Lai v. Garrubbo Capece , 233 F. App'x 201 ( 2007 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2007 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    8-30-2007
    Lai v. Garrubbo Capece
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 07-1529
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    Recommended Citation
    "Lai v. Garrubbo Capece" (2007). 2007 Decisions. Paper 517.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007/517
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    _______________
    NO. 07-1529
    ________________
    KATHERINE LAI,
    Appellant
    v.
    GARRUBBO, CAPECE, D’ARCANGELO, MILLMAN & SMITH, P.C.;
    LAURIE ESTEVES; SHARP & BROWN LLP; JULIA KLUBENSPIES;
    MCDONOUGH, KORN & EICHHORN
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal From the United States District Court
    For the District of New Jersey
    (D.C. Civ. No. 06-cv-03388)
    District Judge: Honorable Susan D. Wigenton
    _______________________________________
    Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    August 28, 2007
    BEFORE: FISHER, ALDISERT and WEIS, CIRCUIT JUDGES
    (Filed August 30, 2007)
    _______________________
    OPINION
    _______________________
    PER CURIAM.
    Pro se Appellant Katherine Lai appeals from a District Court order
    dismissing her complaint with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
    1
    12(b)(6), and denying her request for an entry of default against certain Defendants. We
    will affirm.
    I.
    According to the complaint, Lai alleged that she received a burn in the
    shape of the letter “L” during a surgical procedure in 2003. Lai filed a state court
    complaint asserting, among other claims, sexual assault, harassment and medical
    malpractice against her doctor and nurse staff as well as the St. Barnabas Medical Center.
    In July 2006, Lai filed the federal complaint giving rise to this appeal. In
    her complaint, Lai asserted claims against the attorneys and law firms that represented the
    defendants in the state court action. She asserted three claims in her complaint: (1) two
    claims pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a - 2000h; and (2) one
    claim pursuant to the American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 12101
     -
    12213. The District Court dismissed the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 12(b)(6), and denied her request for an entry of default. Next, the District
    Court denied Lai’s timely motion for reconsideration on January 24, 2007, and again
    dismissed the complaint. Subsequently, Lai timely filed a notice of appeal.
    II.
    We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . Our standard of review
    over the District Court’s dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is
    plenary. See Nami v. Fauver, 
    82 F.3d 63
    , 65 (3d Cir. 1996). “Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
    2
    pleader is entitled to relief.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
    127 S. Ct. 1955
    , 1964
    (2007)(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 
    355 U.S. 41
    , 47 (1957)). In determining whether Lai
    has stated a claim, we must accept her factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable
    inferences from them in her favor. See Alston v. Parker, 
    363 F.3d 229
    , 233 (3d Cir.
    2004).
    III.
    For essentially the reasons given by the District Court, we agree with its
    order dismissing the complaint and denying Lai’s request for an entry of default.
    Specifically, Lai’s allegations that the Defendants violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964
    and the ADA during the defense of their clients in the state court proceedings failed to
    state a claim under either of these statutes. Additionally, no default was ever entered by
    the clerk, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a), and we note that default judgments are disfavored as
    decisions on the merits are encouraged. See Harad v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 
    839 F.2d 979
    , 982 (3d Cir. 1988). The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.
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