Com. v. Rollie, O. ( 2015 )


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  • J-S51019-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    OMAR ALI ROLLIE
    Appellant                No. 2837 EDA 2014
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 5, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0004832-2013
    *****
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    OMAR ALI ROLLIE
    Appellant                No. 2885 EDA 2014
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 5, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0005439-2013
    BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and PLATT, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                          FILED AUGUST 24, 2015
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S51019-15
    Omar Ali Rollie appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed in the
    Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County after a jury found him guilty of
    three counts of attempted murder,1 three counts of aggravated assault,2
    three counts of terroristic threats,3 three counts of recklessly endangering
    another person,4 one count of possession of a controlled substance with the
    intent    to   deliver   (“PWID”),5    and     one   count   of   possession   of   drug
    paraphernalia.6 Upon careful review, we affirm.
    On July 23, 2013, Abdul Nix, Nasire Muhammad, and Ismaile Tasiu
    were standing in a parking lot after leaving a store. Tasiu was talking to the
    owner of the store, and Nix and Muhammad were about to get into their
    rental car when another car drove up next to theirs. As summarized by the
    trial court:
    After five or ten minutes of Nix waiting for Tasiu, the car
    approached the rental car and made suspicious moves, including
    speeding up and positioning so the front of the car was facing
    toward the rental car. Mr. Omar Rollie then exited this second
    car, walked toward Nix, and asked why they were looking at
    him. Nix responded that they were not looking at him and were
    ____________________________________________
    1
    18 Pa.C.S. §§ 901(a), 2502(a).
    2
    18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(3).
    3
    18 Pa.C.S. § 2706(a)(1).
    4
    18 Pa.C.S. § 2705.
    5
    35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
    6
    35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32).
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    J-S51019-15
    just standing; however, Rollie continued to walk toward them
    and asked the question again. Nix then responded a second
    time and started explaining to Rollie that they were just picking
    up a part. Rollie then said that “I got something for you,” turned
    around, went to the back of his car, opened the trunk, took out
    an object covered in a sheet, laid aside an umbrella, and
    unwrapped the sheet to reveal a “long rifle.” At this point, Nix
    and [Muhammad] were in the car while Tasiu was running
    toward the car and got in as Nix was backing up.
    Rollie was pointing the rifle “directly at [the rental] car.” Rollie
    was in front of his own car and between 15 and 20 feet away
    from the back of Nix’s car. Nix observed Rollie aiming at him
    and pulling the trigger twice as Nix was backing up. Nix did not
    see either bullet hit the car. In court, Nix identified Omar Rollie
    as the man with an AK47 who pointed it at the rental car and
    shot twice. Tasiu, owner of the construction company, affirmed
    that Rollie had aimed at the rental car and shot twice. Once
    away from the scene, Nix dialed 911.
    Officer Anthony Peticci, one of the officers who responded to the
    911 call, found “31 baggies of yellow tinted small zip-lock
    baggies” in Rollie’s left back pocket after he ordered Rollie down
    on the ground and handcuffed him. Officer Peticci believed these
    zip-lock baggies to contain marijuana and marijuana was
    confirmed after field testing.
    Officer James Fiore was also a responding officer with Officer
    Peticci. Officer Fiore observed a “camera bag” inside the open
    door of Rollie’s running car. Officer Fiore found marijuana in a
    freezer bag and in a sandwich bag; empty, yellow, tinted zip-
    lock containers; a digital scale; and cocaine in sandwich bags.
    Officer Fiore noted that the digital scale was “commonly used” to
    weigh various narcotics and the “one-by-one inch [yellow] zip-
    lock containers” that were found were “commonly used to
    package marijuana for sale.”
    Detective Christopher Sponaugle also testified at trial as a
    qualified expert.   Detective Sponaugle was assigned to the
    Narcotics Unit with the Delaware County Criminal Investigation
    Division. His expert opinion was that the drugs were possessed
    with the intent to deliver.    He based this opinion on the
    packaging and quantity of the bags. The detective noted that
    the 31 marijuana bags are considered “nicks on the street,”
    which sell for $5.00 each. This shows that Rollie would have to
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    buy each individual pack for a total of $155. This means Rollie
    would have paid $155 for about an ounce of marijuana, which
    was divided among 31 “nick” bags, instead of paying the usual
    $80 rate for an ounce not individually packaged. The detective
    noted that it would make no sense for a user to buy 31
    individual bags for simple consumption. The same thought
    process was applied to the seven grams of marijuana “quarters”
    that would cost more to buy individually than in bulk. Detective
    Sponaugle also stated that the unused small zip-lock bags and
    the scale were for a seller, as a buyer would never carry those
    around.
    Trial Court Opinion, 3/25/15, at 2-4 (internal citations omitted).
    On June 26, 2014, after a three-day jury trial, Rollie was convicted of
    attempted murder, PWID, possession of drug paraphernalia, and other
    related offenses.   On September 5, 2014, the court sentenced him to an
    aggregate term of 25 to 52 years’ incarceration and 9 years’ probation. On
    October 3, 2014, Rollie filed a timely notice of appeal challenging the
    sufficiency of the evidence with regard to his attempted murder, PWID, and
    possession of drug paraphernalia convictions.
    With respect to Rollie’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence:
    As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency claims
    requires that we evaluate the record in the light most favorable
    to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all
    reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Evidence
    will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it
    establishes each material element of the crime charged and the
    commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Nevertheless, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a
    mathematical certainty. Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is
    to be resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak
    and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact
    can be drawn from the combined circumstances.
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    Commonwealth v. Lynch, 
    72 A.3d 706
    , 707-08 (Pa. Super. 2013)
    (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
    Section 2502 of the Crimes Code defines murder as follows:
    § 2502. Murder.
    (a) Murder of the first degree.—A criminal homicide
    constitutes murder of the first degree when it is committed by an
    intentional killing.
    18 Pa.C.S. §2502(a).
    Section 901 of the Crimes Code defines criminal attempt as follows:
    § 901. Criminal Attempt.
    (a) Definition of attempt.—A person commits an attempt
    when, with intent to commit a specific crime, he does any act
    which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of
    that crime.
    18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a).
    First, Rollie claims the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a
    reasonable doubt that he possessed the specific intent to kill because he
    failed to strike any of the victims or their car when he opened fire in the
    direction of the victims’ car.   However, the trial court concluded that the
    Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable
    doubt that Rollie acted with malice and possessed the specific intent that
    supports his conviction for attempted murder.       “Specific intent and malice
    may be established through circumstantial evidence, such as the use of a
    deadly weapon on a vital part of the victim’s body.”       Commonwealth v.
    Arrington, 
    86 A.3d 831
    , 840 (Pa. 2014); see also Commonwealth v.
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    Rogers, 
    615 A.2d 55
     (Pa. Super. 1992) (malice established where
    defendant fired weapon into occupied vehicle).
    The   trial   court   summarized   the   evidence   presented    by   the
    Commonwealth at trial as follows:
    Testimony supported that Rollie had suspiciously parked his car
    facing the group. He asked intimidating questions of why they
    were looking at him and threatened that he had something for
    them. He then took the time to go to the back of his car, open
    the trunk, unwrap the AK47, put aside the wrap and an
    umbrella, walk to the front of his car, aim at the vehicle with
    three people inside, and fire his weapon twice at the vehicle.
    Thus, the fact-finder had sufficient direct evidence to satisfy the
    sufficient evidence standard. Alternatively, the totality of the
    circumstances supports an inference from the fact-finder that
    Rollie had the necessary intent for attempted murder.
    Trial Court Opinion, 3/25/15, at 8-9.
    We agree with the trial court that the evidence, viewed in the light
    most favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to sustain the verdict.
    Lynch, supra.
    Rollie also claims the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction
    for PWID and possession of drug paraphernalia because the car Rollie was
    driving belonged to another individual not involved in this matter, and
    therefore, the drugs might not have belonged to Rollie.
    The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act prohibits
    PWID and possession of drug paraphernalia as follows:
    § 780-113. Prohibited acts; penalties
    (a) The following acts and the causing thereof within the
    Commonwealth are hereby prohibited:
    ...
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    (30) Except as authorized by this act, the manufacture,
    delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or
    deliver, a controlled substance by a person not registered
    under this act, or a practitioner not registered or licensed
    by the appropriate State board, or knowingly creating,
    delivering, or possessing with intent to deliver, a
    counterfeit controlled substance.
    ...
    (32) The use of, or possession with intent to use, drug
    paraphernalia for the purpose of planting, propagating,
    cultivating,    growing,      harvesting,      manufacturing,
    compounding,       converting,      producing,    processing,
    preparing, testing, analyzing, packing, repacking, storing,
    containing, concealing, injecting, ingesting, inhaling, or
    otherwise introducing into the human body a controlled
    substance in violation of this act.
    35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), (32).
    In order to sustain Rollie’s convictions for PWID, the Commonwealth
    must establish that he possessed a controlled substance with the intent to
    deliver it.   Commonwealth v. Kirkland, 
    831 A.2d 607
    , 609 (Pa. Super.
    2003). “The trier of fact may infer that the defendant intended to deliver a
    controlled substance from an examination of the facts and circumstances
    surrounding the case.”        
    Id.
       When the substance is not found on the
    defendant’s person, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant had
    constructive possession of the substance, or “exercise[d] a conscious
    dominion over the illegal substance[.]”         Commonwealth v. Valette, 
    613 A.2d 548
    , 550 (Pa. 1992). “An intent to maintain a conscious dominion may
    be   inferred   from    the   totality   of   the    circumstances.”     
    Id.,
        citing
    Commonwealth           v.   Macolino,     
    469 A.2d 132
    ,   134   (Pa.    1983).
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    “[C]ircumstantial   evidence   may   be   used   to   establish   a   defendant’s
    possession of drugs or contraband.” Valette, 613 A.2d at 550.
    In this case, the drugs in question were found in the vehicle Rollie was
    driving.   Although the vehicle was not registered to Rollie, he was its sole
    occupant, indicating his control over the vehicle. See Commonwealth v.
    Micking, 
    17 A.3d 924
    , 926 (Pa. Super. 2011) (finding that because
    appellant was sole occupant of car and possessed key to unlock glove
    compartment, he had control over contraband in vehicle).          The car Rollie
    was driving contained marijuana, cocaine, baggies, and a digital scale.
    There were 31 yellow tinted baggies of marijuana found on Rollie’s person,
    and some of the baggies found in the vehicle were also tinted yellow.
    Detective Sponaugle testified to Rollie’s intent to deliver by explaining that
    the separation of marijuana into small baggies is consistent with intent to
    deliver. The recovery of the digital scale, which is commonly used to weigh
    drugs for the purpose of bagging and selling, and the baggies found on
    Rollie’s person and car, is sufficient to sustain the verdicts for PWID and
    possession of drug paraphernalia.
    Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that the evidence was
    sufficient to sustain the verdicts for attempted murder, PWID, and
    possession of drug paraphernalia.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/24/2015
    -9-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2837 EDA 2014

Filed Date: 8/24/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021