Com. v. Reisner, E. ( 2015 )


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  • J-S10036-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                       IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    ERIC MICHAEL REISNER
    Appellant                   No. 1853 EDA 2014
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 27, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-45-CR-0002592-2013
    BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., STABILE, J., and PLATT, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.:                            FILED MARCH 12, 2015
    Appellant, Eric Michael Reisner, appeals from the judgment of
    sentence entered in the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas, following
    his jury trial convictions for one count of corruption of a minor, one count of
    unlawful contact with a minor, and one count of indecent assault of a person
    less than 13 years of age.1 We affirm.
    In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly sets forth the relevant
    facts and procedural history of this case as follows:
    On December 10, 2013, a Criminal Information was filed
    charging [Appellant] with the following: one count of
    Corruption of a Minor, one count of Unlawful Contact with
    a Minor, one count of Indecent Assault of a Person Less
    ____________________________________________
    1
    18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6301(a)(1)(ii), 6318(a)(1), 3126(a)(7), respectively.
    _________________________
    *Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S10036-15
    than 13 Years of Age. [Appellant’s] conviction stems from
    facts which occurred in the victim’s home located
    at…Monroe County, Pennsylvania when the victim was
    under 13 years of age. [Appellant] knew S.A., the minor
    victim, as [Appellant] was best friends with S.A.’s
    stepfather. S.A. referred to [Appellant] as “Uncle Eric.”
    The incident underlying [Appellant’s] conviction occurred
    sometime in July or August of 2011.            At that time,
    [Appellant] and S.A. were "roughhousing" in the
    basement. By this, S.A. clarified that [Appellant] and she
    were "poking each other, or just like tickling each other, or
    just joking around." Then, [Appellant] pinched her nipple
    over her shirt, and then under. S.A. stopped playing and
    backed away. [Appellant] then went under her shirt and
    under her bra and proceeded to pinch her nipple. S.A. told
    [Appellant] to stop, and he did.        [Appellant’s] family,
    including her parents and siblings, were upstairs at the
    time.      Following the incident, S.A. sat down with
    [Appellant] to watch television. In the following year, S.A.
    began having trouble in school, namely with her friends.
    S.A. testified that she began to cut herself. S.A. opened
    up to one of her friends about the incident that occurred
    between [Appellant] and her. In February of 2013, S.A.
    was called to her guidance counselor’s office after her
    friend reported the incident. Thereafter, [Appellant] was
    arrested. Following a preliminary hearing which occurred
    on December 11, 2013, all charges were bound over to the
    Monroe County Court of Common Pleas. A trial on this
    matter was held on March 13 and 14 of 2014. A jury
    found [Appellant] guilty on all counts listed in the criminal
    information.     On May 27, 2014, this Court sentenced
    [Appellant] to a total aggregate sentence of nine (9) to
    eighteen (18) months in the Monroe County Correctional
    Facility.   [Appellant] was not classified as a Sexually
    Violent Predator. …[Appellant] was classified as a Tier III
    offender pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.14(d)(16). As
    such,     this   [c]ourt  imposed     lifetime    registration
    requirements on [Appellant].
    (Trial Court Opinion, filed August 4, 2014, at 1-2) (internal citations to the
    record omitted). Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on June 23, 2014.
    That same day, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of
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    errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).     Appellant
    timely filed his statement on July 14, 2014.
    Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
    SHOULD [APPELLANT] HAVE TO REGISTER AS A LIFETIME
    MEGAN’S LAW REGISTRANT AS THE CONDUCT FOR WHICH
    HE WAS CONVICTED, WHILE CONSTITUTING MULTIPLE
    CRIMINAL ACTS, WAS A SINGLE NONVIOLENT ACT
    LASTING NO MORE THAN A FEW SECONDS?
    (Appellant’s Brief at 5).
    Appellant argues the conduct constituting criminal behavior lasted no
    more than a few seconds. Appellant asserts at trial, the court agreed there
    was no continuing course of conduct on Appellant’s part. Appellant contends
    his conviction stemmed from a single incident. Under the plain language of
    the statute, Appellant argues it is simply illogical to require lifetime
    registration for one criminal act that occurred over a few seconds and was
    “nonviolent” in nature. Appellant claims he is not a person who committed
    multiple offenses or had multiple victims. Appellant directs our attention to
    the opinion in support of reversal in Commonwealth v. Gehris, 
    618 Pa. 104
    , 115, 
    54 A.3d 862
    , 869 (2012), for the proposition that the intent of the
    General Assembly was to set up a graduated registration scheme for sex
    offenders, with violent offenders and true recidivists subject to lifetime
    registration, while first time, nonviolent offenders should be given the
    opportunity for rehabilitation. Appellant concludes this Court should vacate
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    the order for lifetime registration and remand for imposition of the fifteen-
    year registration requirement under SORNA. We cannot agree.
    Section 9799.14 governs the classification of sexual offenses for
    registration requirements in relevant part as follows:
    § 9799.14. Sexual offenses and tier system
    (a) Tier system established.−Sexual offenses shall be
    classified in a three-tiered system composed of Tier I
    sexual offenses, Tier II sexual offenses and Tier III sexual
    offenses.
    (b) Tier I sexual offenses.−The following offenses
    shall be classified as Tier I sexual offenses:
    *    *    *
    (8) 18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1)(ii) (relating to corruption
    of minors).
    *    *    *
    (c) Tier II sexual offenses.−The following offenses
    shall be classified as Tier II sexual offenses:
    *    *    *
    (5) 18 Pa.C.S. § 6318 (relating to unlawful contact
    with minor).
    *    *    *
    (d) Tier III sexual offenses.−The following offenses
    shall be classified as Tier III sexual offenses:
    *    *    *
    (8)   18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(7).
    *    *    *
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    J-S10036-15
    (16) Two or more convictions of offenses listed as Tier
    I or Tier II sexual offenses.
    42 Pa.S.C.A. § 9799.14 (a)-(d). Section 9799.15 governs the length of time
    an individual must register with the Pennsylvania State Police as a sexual
    offender in pertinent part as follows:
    § 9799.15. Period of registration
    (a) Period of registration.−Subject to subsection (c),
    an individual specified in section 9799.13 (relating to
    applicability) shall register with the Pennsylvania State
    Police as follows:
    *       *   *
    (3) An individual convicted of a Tier III sexual offense
    shall register for the life of the individual.
    *       *   *
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.15(a)(3).2             Pennsylvania law makes clear that the
    registration requirements under the Sexual Offender Registration and
    Notification Act (“SORNA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.41, do not
    constitute criminal punishment. Commonwealth v. McDonough, 96 A.3d
    ____________________________________________
    2
    The Commonwealth Court recently decided a SORNA provision in Section
    9799.15 was punitive where it required an offender to update registration
    information including temporary lodging, cell phone number, and information
    relating to motor vehicles owned or operated, in person at a registration site
    within three business days, but the provision could be severed from the
    remainder of the statute while preserving the otherwise valid subsections.
    See Coppolino v. Noonan, 
    102 A.3d 1254
     (Pa.Cmwlth. 2014).                 The
    present case does not implicate the provision declared punitive in
    Coppolino.     Nevertheless, the appellate Court’s vigilance confirms the
    statutory purpose is public safety and remediation, not punishment.
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    1067 (Pa.Super. 2014) (rejecting argument that mandating registration
    under SORNA is punitive; reiterating that registration requirements for sex
    offenders is product of remedial legislation with non-punitive goal of public
    safety).
    “Statutory interpretation ‘is a question of law and, as such, our
    standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.’” J.C.B. v.
    Pennsylvania State Police, 
    35 A.3d 792
    , 794 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal
    denied, 
    616 Pa. 653
    , 
    49 A.3d 444
     (2012), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 
    133 S.Ct. 1808
    , 
    185 L.Ed.2d 827
     (2013).
    The basic tenet of statutory construction requires a court
    to construe the words of the statute according to their
    plain meaning. When the words of a statute are clear and
    free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be
    disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. 1
    Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b).
    Generally speaking, the best indication of legislative intent
    is the plain language of a statute…. Under [1 Pa.C.S.A.]
    Section 1921(c), it is only when the words of a statute are
    not explicit that a court may resort to other considerations,
    such as the statute’s perceived “purpose,” in order to
    ascertain legislative intent. Consistently with the Act, this
    Court has repeatedly recognized that rules of construction,
    such as consideration of a statute’s perceived “object” or
    “purpose,” are to be resorted to only when there is an
    ambiguity.     Finally, we note the maxim of statutory
    interpretation that the expression of one thing in a statute
    implies the exclusion of others not expressed. Similarly,
    the court may not supply omissions in the statute when it
    appears that the matter may have been intentionally
    omitted.
    Commonwealth v. Finley, 
    860 A.2d 132
    , 140 (Pa.Super. 2004) (some
    internal citations, footnotes, and quotation marks omitted).         Subsection
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    9799.14(d)(16)    demonstrates    without   ambiguity   that   two   or   more
    convictions of offenses listed as Tier I or Tier II sexual offenses qualifies
    under Tier III for lifetime registration.   42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.14(d)(16),
    9799.15(a)(3).   See also Gehris, 
    supra at 108
    , 
    54 A.3d at
    864 (citing
    Commonwealth v. Merolla, 
    909 A.2d 337
     (Pa.Super. 2006) (refusing to
    inject recidivist philosophy into statute; it is irrelevant whether convictions
    arose out of same criminal episode)).
    Instantly, a jury convicted Appellant under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(7),
    of one count of indecent assault of a person less than 13 years of age.
    Section 9799.14(d)(8) of SORNA unequivocally states a conviction of
    indecent assault of a person less than 13 years of age requires Tier III,
    lifetime sex offender registration. A jury additionally convicted Appellant of
    two Tier I sex offenses. Section 9799.14(d)(16) of SORNA makes clear that
    convictions for two or more Tier I sex offenses also requires Tier III lifetime
    sex offender registration. The language of SORNA is clear and unambiguous
    as it pertains to the registration requirements; therefore; courts are obliged
    to observe those legislative parameters. Thus, Appellant qualifies for and is
    subject to SORNA’s lifetime registration, regardless of how his convictions
    are reviewed. Accordingly, we affirm.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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    J-S10036-15
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 3/12/2015
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