Morgan, L. v. Mumma, R., II ( 2018 )


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  • J-A28011-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    LISA MORGAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    IN HER CAPACITY AS EXECUTOR OF          :        PENNSYLVANIA
    THE ESTATE OF BARBARA MCKIMMIE          :
    MUMMA AND TRUSTEE OF THE                :
    RISIDUARY TRUST OF ROBERT M.            :
    MUMMA                                   :
    :
    :
    v.                         :   No. 309 MDA 2018
    :
    :
    ROBERT M. MUMMA, II BARBARA             :
    MANN MUMMA LINDA MANN MUMMA             :
    :
    :
    v.                         :
    :
    :
    BOBALI CORPORATION                      :
    :
    :
    APPEAL OF: ROBERT M. MUMMA, II          :
    Appeal from the Order Entered December 28, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Civil Division at No(s):
    2010 CV 11490 EQ
    BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    JUDGMENT ORDER BY LAZARUS, J.:           FILED: NOVEMBER 5, 2018
    Robert M. Mumma, II, has appealed, pro se, the order entered in the
    Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, deeming Appellee Lisa Morgan’s
    Motion to Request Issuance of Final Order to be moot. We dismiss the appeal.
    The argument section of Mumma’s brief consists primarily of a copy of
    a brief filed by Robert B. Eyre, Esquire, on Mumma’s behalf in the trial court
    on or about July 23, 2013. Our Supreme Court has previously held that such
    J-A28011-18
    “incorporation by reference” is an unacceptable manner of appellate advocacy
    for the proper presentation of a claim for relief to the Court. Commonwealth
    v. Edmiston, 
    634 A.2d 1078
    , 1092 n.3 (Pa. 1993) (specifying that all claims
    a litigant desires court to consider are required to be set forth in appellate
    brief and not just incorporated by reference); Pines v. Farrell, 
    848 A.2d 94
    ,
    97 n.3 (Pa. 2004) (reliance on “briefs and pleadings already filed in this case”
    was “not a recommended form of advocacy”).               The Rules of Appellate
    Procedure specifically require a party to set forth in his or her brief, in relation
    to the points of his argument or arguments, “discussion and citation of
    authorities as are deemed pertinent,” as well as citations to statutes and
    opinions of appellate courts and “the principle for which they are cited.”
    Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), (b).        Therefore our appellate rules do not allow
    incorporation by reference of arguments contained in briefs filed with other
    tribunals, or briefs attached as appendices, as a substitute for the proper
    presentation of arguments in the body of the appellate brief.
    Mumma’s brief further violates the Rules of Appellate Procedure by
    failing to include a statement of the court’s jurisdiction, this Court’s scope and
    standard of review, a statement of the order in question, and a summary of
    his argument, as required by Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a). Nor does Mumma include a
    statement of place of raising or preservation of issues pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
    2117. Appellate briefs must conform materially to the requirements of the
    appellate rules and this Court may quash or dismiss an appeal if the defect in
    the brief is substantial. Commonwealth v. Adams, 
    882 A.2d 496
    , 497–98
    -2-
    J-A28011-18
    (Pa. Super. 2005); Pa.R.A.P. 2101. Although this Court is willing to construe
    liberally materials filed by a pro se litigant, a pro se appellant enjoys no special
    benefit.   Commonwealth v. Tchirkow, 
    160 A.3d 798
    , 804 (Pa. Super.
    2017). Accordingly, pro se litigants must comply with the procedural rules set
    forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of the Court. Commonwealth v. Lyons, 
    833 A.2d 245
    , 251–52 (Pa. Super. 2003).
    Finally, to the extent that Mumma includes in his brief four pages of
    original argument, albeit devoid of either citation to the record or discussion
    of and citation to authorities, that argument involves issues related to the
    order of the trial court entered on December 13, 2013, and not the order
    currently on appeal. Rule of Appellate Procedure 903 requires that an appeal
    be filed within thirty days after the entry of the order from which it is taken.
    See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Mumma never appealed the December 2013 order and,
    thus, any claims relating to it are waived.
    In light of the foregoing, we find all of Mumma’s appellate issues waived
    and we dismiss the appeal.
    Appeal dismissed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 11/05/2018
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 309 MDA 2018

Filed Date: 11/5/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2018