Morrison, G v. Mahoney. R. ( 2017 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
GREGG MORRISON IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
ROBERT MAHONEY AND MELISSA
MAHONEY
APPEAL OF: ROBERT MAHONEY No. 973 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order March 2, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
Civil Division at No(s): 2013-07606
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., RANSOM, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY RANSOM, J.: FILED JANUARY 09, 2017
Robert Mahoney (“Appellant”) appeals from the trial court’s order of
March 2, 2016, imposing $2,000 in counsel fee sanctions following his failure
to comply with the court’s order of May 26, 2015. After careful review, we
affirm.
The matter underlying the instant appeal is the result of a property
dispute. In 2003, Gregg Morrison (“Mr. Morrison”), Melissa Mahoney (“Ms.
Mahoney”), and Appellant1 became the owners of real property and
improvements thereon located at 203 Schoolhouse Road, Hilltown Township,
Bucks County, Pennsylvania (the “Property”). In October of 2009, Mr.
Morrison and Ms. Mahoney decided to sell the Property; however, all parties
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1
Appellant is Ms. Mahoney’s father.
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could not reach an agreement on the sale price. In September of 2013, Mr.
Morrison brought a complaint in partition, as the Property remained unsold.
Appellant did not contest the sale of the Property and agreed the court
should issue a decree.
In July of 2014, the court issued an order directing the Property to be
partitioned. In August of 2014, following a conference, the trial court issued
another order outlining the parameters for sale in the six months subsequent
to the order. The Property did not sell. Thus, another hearing was held on
May 11, 2015. At this hearing the parties specifically discussed whether the
Property should be auctioned. The court also learned that the condition of
the Property had declined as a result of a lack of regular maintenance and
Ms. Mahoney’s son living at the property. Mr. Morrison’s counsel opined that
should the Property go to auction, a reserve price2 of $300,000 would cover
Morrison’s outstanding mortgage on the Property and associated second line
of credit. Counsel then explained that Mr. Morrison was the only party
presently financially responsible for the house.3 Id. at 16-17, 20. Appellant
and his counsel were present at the hearing. N.T. 3/2/16, at 17.
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2
The lowest price for which the Property could be auctioned. Notes of
Testimony (N.T.), 5/11/15, at 16-17.
3
Counsel further explained that Mr. Morrison paid approximately $2,700 per
month towards the Property for the past two years without living there, and
Mr. Morrison would continue to be obligated to do so until the resolution of
the property dispute. Id. at 20-21. Since August 2014, Appellant had paid
$450 towards maintenance on the Property, and had not contributed
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Based upon proposed orders submitted by the parties, the court issued
an order on May 26, 2015, which provided the following in relevant part:
3. The parties have seven (7) days from the date of this
Order to remove any and all personal belongings,
household goods and furnishing that remain at the
premises. . . Any personal property remaining at the
premises after this time period shall be deemed
abandoned.
***
5. The parties will execute a listing contract with the Broker,
Weidel Real Estate, from the period of June 1, 2015
through September 30, 2015. The parties shall cooperate
in all reasonable respects with Weidel and its agents and
other real estate agents, in attempting to sell the
property.
6. Said premises shall be listed for sale with a listing price of
Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000).
7. In the event that the premises are not sold by September
30, 2015, the premises shall be immediately listed for
auction with Alderfer with a reserve price of Three
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($300,000). All parties shall
sign, without delay, any contract required to list the
property with Alderfer.
8. The parties may petition this [c]ourt for a hearing for a
determination of whether an offer should be accepted and
on what terms.
Trial Court Order, 5/26/15 (“May 26th Order”).4
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(Footnote Continued)
otherwise financially towards the mortgage, utilities or real estate taxes of
the Property since that time. N.T., 3/2/16, at 28-29.
4
In its opinion, the trial court cites the date of this order as May 24, 2015,
however the date of May 26, 2015 is handwritten in the body of the order.
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The Property did not sell by the September 30, 2015 deadline. Mr.
Morrison’s counsel forwarded the auction contract to Appellant for signature
in accordance with the order. Appellant declined sign the auction contract.
In November of 2015, Appellant filed a motion to reconsider the terms of the
May 26th Order, and a hearing was scheduled for January 20, 2016. Neither
Appellant nor his counsel appeared at this hearing, and the reconsideration
motion was denied and dismissed.
On January 26, 2015, Mr. Morrison filed a motion to enforce the May
26th Order and a motion for sanctions. According to Mr. Morrison, Appellant
knowingly and intentionally violated the court’s order “for the specific
purpose of delaying the sale of the property so as to financially punish [Mr.
Morrison].” See Plaintiff’s Motion for Enforcement of Judge’s Order and
Sanctions Against Defendant Robert E. Mahoney and Counsel. Mr. Morrison
requested $2,000 in attorney’s fees in relief.5 Id. A hearing on the motion
for sanctions was set for March 2, 2016. On February 23, 2016, Appellant
filed a second motion for reconsideration of the May 26th Order.
At the outset of the hearing, the court clarified that its purpose was to
examine whether Appellant’s non-compliance was contemptuous.6 N.T.,
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5
Mr. Morrison did not cite statutory authority in support of his motion for
sanctions.
6
Despite the patently untimely filing of Appellant’s motion for
reconsideration of the May 26th Order, the trial court, in its discretion
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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3/2/16, at 2-3, 7. In response, Appellant testified that he had no
recollection of agreeing to a $300,000 reserve price. Id. at 18, 23.
According to Appellant, he first realized this requirement in October of 2015,
when the Weidel listing period ended. Id. at 20-23. Following his testimony
and cross-examination, his counsel argued that Appellant’s non-compliance
was neither willful nor disrespectful of the court and that “nothing
contemptuous” was intended. Id. at 29-32, 46.
The court also permitted Appellant to introduce the testimony of
Anthony Gentile (“Mr. Gentile”), who owns land adjacent to the Property.
Id. at 33-34. Mr. Gentile testified that he offered to buy the Property for
$350,000 in late November of 2015. Id. Appellant relied upon this
testimony to support his assertion of intervening circumstances that justified
a modification of the reserve price. Id. at 17, 36.
Following the hearing, the court granted the motion for sanctions,
found Appellant in contempt, and directed him to pay $2,000 in Mr.
Morrison’s counsel fees. Id. at 46. The court further directed Appellant to
execute the auction contract with Alderfer, amended to the extent that the
reserve price would be established at $350,000. Id.
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
decided to resolve the motion at the time of the contempt hearing. See
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. J.J. White, 448 A.2d 634 (Pa. Super. 1982)
(recognizing, “a court has inherent power to reconsider its own rulings.”).
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Appellant timely appealed and filed a statement of issues raised on
appeal. The trial court filed a responsive opinion.
Appellant presents the following questions for our review:
1. Whether the court below failed to follow required legal
procedures or misapplied the law when it rendered its
credibility finding, beyond “any doubt” that Mr. Mahoney
purposefully was attempting to delay the partition sale, where
the only proceedings before doing so were conferences in
which the court heard the contested, unsworn an unrecorded
characterizations of the facts by counsel, the verity of which
necessarily depended upon the unsworn hearsay contentions
of their clients, sans cross-examination and before any
hearing had been conducted?
2. Whether there is anything contumacious in moving a court to
modify a previous order:
a. where the court has jurisdiction to entertain the motion;
b. where the motion was not only justiciable but
meritorious;
c. where material changes in circumstances had occurred
since entry of the original order;
d. where failing to file the motion would have required the
parties to enter a contract with a third-party creating
new legal obligations not then modifiable by the court;
e. where the filing of the motion was the only recourse to
avoid the above prejudice;
f. where the order itself permitted the parties to petition
to determine such issues.
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
Appellant contends that the trial court prejudged Appellant’s credibility
and did not follow legal procedures in making the contempt determination.
Appellant’s Brief, 7/26/16, at 9, 13, 15-19. Moreover, the Appellant
contends the granting of his motion for reconsideration undermined the
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court’s conclusion to find Appellant in civil contempt. Appellant’s Brief at 23-
25. We find Appellant’s arguments unpersuasive.7
As this Court has observed regarding civil contempt, “it is axiomatic
that courts have always possessed the inherent power to enforce their
orders and decrees by imposing sanctions for failure to comply with said
orders.” Geisenhemer–Shaulis, 827 A.2d. 1207.
To be punished for contempt, a party must not only have violated
a clear order, but that order must have been definite, clear,
and specific—leaving no doubt or uncertainty in the mind of the
contemnor of the prohibited conduct. Because the order forming
the basis for civil contempt must be strictly construed, any
ambiguities or omissions in the order must be construed in favor
of the defendant. In such cases, a contradictory order or an
order whose specific terms have not been violated will not serve
as the basis for a finding of contempt. To sustain a finding of civil
contempt, the complainant must prove certain distinct elements:
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7
The court’s order imposing sanctions does not specifically find Appellant in
civil contempt. Similarly, the court’s opinion does not discuss the authority
for imposing counsel fee sanctions. Adding to the confusion, Mr. Morrison
argues in his Brief that the court imposed sanctions pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2503(7). Appellee’s Brief at 10. An award of counsel fees may be a
sanction following a finding of contempt, or may be awarded to a party
pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 2503(7) “as a sanction against another
participant for dilatory, obdurate or vexatious conduct during the pendency
of a matter.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 2503(7). An award of counsel fees under 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 2503 is distinct from a finding of civil contempt that might
include sanctions in the form of counsel fees. Wood v. Geisenhemer–
Shaulis, 827 A.2d 1204, 1207 (Pa. Super. 2003). Upon review of the
record and notes of testimony, we conclude that the trial court indeed found
Appellant in civil contempt and awarded counsel fees in conjunction thereto.
Civil contempt orders imposing sanctions generally constitute final,
appealable orders. Rhoades v. Pryce, 874 A.2d 148, 151 (Pa. Super.
2005) (en banc ), appeal denied, 851 A.2d 142 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Foulk v.
Foulk, 789 A.2d 254, 258 (Pa. Super. 2001) (en banc)).
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(1) that the contemnor had notice of the specific order or decree
which he is alleged to have disobeyed; (2) that the act
constituting the contemnor's violation was volitional; and (3) that
the contemnor acted with wrongful intent. A person may not be
held in contempt of court for failing to obey an order that is too
vague or that cannot be enforced.
Sutch v. Roxborough Mem'l Hosp., 142 A.3d 38, 67–68 (Pa. Super.
2016) (emphasis in original) (citing Stahl v. Redcay, 897 A.2d 488–89 (Pa.
Super. 2006).
Generally, “[i]n order to hold one in civil contempt, a five-step
process must be followed: (1) a rule to show cause why an
attachment should not issue, (2) an answer and hearing, (3) a
rule absolute, (4) a hearing on the contempt citation, and (5) an
adjudication.” Fulfillment of all five factors is not mandated,
however. “[W]hen the contempt proceedings are predicated on
a violation of a court order that followed a full hearing, due
process requires no more than notice of the violations alleged
and an opportunity for explanation and defense.” The court,
after finding civil contempt, may impose sanctions.
Geisenhemer-Shaulis, 827 A.2d 1208 (internal citations omitted).
Our standard of review is as follows:
[E]ach court is the exclusive judge of contempts against its
process, and on appeal its actions will be reversed only when a
plain abuse of discretion occurs. In civil contempt cases, the
complaining party has the burden of proving non-compliance
with the court order by a preponderance of the evidence.
Redcay, 897 A.2d 489 (internal citations omitted).
In the instant case, the record established that the court comported
with the due process requirements of Geisenhemer-Shaulis in conducting
Appellant’s contempt hearing. Testimony presented at the hearing
established that Appellant had notice of the May 26 th Order when he
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intentionally failed to sign the contract for auction and that Appellant failed
to sign the contract with wrongful intent.
We note that the May 26th Order was definite, clear, and specific.
Appellant demonstrated knowledge of other provisions of the Order. For
example, on cross-examination, Appellant conceded he went to the Property
for the purpose of removing his belongings pursuant to the Order. N.T.,
3/2/16, at 29-32. Appellant’s actions in attempting to remove his
belongings from the Property undermined his testimony that he had no
knowledge of the reserve price contained in the May 26th Order until October
2015. Id. at 20-23.
Appellant’s testimony that upon receipt of the auction contract, he
declined to sign the document and instead contacted his attorney, coupled
with Mr. Morrison’s role as the only party financially responsible for the
Property, led the court to find that Appellant willfully failed to comply with
the court’s order of May 26th and had wrongful intent in doing so. Id.; see
Sutch, 142 A.3d 67-68. We are mindful that this Court defers to the
credibility determinations of the trial court with regard to the witnesses who
appear before it, as that court has had the opportunity to observe their
demeanor. Fonner v. Fonner, 731 A.2d 160, 161 (Pa. Super. 1999) (citing
Alfred v. Braxton, 659 A.2d 1040, 1043 (Pa. Super. 1995)).
The May 26th Order was filed following a full hearing where counsel of
all parties, as well as Mr. Morrison and Appellant were present and discussed
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potential terms of the May 26th Order. After Appellant’s violation of the May
26th Order, Appellant received notice of the violations alleged when Morrison
filed a motion for sanctions and a hearing was set to discuss same. On
March 2, 2016, Appellant was then afforded an opportunity for explanation
and defense of the violation at the sanctions hearing wherein he and Mr.
Gentile testified. The court expressly found that Appellant failed to comply
with the terms of the Order previously entered directing him to execute
paperwork presented in this matter and thereafter properly imposed $2,000
in compensatory attorney fee sanctions.8
The fact that the court granted Appellant’s second motion for
reconsideration is of no moment. The motion for reconsideration was filed
almost six months after the court’s May 26th Order. Appellant testified that
the amount of the reserve price prevented him from complying with the
Order and signing the auction contract in October. However, the $300,000
reserve price was not only discussed in Appellant’s presence before it was
memorialized in court order, but upon receipt and reading the May 26th
Order, Appellant had ample opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration
in a timely fashion.9 Nevertheless, the court recognized valid grounds to
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8
Appellant does not challenge the amount of sanctions imposed, as such we
do not reach the reasonableness of the amount awarded herein.
9
The May 26th Order provided the parties with the option to petition the
court for a hearing to determine “whether an offer should be accepted and
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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modify the reserve price based on the testimony of Mr. Gentile, who, one
month after Appellant had already violated the court’s Order, offered to buy
the property for $50,000 above the reserve price. N.T., 3/2/16, at 34.
Appellant’s knowledge of other provisions of the May 26 th Order,
coupled with Appellant’s receipt of the auction contract, refusal to sign it,
and the fact that Mr. Morrison was the sole party making financial
contributions on the Property, led the court to find that Appellant’s failure to
comply with the court’s Order was volitional and accomplished with wrongful
intent. See Sutch, 142 A.3d 67-68. As such, the court awarded Mr.
Morrison counsel fees as compensation for the damages he sustained by
reason of Appellant’s contumacious behavior. Therefore, we discern no
abuse of discretion, and no relief is due.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/9/2017
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(Footnote Continued)
on what terms.” May 26th Order. Appellant’s motion for reconsideration is
not analogous to this provision as he misstates in his Brief. Appellant’s Brief
at 4.
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