Com. v. Johnson, D. ( 2015 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
DARRYL JOHNSON,
Appellant No. 1564 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 24, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0000835-2013
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED FEBRUARY 02, 2015
Appellant, Darryl Johnson, appeals from the judgment of sentence of
an aggregate term of 54 to 120 months’ incarceration, followed by 10 years’
probation, imposed after he was convicted of persons not to possess a
firearm, carrying a firearm without a license, and conspiracy to commit
robbery. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his
convictions. After careful review, we affirm.
Appellant and his co-defendant, Phillip Freeman, were arrested on
October 19, 2012. Appellant was charged with the above-stated offenses,
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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and he and Freeman proceeded to a jury trial on February 4, 2014.1 The
trial court summarized the facts established at trial as follows:
On October 19, 2012, at 2:00 A.M., David Davis
(hereinafter referred to as “Mr. Davis” or “Victim”) was returning
to his residence after leaving the Harrah’s Casino in the City of
Chester. Mr. Davis was coming home via a bus that dropped
him off at the corner of Third and Kerlin Streets, City of Chester.
After he exited the bus, Mr. Davis proceeded north on Kerlin
Street. Mr. Davis was enroute [sic] to West Tenth Street. As
Mr. Davis was proceeding north on Kerlin Street, a silver Sports
Utility Vehicle (hereinafter referred to as “SUV”) turned onto
Kerlin Street from Fifth Street. While Mr. Davis crossed this
intersection, this motor vehicle stopped, and one of the
individuals inside the SUV called out to him. Mr. Davis turned to
face the vehicle and was instructed by the unknown voice from
within the motor vehicle to come over to the silver SUV. Mr.
Davis informed the occupants of the motor vehicle that he did
not have time to come over to the silver SUV, and that at that
early hour of the morning he did not wish to speak to anyone.
The driver then brandished a firearm and held it outside the
window[,] forcing Mr. Davis at gunpoint to approach the motor
vehicle. During this initial interaction, Mr. Davis was about
fifteen (15) to twenty (20) feet from the SUV.
As Mr. Davis approached the motor vehicle, he observed a
young black male with a medium complexion sitting in the
driver’s seat of the silver SUV continuing to aim a firearm at him.
Mr. Davis determined that the individual in the driver’s seat of
the motor vehicle was the same person who had previously
demanded he come over to the SUV. Mr. Davis believed the
driver was in some way intoxicated based upon a chemical odor
emanating from him[,] and [based upon] the driver’s demeanor.
At trial, Mr. Davis identified the gun wielding driver of the silver
SUV as co-Defendant Freeman.
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1
Appellant waived his right to a jury trial for the charge of persons not to
possess a firearm. The nonjury trial for that charge was conducted
contemporaneously with Appellant’s jury trial on the remaining charges.
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Mr. Davis also observed an individual in the front
passenger seat of the motor vehicle. The passenger of the silver
SUV was also a young black male who was wearing a red
baseball cap, dressed in dark clothing, and had a beard. Mr.
Davis at trial identified this occupant of the motor vehicle as
[Appellant]. Mr. Davis advised the court that [Appellant] never
spoke during the course of the robbery. There were two (2)
additional voices23 coming from the backseat of the silver SUV[.]
Mr. Davis described these two (2) voices as sounding as though
they were the orchestrators of the robbery.
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At the time of their arrest, [Appellant and Freeman]
were the only two (2) individuals inside the motor vehicle.
Mr. Davis quickly surrendered forty-one dollars ($41.00) to
the driver of the motor vehicle, co-Defendant Freeman. Mr.
Davis testified that the denomination of the forty-one dollars
($41.00) was two (2) twenty dollar ($20.00) bills and a single
one dollar ($1.00) bill. On Mr. Davis[’] turning over his cash to
the driver, the silver SUV pulled away and traveled south on
Kerlin Street. Mr. Davis continued north on Kerlin Street and
contacted the police.
Responding to his emergency call, Officer Kyle Battinieri
arrived and met with Mr. Davis somewhere between Seventh
and Ninth Streets. As Mr. Davis was explaining the robbery to
Officer Battinieri, the officer was dispatched to another incident.
Officer Battinieri instructed Mr. Davis to proceed northbound to
Ninth and Kerlin Streets to a Sunoco gas station where he would
rendezvous with him. Shortly after this first interaction, Officer
Battinieri again met with Mr. Davis at the nearby Sunoco station,
[at] Ninth and Kerlin Streets. Officer William Dowd soon also
arrived. While Mr. Davis was explaining the robbery to the
responding officers, Officer Dowd pointed to a vehicle in the gas
station parking lot that matched the description of the involved
motor vehicle Mr. Davis was then relaying to the two (2) officers.
Mr. Davis confirmed that the vehicle observed by Officer Dowd
was the SUV used during the robbery. Mr. Davis then saw an
individual walking to the vehicle that was dressed in a similar
manner to the firearm brandishing driver. This individual
entered the SUV’s driver [side] door. Officer Dowd in his
marked police car began to drive over to the silver SUV. When
Officer Dowd approached this vehicle, it left the gas station,
prompting Officer Dowd to proceed after the SUV.
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Officer Dowd pursued the motor vehicle and conducted a
stop at Tenth and Butler Streets. On Officer Dowd[’s]
approaching from the rear [] driver’s side of the silver SUV, he
observed the front passenger side door open and the passenger
begin to exit the vehicle. With his firearm drawn[,] Officer Dowd
ordered the passenger to reenter the motor vehicle. The
passenger followed this instruction and returned within the SUV.
At trial, Officer Dowd identified the driver as co-Defendant
Freeman and the sole passenger as [Appellant]. After additional
police personnel arrived on the scene, Officer Mark Barag
instructed [Appellant] to step out of the motor vehicle. A pat-
down or frisk of [Appellant] was done. There were no weapons
found on [Appellant’s] person.
The driver of the vehicle, co-Defendant Freeman,
necessitated police removal from the silver SUV due to his failure
to comply with the officer[s’] directives of exiting the motor
vehicle and making visible to the officers his hands. Co-
Defendant Freeman was unable to stand on his own when he
was finally outside the silver SUV. Because of co-Defendant
Freeman[’s] constantly moving and continuing to hide his hands
from officers’ view, a canine unit was released to subdue him.
Eventually, with the help of the police canine the officers were
able to control co-Defendant Freeman. A pat-down was
conducted of the co-Defendant that did not reveal any firearms.
At no point during the struggle with co-Defendant Freeman did
Officer Barag observe co-Defendant Freeman remove a weapon
and/or slide anything under the vehicle to the passenger side of
the SUV.
After helping secure the co-Defendant, Officer Barag
returned to the passenger side of the vehicle and proceeded to
look underneath the silver SUV. It was then that he observed a
firearm on the pavement located directly beneath the passenger
seat, about six (6) inches to one (1) foot underneath the motor
vehicle on the front passenger side. Officer Barag informed
Officer Johnathan Ross of the firearm. Officer Ross retrieved the
firearm from under the motor vehicle. After securing the
firearm, Officer Ross determined that the handgun was loaded
and a bullet was in the chamber of the firearm. Officer Ross
found the firearm completely dry, despite it having been raining
previous[ly] that night[,] as well as at the time of the stop.
[Appellant and Freeman] were arrested and subsequently
processed at the Chester police station by … Officer Roosevelt
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Turner. The property that was found on [Appellant’s] person
during a search at the police station included: A baseball cap;
[a] blue coat; [s]hoelaces; [a] belt[;] [f]orty-six dollars ($46.00)
in cash; and [t]welve cents (12¢) in change. The Chester Police
Department Property Record recounted the denomination of the
currency retrieved from [Appellant] as two (2) twenty dollar
($20.00) bills and six (6) one dollar ($1.00) bills. Officer Turner
additionally recovered three (3) bullets from [Appellant’s] coat
pocket.
When Officer Turner next approached co-Defendant
Freeman to conduct his custodial search, Officer Turner saw
what on first view appeared to be “trash” in the immediate
vicinity of where co-Defendant Freeman was sitting. On closer
inspection, this “trash” was a torn-up box of ammunition. The
box was for twenty-two (.22) caliber bullets. Officer Turner also
noticed bullets on the floor surrounding co-Defendant Freeman
and in a trashcan located near the co-Defendant. These unspent
projectiles matched the bullets seized from co-Defendant
Freeman’s person. These bullets were as well identical to the
bullets found on [Appellant] and those within the firearm
recovered at the scene of [Appellant’s and Freeman’s] arrests.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/18/14, at 8-12 (citations to the record omitted).
Appellant stipulated at trial that he did not have a license to carry a
firearm, and that he is a person who is prohibited from possessing a firearm
under 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105. Based on these stipulations and the above-stated
facts, Appellant was convicted of possessing a firearm without a license,
persons not to possess a firearm, and criminal conspiracy to commit
robbery. On April 24, 2014, Appellant was sentenced to a term of 54 to 120
months’ incarceration for persons not to possess a firearm, a concurrent
term of 42 to 84 months’ incarceration for possessing a firearm without a
license, and a consecutive term of 10 years’ probation for conspiracy to
commit robbery.
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Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, as well as a timely Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Herein, he
presents two questions for our review:
1) Whether the evidence was insufficient to sustain the
conviction for the charges of persons not to possess firearms and
firearms not to be carried without a license since the
Commonwealth failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
[Appellant] actually or constructively possessed the firearm at
issue herein[?]
2) Whether the evidence was insufficient to sustain the
conviction for conspiracy to [commit] robbery since the
Commonwealth failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
[Appellant], with the intent of promoting or facilitating the
commission of a crime, agreed with other persons to commit a
robbery or took an overt act in furtherance of that crime[?]
Appellant’s Brief at 5 (unnecessary italicization omitted).
To begin, we note our standard of review of a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence:
In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must
determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well as all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict winner, are sufficient to support all
elements of the offense. Commonwealth v. Moreno, 14 A.3d
133 (Pa. Super. 2011). Additionally, we may not reweigh the
evidence or substitute our own judgment for that of the fact
finder. Commonwealth v. Hartzell, 988 A.2d 141 (Pa. Super.
2009). The evidence may be entirely circumstantial as long as it
links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Moreno, supra at 136.
Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2011).
Appellant first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his
two firearm offenses, arguing that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he
actually or constructively possessed a gun. Namely, Appellant argues that it
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was Freeman who possessed the gun during the robbery, and when the SUV
was stopped by police, Freeman struggled with the officers “on the ground
near the vehicle[,]” making it more likely that he discarded the firearm
under the vehicle. Appellant’s Brief at 15-16.
We agree with Appellant that the evidence did not establish that he
actually possessed the firearm; however, we disagree with his assertion that
the evidence failed to prove he constructively possessed the gun discovered
under the SUV when it was stopped by police.
Illegal possession of a firearm may be shown by constructive
possession. Commonwealth v. Parker, 847 A.2d 745, 750 (Pa.
Super. 2004).
Constructive possession is a legal fiction, a pragmatic
construct to deal with the realities of criminal law
enforcement. Constructive possession is an inference
arising from a set of facts that possession of the
contraband was more likely than not. We have defined
constructive possession as “conscious dominion.” (citation
omitted). We subsequently defined “conscious dominion”
as “the power to control the contraband and the intent to
exercise that control.” (citation omitted). To aid
application, we have held that constructive possession may
be established by the totality of the circumstances.
Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Thompson, 779 A.2d 1195,
1199 (Pa. Super. 2001), appeal denied, 567 Pa. 760, 790 A.2d
1016 (2001).
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 21 A.3d 1247, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2011).
Here, there was sufficient evidence to prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that Appellant constructively possessed the weapon found
underneath the vehicle. Specifically, when the vehicle was stopped by
police, Appellant opened the door and partially exited the SUV, while
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Freeman did not exit the vehicle until the officers were present outside.
Additionally, while Freeman struggled with the officers, the police did not see
him discard anything underneath the vehicle. The gun was ultimately found
on the ground underneath the front passenger seat of the SUV where
Appellant had been sitting, and near to where Appellant had partially exited
the vehicle. The gun was dry, despite that it was raining, indicating that it
was placed there during the stop of the SUV. Finally, police discovered in
Appellant’s pocket three bullets matching those found loaded in the gun.
Based on the totality of these circumstances, it was reasonable for the jury
to conclude that Appellant had the power and intent to control the gun, and
that he in fact did so when he discarded it underneath the vehicle during the
traffic stop. Consequently, his convictions for persons not to possess a
firearm and possessing a firearm without a license are supported by
sufficient evidence.
Appellant next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his
conspiracy conviction.
To convict of criminal conspiracy, the evidence must establish
that the defendant entered an agreement with another person to
commit or aid in the commission of an unlawful act, that the
conspirators acted with a shared criminal intent, and that an
overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy. 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 903; Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778,
784 (Pa. Super. 1998), allocatur denied, 559 Pa. 689, 739 A.2d
1056 (1999). “An explicit or formal agreement to commit crimes
can seldom, if ever, be proved and it need not be, for proof of a
criminal partnership is almost invariably extracted from the
circumstances that attend its activities.” Commonwealth v.
Swerdlow, 431 Pa. Super. 453, 636 A.2d 1173, 1177 (1994).
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“An agreement sufficient to establish a conspiracy can be
inferred from a variety of circumstances including, but not
limited to, the relation between the parties, knowledge of and
participation in the crime, and the circumstances and conduct of
the parties surrounding the criminal episode.” Commonwealth
v. Rivera, 432 Pa. Super. 88, 637 A.2d 997, 998 (1994) (en
banc).
Commonwealth v. Geiger, 944 A.2d 85, 90 (Pa. Super. 2008) (emphasis
added).
In this case, Appellant avers that the Commonwealth failed to prove
that he entered into an agreement with Freeman to rob the victim. He
maintains that, instead, the evidence established only his mere presence in
the vehicle when Freeman committed the robbery, which alone is insufficient
to support his conspiracy conviction. See Appellant’s Brief at 18-19 (citing,
inter alia, Commonwealth v. Goodyear, 344 A.2d 672 (Pa. Super. 1975)
(finding that minor victim’s testimony that Goodyear’s co-defendant offered
the victim marijuana while Goodyear was merely present was not enough to
support a conspiracy conviction); Commonwealth v. Mercado, 617 A.2d
342 (Pa. Super. 1992) (holding that Mercado’s mere presence in a house
when a controlled drug transaction was conducted, and when the house was
later searched and contraband was discovered, was not sufficient to prove
that he conspired to participate in the drug sale)). Indeed, Appellant
contends that “[h]e was essentially trapped in the wrong vehicle at the
wrong time, with an armed assailant who was apparently high on [drugs].”
Id. at 20. He argues that his mere presence, even combined with the fact
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“he remained in the vehicle after the crime was completed[,] does not
indicate that he formed an agreement prior to the crime.” Id.
Appellant disregards the totality of the other circumstances proven by
the Commonwealth, which make this case distinguishable from the ‘mere
presence’ cases of Goodyear and Mercado. In addition to proving that
Appellant was present when Freeman robbed the victim at gunpoint, and
that he remained with Freeman after the crime when the other occupants of
Freeman’s SUV dispersed (thus belying Appellant’s claim that he was
‘trapped’ in the vehicle) , the Commonwealth also proved that: (1) Appellant
left with Freeman when the police approached the SUV at the gas station;
(2) when Freeman’s vehicle was ultimately stopped by the officers, Appellant
attempted to conceal the weapon used in the robbery by discarding it under
the vehicle; (3) at the time of his arrest, Appellant possessed several bullets
matching those found in the gun; and (4) Appellant possessed cash in the
same denominations as that taken from the victim, while Freeman had no
cash in his possession.
Based on the totality of these circumstances, it was reasonable for the
jury to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant conspired with
Freeman to rob the victim. While Appellant also avers that his conspiracy
conviction cannot stand because he did not commit an overt act in
furtherance of the robbery, it is obvious that Freeman did so by demanding
money from the victim at gun-point. Accordingly, the overt act element of
Appellant’s conspiracy conviction was also satisfied. See Commonwealth
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v. McCall, 911 A.2d 992, 996 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating that the “overt act
need not be committed by the defendant; it need only be committed by a
co-conspirator”).
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/2/2015
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