Com. v. Pittman, G. ( 2017 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
GABRIEL ISHAM PITTMAN
Appellant No. 3393 EDA 2015
Appeal from the PCRA Order October 28, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0000304-1998
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., OTT, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED JANUARY 06, 2017
Gabriel Isham Pittman appeals, pro se, from the order entered October
28, 2015, in the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas dismissing, as
untimely filed, his serial petition for collateral relief filed pursuant to the Post
Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 Pittman seeks relief from the judgment of
sentence of an aggregate term of 26 to 59 years’ imprisonment, imposed
August 19, 1998, following his guilty plea to charges of third-degree murder,
recklessly endangering another person, and carrying a firearm without a
license, and his plea of nolo contendere to one count of aggravated assault.2
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
2
See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(c), 2705, 6106, and 2702(a)(6), respectively.
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On appeal, Pittman contends the jurisdictional timing provisions of the PCRA
are unconstitutional. For the reasons below, we affirm.
The facts underlying Pittman’s guilty plea are well-known to the
parties, and we need not recite them herein. In July of 1999, a panel of this
Court affirmed Pittman’s sentence on direct appeal, and the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court subsequently denied his request for allowance of appeal.
See Commonwealth v. Pittman, 737 A.2d 272 (Pa. Super. 1999), appeal
denied, 747 A.2d 899 (Pa. 1999). Since that time, Pittman has filed
numerous appeals seeking review of the trial court’s repeated denials of both
PCRA and habeas corpus relief. None of them has provided him relief. See
Commonwealth v. Pittman, 797 A.2d 1024 (Pa. Super. 2002)
(unpublished memorandum) (affirming denial of PCRA relief based upon
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel); Commonwealth v. Pittman,
907 A.2d 1136 (Pa. Super. 2006) (unpublished memorandum) (affirming
denial of untimely collateral petition; PCRA court properly construed habeas
corpus petition to be PCRA petition); Commonwealth v. Pittman, 927
A.2d 656 (Pa. Super. 2007) (unpublished memorandum) (affirming denial of
third PCRA petition as untimely filed); Commonwelath v. Pittman, 82 A.3d
1085 (Pa. Super. 2013) (unpublished memorandum) (affirming denial of
fourth PCRA petition as untimely filed), appeal denied, 85 A.3d 483 (Pa.
2014); Pittman v. Pa. DOC, 118 A.3d 442 (Pa. Super. 2015) (unpublished
judgment order) (affirming dismissal of habeas corpus petition while petition
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seeking allocatur review of prior appeal was pending in the Supreme Court;
trial court properly construed filing as serial PCRA petition).
On September 21, 2015, Pittman filed the instant pro se PCRA
petition, his sixth. On September 30, 2015, the PCRA court issued notice of
its intent to dismiss the petition as untimely filed without first conducting an
evidentiary hearing. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Pittman filed a response to the
court’s notice, claiming the timing provisions of the PCRA are
unconstitutional. On October 28, 2015, the court dismissed Pittman’s
petition as untimely filed. This appeal followed.3
Pittman frames his sole issue on appeal as follows:
Does 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1) in itself violate the Suspension
Clause, and as interpreted as a jurisdictional bar, and as
enforced as the same, violate the due process and equal
protection clauses of the U.S. Constitution?
Pittman’s Brief at 2.
When considering an appeal from an order denying PCRA relief,
[o]ur standard of review … is whether the record supports the
PCRA court’s determination and whether the PCRA court’s
decision is free of legal error. The PCRA court’s findings will not
be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the
certified record.
Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 2014) (internal
citations omitted).
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3
Contemporaneous with his notice of appeal, Pittman filed a concise
statement of error complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
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Here, the PCRA court determined Pittman’s petition was untimely filed,
and Pittman failed to plead and prove any of the time-for-filing exceptions.
See Order, 10/28/2015, at 3-4. We agree. The PCRA mandates that “[a]ny
petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition,
shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final[.]” 42
Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Here, Pittman’s judgment of sentence became final
on March 19, 2000, 90 days after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied
allocatur review in his direct appeal and he failed to petition for a writ of
certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. See Pittman, supra, 907
A.2d 1136 (unpublished memorandum at 4-5). Therefore, the present
petition, filed more than 15 years later, is patently untimely.
Nevertheless, the PCRA provides three exceptions to the one-year
timing provision. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). If a petitioner
pleads and proves the applicability of one of the exceptions, his otherwise
untimely petition is not time-barred. See id. While Pittman invoked the
governmental interference exception4 in his pro se petition, he does not
repeat that argument in his brief. Rather, on appeal, Pittman contends the
one-year time limitation of the PCRA is unconstitutional. See Pittman’s Brief
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4
See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(i) (providing exception to one-year filing
requirement if the petitioner pleads and proves “the failure to raise the claim
previously was the result of interference by government officials with the
presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States”).
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at 5. Specifically, he claims the time-bar provision violates the Suspension
Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution.5
First, Pittman argues the time restriction violates the Suspension
Clause found in Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the Constitution: “The
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when
in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” U.S.
Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. Pittman asserts that because the PCRA provides an
“equivalent” state right to habeas corpus review, the state is not permitted
to impair that right by imposing jurisdictional time limits. Pittman’s Brief at
7. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected a similar claim in
Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638 (Pa. 1998).
In Peterkin, the petitioner argued the time limitations “upon [his]
access to the PCRA [were] invalid because they [were] unconstitutional.”
Id. at 642. However, the Peterkin Court emphasized: “It is axiomatic that
no constitutional rights are absolute. All rights are subject to reasonable
restrictions.” Id. The Court held the PCRA’s one-year timing requirement
was a reasonable restriction on a defendant’s right to collateral relief:
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5
We note that Pittman’s argument in his pro se brief is confusing, and at
times, incomprehensible. It is well-established that “although this Court is
willing to construe liberally materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status
generally confers no special benefit upon an appellant.” Commonwealth v.
Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 251–252 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal denied, 879 A.2d
782 (Pa. 2005).
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With the 1995 amendments to the PCRA, the General Assembly
has established a scheme in which PCRA petitions are to be
accorded finality. With certain exceptions, challenges to a
conviction must be raised either within one year of final
judgment or within one year of the effective date of the act.
Because the one-year period within which petitions normally
must be filed is sufficiently generous to prepare even the most
difficult case, and because the exceptions to this filing period
encompass government misconduct, after-discovered evidence,
and constitutional changes, we have no difficulty in concluding
that the PCRA’s time limitation upon the filing of PCRA petitions
does not unreasonably or unconstitutionally limit Peterkin’s
constitutional right to habeas corpus relief. At some point
litigation must come to an end. The purpose of law is not to
provide convicted criminals with the means to escape well-
deserved sanctions, but to provide a reasonable opportunity for
those who have been wrongly convicted to demonstrate the
injustice of their conviction. The current PCRA places time
limitations on such claims of error, and in so doing, strikes a
reasonable balance between society’s need for finality in criminal
cases and the convicted person’s need to demonstrate that there
has been an error in the proceedings that resulted in his
conviction.
Id. at 642–643. Accordingly, Pittman’s claim that the PCRA’s time
restrictions violate the Suspension Clause is meritless. His right to habeas
corpus relief has not been “suspended” by the implementation of the time
limitations.
Pittman also contends Section 9545 violates his due process and equal
protection rights. He states:
[T]he one-year time limit, implemented without state
constitutional authority and in violation of Article 5, Section
10(c) which grants the state supreme court with exclusive rule
making authority over procedural court matters … violates the
substantive right to unimpaired and unsuspended access to
habeas corpus process pursuant to Article I, Section 9, Clause 2
of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the state
constitution, as well as procedural due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment and state constitution.
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Pittman’s Brief at 8-9 (internal citations omitted).
Again, we find he is entitled to no relief. Pittman insists the
Legislature had no authority to enact the timing provisions of the PCRA
because Article 5, Section 10(c) of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court “with exclusive rule making authority over
procedural court matters[.]”6 Id. at 8. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has rejected this assertion, albeit in dicta, in In re Suspension of
Capital Unitary Review Act, 722 A.2d 676 (Pa. 1999). In that case, the
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6
Article V, Section 10 provides, in relevant part:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general
rules governing practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts,
justices of the peace and all officers serving process or enforcing
orders, judgments or decrees of any court or justice of the
peace, including the power to provide for assignment and
reassignment of classes of actions or classes of appeals among
the several courts as the needs of justice shall require, and for
admission to the bar and to practice law, and the administration
of all courts and supervision of all officers of the Judicial Branch,
if such rules are consistent with this Constitution and neither
abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive rights of any
litigant, nor affect the right of the General Assembly to
determine the jurisdiction of any court or justice of the peace,
nor suspend nor alter any statute of limitation or repose. All
laws shall be suspended to the extent that they are inconsistent
with rules prescribed under these provisions. Notwithstanding
the provisions of this section, the General Assembly may by
statute provide for the manner of testimony of child victims or
child material witnesses in criminal proceedings, including the
use of videotaped depositions or testimony by closed-circuit
television.
PA Const. Art. V, § 10(c).
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Court denied reconsideration of its decision to suspend the Capital Unitary
Review Act (“CURA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9570-9579. Id. at 676. The Court
concluded that CURA, which “purported to prescribe, with specificity, a
detailed procedure by which courts were to administer capital cases,” was
inconsistent with both the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure and the
Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure promulgated by the Court. Id. at
677, 678. The Court also found the problem of undue delay in death penalty
cases, which CURA attempted to correct, was “effectively eliminate[d]” by
both Section 9545(b) and 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(j).7 In a footnote, however,
the Court concisely stated: “Neither section 9545(b) nor section 9711(j)
poses a problem under Article V, Section 10, since neither enactment
conflicts with a pre-existing procedural rule of this Court.” Id. at 679 n.1.
Accordingly, Pittman’s claim fails.
Furthermore, to the extent Pittman asserts Section 9545 interferes
with his right to procedural due process, the Supreme Court rejected that
argument in Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214 (Pa. 1999):
With passage of the amendments to the PCRA, Appellant and his
counsel were made aware of the PCRA’s jurisdictional time
restrictions. Thus, Appellant had adequate notice of the
requirements of the PCRA. In his petition and on appeal to this
court, Appellant had the opportunity to bring his petition within
the parameters of the jurisdictional requirements of the PCRA,
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7
42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(j) outlined the procedures for the issuance of a death
warrant by the Governor. It has since been repealed, and those procedures
are now codified at 61 Pa.C.S. § 4302.
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yet was unable to advance his claims accordingly. Thus,
Appellant’s procedural due process rights were not violated.
Id. at 220. Moreover, with respect to Pittman’s claim that the jurisdictional
timing restrictions of the PCRA violate his right to equal protection under the
law, we find his argument convoluted and his citations to civil decisions of
the United States Supreme Court irrelevant. See Pittman’s Brief at 10-15.
As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained in Commonwealth v.
Albert, 758 A.2d 1149 (Pa. 2000):
The essence of the constitutional principle of equal protection
under the law is that like persons in like circumstances will be
treated similarly. However, it does not require that all persons
under all circumstances enjoy identical protection under the law.
Id. at 1151 (citations omitted). Pittman fails to explain how he is treated
differently than “like persons in like circumstances” as a result of the timing
restrictions. Id. Accordingly, his arguments are unavailing.
Because we find Pittman’s serial PCRA petition is untimely filed, and he
has failed to prove that the timing provisions of the PCRA are
unconstitutional, we affirm the order on appeal.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/6/2017
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