In Re: Invol. Term. of Par. Rights to E.A.F., Jr. ( 2015 )

J-S77030/14
IN RE: INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO E.A.F., Jr. : PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF E.A.F., Sr., FATHER :
: No. 1990 EDA 2014
:
Appeal from the Decree entered June 13, 2014,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County,
Orphans’ Court Division, at No. A2013-54
BEFORE: STABILE, JENKINS, AND STRASSBURGER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED JANUARY 15, 2015
E.A.F., Sr. (Father), appeals from the decree of the Court of Common
Pleas of Lehigh County, entered on June 13, 2014, that terminated his
parental rights to his son, E.A.F., Jr., born in July of 2011, pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8), and 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). We
affirm.
The record supports this recitation of the facts of this case. Lehigh
County Office of Children and Youth Services (LCOCYS) first became aware
of this family on September 12, 2011, when it received a referral alleging
domestic violence between Mother and Father. LCOCYS received a second
referral on September 29, 2011, when Child was approximately two months
old, that Child had been hospitalized with dehydration and constipation. He
was diagnosed with “Hirschprung's Disease” and underwent surgery to
correct the condition. Another incident of domestic violence occurred on

Retired Senior Judge assigned to Superior Court.
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November 9, 2011, when Father struck Mother in the face while she was
holding Child. Father was charged with simple assault.
Child was hospitalized again on December 5, 2011, with bacterial
infections that required strict adherence to a particular treatment regimen.
Mother voluntarily placed Child in the custody of LCOCYS when she was
unable to care for Child’s medical needs. The trial court adjudicated Child
dependent on February 9, 2012, and placed him in the legal and physical
custody of LCOCYS. Neither parent was present for the Adjudication.
The adjudication order required the parents to submit to drug testing
once a week for three months; schedule and undergo a drug and alcohol
evaluation and follow through with all the recommendations of that
evaluation; attend all of Child’s medical appointments; attend all meetings at
SafeStart regarding Child; attend visits with the Child two times per week
for two hours each; engage in parenting classes; continue to attend Lehigh
Valley Community Mental Health for mental health treatment and sign a
release of information to provide their treatment records to LCOCYS; obtain
legal employment and stable housing; and follow through with
recommendations made by the LCOCYS.
The trial court held the first permanency review hearing in this matter
on May 3, 2012. Father attended but Mother, who was aware of the
hearing, did not. The trial court found that there had been minimal
compliance with its order by Father, no compliance by Mother, and that
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neither parent had made any progress toward alleviating the circumstances
that necessitated Child’s placement. Of twenty-four visits scheduled with
Child, Father attended two and Mother attended one. Neither parent had
submitted to drug testing.
The trial court held a second permanency review on August 9, 2012.
Neither parent attended that hearing. The trial court found that neither
parent had made any progress toward alleviating the circumstances that led
to Child’s placement, nor had either parent complied with the permanency
plan or visited with Child. The whereabouts of the parents were unknown
and neither had any contact with LCOCYS. The trial court ordered services
for the parents to remain as previously ordered.
In August 2012, LCOCYS assigned caseworker Heather Hudson to
Child’s case. At trial, Ms. Hudson testified about her attempts to engage the
parents in services and the parents’ failure to participate successfully in any
court-ordered services. N.T. 11/28/13, at 7-9.
LCOCYS filed a motion for aggravated circumstances on January 30,
2013, alleging the parents’ failure to maintain substantial and continuing
contact with Child for a period of more than six months. The trial court
heard the motion for aggravated circumstances at a permanency review
hearing held on February 14, 2013, and found that aggravated
circumstances existed. Father appeared at this hearing, but Mother did not.
The trial court again found neither compliance with, nor progress by, either
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parent in the court-ordered reunification services or in rectifying the
circumstances that led to Child’s placement.
On April 11, 2013, the trial court held a hearing on LCOCYS’ request to
modify Child’s placement by placing him in kinship care with his Paternal
Grandmother, T.P. The trial court denied the request on the ground of the
bond that Child had developed with his foster parents and foster sibling after
sixteen months of placement in their home.
At a permanency review hearing on September 23, 2013, the trial
court found that neither parent had complied with the permanency plan, and
that neither had made any progress toward reunification. By this time, Child
had been in the custody of LCOCYS and had been placed with the same
foster family for twenty-one months.
LCOCYS filed its petitions for the involuntary termination of the
parental rights of Mother and Father on May 7, 2013. The trial court held a
hearing on those petitions on October 28, 2013. Testifying at that hearing
were caseworker, Heather Hudson; casework supervisor, Rhoda Stoudt;
SafeStart childhood development manager, Dana Henry; Child’s court-
appointed special advocate, Beverly Walton; Mother; and Father. On June
13, 2014, the trial court entered its Decree terminating the parental rights of
Mother and Father pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8),
and 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). Father filed a timely notice of appeal on July 8,
2014, and a notice of appeal amended to include his statement of errors
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complained of on appeal on July 9, 2014. Mother did not file an appeal and
she is not a party to this appeal.
Father raises the following questions on appeal:
1. Did the lower court err when it found that [LCOCYS] had
proven by clear and convincing evidence that the paternal rights
of [Father] should be terminated?
2. Did the lower court err when it found that termination of the
parental rights of [Father] served the best interests of [Child],
when the circumstances that necessitated the original placement
of [Child] into the custody of [LCOCYS] no longer existed and
[Father] had an appropriate family member willing and able to
take custody of [Child]?
Father’s Brief, at 5.
Our standard of review is as follows:
In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, our
scope of review is comprehensive: we consider all the evidence
presented as well as the trial court’s factual findings and legal
conclusions. However, our standard of review is narrow: we will
reverse the trial court’s order only if we conclude that the trial
court abused its discretion, made an error of law, or lacked
competent evidence to support its findings. The trial judge’s
decision is entitled to the same deference as a jury verdict.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
Further, we have stated:
Where the hearing court’s findings are supported by
competent evidence of record, we must affirm the hearing court
even though the record could support an opposite result.
We are bound by the findings of the trial court which have
adequate support in the record so long as the findings do not
evidence capricious disregard for competent and credible
evidence. The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of
the evidence presented, and is likewise free to make all
credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.
Though we are not bound by the trial court’s inferences and
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deductions, we may reject its conclusions only if they involve
errors of law or are clearly unreasonable in light of the trial
court’s sustainable findings.
In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).
Requests to have a natural parent’s parental rights terminated are
governed by 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511, which provides, in pertinent part:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
...
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least
six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition
either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing
parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform
parental duties.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for
his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
will not be remedied by the parent.
...
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency
for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led
to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist,
the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within
a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance
reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy
the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the
child within a reasonable period of time and termination of
the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare
of the child.
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...
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an
agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of
removal or placement, the conditions which led to the
removal or placement of the child continue to exist and
termination of parental rights would best serve the needs
and welfare of the child.
...
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.
In order to affirm the termination of parental rights, this Court need
only agree with any one subsection of Section 2511(a), in addition to
subsection (b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en
banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004).
It is well settled that a party seeking termination of a parent’s rights
bears the burden of proving the grounds to do so by “clear and convincing
evidence,” a standard which requires evidence that is “so clear, direct,
weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
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conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In
re T.F., 847 A.2d 738, 742 (Pa. Super. 2004). Further,
A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the
parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness in
resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parent-
child relationship. Parental rights are not preserved by waiting
for a more suitable or convenient time to perform one’s parental
responsibilities while others provide the child with his or her
physical and emotional needs.
In the Interest of K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal
citations omitted).
To terminate parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(1), the
person or agency seeking termination must demonstrate through clear and
convincing evidence that, for a period of at least six months prior to the
filing of the petition, the parent’s conduct demonstrated a settled purpose to
relinquish parental rights or that the parent has refused or failed to perform
parental duties. In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.
Super. 2003).
With respect to subsection 2511(a)(1), our Supreme Court has held:
Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental
duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the
court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent’s
explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment
contact between parent and child; and (3) consideration of the
effect of termination of parental rights on the child pursuant to
Section 2511(b).
In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 550 Pa.595, 602, 708 A.2d 88, 92
(1988). Further,
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the trial court must consider the whole history of a given case
and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory provision.
The court must examine the individual circumstances of each
case and consider all explanations offered by the parent facing
termination of his or her parental rights, to determine if the
evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances, clearly
warrants the involuntary termination.
In re N.M.B., 856 A.2d 847, 854-855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).
The Adoption Act provides that a trial court “shall give primary
consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and
welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). The Act does not make
specific reference to an evaluation of the bond between parent and child but
our case law requires the evaluation of any such bond. See In re E.M., 533
Pa. 115, 620 A.2d 481 (1993). However, this Court has held that the trial
court is not required by statute or precedent to order a formal bonding
evaluation performed by an expert. In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533
(Pa. Super. 2008).
Before we address the merits of Father’s appeal, we must address
certain shortcomings in his brief. In the argument section of his brief,
Father argues the claims that he makes in his questions presented, i.e., that
LCOCYS failed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate that his
parental rights should have been terminated, that the termination of his
rights was not in Child’s best interests, and that a family member is
available to care for Child. Father also argues, however, that LCOCYS came
to the litigation with unclean hands, and that the trial court terminated his
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rights pursuant to the wrong subsections of the statute. We will not
consider the question of kinship care for Child or the question of LCOCYS’
unclean hands on the ground that Father has waived these issues by failing
to raise them in his statement of errors complained of on appeal. See
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii); Yates v. Yates, 963 A.2d 535, 542 (Pa. Super.
2008). We must also reject Father’s “unclean hands” claim on the ground
that he failed to support it with any reference to our law, and has thusly
failed to develop an adequate argument. “The failure to develop an
adequate argument in an appellate brief may result in waiver of the claim
under Pa.R.A.P. 2119.” Commonwealth v. Beshore, 916 A.2d 1128, 1140
(Pa. Super. 2007) (internal citation omitted). “[A]rguments which are not
appropriately developed are waived. Arguments not appropriately
developed include those where the party has failed to cite any authority in
support of a contention.” Lackner v. Glosser, 892 A.2d 21, 29-30 (Pa.
Super. 2006) (internal citations omitted). See Chapman-Rolle v. Rolle,
893 A.2d 770, 774 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating, “[i]t is well settled that a
failure to argue and to cite any authority supporting an argument constitutes
a waiver of issues on appeal”) (quoting Jones v. Jones, 878 A.2d 86, 90
(Pa. Super. 2005)).
Finally, we decline to consider Father’s complaint that the trial court
erred when it terminated his parental rights pursuant to subsections 23
Pa.C.S.A. 2511(a) (2), (5) and (a)(8). He asserts subsections 2511(a)(5)
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and (8) do not apply to the facts of this case and asserts the court erred in
applying subsection 2511(a)(2) because father’s mother was willing and able
to care for Child. Appellant’s Brief, at 14-17. The trial court decision
thoroughly addresses subsections 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8), in addition to
subsection 2511(a)(1). We, however, need only agree with the trial court’s
analysis pursuant to one subsection, and we have chosen to analyze its
determination pursuant to subsection (a)(1). See Z.S.W., supra.
Our review of the record reveals that the trial court’s decision to
terminate Father’s parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§2511(a)(1) and (b),
and to permit Child’s adoption without notice to or consent from Father, is
supported by clear and convincing evidence, and that there was no abuse of
the trial court’s discretion.
We have carefully read the trial court opinion in this matter and are
fully satisfied that it ably addresses the issues Father has raised on appeal.
Therefore, rather than conduct our own analysis of those issues, we will
affirm the trial court’s decree on the basis of the concise, thoughtful, and
well-written opinion of the Honorable Carol H. McGinley.
Decree affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/15/2015
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, 901 A.2d 502, 508 (pa. Super. 2006). First, the
Court looks at the parent's conduct. ld. The petitioner has the burden of showing by clear and
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In re: Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights 10 E.A.F., Jr.
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convincing evidence that a statutory reason for termination exists. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745 (1982). Second, once the court has determined a statutory ground for termination has been
established, the court focuses on the child's needs and welfare. In re Adoption 0/ R.J.S., supra.
All children are entitled to certain irreducible minimum requirements from their parents,
including adequate housing, clothing, food, love, and supervision. In Re: J. w., 578A.2d 952
(pa. Super. 1990). In addition, a parent must exhibit reasonable firmness in attempting to
overcome any barriets or obstructive behavior of others and affirmatively demonstrate love,
protection and concern for the child. In Re: C.MS., 832 A.2d 464 (pa. Super. 2003).
The Court must examine the circumstances of the case and also consider all explanations
offered to determine if the evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances, clearly warrants
involuntary termination. Matter ofAdoption a/Charles E.D.M, II, 550 Pa. 595,601,708 A.2d
88,91 (Pa. 1998), The petitioner has the burden of producing evidence that is so clear, direct,
weighty and convincing so as to enable the court to come to a clear conviction, without
hesitation of the truth of the precise facts at issue. In re: Child M, 681 A.2d 793 (pa. Super.
1996).
MOTHER
When B.A.F., Jr. was two months old, he experienced a serious medical condition
requiring surgery and several hospitalizations. The Child was discharged to the care of his
parents after the first few hospitalizations. The medical complications continued to increase and
the parental responsibility grew to include training to administer medication to the child. Neither
parent completed the training. Mother was overwhelmed by the responsibility of caring for the
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Child, which included the care required in tending to his medical needs: and, on December 12,
2011, Mother voluntarily placed E.A.F., Jr. with LCOCYS. Father's whereabouts at that time
were unknown.
On February 9, 2012, at approximately six months old, E.A.F., Jr. was adjudicated
dependent. Since the adjudication, Mother has been ordered to: submit to drug testing once a
week for three months; schedule and undergo a drug and alcohol evaluation and follow through
with those recommendations; attend all medical appointments for the' Child; attend meetings at
SafeStart regarding the Child; attend visits with the Child two times a week for two hours;
engage in parenting classes; attend mental health treatment; obtain legal employment; obtain
stable housing; and follow through with recommendations ofLCOCYS.
Mother has had the same court-ordered requirements since February 9, 2012. Her
compliance has been almost non-existent. Since the adjudication of dependency, Mother visited
the Child one time on January 24, 2012, and attempted a visit at the hospital on June 6, 2012, but
left after a few moments and did not return. An Aggravated Circumstances Order was entered
on February 19, 2013. The Order found that the identity and whereabouts of the parents are
known and both Mother and Father failed to maintain substantial and continual contact with the
Child for a period of six months. Mother did not visit the Child since the Aggravated
Circumstances Order.
Mother did not submit to urinalysis to demonstrate sobriety; did not attend any drug or
alcohol treatment: Mother did not complete a parenting class; she did not attend mental health
treatment since July of2012; and she did not obtain legal employment. She is currently living
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with Father at Father's uncle's residence.
Mother's conduct for the entire duration ofE.A.F., Jr.'s dependency, has clearly
evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing her parental claim to the Child. She .has failed to
perform any parental duties including maintaining contact via visitation. She has not provided
for the Child in any manner: no emotional, social, educational or financial support exists in the
record of this case. Mother'S utter lack of involvement has caused the Child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence for his physical and mental well-being and Mother
has not demonstrated that she will remedy her refusal to parent in the future. Accordingly, we
find Petitioner has established by clear and convincing evidence that the grounds for involuntary
termination set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 251 I (a)(1) and (2) have been met as to Mother.
In addition, the Child has been removed from Mother for more than two years. The
"condition" that led to the Child's placement was Mother's mental state and inability to meet the
Child's medical needs. Mother was "overwhelmed" by the requirements of motherhood.
The extreme medical care that was required when Mother placed the Child into care has
since ceased, but there is nothing to suggest that removing the initial medical conditions resolved
the problems that caused Mother to be overwhelmed. The general stress of raising a toddler
remains along with the additional stress of rearing a child with special dietary restrictions due to
allergies. Further, Mother is now faced with her own serious medical conditions.
Mother has failed to attend mental health services which would have assessed her stress
and anxiety and which would have provided her with coping skills to remedy the condition that
caused E.A.F., Jr'splacement. There is nothing left to offer Mother that would remedy the
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condition within a reasonable period oftime. In addition, as discussed more fully below,
termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare ofthe Child. Accordingly,
we find Petitioner has established by clear and convincing evidence that the grounds for
involuntary termination set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 251 I (a)(5) and (8) have been met as to
Mother.
Finding that LCOCYS has established statutory grounds for terminating Mother's
parental rights, we turn now to our primary consideration: the needs and welfare of the child. 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 251 I (b). In addressing the needs and welfare of the child, it is necessary to consider
the emotional bond between the parent and the child. In Re: E.M, 620 A.2d 481 (Pa. 1993). "A
court, in considering what situation would best serve the child's needs and welfare, must
. examine the status of the natural parental bond to consider whether terminating the natural
parents' rights would destroy something in existence that is necessary and beneficial." In Re:
P.A.B., 570 A.2d 522 (pa. Super. 1990). Further, parents cannot solely rely on their natural ties
to their child. In Re: Stickler, 356 Pa. Super. 56,60,514 A.2d 140,142 (1986).
Mother voluntary placed the Child when he was less than five months old. Today E.A.F.,
Jr. is nearly three years old. From the time of placement until the time of the first termination
hearing date, a period of twenty-two months, Mother visited with Child twice. At the time of the
termination hearing, Mother had not seen the Child for sixteen months. She has Dot provided for
the Child in any fashion; all ofE.A.F., Jr.'s needs are met by his foster family.and his paternal
grandmother. Any bond thatmay have existed when E.A.F., Jr. was a baby has been severed due
to the lack of contact between Mother and the Child. The only remaining tie that exists between
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them is a biological one. Therefore, terminating E.A.F. Jr. 's relationship with Mother will not
destroy something in existence that is necessary and beneficial to him; it will simply maintain the
status quo. It is in E.A.F. Jr. 's best interest to have the opportunity to be raised in a stable, loving
and permanent home. The needs and welfare ofE.A.F. Jr. dictate termination of Mother's
parental rights in accordance with 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 25 I l(b).
FATHER
On November 9,2011, Father struck Mother in the face while she was holding the Child;
he was charged with simple assault. At the time the Child was placed with LCOCYS, Father's
whereabouts were unknown and there was a warrant out for his arrest. Father had the same
court-ordered requirements as Mother pursuant to the Adjudication Order of February 9, 2012:
submit to drug testing once a week for three months; schedule and undergo a drug and alcohol
evaluation and follow through with those recommendations; attend all medical appointments for
the Child; attend meetings at Safe Start regarding the Child; attend visits with the Child two
times a week for two hours; engage in parenting classes; attend mental health treatment; obtain
legal employment; obtain stable housing; follow through with recommendations of LCOCYS.
From February 9, 2012 until the time of the termination hearing held on October 28,
2013, Father submitted one urine screen and it was positive for marijuana and ethyl glucoronide.
He did not obtain the required drug and alcohol evaluation nor comply with recommendations.
Father did not attend most of the Child's doctor's appointments. He did attend an allergist
appointment on April 2, 2013, although Father was unable to state a comprehensive list ofwhat
the Child is allergic to at the tennination hearing. Father did not attend SafeStart; did not engage
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in parenting classes; did not attend mental health treatment; and did not obtain legal
employment. Father has maintained housing with his uncle.
Regarding visits, Father last saw the Child at the April 2; 2013 allergist appointment;
Father could not remember any prior visits. He did have two prior visits during the period
between February 9, 2012 and May 3,2012, and he subsequently visited the Child on June 6,
2012, while the Child was in the hospital. This amounts to four total visits in twenty months.
Such minimal contact with the Child and such a lack of progress over such a lengthy
period of time clearly evidences Father's refusal and failure to perform parental duties. Other
than consistently living with his uncle, a home not appropriate for the Child, Father has made no
progress in accomplishing any of the court-ordered requirements for reunification. Father
testified that he knew of the tasks that he was required to complete in order to get his son back.
His reasons for not completing those tasks were that: "(s]ometimes I just didn't think that I
should have to g6" and that there were too many things to accomplish simultaneously, N,T,
October 29, 2013, p, 102, Father's refusal to accept any parental responsibility has caused the
Child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for E.A,F" Jr, 's
physical and mental well-being, He has not supported his son in any manner and all the Child's
needs are being met by the foster family and by the paternal grandmother. Accordingly, we find
Petitioner has established by clear and convincing evidence that the grounds for involuntary
termination set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 251 I (a)(I) and (2) have been met as to Father.
At the time of the first termination hearing, E.A.F., Jr. had been removed from Father's
care for a period of twenty months, At the time the Child was placed into LCOCYS's care,
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Father's whereabouts were unknown and he had an outstanding warrant for assaulting Mother.
Since February 9, 2012, Father was court-ordered to complete specific tasks to establish sobriety,
stability and a relationship with the Child. There is no evidence to suggest that Father will now
remedy the problems that he has for so long ignored or that any available services would remedy
the problems within a reasonable period of time. In addition, as more fully discussed below,
termination of Father's parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the Child.
Accordingly, we find Petitioner has established by clear and convincing evidence that the
grounds for involuntary termination set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 25! 1(a)(5) and (8) have been met
as to Father.
As previously discussed regarding Mother, fmding that LCOCYS has established
statutory grounds for terminating Father's parental rights, we turn now to our primary
consideration: the needs and welfare of the child. 23 PaC.SA § 251 I (b). In addressing the
needs and welfare of the child, it is necessary to consider the emotional bond between the parent
and the child. In Re: E.M, 620 A.2d 481 (pa. 1993). "A court, in considering what situation
would best serve the child's needs and welfare, must examine the Status of the natural parental
bond to consider whether terminating the natural parents' rights would destroy something in
existence that is necessary and beneficia!." In Re: P.A.B., 570 A.2d 522 (pa. Super. 1990).
Further, parents cannot solely rely on their natural ties to their child. In Re: Stickler, 356 Pa.
Super. 56,60,514 A.2d 140, 142 (1986).
Father attended the Child's allergist appointment on April 2, 2013. At the appointment,
the Child did not approach Father and did not want to engage with Father. Father tried to talk
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Circulated 01/06/2015 11:15 AM
In re: Involuntary Termination ofParental Rights to E.A.F., Jr.
Case No.: A2013c0054
with the Child, but the Child just clung to the foster mother. Prior to the April 2, 2013 visit,
Father's last contact with the Child was ten months earlier on June 6, 2012; Father could not
recall that visit. The Child's behavior towards Father demonstrates no bond exists between the
two. It is reasonable to infer that a twenty-seven-month-old child would not have a relationship,
bond or, very possibly, a memory ofa person who he has only seen four times in twenty months.
The Child's behavior towards Father confirms such lack ofrelationship. Terminating the rights
of Father would not destroy anything in existence that is necessary and beneficial to E.A.F., Jr.
It would best serve the needs and welfare of the Child to terminate Father's rights and 10 be
given the opportunity to be raised in a stable, loving and permanent home where he is permitted
to continue the nurturing relationships with the people to whom he is firmly bonded, namely his
foster family and paternal grandmother. The needs and weJfare ofE.A.F., Jr. dictate termination
of Father's parental rights in accordance with 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 25 11 (b).
z~
CAROL K. McGINLEY, P.J.
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