Com. v. Sweeney, W. ( 2019 )


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  • J-S10004-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    WILLIAM WESLEY SWEENEY                     :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 2309 EDA 2018
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 3, 2018
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-23-CR-0007866-2013
    BEFORE:      GANTMAN, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and COLINS*, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                               FILED MARCH 22, 2019
    Appellant, William Wesley Sweeney, appeals from the order of the Court
    of Common Pleas of Delaware County that denied his first petition filed under
    the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 After careful review, we affirm.
    This case arises out of an undercover police officer’s response to an
    October 20, 2013 Craigslist ad entitled “Sunday Funday in Delco -33
    (Aston/Lima)” that stated: “Looking for some fun (mutual oral) at my place
    today. I am looking for someone under 25, white, thin/athletic, D/D Free, and
    likes to get sucked and suck too (Not necessary).” The police officer, posing
    as a 15-year old boy named “Sammy,” communicated with Appellant in
    response to this ad. Following numerous email exchanges between “Sammy”
    ____________________________________________
    1   42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541–9546.
    ____________________________________
    * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S10004-19
    and Appellant over an eight-day period, Appellant was arrested when he came
    to an arranged meeting place on October 27, 2013.
    Appellant waived his right to a jury trial and, following a bench trial, was
    convicted on January 22, 2015 of five counts of criminal attempt (related to
    sexual offenses), five counts of criminal solicitation (related to sexual
    offenses), and one count each of unlawful contact with minor and criminal use
    of communication facility.2        On July 9, 2015, the trial court imposed an
    aggregate sentence of three to six years of incarceration to be followed by
    three years of probation. Appellant, represented by new counsel, filed a direct
    appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the weight of the evidence,
    the trial court’s denial of his motion to exclude the October 20, 2013 Craigslist
    ad, and the admission of testimony of two witnesses not involved in the
    Craigslist ad or email exchange concerning Appellant’s communication with
    them when they were under age 16. On October 7, 2016, this Court affirmed
    the judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Sweeney, 
    159 A.3d 37
    (Pa.
    Super. 2016) (unpublished memorandum).
    On November 2, 2017, Appellant, represented by the same counsel as
    on his direct appeal, filed the instant timely PCRA petition.        In this PCRA
    petition, Appellant alleged that trial counsel was ineffective in four respects:
    failing to raise a discrepancy between the internet provider address on the
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    2   18 Pa.C.S. §§ 901(a), 902(a), 6318(a)(1), and 7512(a), respectively.
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    Craiglist ad and Appellant’s internet provider address, failing to show that the
    telephone number on the Craigslist ad was not Appellant’s, advising Appellant
    to waive jury trial, and failing to move to suppress a statement that Appellant
    gave to police following his arrest. PCRA Petition at 1-2 ¶5. The PCRA court
    held an evidentiary hearing on the petition on June 28, 2018, at which
    Appellant’s trial counsel and Appellant testified. On July 3, 2018, the PCRA
    court denied the PCRA petition. This timely appeal followed.
    Appellant raises the following four issues for our review:
    I. Was Trial Counsel ineffective for not effectively rais[ing] during
    Trial the difference of the address that was provided by Craigslist
    as opposed to the address indicated by Defendant's internet
    provider (Verizon)?
    II. Was Trial Counsel ineffective in that [he] did not elicit at the
    time of Trial that the telephone number attached to the Craigslist
    ad was not the number that the Defendant was familiar with?
    III. Was Trial Counsel ineffective as to [his] advice to Defendant
    to proceed with a bench trial?
    IV. Was Trial Counsel ineffective for failing to file a Pretrial
    Omnibus Motion attempting to exclude a statement given by Mr.
    Sweeney to the Aston Township Police Department on the date of
    his arrest?
    Appellant’s Br. at 4.
    We review the denial of a PCRA petition to determine whether the record
    supports the PCRA court’s findings and whether its decision is free of legal
    error.       Commonwealth v. Mason, 
    130 A.3d 601
    , 617 (Pa. 2015);
    Commonwealth v. Smith, 
    181 A.3d 1168
    , 1174 (Pa. Super. 2018).                    We
    must view the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record in a light
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    most favorable to the prevailing party, and the PCRA court’s credibility
    determinations, if supported by the record, are binding on this Court. 
    Mason, 130 A.3d at 617
    .
    To be entitled to relief under the PCRA on a claim of ineffective
    assistance of counsel, the convicted defendant must prove: (1) that the
    underlying legal claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel’s action or inaction
    had no reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s interests; and (3)
    that he suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s action or inaction. 
    Mason, 130 A.3d at 618
    ; 
    Smith, 181 A.3d at 1174-75
    ; Commonwealth v. Michaud,
    
    70 A.3d 862
    , 867 (Pa. Super. 2013). The defendant must satisfy all three
    prongs of this test to obtain relief under the PCRA. 
    Mason, 130 A.3d at 618
    ;
    
    Smith, 181 A.3d at 1175
    ; 
    Michaud, 70 A.3d at 867
    .
    Appellant’s   claims   that   trial   counsel   allegedly   failed   to   show
    discrepancies between the Craigslist ad and Appellant’s internet provider
    address and telephone were properly rejected by the PCRA court because they
    are unsupported by the record.        Contrary to Appellant’s assertions, trial
    counsel demonstrated at trial that the Craigslist ad telephone number did not
    match Appellant’s telephone number and that the police made no attempt to
    determine whose telephone number the Craigslist ad number was. N.T. Trial,
    1/15/15, at 40-43, 107-10, 117.         The trial record also showed that trial
    counsel through his questioning of the police forensic expert established that
    the police made no determination that the internet provider address in the
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    Craigslist ad was Appellant’s or was consistent with the ad being placed from
    Appellant’s computer or house. 
    Id. at 117-19.
    To the extent that Appellant
    argues that trial counsel was ineffective because he did not also show an
    actual internet provider address discrepancy, there is no evidence in the
    record that there was a difference between the internet provider address
    associated with the Craigslist ad and Appellant’s internet provider address.
    While PCRA counsel stated that he contended that “the IP address that was
    provided by Craigslist is different than the Defendant's internet provider,
    Verizon,” the only evidence that he introduced at the PCRA hearing on this
    issue was Appellant’s testimony that he wanted to testify at trial concerning
    “the difference in [IP] addresses,” not testimony or other evidence as to what
    Appellant’s internet provider address was. N.T. PCRA Hearing at 4, 40-41.
    Appellant’s remaining two arguments likewise fail.     Neither of these
    arguments satisfies the requirement that counsel’s action or inaction lacked a
    reasonable basis. Where the trial counsel’s conduct is an informed strategic
    choice that could be reasonably viewed at the time as advancing the
    defendant’s interests, this element is absent and ineffective assistance of
    counsel cannot be shown, even though in hindsight trial counsel’s strategy
    was not successful. Commonwealth v. Williams, 
    141 A.3d 440
    , 463 (Pa.
    2016); Commonwealth v. Dunbar, 
    470 A.2d 74
    , 77 (Pa. 1983);
    Commonwealth v. Jones, 
    636 A.2d 1184
    , 1188-90 (Pa. Super. 1994). Trial
    counsel’s testimony at the PCRA hearing demonstrated that both his
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    recommendation of a bench trial and his decision not to move to suppress
    Appellant’s statement were fully considered strategic decisions.
    Trial counsel explained that he advised Appellant to waive his right to
    jury trial and to agree to a bench trial because he believed that a jury would
    view Appellant unfavorably because he was bisexual, and because a jury
    would be affected by the fact that the charges involved solicitation of a child
    for sex and by the evidence that the Commonwealth was permitted to
    introduce concerning the other incidents of alleged communications between
    Appellant and underage boys. N.T. PCRA Hearing at 15-20.           Trial counsel
    testified that he also recommended a bench trial because he believed that the
    judge to whom the case was assigned was likely to be a more favorable fact
    finder in this type of case than a jury. 
    Id. at 20,
    34-35.
    Trial counsel explained that he did not file a motion to suppress because
    the statement gave Appellant’s version of events, that the ad that he posted
    on Craigslist was a different ad that did not contain the language concerning
    sexual activity, and because not suppressing the statement placed Appellant’s
    explanation in evidence without forcing Appellant to testify, which trial counsel
    believed would have been harmful to his defense. N.T. PCRA Hearing at 8-
    14, 22-25, 31-32. Trial counsel also testified that he did not file a motion to
    suppress because he believed that such a motion had no chance of success.
    
    Id. at 10-14.
    The PCRA court found trial counsel’s testimony concerning both
    of these decisions credible. PCRA Court Opinion at 8, 9-10 n.2, 11-12.
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    In addition, Appellant failed to prove other essential elements of
    ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to both of these claims.
    Appellant did not show that his suppression claim had arguable merit.
    Appellant’s statement was audio recorded.        Ex. C-4B at 1-2; N.T. PCRA
    Hearing at 9.       Appellant was given Miranda3 warnings and signed an
    acknowledgement of those warnings waiving his Miranda rights before he
    gave the statement to the police. Ex. C-3; Ex. C-4B at 1, 4.
    Appellant argues that this waiver was invalid because he allegedly had
    consumed prescription drugs and alcohol and was intoxicated at the time.
    Appellant told trial counsel that he had a blood alcohol level of .085 on a
    breathalyzer test given by the police and that he had taken drugs. N.T. PCRA
    Hearing at 11-12.        The fact that a defendant has consumed intoxicating
    substances, however, does not automatically invalidate a waiver of Miranda
    rights or make a statement to the police involuntary. Commonwealth v.
    Ventura, 
    975 A.2d 1128
    , 1137 (Pa. Super. 2009); Commonwealth v.
    Adams, 
    561 A.2d 793
    , 795 (Pa. Super. 1989). Rather, the test is whether
    the defendant had sufficient mental capacity at the time of the statement to
    know what he was saying and to have voluntarily intended to say it, and if it
    is found that he had such capacity, the statement will not be suppressed.
    
    Ventura, 975 A.2d at 1137-39
    (Pa. Super. 2009); 
    Adams, 561 A.2d at 795
    -
    ____________________________________________
    3   Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    (1966).
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    J-S10004-19
    97. Trial counsel testified that he listened to the audiotape of Appellant’s
    statement and that Appellant did not sound at all intoxicated and appeared in
    full control of his faculties and capable of understanding what was occurring.
    N.T. PCRA Hearing at 10-12, 31. The PCRA court specifically found this
    testimony credible. PCRA Court Opinion at 11-12.4 Given this evidence and
    the PCRA’s credibility finding, the motion to suppress lacked arguable merit
    and cannot support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
    Adams, 561 A.2d at 795
    -97.
    Furthermore, Appellant did not show that trial counsel’s bench trial
    advice caused him prejudice. To show prejudice where the alleged ineffective
    assistance concerns the waiver of jury trial, the defendant must demonstrate
    a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s conduct, he would not have
    waived his right to a jury trial. Commonwealth v. Miller, 
    987 A.2d 638
    , 660
    (Pa. 2009); Commonwealth v. Mallory, 
    941 A.2d 686
    , 704 (Pa. 2008). No
    such showing is present here. The colloquy conducted on the record before
    the start of trial makes clear that Appellant was fully advised of his right to a
    jury trial and that the decision was his to make, regardless of counsel’s advice,
    and Appellant’s answers in that colloquy establish that he knowingly,
    ____________________________________________
    4 Appellant testified at the PCRA hearing that he was drunk and under the
    influence of Klonopin and Methadone and that he told the police that he
    wanted to leave before they took the recorded statement. N.T. PCRA Hearing
    at 44-45. The PCRA court, however, did not find Appellant’s testimony
    credible. PCRA Court Opinion at 11-12.
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    intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to jury trial. N.T. Trial, 1/15/15,
    at 3-10.    At the PCRA hearing, trial counsel testified that Appellant had
    expressed a preference for a nonjury trial even when trial counsel had initially
    recommended a jury trial. N.T. PCRA Hearing at 15-17. Appellant admitted
    that at the time of trial he agreed with trial counsel’s recommendation to
    proceed with a nonjury trial and did not testify that he wanted a jury trial. 
    Id. at 37-39.
    For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Appellant did not show any
    ineffective assistance of counsel by his trial counsel.      Accordingly, having
    discerned no error of law and no unsupported findings in its decision, we affirm
    the PCRA court’s order denying Appellant’s PCRA petition.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 3/22/19
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