American Independent v. Estate of: Scott, K. ( 2015 )

J-A32005-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
AMERICAN INDEPENDENT INSURANCE IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
COMPANY PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
ESTATE OF KENTA SCOTT, BY SHELLY
CROWDER AS ADMINISTRATRIX AND
SOPHIA DERRELL AND ESTATE OF
MICHAEL WADE, JR., BY JOHN PADOVA,
JR., ESQUIRE AS ADMINISTRATOR AND
ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY OF
PHILADELPHIA, L.L.C. D/B/A NATIONAL
AND EAN HOLDINGS, L.L.C.
APPEAL OF: ESTATE OF KENTA SCOTT,
BY SHELLY CROWDER AS
ADMINISTRATRIX AND ESTATE OF
MICHAEL WADE, JR., BY JOHN PADOVA,
JR., ADMINISTRATOR
Appellants No. 1198 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Order March 12, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Civil Division at No(s): 130102246
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED MARCH 09, 2015
Appellants, Estate of Kenta Scott, by Shelly Crowder as Administratrix
and Estate of Michael Wade, Jr., by John Padova, Jr., Administrator, appeals
from the order entered March 12, 2014, in the Court of Common Pleas of
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A32005-14
Philadelphia County, that entered summary judgment in favor of Appellee,
American Independent Insurance Company (“American Independent”), in
American Independent’s declaratory judgment action against Appellants.
We affirm.
This action arises out of a one-vehicle accident that occurred on
January 9, 2010, in which decedents, Michael Wade, Jr., and Kenta Scott,
were killed. In the accident, Wade was the operator of a rental vehicle
owned by Enterprise Rent-A-Car and rented to Sophia Derrell. Scott, who
was Derrell’s friend, was the front-seat passenger of the vehicle. There is no
dispute that Derrell was the only authorized driver of the rental car under
the car rental agreement, and there is no claim that she knew Wade. Derrell
testified in her deposition that she did not know Wade, and that she did not
give permission to either Wade or Scott to use the vehicle.
At the time of the accident, Wade was insured under an automobile
insurance policy issued by American Independent. American Independent
commenced the instant action for declaratory judgment, seeking a judgment
that the damages resulting from the accident are not covered because of an
exclusion under the policy for using a vehicle without the permission of the
owner. The pertinent language of the police provides:
Additional Definition
When used in this Part I, “insured person” or “insured
persons” means:
…
-2-
J-A32005-14
4. You [Wade] with respect to an accident arising out of the
maintenance or use of any vehicle with the express or implied
permission of the owner of the vehicle
American Independent Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Policy at 7. The policy
defines “owner” as an individual who:
a. Holds legal title to the vehicle
b. Has legal possession of the vehicle that is subject to a written
security agreement with an original term of six (6) months.
Id. at 5.
At the close of discovery, American Independent moved for summary
judgment. On March 12, 2013, the trial court granted the motion for
summary judgment, ordering that “Plaintiff, American Independent
Insurance Company, does not owe any defense or indemnification to
Defendant Estate of Michael Wade, Jr., by John Padova, Jr., Esquire, as
Administrator, for any claims arising out of the January 9, 2010 accident….”
Order, 3/12/13. The court further determined that “decedent Michael Wade,
Jr. and/or the Estate of Michael Wade, Jr., by John Padova, Jr., Esquire, as
administrator, is not an insured under the policy of insurance, Policy No.
35464330, issued by American Independent Insurance Company in effect as
of January 9, 2010.” Id. This timely appeal followed.
Our standard in reviewing a challenge to an order granting summary
judgment is as follows.
We may reverse if there has been an error of law or an abuse of
discretion. Our standard of review is de novo, and our scope
plenary. We must view the record in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party and all doubts as to the existence of a
-3-
J-A32005-14
genuine issue of material fact must also be resolved against the
moving party.
Executive Risk Indemnity Inc. v. CIGNA Corp., 976 A.2d 1170, 1172
(Pa. Super. 2009). Furthermore,
[i]n evaluating the trial court’s decision to enter summary
judgment, we focus on the legal standard articulated in the
summary judgment rule. See PA.R.C.P. 1035.2. The rule states
that where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to relief as a matter of law, summary
judgment may be entered. Where the nonmoving party bears
the burden of proof on an issue, he may not merely rely on his
pleadings or answers in order to survive summary judgment.
Failure of a non-moving party to adduce sufficient evidence on
an issue essential to his case and on which he bears the burden
of proof establishes the entitlement of the moving party to
judgment as a matter of law.
Shepard v. Temple University, 948 A.2d 852, 856 (Pa. Super. 2008)
(citations omitted).
With the above standard in mind, we turn to the merits of the
Appellants’ appeal. Appellants contend that the policy provision that
provides coverage to the named insured only if the insured is operating a
non-owned vehicle with the express or implied permission of the title holder
is unconscionable, and therefore unenforceable as against public policy. See
Appellants’ Brief at 14.
We begin our analysis by noting that “the interpretation of a
contract of insurance is a matter of law for the courts to decide.
In interpreting an insurance contract, we must ascertain the
intent of the parties as manifested by the language of the
written agreement. When the policy language is clear and
unambiguous, we will give effect to the language of the
contract.” Paylor [v. Hartford Ins. Co., 640 A.2d 1234, 1235
(Pa. 1994)]. We further note that an insured’s failure to read
carefully the clear and unambiguous terms of his insurance
-4-
J-A32005-14
policy has never furnished grounds to invalidate those terms or
otherwise nullify them. See, e.g., Standard Venetian Blind
Co. v. American Empire Ins. Co., 503 Pa. 300, 469 A.2d 563,
566 (1983) (holding failure to read an insurance contract is an
unavailing excuse and cannot justify avoidance of its terms).
Erie Insurance Exchange v. Baker, 601 Pa. 355, 362, 972 A.2d 507, 511
(2008).
We note at the outset that there simply are no facts to suggest that
Wade had either express or implied permission to use the rental vehicle.
See Belas v. Melanovich, 372 A.2d 478 (Pa. Super. 1977) (setting forth
framework for analyzing whether individual had implied consent to use
vehicle). As noted, it is undisputed that Derrell was the only authorized
driver of the vehicle under the Enterprise rental agreement. It therefore
follows that Enterprise, as the holder of the legal title to the vehicle, did not
give express or implied permission to either Wade or Scott to use the
vehicle. Derrell expressly denied that she gave Wade or Scott permission to
use the vehicle, and indicated that she did not even know Wade. Moreover,
even if Derrell had given permission to use the vehicle, such permission
would still be invalid to trigger coverage under the American Independent
policy as Derrell’s permission clearly does not constitute “express or implied
permission of the owner of the vehicle.” American Independent
Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Policy at 7.
We further find no merit to Appellants’ contention that the
nonpermissive use exclusion provision at issue is unconscionable and against
-5-
J-A32005-14
public policy. In Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Cummings, 652 A.2d
1338, 1343 (Pa. Super. 1994), this Court expressly held that nonpermissive
use exclusions, such as the provision at issue, do not violate either the
legislative intent or public policy expressed in the motor vehicle financial
responsibility law.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the order entering summary
judgment in favor of American Independent.
Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/9/2015
-6-