Com. v. Hall, A. ( 2015 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
AMIN HALL
Appellant No. 834 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 15, 2010
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0903091-2005
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and ALLEN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED MARCH 09, 2015
Appellant, Amin Hall, appeals nunc pro tunc from the judgment of
sentence entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas,
following his revocation of probation. We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
On December 2, 2005, following a bench trial, the court convicted Appellant
of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver (“PWID”).1
The court sentenced Appellant on July 19, 2006, to one (1) to two (2) years’
imprisonment, plus two (2) years’ probation. Appellant committed new
crimes while on probation, resulting in convictions for persons not to possess
firearms and possession of a controlled substance; the court sentenced
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1
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
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Appellant on September 16, 2009, to an aggregate term of five (5) to ten
(10) years’ imprisonment for these new offenses.
On July 15, 2010, the court held a revocation of probation (“VOP”)
hearing with respect to Appellant’s underlying PWID conviction. Based on
Appellant’s new convictions, the court revoked Appellant’s probation and
resentenced him to two (2) to four (4) years’ imprisonment, consecutive to
Appellant’s five (5) to ten (10) year sentence for the new crimes. At the
conclusion of the VOP hearing, counsel (“VOP counsel”) agreed on the record
to file post-sentence motions and a direct appeal for Appellant.
Nevertheless, counsel filed nothing.
On August 1, 2011, Appellant filed a pro se document titled “Motion to
Modify and Reduce Sentence Nunc Pro Tunc,” asking the court to consider
running his PWID sentence concurrent to his persons not to possess firearms
and possession of a controlled substance sentences, based on Appellant’s
need to care for his children. The court properly treated Appellant’s motion
as a petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 2 The court
appointed counsel (“PCRA counsel”) on February 13, 2012, who filed an
amended PCRA petition on May 10, 2012. In the amended petition,
Appellant sought reinstatement of both his post-sentence and his direct
appeal rights nunc pro tunc, based on VOP counsel’s failure to file post-
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2
42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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sentence motions and a direct appeal as requested. The Commonwealth
filed a motion to dismiss on June 14, 2013, agreeing only to reinstatement
of Appellant’s direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc, but opposing Appellant’s
request for reinstatement of post-sentence rights nunc pro tunc. On
December 13, 2013, the court granted reinstatement of Appellant’s direct
appeal rights nunc pro tunc.3 Appellant timely filed a nunc pro tunc notice of
appeal on Monday, January 13, 2014. On May 8, 2014, the court ordered
Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant timely filed a Rule 1925(b)
statement on May 16, 2014.
Appellant raises one issue for our review:
IS APPELLANT ENTITLED TO [A] NEW SENTENC[ING]
HEARING?
(Appellant’s Brief at 2).
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3
The court did not expressly rule on Appellant’s request for reinstatement of
post-sentence rights nunc pro tunc. The December 13, 2013 docket entry
states: “Order GRANTING motion for Appeal rights to be reinstated Nunc Pro
Tunc[.]” There is also a March 21, 2014 docket entry, which contains the
court’s signature, stating: “Order Granting Reinstatement of Appellate Rights
Nunc Pro Tunc to Superior Court.” The certified record does not contain
separate December 13, 2013 or March 21, 2014 orders. Additionally, the
trial court opinion indicates in its recitation of the procedural history of the
case that the parties agreed to reinstatement of Appellant’s appeal rights
nunc pro tunc, but the court does not mention any decision regarding
reinstatement of Appellant’s post-sentence rights nunc pro tunc. Based on
this record, we infer the court’s reinstatement of only Appellant’s direct
appeal rights nunc pro tunc effectively denied Appellant’s request for
reinstatement of post-sentence rights nunc pro tunc.
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When reviewing the outcome of a revocation proceeding, this Court is
limited to determining the validity of the proceeding, the legality of the
judgment of sentence imposed, and the discretionary aspects of sentencing.
Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1031, 1033-34 (Pa.Super. 2013)
(en banc) (explaining that, notwithstanding prior decisions which stated our
scope of review in revocation proceedings is limited to validity of
proceedings and legality of sentence, we unequivocally hold that this Court’s
scope of review on appeal from revocation sentencing also includes
discretionary sentencing challenges).
Appellant argues the court failed to state sufficient reasons for
imposition of the revocation sentence on the record, aside from mentioning
that the court wanted Appellant to stay out of trouble. Appellant claims the
court’s failure to explain its sentencing rationale contravenes the
requirements of Pa.R.Crim.P. 708.4 Appellant emphasizes that the court
lacked the benefit of a pre-sentence investigation (“PSI”) report when
fashioning the revocation sentence. Appellant maintains the court’s
imposition of the revocation sentence consecutive to his firearms and simple
possession sentences was harsh and unreasonable, where the court was
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4
Appellant relies on Rule 708(C)(2), which at the time of Appellant’s VOP
hearing required the court to state on the record the reasons for the
sentence imposed at a revocation/sentencing proceeding. See Pa.R.Crim.P.
708(C)(2) (effective July 1, 2002). The current version of the Rule contains
this same language at subsection (D)(2). See Pa.R.Crim.P. 708(D)(2)
(amended March 15, 2013; effective May 1, 2013).
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unaware of the circumstances of Appellant’s new offenses. Appellant insists
the court ignored the factors set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b), which
require the court to consider the protection of the public, gravity of the
offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the
community, and Appellant’s rehabilitative needs. Appellant complains the
court did not consider Appellant’s age, background, family history, and
rehabilitative needs. Appellant concludes the court’s revocation sentence
was manifestly excessive, an abuse of discretion, and unreasonable, and this
Court must vacate the sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing.
As presented, Appellant’s issue challenges the discretionary aspects of his
sentence. See Cartrette, supra (explaining claim sentencing court failed to
follow Section 9721(b) factors pertains to discretionary sentencing matters);
Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied,
621 Pa. 682, 76 A.3d 538 (2013) (stating claim sentence is harsh and
unreasonable challenges discretionary aspects of sentencing);
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez-Dejusus, 994 A.2d 595 (Pa.Super. 2010)
(explaining challenge to imposition of consecutive sentences implicates
discretionary aspects of sentencing); Commonwealth v. Twitty, 876 A.2d
433 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal denied, 586 Pa. 749, 892 A.2d 823 (2005)
(stating claim sentencing court failed to state adequate reasons on record
for sentence presents challenge to discretionary aspects of sentencing);
Commonwealth v. Cruz-Centeno, 668 A.2d 536 (Pa.Super. 1995), appeal
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denied, 544 Pa. 653, 676 A.2d 1195 (1996) (explaining allegation court
ignored mitigating factors challenges discretionary aspects of sentencing).
Generally, objections to the discretionary aspects of a sentence are waived if
they are not raised at the sentencing hearing or in a timely filed post-
sentence motion. Griffin, supra at 935-36. See also Pa.R.Crim.P. 708(D)
(effective July 1, 2002) (stating motion to modify sentence imposed after
revocation shall be filed within 10 days of date of imposition).5
Where the court reinstates direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc, the
appellant is not automatically entitled to reinstatement of his post-sentence
rights nunc pro tunc as well. Commonwealth v. Liston, 602 Pa. 10, 977
A.2d 1089 (2009). Nevertheless, a PCRA court can reinstate a defendant’s
post-sentence rights nunc pro tunc if the defendant successfully pleads and
proves he was deprived of the right to file and litigate post-sentence motions
as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 20 n.9, 977 A.2d at
1095 n.9. Compare Commonwealth v. Fransen, 986 A.2d 154(Pa.Super. 2009) (holding PCRA petitioner who obtains reinstatement of
direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc is not entitled to reinstatement of post-
sentence rights nunc pro tunc if he did not request that relief with PCRA
court, and if court did not hold evidentiary hearing on that issue; appellant’s
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5
The current version of the Rule contains this same language at subsection
(E). See Pa.R.Crim.P. 708(E) (amended March 15, 2013; effective May 1,
2013).
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claim that he was entitled to file post-sentence motions and to have benefit
of evidentiary hearing warranted no relief where appellant did not plead or
prove in PCRA petition that he was deprived of right to file post-sentence
motions).6
Instantly, the court revoked Appellant’s probation and resentenced
him for the PWID conviction on July 15, 2010. At the conclusion of the
hearing, VOP counsel agreed on the record to file post-sentence motions and
a direct appeal as Appellant requested, but counsel failed to do so. On
August 1, 2011, Appellant filed a pro se motion to modify and reduce
sentence nunc pro tunc, raising a challenge to the discretionary aspects of
sentencing. The court properly treated Appellant’s motion as a PCRA
petition and appointed PCRA counsel, who subsequently filed an amended
PCRA petition seeking reinstatement of both post-sentence and direct appeal
rights nunc pro tunc. In the petition, Appellant specifically pled that he
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6
We recognize this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d
293 (Pa.Super. 2011), in which this Court declined to find waiver of a
defendant’s discretionary aspects of sentencing challenge because the
defendant was denied counsel entirely throughout the post-sentence and
direct appeal process based on counsel’s withdrawal at sentencing, and the
court denied the defendant’s request to file post-sentence motions nunc pro
tunc. Corley dealt with the complete denial of counsel, rather than the
ineffectiveness of counsel. See id. at 297 (distinguishing Liston and
Fransen as applicable to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel; where
appellant was denied counsel entirely throughout post-sentence and direct
appeal period when he was constitutionally entitled to counsel,
reinstatement of appellate rights nunc pro tunc was not based on ineffective
assistance of counsel; it was based on complete denial of counsel, so
rationale underlying Liston and Fransen is inapplicable).
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requested VOP counsel to file post-sentence motions and a direct appeal at
the conclusion of the VOP hearing; VOP counsel agreed to do so but took no
action. Additionally, Appellant again raised a challenge to the discretionary
aspects of sentencing. The Commonwealth responded to the PCRA petition
with a motion to dismiss, in which the Commonwealth agreed to
reinstatement of Appellant’s direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc but opposed
Appellant’s request for reinstatement of post-sentence rights nunc pro tunc.7
On December 13, 2013, the court granted reinstatement of Appellant’s direct
appeal rights nunc pro tunc.8 On Monday, January 13, 2014, Appellant
timely filed a nunc pro tunc notice of appeal.
Consistent with Liston and Fransen, Appellant pled in his amended
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7
The Commonwealth argued that a defendant seeking reinstatement of
post-sentence rights nunc pro tunc must prove prejudice (which the
Commonwealth interpreted as meaning, but for VOP counsel’s failure to
timely object, the court would have imposed a different sentence). (See
Commonwealth’s Motion to Dismiss, filed 6/14/13, at 3.) In support of this
proposition, the Commonwealth cites a passage in Liston. Nevertheless,
the quoted portion of Liston appears in the Liston Court’s recitation of the
Commonwealth’s argument—not the Court’s actual analysis. Further, Liston
expressly stated that a PCRA court is not prohibited from reinstating a
defendant’s right to file post-sentence motions nunc pro tunc if the
defendant successfully pleads and proves he was deprived of the right to
file and litigate post-sentence motions as a result of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Liston, supra at 20 n.9, 977 A.2d at 1095 n.9.
Notably, Liston mentioned no requirement that a defendant also plead and
prove the court would have granted sentencing relief had counsel timely
objected. See id.
8
The court’s ruling effectively denied Appellant’s request for reinstatement
of post-sentence rights nunc pro tunc.
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PCRA petition that VOP counsel was ineffective for failing to file a requested
post-sentence motion and a requested notice of appeal. See Liston,
supra; Fransen, supra. Appellant also asked the court for a hearing, in
the event the court required more evidence to decide Appellant’s petition.
Notwithstanding Appellant’s request, the court declined to hold a hearing
and granted reinstatement of Appellant’s direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc.
Per Fransen, remand for an evidentiary hearing might be an appropriate
remedy in this situation to afford the appellant an opportunity to offer proof
that counsel failed to file post-sentence motions as requested. See
Fransen, supra.Under the circumstances of this case, however, VOP counsel agreed on
the record at the conclusion of the VOP hearing to file post-sentence motions
and a direct appeal on Appellant’s behalf. (See N.T. VOP Hearing, 7/15/10,
at 9-10.) But for VOP counsel’s failure, Appellant would have filed post-
sentence motions, which is the prejudice Liston anticipated.9 See Liston,
supra. Further, the court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion addressed Appellant’s
discretionary aspects of sentencing claim. Thus, the court has already
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9
Appellant consistently raised a challenge to the discretionary aspects of
sentencing throughout these proceedings. Issues related to the
discretionary aspects of sentencing had to be raised at sentencing or in a
post-sentence motion. See Griffin, supra. Appellant asked for restoration
of his right to file post-sentence motions nunc pro tunc. Therefore,
restoration of Appellant’s direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc without
restoration of Appellant’s post-sentence rights nunc pro tunc, as requested,
was essentially an empty gesture.
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examined the issue Appellant wanted to raise in the post-sentence motions
nunc pro tunc. For these reasons, remand is unnecessary, and we decline to
find waiver of Appellant’s challenge to the discretionary aspects of his
sentence. Therefore, we proceed with our merits-based analysis of
Appellant’s sentencing issue.10
When appealing the discretionary aspects of a sentence, an appellant
must invoke the appellate court’s jurisdiction by including in his brief a
separate concise statement demonstrating that there is a substantial
question as to the appropriateness of the sentence under the Sentencing
Code. Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 571 Pa. 419, 812 A.2d 617 (2002);
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). This Court must evaluate what constitutes a substantial
question on a case-by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Paul, 925 A.2d 825(Pa.Super. 2007). A substantial question exists “only when the appellant
advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were
either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or
(2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing
process.” Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 913 (Pa.Super. 2000).
A claim of excessiveness can raise a substantial question as to the
appropriateness of a sentence under the Sentencing Code, even if the
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10
We reject the Commonwealth’s argument that Appellant waived his
sentencing challenge for failure to file post-sentence motions, particularly
where the Commonwealth opposed reinstatement of Appellant’s post-
sentence rights nunc pro tunc.
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sentence is within the statutory limits. Mouzon, supra at 430, 812 A.2d at
624. Bald allegations of excessiveness, however, do not raise a substantial
question to warrant appellate review. Id. at 435, 812 A.2d at 627. Rather,
a substantial question exists “only where the appellant’s Rule 2119(f)
statement sufficiently articulates the manner in which the sentence violates
either a specific provision of the sentencing scheme set forth in the
Sentencing Code or a particular fundamental norm underlying the sentencing
process….” Id. See, e.g., Cartrette, supra (indicating claim that
revocation court ignored appropriate sentencing factors set forth in Section
9721(b) raises substantial question); Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903
A.2d 1247 (Pa.Super. 2006) (holding defendant’s claims that sentencing
court did not state on record any reasons for sentence, imposed sentence of
total confinement without discussing necessary factors, and imposed
sentence excessive and disproportionate to underlying technical probation
violations raised substantial questions warranting appellate review). An
allegation that the sentencing court failed to consider a specific mitigating
factor, however, does not necessarily raise a substantial question.
Commonwealth v. Berry, 785 A.2d 994 (Pa.Super. 2001) (holding claim
that sentencing court ignored appellant’s rehabilitative needs failed to raise
substantial question).
To the extent Appellant complains the sentencing court did not
adequately consider specific mitigating factors, such as his age, background,
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family history, and rehabilitative needs, this allegation does not raise a
substantial question. See id. Likewise, Appellant’s bald allegation of
manifest excessiveness and unreasonableness does not warrant our review.
See Mouzon, supra. Additionally, Appellant’s challenge to the court’s
imposition of consecutive sentences does not raise a substantial question.
See Commonwealth v. Marts, 889 A.2d 608 (Pa.Super. 2005) (explaining
sentencing court has discretion to impose its sentences concurrently or
consecutively to other sentences imposed at same time or to sentences
already imposed; any challenge to exercise of this discretion ordinarily
does not raise substantial question). Nevertheless, Appellant’s claims that
the court failed to state adequate reasons on the record for its sentence and
ignored the factors set forth at Section 9721(b) do raise substantial
questions which warrant review. See Cartrette, supra; Malovich, supra.“In general, the imposition of sentence following the revocation of
probation is vested within the sound discretion of the trial court, which,
absent an abuse of that discretion, will not be disturbed on appeal.”
Commonwealth v. Hoover, 909 A.2d 321 (Pa.Super. 2006). Following the
revocation of probation, the court may impose a sentence of total
confinement if any of the following conditions exist: the defendant has been
convicted of another crime; the conduct of the defendant indicates it is likely
he will commit another crime if he is not imprisoned; or, such a sentence is
essential to vindicate the authority of the court. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(c).
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The Sentencing Guidelines do not apply to sentences imposed following a
revocation of probation. Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 893 A.2d 735, 739
(Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 588 Pa. 788, 906 A.2d 1196 (2006).
“[U]pon sentencing following a revocation of probation, the trial court is
limited only by the maximum sentence that it could have imposed originally
at the time of the probationary sentence.” Commonwealth v. Coolbaugh,
770 A.2d 788, 792 (Pa.Super. 2001).
Pursuant to Section 9721(b), “the court shall follow the general
principle that the sentence imposed should call for confinement that is
consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it
relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the
rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). “[T]he
court shall make as part of the record, and disclose in open court at the time
of sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons for the sentence
imposed.” Id. Nevertheless, “[a] sentencing court need not undertake a
lengthy discourse for its reasons for imposing a sentence….”
Commonwealth v. Crump, 995 A.2d 1280, 1283 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal
denied, 608 Pa. 661, 13 A.3d 475 (2010). Rather, “the record as a whole
must reflect the sentencing court’s consideration of the facts of the crime
and character of the offender.” Id. See also Commonwealth v. Devers,
519 Pa. 88, 546 A.2d 12 (1988) (explaining that when sentencing court has
benefit of PSI report, this Court can assume court was aware of relevant
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information regarding defendant’s character and weighed those
considerations along with mitigating factors; thus, court’s requirement to
state reasons on record for sentence imposed is satisfied where court is
informed by PSI report); Commonwealth v. Carrillo-Diaz, 64 A.3d 722(Pa.Super. 2013) (explaining where revocation court presided over
defendant’s no contest plea hearing and original sentencing, as well as his
probation revocation hearing and sentencing, court had sufficient
information to evaluate circumstances of offense and character of defendant
when sentencing following revocation).
Here, the court explained its revocation sentencing rationale as
follows:
First, a review of the record shows that the [c]ourt
properly found [A]ppellant in direct violation of [his]
probation by being convicted of new offenses….
Accordingly, there are no meritorious issues to be raised
on appeal in regard to propriety of the revocation of
[A]ppellant’s probation.
Second, [A]ppellant claims that the court erred in not
ordering a presentence investigation report. … This
[c]ourt did review the hearing summary and all relevant
details of [A]ppellant’s new case in open court as well as
the prior violation case. This [c]ourt reviewed the PARS
report (Summary) for the new VUFA case and examined all
of the relevant factors needed to craft an appropriate
sentence. This [c]ourt had the benefit of having previous
interaction with [A]ppellant in his prior case, thus
observing him and fashioning a sentence for him in 2006.
In the present instance, this [c]ourt conducted an open
dialogue with [A]ppellant to enable the [c]ourt to gain
further insight into [A]ppellant’s explanations for his
conduct (or conduct omissions). Furthermore, the [c]ourt
offered [A]ppellant an opportunity to speak by stating,
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“[Appellant], is there anything you would like to say to me
today, sir?” [A]ppellant replied “No.”
* * *
In the instant case, the [c]ourt took into consideration
public protection as well as the gravity of the offense in
deciding the length of [A]ppellant’s sentence as well as
whether or not [A]ppellant’s sentence[s] should run
consecutive. The facts of this case are indeed egregious
and while the rehabilitative needs of [A]ppellant must
always be considered, the protection of the public is the
more viable concern in this instance.
Having had prior contact with [A]ppellant, this [c]ourt was
in the best position to view [A]ppellant’s character,
displays of remorse, defiance or indifference as well as the
overall effect and nature of the crime.
Accordingly, in the instant case the sentence did not
exceed the statutory maximum nor has [A]ppellant
claimed that the sentence resulted from a bias. There was
nothing unreasonable about the sentence. This [c]ourt
revoked [Appellant’s] probation and sentenced him to two
(2) to four (4) years confinement (consecutive) after a
careful review of all relevant information. Therefore,
[A]ppellant’s Violation of Probation sentence is a proper
application of judicial discretion.
For these reasons, [A]ppellant’s sentence should be
affirmed.
(Trial Court Opinion, filed July 21, 2014, at 2-5) (internal citations omitted).
We see no reason to disrupt the court’s analysis. See Hoover, supra.Here, the revocation court presided over Appellant’s original PWID trial
and sentencing. At the time of the original sentencing, the court had the
benefit of a PSI report. During the VOP hearing, the Commonwealth
provided the court with a summary of the facts underlying Appellant’s new
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convictions for persons not to possess firearms and simple possession.
Thus, the record belies Appellant’s claim that the court was unaware of the
circumstances of Appellant’s new offenses. The Commonwealth also
informed the court that Appellant’s new firearms conviction constituted
Appellant’s second violation of the Uniform Firearms Act. The court
explained to Appellant that the court had warned him to stay out of trouble
at his original sentencing hearing, but Appellant failed to do so. The court
also offered Appellant the opportunity to address the court, but Appellant
declined. Consequently, the court revoked Appellant’s probation and
resentenced him to two (2) to four (4) years’ imprisonment for his PWID
conviction. The record as a whole makes clear the revocation court
considered the facts of Appellant’s case and his character per Section
9721(b), and set forth adequate reasons to justify the VOP sentence. See
Devers, supra; Carrillo-Diaz, supra; Crump, supra. Thus, Appellant is
not entitled to relief. See Hoover, supra. Accordingly, we affirm.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/9/2015
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