Com. v. Fowler, N. ( 2017 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
NESBITT FOWLER
Appellant No. 3722 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence dated November 9, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0007715-2014
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., SOLANO, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY SOLANO, J.: FILED JUNE 22, 2017
Appellant, Nesbitt Fowler, appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed after the trial court convicted him of aggravated assault, simple
assault and recklessly endangering another person.1 We affirm.
Appellant’s convictions arose from an incident involving his girlfriend,
Keshiva Poindexter, on June 7, 2014. Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion
in limine in which he sought the court’s permission to question Ms.
Poindexter about a video Ms. Poindexter allegedly recorded of Appellant and
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2702(a), 2701(a), and 2705.
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posted on the Internet.2 The trial court, in an order by the Honorable
Carolyn H. Nichols, granted Appellant’s motion in limine on July 16, 2015.
On July 27, 2015, the Commonwealth filed a motion to admit prior
“evidence that [Appellant] had attacked the victim on six prior occasions to
show, inter alia, intent, and absence of mistake, or to rebut anticipated
defense.” Commonwealth Brief at 3; see also Commonwealth Motion to
Admit Other Acts Evidence, 7/27/15. The motion was heard prior to trial on
September 10, 2015, by the Honorable Steven F. Geroff, sitting as the pre-
trial motions judge.3 At the hearing, the prosecutor conceded:
The main reason, your honor, that the Commonwealth
seeks to admit [evidence of Appellant’s prior bad acts] is that
there was a motion in limine. . . . [T]here is a motion in limine
where Judge Nichols granted [Appellant’s] motion to allow the
defense to question the complaining witness on a video that was
posted of [Appellant] on YouTube. Essentially in a dance where
he proceeded to take off his clothes.
And based on that ruling, Judge Nichols ruled that it was
allowed to establish motive and bias on the part of the
complainant. So in response, I filed the other acts motion to
allow these alleged other acts to come into evidence to refute
that bias or motive.
____________________________________________
2
Appellant’s motion in limine appears to have been verbal. Although there
is no physical motion in the record, its existence is not disputed and is
verified by the trial court’s two orders, one on June 25, 2015 stating that
“Defense Motion in Limine is Held Under Advisement” and a second on July
16, 2015 stating “Defense Motion in Limine is Granted. Defense may ask
questions to witness about video. Trial date to remain 9/10/15.”
3
Judge Geroff heard the Commonwealth’s pre-trial motion because
Appellant had elected to proceed at a bench trial before Judge Nichols.
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N.T., 9/10/15, at 3-4. Counsel for Appellant responded that “there’s
no exception that says other acts can come in to bolster the credibility
of the witness.” Id. at 8. Appellant’s counsel then asked whether
“Your Honor is following my logic?” to which the court responded “I
do.” Id. at 10. However, the court continued, “Let’s assume that
video never happened,” and it then reviewed the prior acts set forth in
the Commonwealth’s motion. Id.
At the end of the hearing, Judge Geroff permitted the
Commonwealth to present evidence of two of the prior acts: (1) an
incident in the summer of 2013 when Appellant allegedly strangled Ms.
Poindexter until she lost consciousness, and (2) an incident the
following spring when Appellant allegedly punched Ms. Poindexter on
the forehead. N.T., 9/10/15, at 14-15; see also Trial Court Opinion,
6/30/16, at 3-4. The court stated:
Certainly anything [Ms. Poindexter] testifies to is subject
to great question as to her credibility. But I’m ready to rule. As
to the December 2012, January 2-13, I will not permit that. The
summer of 2013 . . . I would permit her to testify to being
strangled by [Appellant] and losing consciousness. . . . I can
assure you, you can use your cross-examination to show this
lady is making all of this up. . . . So I won’t allow December
2013. Clearly, we’re not allowing February 2014. And I will
allow the allegation that during April and May of 2014,
[Appellant] allegedly punched the complainant on the forehead.
I’ll permit that.
So now you got just two acts, two alleged acts.
N.T., 9/10/15, at 13-15.
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The case proceeded to trial. Judge Nichols, sitting as the trial court,
summarized the trial court’s factual findings as follows:
On June 7, 2014, the complainant, Keshiva Poindexter,
contacted her boyfriend, [Appellant], through text message
regarding the return of her cell phone. At some point that
evening, Ms. Poindexter drove to [Appellant’s] house at 1638
Frazier St. in Philadelphia. She entered the residence through
the open front door and found [Appellant’s] cousin laying on a
couch. She asked the cousin where [Appellant] was and he
replied he didn’t know. Ms. Poindexter then proceeded upstairs
where she encountered another female. Again she asked where
[Appellant] was and if she had seen her cell phone. The cousin
then informed Ms. Poindexter that [Appellant] would be
returning shortly. Six minutes after she arrived, [Appellant]
returned to the house. A verbal argument ensued between Ms.
Poindexter and [Appellant]. [Appellant] then grabbed Ms.
Poindexter by the hand and punched her with a closed fist
several times in the face, specifically her eyes. Ms. Poindexter
then blacked out. She was awoken by [Appellant’s] father
slapping her. She then ran outside, where she called her friend
for help and then passed out again. At some point police were
called and she was taken to the University of Pennsylvania
Hospital. The damage to Ms. Poindexter’s eyes [was] extensive
and required several surgeries with several more in the future.
Additionally, there was permanent damage to her optical nerves.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/30/16, at 2 (citations to notes of testimony omitted).
The trial court rendered its guilty verdicts on September 10, 2015 and
deferred sentencing for the preparation of a pre-sentence investigation
report. On November 9, 2015, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 4½ to
10 years’ incarceration. Appellant then filed this timely appeal, in which he
presents a single issue for our review:
Did not the lower court err in allowing the Commonwealth
to present evidence of other acts by [Appellant]?
Appellant’s Brief at 3.
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Appellant states that the Commonwealth sought to introduce evidence
of his “uncharged alleged bad acts” against Ms. Poindexter “to bolster [Ms.
Poindexter]’s credibility in the face of the defense evidence of her motivation
to lie.” Appellant’s Brief at 9. The essence of Appellant’s claim is that the
evidence was improperly admitted because it was “clearly offered for the
purpose of trying to paint [Appellant] as having bad character and a
propensity for violence [and n]one of the allowable justifications for the
introduction of other bad acts evidence apply here.” Id. at 13. The
Commonwealth counters that the evidence of the two prior acts was properly
admitted because “case law permits the admission of evidence of previous
assault of the same victim to prove ill-will, malice, and intent, among other
purposes.” Commonwealth Brief at 4.
We review challenges to the admission of “other acts” evidence for an
abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Patterson, 91 A.3d 55, 68 (Pa.
2014) (“The admission of evidence of prior bad acts is solely within the
discretion of the trial court, and the court’s decision will not be disturbed
absent an abuse of discretion”), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 1400 (2015). The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained:
An abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an
appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but
requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality,
prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be
clearly erroneous. Typically, all relevant evidence, i.e., evidence
which tends to make the existence or non-existence of a
material fact more or less probable, is admissible, subject to the
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prejudice/probative value weighing which attends all decisions
upon admissibility. See Pa.R.E. 401; Pa.R.E. 402.
Commonwealth v. Dillon, 925 A.2d 131, 136 (Pa. 2007) (internal
quotations and some citations omitted).
Rule 404(b) of the Rules of Evidence provides:
(b) Crimes, Wrongs or Other Acts.
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is
not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to
show that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character.
(2) Permitted Uses. This evidence may be admissible for
another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of
mistake, or lack of accident. In a criminal case this
evidence is admissible only if the probative value of the
evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.
Under this rule, evidence of other bad acts or crimes that are not currently
being prosecuted against the defendant are not admissible against the
defendant to show his bad character or propensity to commit criminal acts.
Commonwealth v. Flamer, 53 A.3d 82, 87 (Pa. Super. 2012). Evidence of
other bad acts or crimes may be admissible, however, where the evidence is
used for some other purpose. Id. Such purposes explicitly include “proving
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence
of mistake, or lack of accident.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2); see, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 42 A.3d 1017, 1027 (Pa. 2012) (“Prior acts
are admissible to show ill will, motive, malice, or the nature of the
relationship between the defendant and the decedent”). “[A]dmission for
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these purposes is allowable only whenever the probative value of the
evidence exceeds its potential for prejudice.” Commonwealth v. Briggs,
12 A.3d 291, 337 (Pa. 2011). “The admission of evidence becomes
problematic only when its prejudicial effect creates a danger that it will stir
such passion in the jury as to sweep them beyond a rational consideration of
guilt or innocence of the crime on trial.” Commonwealth v. Sherwood,
982 A.2d 483 n.25 (Pa. 2009) (citation omitted).
The trial court provided the following reasoning to support admission
of the contested evidence:
The prior bad acts of [a d]efendant are admissible to show
intent when intent or knowledge is an essential element of the
crime charged. Commonwealth v. Sparks, 342 Pa. Super.
202, 206-207, 492 A.2d 720, 723 (1985) (citation omitted).
Here [Appellant] is charged with Aggravated Assault, which
requires a mens rea of intentionally, knowingly or recklessly
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the
value of human life. The prior behavior is similar to the current
charge and shows the intent of [Appellant] to attempt to cause
serious bodily injury to Ms. Poindexter. It also shows that there
was a hostile relationship between [Appellant] and Ms.
Poindexter and that [Appellant] intentionally wanted to cause
serious bodily injury to Ms. Poindexter.
The prior bad acts of [Appellant] were also properly
admitted to show that there was an absence of mistake
regarding the assault of Ms. Poindexter. In the case,
Commonwealth v. Ulatoski, 472 Pa. 53, 371 A.2d 186 (1977),
the defendant was charged with murder for shooting his wife. At
trial he claimed that the shooting was an accident. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that
evidence showing prior incidents of physical abuse by the
defendant towards his wife were relevant and admissible to
prove that the shooting was not an accident. Similar to the
present case, [Appellant] might have claimed at trial that the
injuries were accidental in nature. However the prior bad acts
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evidence was relevant to show that in the past [Appellant] had
assaulted Ms. Poindexter and was admissible to rebut such a
claim of mistake.
The two incidents that were admitted were also very close
in time to the current incident and were not too remote to be
admissible. Additionally, their prejudicial effect to [Appellant]
was far outweighed by their probative value in proving the
essential elements of the current charge. Therefore the
admission of the two prior incidents of assault by [Appellant]
were properly admitted to show intent and absence of mistake.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/30/16, at 4-5. Upon review, we discern no abuse of
discretion by the trial court. As noted by the Commonwealth, case law
supports admission of the evidence at issue here. See Commonwealth Brief
at 6, citing Commonwealth v. Drumheller, 808 A.2d 893, 905 (Pa. 2002)
(evidence of prior abuse of victim admissible to prove appellant’s motive,
malice, intent, and ill-will toward the victim); Commonwealth v. Ulatoski,
371 A.2d 186, 190 (Pa. 1977) (same) (collecting cases); Commonwealth
v. Powell, 956 A.2d 406, 419 (Pa. 2008) (evidence of defendant’s anger,
impatience, and dislike of victim admissible to establish motive, intent, and
malice in harming that victim).
The evidence of Appellant’s two prior acts, although not charged
crimes, was admissible to relate the “complete story” and “natural
development” of the relationship between Appellant and Ms. Poindexter. In
Commonwealth v. Lark, 543 A.2d 491 (Pa. 1988), the Supreme Court
explained:
Evidence of distinct crimes are not admissible against a
defendant being prosecuted for another crime solely to show his
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bad character and his propensity for committing criminal acts.
However, evidence of other crimes and/or violent acts may be
admissible in special circumstances where the evidence is
relevant for some other legitimate purpose and not merely to
prejudice the defendant by showing him to be a person of bad
character. . . . [One] “special circumstance” where evidence of
other crimes may be relevant and admissible is where such
evidence was part of the chain or sequence of events which
became part of the history of the case and formed part of the
natural development of the facts. This special circumstance,
sometimes referred to as the “res gestae” exception to the
general proscription against evidence of other crimes, is also
known as the “complete story” rationale, i.e., evidence of other
criminal acts is admissible “to complete the story of the crime on
trial by proving its immediate context of happenings near in time
and place.” McCormick, Evidence, § 190 (1972 2d ed.); see also
Commonwealth v. Coyle, 415 Pa. 379, 389–91, 203 A.2d 782,
787 (1964) (evidence of other crimes admissible as these crimes
were interwoven with crimes for which defendant was being
prosecuted).
543 A.2d at 497 (some citations omitted). The rationale of Lark fully
supports admissibility of the Commonwealth’s evidence here, as evidence of
Appellant’s past conduct toward Appellant, if believed by the fact-finder,
would support the view that the criminal activity at issue was merely a part
of his ongoing pattern of conduct toward Ms. Poindexter — an earlier chapter
of the “complete story.”
Finally, even if we were to accept Appellant’s argument that the
admission of the prior acts was improper, such admission would constitute
harmless error. Chief Justice Saylor recently explained:
It is well-established that an erroneous evidentiary ruling by a
trial court does not require us to grant relief where the error was
harmless. Commonwealth v. Young, 561 Pa. 34, 748 A.2d
166, 193 (1999). Specifically, we have held that harmless error
exists where: (1) the error did not prejudice the defendant or
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the prejudice was de minimis; (2) the erroneously admitted
evidence was merely cumulative of other untainted evidence; or
(3) the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt
was so overwhelming that the prejudicial effect of the error by
comparison could not have contributed to the verdict. Id. We
have explained that the doctrine of harmless error is a
“technique of appellate review designed to advance judicial
economy by obviating the necessity for a retrial where the
appellate court is convinced that a trial error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. Its purpose is premised on the well-
settled proposition that a defendant is entitled to a fair trial but
not a perfect one.” Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 614 Pa.
229, 36 A.3d 163, 182 (2012) (citation and internal quotations
omitted).
Commonwealth v. Hicks, 156 A.3d 1114, 1139–40 (Pa. 2017) (Saylor, J.,
concurring); see also Commonwealth v. Melvin, 103 A.3d 1, 19-20 (Pa.
Super. 2014). We are confident that any error in admitting the evidence at
issue here would have been harmless.
Ms. Poindexter was the only witness to testify at trial. She testified at
length regarding the incident that occurred on June 7, 2014, and the
physical evidence of her injuries. For instance, she stated:
As we were arguing, [Appellant] attacked me with punching me
in the face. I can’t recall how many times. I just know I blacked
out. And when I woke up my eye was shut and I thought he
was pouring water on me, but there was blood gushing from all
over my face.
N.T., 9/10/15, at 14. Ms. Poindexter stated that she spoke with police on
the scene after she called 911. N.T., 9/10/15, at 112-113. She told police
that she had been attacked and pointed to the house where it happened.
Id. at 113. She stated that the police did not arrest Appellant at that time
because “he had walked off by then.” Id.- 10 -
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Ms. Poindexter testified about her broken orbital bone, permanently
damaged eye nerves, and three surgeries she had prior to trial, with more to
follow. See, e.g., N.T., 9/10/15, at 20-23. Ms. Poindexter gave the
following description of her injuries:
WITNESS: As you can see, [my eye is] damaged. It
was worse than this. This is from the
third surgery. He moved it and moved it
a little bit, but when it first happened,
my eye was all the way. You didn’t even
see the black part. I thought they –
that’s why they were saying I was blind.
I thought they weren’t going to be able
to fix it at all.
COMMONWEALTH: You can put your hair back if you’d like.
WITNESS: This is how I wear my hair now to cover
my appearance.
N.T., 9/10/15, at 23-24. Without objection, the Commonwealth introduced
exhibits documenting Ms. Poindexter’s injuries, including a police report and
photographs.
At closing, Appellant sought to discredit Ms. Poindexter as being an
inconsistent and untruthful witness who “went [to Appellant’s house] to start
trouble.” N.T., 9/10/15, at 132. Specifically, Appellant’s counsel stated that
“it was to cause some sort of trouble. And I submit to Your Honor that when
she found [Appellant] was with another woman, something happened.
Something happened and she ended up being punched two or three times in
the face.” Id. Then, in arguing that Appellant lacked the requisite intent to
cause Ms. Poindexter serious bodily injury, Appellant’s counsel added:
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“[t]wo to three punches during some sort of confrontational issue, during
some sort of confrontational problem while somebody is at your house
uninvited is not proof that [Appellant] had specific intent to cause serious
bodily injury, or, even if serious bodily injury was caused, that he did so
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to the value of human life.” Id. at 134.
In light of the evidence and the defense presented by Appellant’s
counsel at closing, we conclude that any error in the admission at trial of
prior acts involving Appellant and Ms. Poindexter would have been harmless.
Accordingly, because Appellant’s evidentiary claim is without merit, we
affirm the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/22/2017
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