30014-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    VONDA KAY BROWN                            :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 615 WDA 2017
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 9, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-02-CR-0004011-2015
    BEFORE:      SHOGAN, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.:                                 FILED APRIL 5, 2019
    Appellant Vonda Kay Brown appeals from the judgment of sentence
    entered on March 9, 2017, following her conviction for, inter alia, aggravated
    assault, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1).1 After careful review, we affirm.
    The trial court set forth the following factual history:
    This matter arises out of the . . . charges being filed against
    [Appellant] when her severely disabled son was found to have
    second degree burns to his right hand while under the care of
    [Appellant]. The Commonwealth established that on October 13,
    2014[,] the victim was brought by [Appellant] to the emergency
    room of Ohio Valley Hospital at 7:29 p.m. with a complaint of right
    hand swelling. The triage nurse described the victim’s right hand
    as being swollen with multiple areas of large serosanguineous-
    filled blisters. [Appellant] stated her son woke up with his hand
    ____________________________________________
    1   Appellant also plead guilty to one count of false/fraudulent medical
    assistance claim, 62 P.S. § 1407(a)(1), and one count of unentitled
    reimbursement, 62 P.S. § 1407(a)(12), at a separate docket and was
    sentenced for those convictions on February 7, 2017. Those convictions are
    not implicated in the instant appeal.
    ____________________________________
    * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-A30014-18
    in that condition and that for the past few days the victim had
    been hitting himself in the mouth with his right hand and that she
    had put a sock on his hand to protect it and that when she
    removed the sock that morning his hand was swollen. The triage
    nurse believed that based on the appearance of his hand that it
    had been burned. She testified that after she conducted her
    examination she notified the [hospital physician that] victim’s
    hand was burned.
    The Commonwealth offered photographs of the victim’s
    hand taken at the time of his presentation to the hospital which
    showed the swelling and blistering of the hand as well as a clear
    straight line of demarcation of the injury in the area of the wrist.
    As a result of his disability, the victim was described as being non-
    verbal with his arms, wrists and legs being severely contracted.
    Although [Appellant] informed the nursing personnel that the
    victim had been hitting his hand on his face, there was no bruising
    or injuries to his face.
    The Commonwealth called Officer Greg Boss of the City of
    Pittsburgh Police Sex Assault and Family Crisis Unit who testified
    that during his investigation he interviewed [Appellant] and that:
    She told me that sometime between the 10th and
    13th her son [hit] himself in the mouth with his right
    hand, which caused a cut to his hand. At that time
    she covered it to protect [it] with a sock, and a few
    days later she noticed after she took the sock off that
    it was badly infected at the time.
    Boss also testified that [Appellant] was “very clear” during
    their interview “that she was the sole provider and caretaker for
    her son, nobody else cared for him but her.”
    On cross examination Boss acknowledged he initially
    interviewed the victim’s primary care physician who wasn’t able
    to conclusively say how the injury happened and, therefore,
    determined that the charges were “unfounded.” He also testified,
    however, that at that time he had not yet reviewed the
    photographs of the victim’s hand or obtained the medical records.
    He further testified that: “So when I got the pictures and I saw
    how severe they were, I felt that it needed to be investigated more
    thoroughly.” He also spoke with physicians, including Dr. Stacy
    Lane, who informed him that the injury to the victim’s hand was
    a submersion burn.
    -2-
    J-A30014-18
    The Commonwealth also called Dr. Stacy Lane, an infectious
    disease specialist. Dr. Lane testified that she examined the victim
    on October 14, 2014 to determine if his injury was the result of
    an infection. She indicated that her examination showed that the
    victim had “marked bulbous lesions of his hand with splitting.”
    She testified on her examinations he did not have any of the signs
    of a primary infection, including white blood cell count elevation,
    fever, elevated C-reactive protein or elevated sedimentation rate
    and his blood cultures were normal. She testified that there were
    no bite marks or cuts on the hand and that there was no
    purulence, puss or induration which would be consistent with an
    infection from a bite or infectious injury to the hand. She indicated
    that if the injury was the result of a bite which is then covered
    with a sock for an extended period there would be significant
    purulence, a foul smell, necrosis and disfigurement. It was her
    opinion the injury was a burn with resulting cellulitis. She testified
    on cross-examination that she believed the injuries were caused
    when the hand was “dunked in something hot,” but acknowledged
    that she could not determine whether it was something hot or
    something chemical.
    The Commonwealth also called Dr. Michael Lally, a general
    and vascular surgeon, who testified that he examined the victim
    on October 14, 2014 and found that his hand was covered with
    water blisters which he believed were from a burn from
    immersion. Due to the appearance of the injury he ordered that
    photographs be taken. He testified that all the melanin in the skin
    was burn[ed] and lifted off and water blisters were uniformly
    distributed across the entire hand all the way up from the nails to
    the transition area of the wrist leaving [a] pink area of underlying
    dermis. Dr. Lally testified that in a thermal or scald injury the first
    thing that happens is that water blisters occur over the first 5 to
    7 days after a burn. The blisters then drain and over the course
    of the next weeks the area is repopulated with epidermal cells and
    new skin. Dr. Lally testified that he was informed that the alleged
    cause of the injury was a sock or glove being placed over a bite
    or other injury to the hand, however, the wound or injury to the
    victim’s hand was not consistent with that mechanism of injury.
    Dr. Lally testified that if there was infection there would be a
    central area of death of the skin and the subcutaneous tissue
    would be liquefied and it would spread out in a starburst pattern
    and work its way up the limb. He testified that the victim’s hand
    did not have any of the characteristics of an infection. He testified
    the injury was equally distributed over the entire hand both on the
    -3-
    J-A30014-18
    palmer and dorsal sides and even in the webs between the fingers
    with a sharp demarcation line of the injury at the level of the
    [wrist]. Dr. Lally further testified that the victim did not have any
    of the signs of infection which would have included redness
    spreading up his entire arm, swollen lymph nodes in the armpit,
    elevated white count, fever, or other signs of toxicity. Dr. Lally
    testified that the victim proceeded through the expected stages of
    recovery of a scald burn. Dr. Lally testified that it was his opinion
    that the injury was either a thermal or chemical burn.
    The Commonwealth also called Dr. Ariel Aballay, a board-
    certified general surgeon who practiced burn surgery for 10 years
    and was director of the West Penn burn unit for three years.
    Dr. Aballay testified that he reviewed the medical records and the
    pictures of the victim’s hand and interviewed the individuals
    involved in his care. He testified that based on his review of
    materials the victim’s injuries were consistent with a second
    degree burn. The characteristics of the injuries were the presence
    of blisters on the entire hand and a clear line of demarcation
    between burned and normal skin which was consistent with an
    injury caused by the submersion of the hand into a hot liquid.
    Dr. Aballay also testified there [were] no splattering burns
    above the demarcation line which would be consistent with
    someone accidently placing their hand in a hot liquid and then
    attempting to remove it quickly. In addition, based on the victim
    having severe contraction of the hips, knees, elbows and wrists it
    was unlikely that the victim would extend the hand and put it [in]
    a container with water by himself. He also testified that the
    appearance of the blisters from a burn would be within 24 to 72
    hours depending on the temperature of the water and the time of
    exposure.
    Dr. Aballay testified that the description of the injury
    occurring from either a bite or blow to the hand which was then
    covered by a sock, which then resulted in infection, was
    inconsistent with the demarcation line of the injury at the wrist
    and the involvement of the palmer aspect of the hand. On cross
    examination Dr. Aballay testified that the injury was not consistent
    with a chemical burn due to the uniformity of the injury between
    the fingers, which was consistent with hot water. He testified that
    in order to have a second degree burn of the nature shown by the
    victim the hand would have to be submerged in hot water at 120°F
    for several minutes but as the temperature increases the length
    of time necessary to cause the burn decreases.
    -4-
    J-A30014-18
    The Commonwealth called Jennifer Sneer, an agent for the
    Medicaid Fraud Control Section of the office of the Attorney
    General who testified that she interviewed [Appellant] concerning
    the victim’s hospitalization and that [Appellant] informed her that
    in June 2014 the victim had become increasingly combative and
    that he had been hitting himself in the face with his right hand to
    the point that he made a cut on his knuckles. [Appellant] further
    stated that shortly after she had taken the victim to his primary
    care physician and when she came home she put Neosporin on
    the cut and put a sock on his hand. [Appellant] also stated that
    very shortly after the sock became wet with saliva and she
    replaced the sock in June 2014 and that it stayed on his hand until
    October 13, 2014 when she removed it.
    [Appellant] testified that her son, who was born on June 20,
    1990, suffered from cerebral palsy, muscular dystrophy, scoliosis
    and a seizure disorder. As a result of these conditions he was
    unable to speak, walk, feed or clothe himself or take care of his
    personal needs and his arms, legs and hands were severely
    contracted. She testified that when he would become agitated or
    would be in pain he would hit himself in the mouth with his fist or
    put his fist in his mouth and bite it causing cuts or bruises to his
    hand. She testified that he has been biting his hands since he has
    been about five years old. [Appellant] testified that in May of
    2014 her son was becoming more combative and agitated and in
    order to protect her son’s hand and his teeth she put a sock on
    his right hand to keep him from biting it and to keep him from
    knocking his teeth out.          She denied that she ever told
    investigators that she did not remove the sock for an extended
    period but instead that she changed [it] regularly.
    She testified that on October 13, 2014[,] when she removed
    the sock, which she stated had been on overnight, she noted that
    his right hand was swollen and had blisters. She testified she
    called Dr. McKnight’s office and talked to her secretary on four
    occasions and was told to put an ice pack on his hand. She
    testified that she followed those instructions but wasn’t satisfied
    so she took him to [the] hospital. She testified that she was never
    told that her son was being treated for a burn but that she saw on
    one of the reports that he had cellulites. [Appellant] testified she
    cared for her son throughout his life and denied submerging his
    hand in water or otherwise burning his hand.
    On cross examination she acknowledged that when she
    arrived at the hospital she told the staff he had been biting
    -5-
    J-A30014-18
    himself, that she had placed a sock on his hand and when she
    removed the sock that morning his hand was swollen and covered
    with blisters as shown in the photographs. She denied giving
    inconsistent statements about the period of time that the sock was
    on his hand, indicating [that] she had always denied that the sock
    was on his hand continuously from July to October.             She
    contended that he had an open wound that had become infected
    which resulted in the appearance of his hand.
    [Appellant’s] daughter, Breanna McGee, also testified that
    while she lived with her mother and her brother, [she had never
    witnessed Appellant act aggressively towards the victim] and that
    she had a reputation as a good and caring person. Upon
    consideration of all testimony [Appellant] was found guilty of
    aggravated assault.
    Trial Court Opinion, 6/25/18, at 2–8 (citations omitted).
    Appellant was initially sentenced to thirty-six to seventy-two months of
    incarceration for the aggravated assault conviction under 18 Pa.C.S.
    § 2702(a)(1).2     Order, 2/7/17.       Appellant filed a post-sentence motion on
    February 13, 2017. Following a March 9, 2017 hearing on the post-sentence
    motion, the trial court re-sentenced Appellant to twenty-six to fifty-two
    months of incarceration.          Order, 3/9/17.    The trial court re-sentenced
    Appellant because it found that she was subject to a lower offense gravity
    score on the grounds that the evidence was not sufficient to establish that the
    ____________________________________________
    2   Pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1),
    (a)   Offense defined.--A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he:
    (1) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes
    such injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under
    circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of
    human life;
    -6-
    J-A30014-18
    victim suffered serious bodily injury due to the lack of testimony about the
    victim’s current condition, including whether he suffered any permanent
    scarring from the burns. N.T. (Post-Sentence Motion Hearing), 3/9/17, at 7.
    Appellant filed a second post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied.
    This appeal followed. Both Appellant and the trial court have complied with
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    Appellant presents the following question for our review:
    1. Was the evidence insufficient to convict [Appellant] of
    aggravated assault (18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1)) as the
    evidence failed to establish that the victim suffered serious
    bodily injury or that she acted with the requisite mens rea?
    Appellant’s Brief at unnumbered 5.
    Our standard for review of a sufficiency of the evidence claim is as
    follows:
    When presented with a claim that the evidence was insufficient to
    sustain a conviction, an appellate court, viewing all of the evidence
    and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable
    to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, must determine
    whether the evidence was sufficient to enable the fact-finder to
    find that all elements of the offense were established beyond a
    reasonable doubt.
    Commonwealth v. Woody, 
    939 A.2d 359
    , 361 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation
    omitted).    “Furthermore, ‘[t]he Commonwealth may sustain its burden by
    proving the crime’s elements with evidence which is entirely circumstantial
    and the trier of fact, who determines credibility of witnesses and the weight
    to give the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part, or none of the
    evidence.’” 
    Id. at 361–362
    (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 701 A.2d
    -7-
    J-A30014-18
    252, 254 (Pa. Super. 1997)). “As an appellate court, we do not assess
    credibility nor do we assign weight to any of the testimony of record.”
    Commonwealth v. Vogelsong, 
    90 A.3d 717
    , 719 (Pa. Super. 2014).
    Further, “circumstantial evidence is reviewed by the same standard as direct
    evidence—a decision by the trial court will be affirmed so long as the
    combination of the evidence links the accused to the crime beyond a
    reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Bricker, 1014 (Pa. Super. 2005)
    (quotation omitted).   “Additionally[,] we may not reweigh the evidence or
    substitute our own judgment for that of the factfinder.” Commonwealth v.
    Walker, 
    139 A.3d 225
    , 229 (Pa. Super. 2016).
    Under 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702 (a)(1), “[a] person is guilty of aggravated
    assault if he . . . attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes
    such injury intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances
    manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life.” 18 Pa.C.S.
    § 2702(a)(1).    As noted by Appellant, the term “serious bodily injury” is
    defined by statute as “bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death
    or which causes serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or
    impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” Appellant’s Brief
    at unnumbered 14 (quoting 18 Pa.C.S. § 2301).
    Appellant asserts that intent is a fact-specific inquiry. Appellant’s Brief
    at unnumbered 19. She argues that the Commonwealth failed to produce any
    witnesses who observed Appellant abuse the victim, and relied instead upon
    -8-
    J-A30014-18
    “medical witnesses,” who testified that the victim’s injuries could not have
    occurred as Appellant claimed they did. 
    Id. Specifically, Appellant
    avers that
    there was “no evidence as to how [the victim’s] injuries occurred,” and that
    “there is a complete lack of evidence as to [Appellant’s] actual conduct, which
    would support a finding of recklessness.” 
    Id. at 22.
    Ultimately, Appellant
    argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that she “attempted to cause
    serious bodily injury to her son, intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly.” 
    Id. at 21.
    In its Pa.R.A.P. (a) 1925 opinion, the trial court reviewed the evidence
    presented at trial and held that the following established that Appellant did
    have the specific intent to cause bodily injury:
    Based on the totality of the evidence, it is clear that the
    Commonwealth established that [Appellant], who was the sole
    person in custody and control of the victim, submerged the
    victim’s hand into hot water or other liquid for a sufficient period
    of time to cause second degree burns to his hand. Based on the
    victim’s physical conditions and abilities, the Commonwealth
    established that the victim did not accidently or inadvertently
    place his own hand into the water. The evidence established that
    a third person would have been required to place his hand into the
    hot water and submerge it to his wrist for a period of time
    necessary to cause the burns. It is clear that specific intent to
    cause serious bodily injury can be inferred from the evidence. The
    evidence establishes that this was not an inadvertent act in which
    his hand fell or was placed into hot water and then was quickly
    pulled away but instead that it was done purposefully and with the
    intent to cause a serious injury to the hand.             Therefore,
    [Appellant] was appropriately found guilty of aggravated assault.
    Trial Court Opinion, 6/25/18, at 10–11.
    -9-
    J-A30014-18
    “For aggravated assault purposes, an ‘attempt’ is found where the
    accused, with the required specific intent, acts in a manner which constitutes
    a substantial step toward perpetrating a serious bodily injury upon another.”
    Commonwealth v. Alford, 
    880 A.2d 666
    , 670 (Pa. Super. 2005). In order
    to determine whether an appellant possessed the requisite intent, this Court
    will look at both direct and circumstantial evidence.   
    Id. at 670–671.
        “In
    determining whether intent was proven from such circumstances, the fact
    finder is free to conclude the accused intended the natural and probable
    consequences of his actions to result therefrom.”        Commonwealth v.
    Bradley, 
    69 A.3d 253
    , 257 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting trial court’s 1925(a)
    opinion, 6/21/12, at 4–6) (finding the requisite intent where defendant, an
    adult male, twisted the arm of small child and fractured child’s arm because
    the “natural consequence of an adult twisting the arm of a small child this
    hard was a fractured bone.”)).
    Because direct evidence of intent is often unavailable, intent to
    cause serious bodily injury may be shown by the circumstances
    surrounding the attack. In determining whether intent was
    proven from such circumstances, the fact finder is free to conclude
    the accused intended the natural and probable consequences of
    his actions to result therefrom.
    Commonwealth v. Bruce, 
    916 A.2d 657
    , 661 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations
    and quotations omitted).
    As the trial court noted in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, Appellant was the
    only person who provided care for the victim, who is disabled and dependent
    upon Appellant for all of his needs.    Trial Court Opinion, 6/25/18, at 10.
    - 10 -
    J-A30014-18
    Moreover, the victim’s upper extremities were contracted such that he would
    have been unable to voluntarily or accidentally extend his hands to place them
    in hot water. 
    Id. Additionally, three
    doctors, an infectious disease specialist,
    a general/vascular surgeon, and a burn specialist, testified that the injuries to
    the victim were not due to an infection but were the result of the victim’s hand
    being submerged in a hot liquid. 
    Id. This finding
    was based upon the fact
    that the victim showed no clinical signs of having an infection; there was a
    demarcation line between burned and normal skin; and the victim’s entire
    hand was involved. 
    Id. Finally, Dr.
    Aballay, the burn specialist, testified that
    the “lack of any splatter burns above the line of demarcation was inconsistent
    with the hand being inadvertently placed in hot water and being immediately
    pulled out.” 
    Id. Given our
    standard of review and the evidence put forth by
    the Commonwealth and accepted by the trier of fact, we are constrained to
    find that the evidence is sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction for
    aggravated assault pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702 (a)(1).
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 4/5/2019
    - 11 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 615 WDA 2017

Filed Date: 4/5/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/5/2019