In Re: B.J.Z. Appeal of: J.Z. , 207 A.3d 914 ( 2019 )

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2019 PA Super 106IN RE: B.J.Z. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: J.Z., FATHER
No. 2471 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Decree Entered July 24, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
Orphans' Court at No(s): CV-2017-A9116
IN RE: N.M.Z. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: J.Z., FATHER
No. 2494 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Decree Entered July 24, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 2017-A9116
IN RE: C.J.Z. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: J.Z., FATHER
No. 2496 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Decree Entered July 24, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
Orphans' Court at No(s): CV-2017-A9115
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OTT, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
OPINION BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 04, 2019
J.Z. (“Father”) appeals from the July 18, 2018 decrees that were entered
on the docket on July 24, 2018, granting the petitions filed by the Buck’s
County Children and Youth Services Agency (Agency) to involuntarily
terminate Father’s parental rights to B.J.Z. (born in November of 2013), C.J.Z.
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(born in August of 2011), and N.M.Z. (born in November of 2009) (collectively
“Children”).1,2 After review, we affirm.
The trial court provided the following factual and procedural background
of this case, stating:
The Agency first received a referral regarding this family in 2009
when the oldest child, N.M.Z.[,] was born and tested positive for
methadone. The Agency was concerned at that time with Mother’s
level of drug treatment compliance.4 In-home services were
provided and that Agency referral was closed in 2011, several
months prior to C.J.Z.’s birth.
4 Just prior to N.M.Z.’s birth, Mother had involvement with
the Agency regarding another child whom she voluntarily
relinquished. That child was later adopted.
The family’s case was reopened on January 29, 2013, due to
ongoing concerns as to [] Children being inadequately supervised,
the condition of the home, substance abuse by the parents, []
Children not be[ing] appropriately dressed, and C.J.Z. being
developmentally delayed. General protective services were in
place at the time of B.J.Z.’s birth in 2013. A family service plan
was created and the Agency provided services to assist the family
during the next three (3) years. However, as a result of the
parents’ noncompliance with the requirements of the support
housing program, they were evicted from their home. Following
the eviction the family moved to a hotel. A voluntary placement
with the Agency agreement for the Children was signed by the
parents in August 2016, when the parents could no longer pay for
the hotel and became homeless.
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1 These appeals were consolidated sua sponte by per curiam order of this
Court, as all of these matters involve related parties and issues. Order,
9/19/18.
2The parental rights of Children’s mother, D.V. (“Mother”), were terminated
by separate decrees entered on the same date. Mother has also filed appeals,
which are addressed in a separate memorandum at Nos. 2499 EDA 2018,
2505 EDA 2018, and 2506 EDA 2018.
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[] Children were adjudicated dependent on September 2,
2016 by Order signed by Judge Mellon of this bench, and all 3
Children have remained in the custody of the Agency since that
time. Both parents have failed to adequately comply with the
Permanency Placement Plans that were implemented. On
November 6, 2017, the Agency filed the subject Petitions for the
Involuntary Termination of Father’s Parental Rights under § 2511
(a)(2), (5), and (8). On August 17, 2018, Father filed a timely
appeal of our July 18, 2018 Decrees in the Superior Court.
Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 9/26/18, at 2-3 (citations to record omitted).3
On appeal, Father presents the following issues for our review:
1. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt commit reversible [error] by permitting
the court appointed counsel for … [C]hildren to make hearsay
statements on the record of [] [C]hildren’s wishes over
[Father’s] objections and by considering such statements as
evidence thus violating P[a.] Rules of Evidence 802 and
denying [Father] due process of law?
2. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt commit reversible error by refusing to
hear … [C]hildren’s testimony and denying [Father] the right
to question [] [C]hildren when the court had permitted
hearsay testimony of [] [C]hildren through their court
appointed counsel in violation of P[a.] Rules of Evidence 802
and [Father’s] right to due process of law?
3. Did [the Agency] fail to meet the requirements of 23 Pa.C.S.[]
§ 2511(a)(2)[,] (5)[,] and (8) and [the Agency] has not
produced clear and convincing evidence that the minor
[C]hildren were not bonded, that the termination of [F]ather’s
parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of []
Children[,] nor that he is unable to remedy the issue that
caused [] [C]hildren [to] be taken into care?
Father’s brief at 4.
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3 We note that a guardian ad litem (“GAL”), Emily Ward, Esq., and a child
advocate, Linda Shick, Esq., were appointed to represent the best interests
and the legal interests of Children. Both attorneys participated in the
termination hearing and filed briefs in this appeal.
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With regard to the first two issues raised by Father, he claims that the
court erred by allowing statements made by the two oldest Children into
evidence by way of statements to the court made by Children’s legal-interests
attorney. Father asserts that because the court never spoke directly to
Children or allowed Father to question Children during the court proceeding,
the court therefore relied on inadmissible hearsay in rendering its decision.
In its opinion, the trial court states that it “believe[s] that the issue of
whether [] Children’s legal[-]interests counsel may speak on their behalf is an
issue of first impression at the trial court level in the Commonwealth….” TCO
at 6. The court explained:
This [c]ourt has given a great deal of thought to this issue.
We have extensively considered the [In re: Adoption of L.B.M.,
161 A.3d 172 (Pa. 2017),] opinion which mandated the utilization
of child[-]directed legal counsel in certain cases, but provided no
guidance as to the logistical means of incorporating [] Children’s
wishes into the record. We considered the use of the word
“express” in the L.B.M. opinion, which we find has significant
meaning regarding counsel’s role in relaying [] Children’s desires.
We also considered statutory law applicable to Dependency Court
at 42 Pa.C.S. § 6311 and Rule 1154 of Dependency Court[,] which
is found in 237 Pennsylvania Code, which, while not binding in
Orphans’ Court, we find to be persuasive and logical.
Accordingly, we held that there exists a rebuttable
presumption against children having to testify and suffer the
associated trauma in proceedings such as this, whether it is in
open court or in chambers, or in the presence of attorneys,
subjected to cross-examination. This [c]ourt held that it is
permissible for the legal[-]interests counsel to advise the [c]ourt
regarding [] Children’s wishes, to the extent that those wishes can
be ascertained. We permitted adverse counsel to argue against
the weight of the legal[-]interests counsel’s expression of []
Children’s wishes based on relevant factors such as, but not
limited to, diminished capacity of a child, the mental health status
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of a child, the emotional maturity status of a child, and the legal[-
]interests counsel’s alleged failure to establish a sufficient basis
for ascertaining the respective Child’s preferred outcomes. This
[c]ourt gave the evidence offered and expressed as to []
Children’s wishes the weight to which it was deemed entitled
under the circumstances of this particular case.
At the hearing, [] Children’s legal[-]interests counsel shared
her encounters with B.J.Z., C.J.Z., and N.M.Z. We provide,
verbatim, excerpts from the record as follows:
[N.M.Z.] I was able to have a pretty good
conversation with...did he understand why he was
living with the [foster family,] did he understand why
he only visited with his parents...--how he would like
things to continue.
[C.J.Z.] I was able to have that same conversation
with, ... he answered me appropriately. [C.J.Z.]...he
seemed to understand within that framework.
(N.T. 1/30/2018, pp. 194-195).
On her second visit, legal[-]interests counsel met with each
Child individually. While it was difficult to have a conversation
with the youngest due to his age and maturity level, the other two
Children participated in conversation and understood the
ramifications of their desires as expressed to their legal[-
]interests counsel.
[W]e talked about...what [] parents’ rights are, and
we talked about what...this hearing was about
whether or not their parents were going to be allowed
to keep those rights, because the [c]ourt was going to
determine whether or not they were doing a good job
at that. Since it affected them, [the Judge] would
want to know what they would want to have happen.
And I told them that their parents had all kind of rights
to decide where they go to school, if they go to church,
what clothes they wear, if their hair gets cut, what
doctors they see, if they sign up for soccer. I went
through a long list[] of things that parents get to
do...they know that they’ve been in foster care for a
number of years, and they know that their parents
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have not been doing those things, and they know that
the [foster parents] are now doing those things.
We talked about...what they want me to tell you...[.]
They both know you’re supposed to tell the truth.
They both...had an understanding...of the seriousness
[and that] it was not a fun meeting. It was not a
playful meeting. I was very serious with them. They
both looked at me in the eye when they talked to me,
and I think I have a good perception of what—what
both of them want me to tell you.
(N.T. 1/30/2018, pp. 196-199).
[] Children’s legal[-]interests counsel shared additional
insights and represented that [] Children very much want to stay
with their foster parents, even if they do not see their parents for
a potentially long period of time. [] Children feel “safe and happy”
with the foster family, and even though they love their mother
and father, they know their parents have not taken appropriate
care of them and are still unable to do so at this time.
“[A] child’s legal interests...are synonymous with the child’s
preferred outcome...[.]” In re Adoption of L.B.M., 161 A.3d at
174. Here, we heard from all counsel and appreciate the
compelling arguments offered in response to the issue of hearsay
as it relates to the representations of [] [C]hildren’s legal[-
]interests counsel. We do not believe that the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania would mandate that children in these hearings must
testify under the rationale that it would otherwise be permitting
inadmissible hearsay. Such a decision would likely cause
additional distress and long-lasting, if not permanent, emotional
impact on children. Such a mandate appears inconsistent with
the Supreme Court’s directive in the L.B.M. case[,] which imposes
the utilization of child[-]directed legal counsel.
Accordingly, it is logical that the trial court may hear and
rely, to the extent the court deems appropriate, [on] the
representations of the child through their legal[-]interests
counsel. In the instant matter, based on the above analysis and
considerations, we accepted legal[-]interests counsel’s
representations to the [c]ourt. Counsel represented that []
Children, particularly the older two, seven (7) and eight (8) years
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old, understood the nature of the relevant proceedings as well as
the ramifications of the potential determination that the
termination of their parents’ parental rights was appropriate
pursuant to § 2511(a) and in their best interest pursuant to §
2511(b). Counsel was confident that the older Children clearly
and unequivocally expressed their desired outcome. We heard no
basis for discrediting or diminishing the weight of legal[-]interests
counsel’s representations. Based on the above analysis, we
submit there is no merit to [Father’s] first two matters complained
of on appeal.
TCO at 6-9 (some citations to record omitted).
We agree with the trial court’s position on Father’s first two issues. In
addition to the court’s reliance on the L.B.M. case, “we note that testimony
as to what a child tells other people is admissible in order to establish that
child’s mental state at the time he or she made the comment.” In re Child
M., 681 A.2d 793, 800 (Pa. Super. 1996). The Child M. case involved a
termination of a mother’s parental rights, wherein the mother questioned
whether the trial court erred “by admitting hearsay statements of the child
into evidence and by refusing to require the child to testify….” Id. at 796.
This Court declined to create a requirement that “would entitle a natural
parent to force an abused child to testify in an involuntary termination
proceeding.” Id. at 798. Moreover, this Court agreed that mental health
professionals, caseworkers, and the foster parents could testify about their
direct observations of the child’s conduct. Furthermore, the Child M. opinion
provided that “testimony as to what a child tells other people is admissible in
order to establish that child’s mental state at the time he or she made the
comment.” Id. at 800.
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Additionally, in In re B.L.L., 787 A.2d 1007 (Pa. Super. 2001), a
termination case, an issue on appeal asserted an error by the trial court when
it refused to schedule an additional hearing to allow the child to testify. The
B.L.L. opinion discussed the differences between custody, adoption and
termination cases, summarizing its conclusions as follows:
[I]n custody proceedings there is no mandatory provision for
providing counsel for the child, whereas in termination and
adoption proceedings, the child must be represented by counsel.
The burden of proof in custody and adoption cases is competent
evidence, or preponderance of evidence to support the Order or
Decree. The proof required in involuntary termination
proceedings is clear and convincing evidence. In custody and
adoption hearings, the testimony of the child, if relevant, is
required to be placed on the record subject to interrogation by
counsel under the supervision of the court. Finally, in involuntary
termination proceedings, the testimony of the child is not a
requisite part of the inquiry, which focuses entirely on the
parenting capacity of the parent. No statute or case law exists
which requires or permits the child’s testimony to be an element
of that review.
Id. at 1016.
We also note that in In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080 (Pa. 2018), our Supreme
Court, discussing a situation where a child is too young to verbalize his or her
preferred outcome, relied on Section 6311 of the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §
6311(a), which concerns the appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent
the legal and best interests of a child. The T.S. court noted that Section
6311(b)(9) provided that the guardian ad litem must “advise the court of the
child’s wishes to the extent that they can be ascertained and present to the
court whatever evidence exists to support the child’s wishes. 42 Pa.C.S. §
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6311(b)(9).” Id. at 1089. Although the situation in the instant case concerns
two of three Children, who are able to verbalize their wishes, the T.S. case
provides guidance and persuades us, in addition to all of the above, that the
trial court did not err in allowing Children’s legal-interests counsel to provide
the court with information as to Children’s position on the question of parental
termination. The trial court did not err in concluding that Father’s first two
issues do not provide him with relief.4
Next, we address Father’s third issue and begin by setting forth the
applicable standard of review:
When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating
parental rights, we are limited to determining whether the
decision of the trial court is supported by competent evidence.
Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient
evidentiary support for the trial court’s decision, the decree must
stand. Where a trial court has granted a petition to involuntarily
terminate parental rights, this Court must accord the hearing
judge’s decision the same deference that we would give to a jury
verdict. We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the
record in order to determine whether the trial court’s decision is
supported by competent evidence.
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4 We note that Father relies on In re Adoption of M.D.Q., 192 A.3d 1201(Pa. Super. 2018), suggesting that it is factually similar to the instant case
because the children were of a similar age to the two older children here. In
M.D.Q., the children’s father and stepmother petitioned to have the parental
rights of the children’s mother terminated. This Court’s reason for vacating
and remanding the M.D.Q. case rested on the failure of the appointed
attorney, representing the children’s legal interests, to make clear on the
record the children’s preferred outcome. Rather, the attorney’s statements
appeared to focus on what she believed to be best for the children. That is
not the circumstances in the case presently before this Court.
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In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quoting In re S.H., 879
A.2d 802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2005)). Moreover, we have explained that:
The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as
testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to
enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”
Id. (quoting In re J.L.C. & J.R.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)).
The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented
and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts
in the evidence. In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004). If
competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if
the record could also support the opposite result. In re Adoption of T.B.B.,
835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa. Super. 2003).
We are guided further by the following: Termination of parental rights
is governed by Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated
analysis.
Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court
must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental
rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The
party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds
for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
of permanently severing any such bond.
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In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511,
other citations omitted). The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination
of parental rights are valid. R.N.J., 985 A.2d at 276.
With regard to Section 2511(b), we direct our analysis to the facts
relating to that section. This Court has explained that:
Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental
rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884
A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated, “Intangibles
such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the
inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” In addition, we
instructed that the trial court must also discern the nature and
status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect
on the child of permanently severing that bond. Id. However, in
cases where there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and
child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. In re K.Z.S.,
946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008). Accordingly, the extent
of the bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the
circumstances of the particular case. Id. at 763.
In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).
In this case, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant
to Section 2511(a)(2), (5), (8) and (b). We need only agree with the trial
court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b),
in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en
banc). Here, we analyze the court’s decision to terminate under Sections
2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows.
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
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***
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
***
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by
terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).
In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] §
2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1)
repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2)
such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to
be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
not be remedied.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation
omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot
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be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those
grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental
duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations
omitted).
Initially, Father acknowledges that he has not met the criteria to have
Children returned to his care, mainly because he did not have adequate
housing and was not employed. However, he contends that he has made
substantial progress and that “the Agency has failed to establish that the
placement of [] [C]hildren was irredeemable and therefore … he should be
afforded additional time to seek return of his [C]hildren to his care.” Father’s
brief at 39.
With regard to Section 2511(a)(2), the trial court provided an extensive
review of the testimony provided by Victoria Kane, a social worker with the
Agency. See TCO at 10-15. One of the items the court noted was that Father
was inconsistent in his visitation with Children. However, in summarizing its
conclusion, the court stated that,
[b]ased on the evidence and testimony provided, and in
conformity with the pertinent statutory and decisional law, we
found that Father has failed to remedy his parental incapacities
for a substantial time period. These incapacity factors include
housing, employment, and drug and mental health issues. It
appears, clearly and convincingly, that the causes of Father’s
ongoing parental incapacities will not be remedied.
TCO at 15.
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Having reviewed the record, we conclude that it supports the findings of
the trial court that Father has not provided Children with the essential parental
care, control and subsistence necessary for their mental and physical well-
being, and that Father is unable to remedy the causes of his parental
incapacity, neglect or refusal any time in the foreseeable future. Thus, we
agree with the trial court that Father is not entitled to any relief.
Next, we consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by
terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). We have
discussed the required analysis under Section 2511(b) previously in this
opinion. See In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d at 324. The trial court
provided the following discussion in response to Father’s contention that the
record does not support the criteria under Section 2511(b):
[] Children[] have resided with their present foster parents
since November 17, 2017, having begun respite care at the foster
home on the weekends for the month prior to their transition to
this foster family. The foster parents were and are comfortable
with fostering all three Children, and understand [] Children’s
respective behavioral issues. The foster parents have biological
twin boys the same age as the oldest child, N.M.Z.
Ms. Kane testified that the foster home has been a good fit
for [] Children. The “whole family is very supportive of them.”
She testified further:
[T]he Children are very hyperactive and need
constant redirection in their behaviors. [The foster
parents] have very calm demeanors. They don’t get
worked up…[a] lot of the behaviors are attention
seeking…so they’re not feeding into the behaviors to
make them worse. And they seem committed to help
these kids really stabilize their behaviors.
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They…are eager to welcome the Children into their
family…and want to have them long term.
(N.T. 1/30/2018, p. 84).
We heard testimony from Ms. Kane about the foster parents
being affectionate toward [] Children, and [] Children
reciprocating that affection. The foster parents’ biological children
receive speech services, just as N.M.Z and C.J.Z. do. The twins
and N.M.Z. are in the same classroom at school, and have
exhibited an appropriate bond with each other. The twins have
been a positive influence on N.M.Z. Finally, Ms. Kane testified that
the youngest Child, B.J.Z., was essentially non-verbal when he
came into care. The foster parents have been very supportive and
helpful in that regard. B.J.Z. has become very vocal and now
speaks in full sentences. We heard uncontroverted evidence of a
strong bond between the foster family and these three Children.
The foster parents have expressed an interest in adopting B.J.Z.,
C.J.Z. and N.M.Z.
When considering what situation would best serve a child’s
needs and welfare, the trial court must examine the status of the
natural parental bond and whether terminating the natural
parent’s rights would destroy something in existence that is
necessary and beneficial to the child.
When conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not
required to use expert testimony. Social workers and
caseworkers can offer evaluations as well...[.]
Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a
formal bonding evaluation...[.] “Above all
else...adequate consideration must be given to the
needs and welfare of the child.” ... A parent’s own
feelings of love and affection for a child, alone, do not
prevent termination of parental rights...[.]
Before granting a petition to terminate parental rights,
it is imperative that a trial court carefully consider the
intangible dimension of the needs and welfare of a
child—the love, comfort, security, and closeness—
entailed in a parent-child relationship, as well as the
tangible dimension. Continuity of relationships is also
important to a child, for whom severance of close
parental ties is usually extremely painful. The trial
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court, in considering what situation would best serve
the child’s needs and welfare, must examine the
status of the natural parental bond to consider
whether terminating the natural parents’ rights would
destroy something in existence that is necessary and
beneficial.
In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 [(Pa. Super. 2010)] (internal
citations omitted).
We found termination was warranted here, a result
advanced not only by the Agency, but by the court-appointed
best[-]interests counsel for [] Children and by separate court-
appointed legal[-]interests counsel for [] Children. The record
contains clear and convincing evidence that Father has not made
reasonable or consistent strides toward adequately being able to
parent the Children. The evidence suggests that Father, while
hopefully continuing his sobriety achieved at Guadenzia, has
never valued obtaining an AA sponsor, has been unwilling to
pursue mental health treatment, and has perpetuated his long
history of failing to establish adequate employment or housing.
Indeed, the evidence presented, including by Father, lacked any
indication of reasonably reliable future plans by Father to provide
adequate housing and support for himself and [] Children.
Importantly for the [c]ourt’s best interests analysis, the
record is devoid of evidence of a necessary and beneficial
relationship between Father and [] Children, the existence of
which, should Father’s rights be terminated, would result in a
negative effect on [] Children. In sum, the record contains clear
and convincing evidence that Father has been, and continues to
be, incapable of adequately parenting B.J.Z., C.J.Z., and N.M.Z.
“[T]he court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a
child’s need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of
progress and hope for the future.” Id. See M.E.P., 825 A.2d at
1276 (“A child’s life simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that
the parent will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of
parenting.”) (citations omitted). Here, Father has repeatedly
failed to remedy his parental incapacities and when these
considerations are balanced against [] Children’s needs for
permanence and stability, this [c]ourt concluded that it was in the
best interests of B.J.Z., C.J.Z. and N.M.Z. to grant the Agency’s
Petition to Terminate Father’s Parental Rights.
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J-S84001-18
TCO at 18-20 (some citation to the record omitted). Again, we have reviewed
the record and conclude that the court’s findings and conclusions are
supported by the evidence of record before the trial court. It is evident that
Father is primarily seeking to have this Court reweigh the evidence in a light
more favorable to him. However, it is beyond our purview to disturb the
credibility determinations of the trial court when the testimony relied upon is
supported in the record. The trial court was free to conclude that Father was
unlikely to remedy his problems in the near future; thus, the permanency
needs of Children dictate the results here. Father is not entitled to relief.
Decrees affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/4/19
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